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{-# LANGUAGE LambdaCase #-}
{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings #-}
module Network.TLS.Handshake.Common (
handshakeFailed,
handleException,
unexpected,
newSession,
handshakeDone12,
ensureNullCompression,
ticketOrSessionID12,
-- * sending packets
sendCCSandFinished,
-- * receiving packets
RecvState (..),
runRecvState,
runRecvStateHS,
recvPacketHandshake,
onRecvStateHandshake,
ensureRecvComplete,
processExtendedMainSecret,
getSessionData,
storePrivInfo,
isSupportedGroup,
checkSupportedGroup,
errorToAlert,
errorToAlertMessage,
expectFinished,
processCertificate,
--
setPeerRecordSizeLimit,
) where
import Control.Concurrent.MVar
import Control.Exception (IOException, fromException, handle, throwIO)
import Control.Monad.State.Strict
import qualified Data.ByteString as B
import Network.TLS.Cipher
import Network.TLS.Compression
import Network.TLS.Context.Internal
import Network.TLS.Crypto
import Network.TLS.Extension
import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key
import Network.TLS.Handshake.Process
import Network.TLS.Handshake.Signature
import Network.TLS.Handshake.State
import Network.TLS.Handshake.State13
import Network.TLS.IO
import Network.TLS.Imports
import Network.TLS.Measurement
import Network.TLS.Parameters
import Network.TLS.State
import Network.TLS.Struct
import Network.TLS.Struct13
import Network.TLS.Types
import Network.TLS.Util
import Network.TLS.X509
handshakeFailed :: TLSError -> IO ()
handshakeFailed err = throwIO $ HandshakeFailed err
handleException :: Context -> IO () -> IO ()
handleException ctx f = catchException f $ \exception -> do
-- If the error was an Uncontextualized TLSException, we replace the
-- context with HandshakeFailed. If it's anything else, we convert
-- it to a string and wrap it with Error_Misc and HandshakeFailed.
let tlserror = case fromException exception of
Just e | Uncontextualized e' <- e -> e'
_ -> Error_Misc (show exception)
established <- ctxEstablished ctx
setEstablished ctx NotEstablished
handle ignoreIOErr $ do
tls13 <- tls13orLater ctx
if tls13
then do
when (established == EarlyDataSending) $ clearTxRecordState ctx
when (tlserror /= Error_TCP_Terminate) $
sendPacket13 ctx $
Alert13 [errorToAlert tlserror]
else sendPacket12 ctx $ Alert [errorToAlert tlserror]
handshakeFailed tlserror
where
ignoreIOErr :: IOException -> IO ()
ignoreIOErr _ = return ()
errorToAlert :: TLSError -> (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
errorToAlert (Error_Protocol _ ad) = (AlertLevel_Fatal, ad)
errorToAlert (Error_Protocol_Warning _ ad) = (AlertLevel_Warning, ad)
errorToAlert (Error_Packet_unexpected _ _) = (AlertLevel_Fatal, UnexpectedMessage)
errorToAlert (Error_Packet_Parsing msg)
| "invalid version" `isInfixOf` msg = (AlertLevel_Fatal, ProtocolVersion)
| "request_update" `isInfixOf` msg = (AlertLevel_Fatal, IllegalParameter)
| otherwise = (AlertLevel_Fatal, DecodeError)
errorToAlert _ = (AlertLevel_Fatal, InternalError)
-- | Return the message that a TLS endpoint can add to its local log for the
-- specified library error.
errorToAlertMessage :: TLSError -> String
errorToAlertMessage (Error_Protocol msg _) = msg
errorToAlertMessage (Error_Protocol_Warning msg _) = msg
errorToAlertMessage (Error_Packet_unexpected msg _) = msg
errorToAlertMessage (Error_Packet_Parsing msg) = msg
errorToAlertMessage e = show e
unexpected :: MonadIO m => String -> Maybe String -> m a
unexpected msg expected =
throwCore $ Error_Packet_unexpected msg (maybe "" (" expected: " ++) expected)
newSession :: Context -> IO Session
newSession ctx
| supportedSession $ ctxSupported ctx = Session . Just <$> getStateRNG ctx 32
| otherwise = return $ Session Nothing
-- | when a new handshake is done, wrap up & clean up.
handshakeDone12 :: Context -> IO ()
handshakeDone12 ctx = do
-- forget most handshake data and reset bytes counters.
modifyMVar_ (ctxHandshakeState ctx) $ \case
Nothing -> return Nothing
Just hshake ->
return $
Just
(newEmptyHandshake (hstClientVersion hshake) (hstClientRandom hshake))
{ hstServerRandom = hstServerRandom hshake
, hstMainSecret = hstMainSecret hshake
, hstExtendedMainSecret = hstExtendedMainSecret hshake
, hstSupportedGroup = hstSupportedGroup hshake
}
updateMeasure ctx resetBytesCounters
-- mark the secure connection up and running.
setEstablished ctx Established
return ()
sendCCSandFinished
:: Context
-> Role
-> IO ()
sendCCSandFinished ctx role = do
sendPacket12 ctx ChangeCipherSpec
contextFlush ctx
enablePeerRecordLimit ctx
verifyData <-
VerifyData
<$> ( usingState_ ctx getVersion >>= \ver -> usingHState ctx $ getHandshakeDigest ver role
)
sendPacket12 ctx (Handshake [Finished verifyData])
usingState_ ctx $ setVerifyDataForSend verifyData
contextFlush ctx
data RecvState m
= RecvStatePacket (Packet -> m (RecvState m)) -- CCS is not Handshake
| RecvStateHandshake (Handshake -> m (RecvState m))
| RecvStateDone
recvPacketHandshake :: Context -> IO [Handshake]
recvPacketHandshake ctx = do
pkts <- recvPacket12 ctx
case pkts of
Right (Handshake l) -> return l
Right x@(AppData _) -> do
-- If a TLS13 server decides to reject RTT0 data, the server should
-- skip records for RTT0 data up to the maximum limit.
established <- ctxEstablished ctx
case established of
EarlyDataNotAllowed n
| n > 0 -> do
setEstablished ctx $ EarlyDataNotAllowed (n - 1)
recvPacketHandshake ctx
_ -> unexpected (show x) (Just "handshake")
Right x -> unexpected (show x) (Just "handshake")
Left err -> throwCore err
-- | process a list of handshakes message in the recv state machine.
onRecvStateHandshake
:: Context -> RecvState IO -> [Handshake] -> IO (RecvState IO)
onRecvStateHandshake _ recvState [] = return recvState
onRecvStateHandshake _ (RecvStatePacket f) hms = f (Handshake hms)
onRecvStateHandshake ctx (RecvStateHandshake f) (x : xs) = do
let finished = isFinished x
unless finished $ processHandshake12 ctx x
nstate <- f x
when finished $ processHandshake12 ctx x
onRecvStateHandshake ctx nstate xs
onRecvStateHandshake _ RecvStateDone _xs = unexpected "spurious handshake" Nothing
isFinished :: Handshake -> Bool
isFinished Finished{} = True
isFinished _ = False
runRecvState :: Context -> RecvState IO -> IO ()
runRecvState _ RecvStateDone = return ()
runRecvState ctx (RecvStatePacket f) = recvPacket12 ctx >>= either throwCore f >>= runRecvState ctx
runRecvState ctx iniState =
recvPacketHandshake ctx
>>= onRecvStateHandshake ctx iniState
>>= runRecvState ctx
runRecvStateHS :: Context -> RecvState IO -> [Handshake] -> IO ()
runRecvStateHS ctx iniState hs = onRecvStateHandshake ctx iniState hs >>= runRecvState ctx
ensureRecvComplete :: MonadIO m => Context -> m ()
ensureRecvComplete ctx = do
complete <- liftIO $ isRecvComplete ctx
unless complete $
throwCore $
Error_Protocol "received incomplete message at key change" UnexpectedMessage
processExtendedMainSecret
:: MonadIO m => Context -> Version -> MessageType -> [ExtensionRaw] -> m Bool
processExtendedMainSecret ctx ver msgt exts
| ver < TLS10 = return False
| ver > TLS12 = error "EMS processing is not compatible with TLS 1.3"
| ems == NoEMS = return False
| otherwise =
liftIO $
lookupAndDecodeAndDo
EID_ExtendedMainSecret
msgt
exts
nonExistAction
existAction
where
ems = supportedExtendedMainSecret $ ctxSupported ctx
err = "peer does not support Extended Main Secret"
nonExistAction =
if ems == RequireEMS
then throwCore $ Error_Protocol err HandshakeFailure
else return False
existAction ExtendedMainSecret = do
usingHState ctx $ setExtendedMainSecret True
return True
getSessionData :: Context -> IO (Maybe SessionData)
getSessionData ctx = do
ver <- usingState_ ctx getVersion
sni <- usingState_ ctx getClientSNI
mms <- usingHState ctx $ gets hstMainSecret
ems <- usingHState ctx getExtendedMainSecret
cipher <- cipherID <$> usingHState ctx getPendingCipher
alpn <- usingState_ ctx getNegotiatedProtocol
let compression = 0
flags = [SessionEMS | ems]
case mms of
Nothing -> return Nothing
Just ms ->
return $
Just
SessionData
{ sessionVersion = ver
, sessionCipher = cipher
, sessionCompression = compression
, sessionClientSNI = sni
, sessionSecret = ms
, sessionGroup = Nothing
, sessionTicketInfo = Nothing
, sessionALPN = alpn
, sessionMaxEarlyDataSize = 0
, sessionFlags = flags
}
-- | Store the specified keypair. Whether the public key and private key
-- actually match is left for the peer to discover. We're not presently
-- burning CPU to detect that misconfiguration. We verify only that the
-- types of keys match and that it does not include an algorithm that would
-- not be safe.
storePrivInfo
:: MonadIO m
=> Context
-> CertificateChain
-> PrivKey
-> m PubKey
storePrivInfo ctx cc privkey = do
let c = fromCC cc
pubkey = certPubKey $ getCertificate c
unless (isDigitalSignaturePair (pubkey, privkey)) $
throwCore $
Error_Protocol "mismatched or unsupported private key pair" InternalError
usingHState ctx $ setPublicPrivateKeys (pubkey, privkey)
return pubkey
where
fromCC (CertificateChain (c : _)) = c
fromCC _ = error "fromCC"
-- verify that the group selected by the peer is supported in the local
-- configuration
checkSupportedGroup :: Context -> Group -> IO ()
checkSupportedGroup ctx grp =
unless (isSupportedGroup ctx grp) $
let msg = "unsupported (EC)DHE group: " ++ show grp
in throwCore $ Error_Protocol msg IllegalParameter
isSupportedGroup :: Context -> Group -> Bool
isSupportedGroup ctx grp = grp `elem` supportedGroups (ctxSupported ctx)
ensureNullCompression :: MonadIO m => CompressionID -> m ()
ensureNullCompression compression =
when (compression /= compressionID nullCompression) $
throwCore $
Error_Protocol "compression is not allowed in TLS 1.3" IllegalParameter
expectFinished :: Context -> Handshake -> IO (RecvState IO)
expectFinished ctx (Finished verifyData) = do
processFinished ctx verifyData
return RecvStateDone
expectFinished _ p = unexpected (show p) (Just "Handshake Finished")
processFinished :: Context -> VerifyData -> IO ()
processFinished ctx verifyData = do
(cc, ver) <- usingState_ ctx $ (,) <$> getRole <*> getVersion
expected <-
VerifyData <$> usingHState ctx (getHandshakeDigest ver $ invertRole cc)
when (expected /= verifyData) $ decryptError "cannot verify finished"
usingState_ ctx $ setVerifyDataForRecv verifyData
processCertificate :: Context -> Role -> CertificateChain -> IO ()
processCertificate _ ServerRole (CertificateChain []) = return ()
processCertificate _ ClientRole (CertificateChain []) =
throwCore $ Error_Protocol "server certificate missing" HandshakeFailure
processCertificate ctx _ (CertificateChain (c : _)) =
usingHState ctx $ setPublicKey pubkey
where
pubkey = certPubKey $ getCertificate c
-- TLS 1.2 distinguishes session ID and session ticket. session
-- ticket. Session ticket is prioritized over session ID.
ticketOrSessionID12
:: Maybe Ticket -> Session -> Maybe SessionIDorTicket
ticketOrSessionID12 (Just ticket) _
| ticket /= "" = Just $ B.copy ticket
ticketOrSessionID12 _ (Session (Just sessionId)) = Just $ B.copy sessionId
ticketOrSessionID12 _ _ = Nothing
setPeerRecordSizeLimit :: Context -> Bool -> RecordSizeLimit -> IO ()
setPeerRecordSizeLimit ctx tls13 (RecordSizeLimit n0) = do
when (n0 < 64) $
throwCore $
Error_Protocol ("too small recode size limit: " ++ show n0) IllegalParameter
-- RFC 8449 Section 4:
-- Even if a larger record size limit is provided by a peer, an
-- endpoint MUST NOT send records larger than the protocol-defined
-- limit, unless explicitly allowed by a future TLS version or
-- extension.
let n1 = fromIntegral n0
n2
| n1 > protolim = protolim
| otherwise = n1
-- Even if peer's value is larger than the protocol-defined
-- limitation, call "setPeerRecordLimit" to send
-- "record_size_limit" as ACK. In this case, the protocol-defined
-- limitation is used.
let lim = if tls13 then n2 - 1 else n2
setPeerRecordLimit ctx $ Just lim
where
protolim
| tls13 = defaultRecordSizeLimit + 1
| otherwise = defaultRecordSizeLimit
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