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/* Copyright (C) CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o. <knot-resolver@labs.nic.cz>
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
*/
#include "lib/resolve-impl.h"
#include <ctype.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <libknot/rrtype/rdname.h>
#include <libknot/descriptor.h>
#include <ucw/mempool.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include "lib/resolve.h"
#include "lib/layer.h"
#include "lib/rplan.h"
#include "lib/layer/iterate.h"
#include "lib/dnssec/ta.h"
#include "lib/dnssec.h"
#if ENABLE_COOKIES
#include "lib/cookies/control.h"
#include "lib/cookies/helper.h"
#include "lib/cookies/nonce.h"
#else /* Define compatibility macros */
#define KNOT_EDNS_OPTION_COOKIE 10
#endif /* ENABLE_COOKIES */
/** Magic defaults */
#ifndef LRU_RTT_SIZE
#define LRU_RTT_SIZE 65536 /**< NS RTT cache size */
#endif
#ifndef LRU_REP_SIZE
#define LRU_REP_SIZE (LRU_RTT_SIZE / 4) /**< NS reputation cache size */
#endif
#ifndef LRU_COOKIES_SIZE
#if ENABLE_COOKIES
#define LRU_COOKIES_SIZE LRU_RTT_SIZE /**< DNS cookies cache size. */
#else
#define LRU_COOKIES_SIZE LRU_ASSOC /* simpler than guards everywhere */
#endif
#endif
static struct kr_context the_resolver_value = {{0}};
struct kr_context *the_resolver = NULL;
bool kr_rank_check(uint8_t rank)
{
switch (rank & ~KR_RANK_AUTH) {
case KR_RANK_INITIAL:
case KR_RANK_OMIT:
case KR_RANK_TRY:
case KR_RANK_INDET:
case KR_RANK_BOGUS:
case KR_RANK_MISMATCH:
case KR_RANK_MISSING:
case KR_RANK_INSECURE:
case KR_RANK_SECURE:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
bool kr_rank_test(uint8_t rank, uint8_t kr_flag)
{
if (kr_fails_assert(kr_rank_check(rank) && kr_rank_check(kr_flag)))
return false;
if (kr_flag == KR_RANK_AUTH) {
return rank & KR_RANK_AUTH;
}
if (kr_fails_assert(!(kr_flag & KR_RANK_AUTH)))
return false;
/* The rest are exclusive values - exactly one has to be set. */
return (rank & ~KR_RANK_AUTH) == kr_flag;
}
/** @internal Set @a yielded to all RRs with matching @a qry_uid. */
void set_yield(ranked_rr_array_t *array, const uint32_t qry_uid, const bool yielded)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < array->len; ++i) {
ranked_rr_array_entry_t *entry = array->at[i];
if (entry->qry_uid == qry_uid) {
entry->yielded = yielded;
}
}
}
/**
* @internal Defer execution of current query.
* The current layer state and input will be pushed to a stack and resumed on next iteration.
*/
int consume_yield(kr_layer_t *ctx, knot_pkt_t *pkt)
{
struct kr_request *req = ctx->req;
size_t pkt_size = pkt->size;
if (knot_pkt_has_tsig(pkt)) {
pkt_size += pkt->tsig_wire.len;
}
knot_pkt_t *pkt_copy = knot_pkt_new(NULL, pkt_size, &req->pool);
struct kr_layer_pickle *pickle = mm_alloc(&req->pool, sizeof(*pickle));
if (pickle && pkt_copy && knot_pkt_copy(pkt_copy, pkt) == 0) {
struct kr_query *qry = req->current_query;
pickle->api = ctx->api;
pickle->state = ctx->state;
pickle->pkt = pkt_copy;
pickle->next = qry->deferred;
qry->deferred = pickle;
set_yield(&req->answ_selected, qry->uid, true);
set_yield(&req->auth_selected, qry->uid, true);
return kr_ok();
}
return kr_error(ENOMEM);
}
static int edns_put(knot_pkt_t *pkt, bool reclaim)
{
if (!pkt->opt_rr) {
return kr_ok();
}
if (reclaim) {
/* Reclaim reserved size. */
int ret = knot_pkt_reclaim(pkt, knot_edns_wire_size(pkt->opt_rr));
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
}
/* Write to packet. */
if (kr_fails_assert(pkt->current == KNOT_ADDITIONAL))
return kr_error(EINVAL);
return knot_pkt_put(pkt, KNOT_COMPR_HINT_NONE, pkt->opt_rr, KNOT_PF_FREE);
}
/** Removes last EDNS OPT RR written to the packet. */
static int edns_erase_and_reserve(knot_pkt_t *pkt)
{
/* Nothing to be done. */
if (!pkt || !pkt->opt_rr) {
return 0;
}
/* Fail if the data are located elsewhere than at the end of packet. */
if (pkt->current != KNOT_ADDITIONAL ||
pkt->opt_rr != &pkt->rr[pkt->rrset_count - 1]) {
return -1;
}
size_t len = knot_rrset_size(pkt->opt_rr);
int16_t rr_removed = pkt->opt_rr->rrs.count;
/* Decrease rrset counters. */
pkt->rrset_count -= 1;
pkt->sections[pkt->current].count -= 1;
pkt->size -= len;
knot_wire_add_arcount(pkt->wire, -rr_removed); /* ADDITIONAL */
pkt->opt_rr = NULL;
/* Reserve the freed space. */
return knot_pkt_reserve(pkt, len);
}
static inline size_t edns_padding_option_size(int32_t tls_padding)
{
if (tls_padding == -1)
/* FIXME: we do not know how to reserve space for the
* default padding policy, since we can't predict what
* it will select. So i'm just guessing :/ */
return KNOT_EDNS_OPTION_HDRLEN + 512;
if (tls_padding >= 2)
return KNOT_EDNS_OPTION_HDRLEN + tls_padding;
return 0;
}
static int edns_create(knot_pkt_t *pkt, const struct kr_request *req)
{
pkt->opt_rr = knot_rrset_copy(req->ctx->upstream_opt_rr, &pkt->mm);
size_t wire_size = knot_edns_wire_size(pkt->opt_rr);
#if ENABLE_COOKIES
if (req->ctx->cookie_ctx.clnt.enabled ||
req->ctx->cookie_ctx.srvr.enabled) {
wire_size += KR_COOKIE_OPT_MAX_LEN;
}
#endif /* ENABLE_COOKIES */
if (req->qsource.flags.tls || req->qsource.comm_flags.tls) {
wire_size += edns_padding_option_size(req->ctx->tls_padding);
}
return knot_pkt_reserve(pkt, wire_size);
}
/**
* @param all_secure optionally &&-combine security of written RRs into its value.
* (i.e. if you pass a pointer to false, it will always remain)
* @param all_cname optionally output if all written RRs are CNAMEs and RRSIGs of CNAMEs
* @return error code, ignoring if forced to truncate the packet.
*/
static int write_extra_ranked_records(const ranked_rr_array_t *arr, uint16_t reorder,
knot_pkt_t *answer, bool *all_secure, bool *all_cname)
{
const bool has_dnssec = knot_pkt_has_dnssec(answer);
bool all_sec = true;
bool all_cn = (all_cname != NULL); /* optim.: init as false if not needed */
int err = kr_ok();
for (size_t i = 0; i < arr->len; ++i) {
ranked_rr_array_entry_t * entry = arr->at[i];
kr_assert(!entry->in_progress);
if (!entry->to_wire) {
continue;
}
knot_rrset_t *rr = entry->rr;
if (!has_dnssec) {
if (rr->type != knot_pkt_qtype(answer) && knot_rrtype_is_dnssec(rr->type)) {
continue;
}
}
err = knot_pkt_put_rotate(answer, 0, rr, reorder, 0);
if (err != KNOT_EOK) {
if (err == KNOT_ESPACE) {
err = kr_ok();
}
break;
}
if (rr->type != KNOT_RRTYPE_RRSIG) {
all_sec = all_sec && kr_rank_test(entry->rank, KR_RANK_SECURE);
}
all_cn = all_cn && kr_rrset_type_maysig(entry->rr) == KNOT_RRTYPE_CNAME;
}
if (all_secure) {
*all_secure = *all_secure && all_sec;
}
if (all_cname) {
*all_cname = all_cn;
}
return err;
}
static int pkt_padding(knot_pkt_t *packet, int32_t padding)
{
knot_rrset_t *opt_rr = packet->opt_rr;
int32_t pad_bytes = -1;
if (padding == -1) { /* use the default padding policy from libknot */
const size_t block_size = knot_wire_get_qr(packet->wire)
? KNOT_EDNS_ALIGNMENT_RESPONSE_DEFAULT
: KNOT_EDNS_ALIGNMENT_QUERY_DEFAULT;
pad_bytes = knot_edns_alignment_size(packet->size, knot_rrset_size(opt_rr),
block_size);
}
if (padding >= 2) {
int32_t max_pad_bytes = knot_edns_get_payload(opt_rr) - (packet->size + knot_rrset_size(opt_rr));
pad_bytes = MIN(knot_edns_alignment_size(packet->size, knot_rrset_size(opt_rr), padding),
max_pad_bytes);
}
if (pad_bytes >= 0) {
uint8_t zeros[MAX(1, pad_bytes)];
memset(zeros, 0, sizeof(zeros));
int r = knot_edns_add_option(opt_rr, KNOT_EDNS_OPTION_PADDING,
pad_bytes, zeros, &packet->mm);
if (r != KNOT_EOK) {
knot_rrset_clear(opt_rr, &packet->mm);
return kr_error(r);
}
}
return kr_ok();
}
/** @internal Add an EDNS padding RR into the answer if requested and required. */
static int answer_padding(struct kr_request *request)
{
if (kr_fails_assert(request && request->answer && request->ctx))
return kr_error(EINVAL);
if (!request->qsource.flags.tls && !request->qsource.comm_flags.tls) {
/* Not meaningful to pad without encryption. */
return kr_ok();
}
return pkt_padding(request->answer, request->ctx->tls_padding);
}
/* Make a clean SERVFAIL answer. */
static void answer_fail(struct kr_request *request)
{
/* Note: OPT in SERVFAIL response is still useful for cookies/additional info. */
if (kr_log_is_debug(RESOLVER, request)) /* logging optimization */
kr_log_req(request, 0, 0, RESOLVER,
"request failed, answering with empty SERVFAIL\n");
knot_pkt_t *answer = request->answer;
knot_rrset_t *opt_rr = answer->opt_rr; /* it gets NULLed below */
int ret = kr_pkt_clear_payload(answer);
knot_wire_clear_ad(answer->wire);
knot_wire_clear_aa(answer->wire);
knot_wire_set_rcode(answer->wire, KNOT_RCODE_SERVFAIL);
if (ret == 0 && opt_rr) {
knot_pkt_begin(answer, KNOT_ADDITIONAL);
answer->opt_rr = opt_rr;
answer_padding(request); /* Ignore failed padding in SERVFAIL answer. */
edns_put(answer, false);
}
}
/* Append EDNS records into the answer. */
static int answer_append_edns(struct kr_request *request)
{
knot_pkt_t *answer = request->answer;
if (!answer->opt_rr)
return kr_ok();
int ret = answer_padding(request);
if (!ret) ret = knot_pkt_begin(answer, KNOT_ADDITIONAL);
if (!ret) ret = knot_pkt_put(answer, KNOT_COMPR_HINT_NONE,
answer->opt_rr, KNOT_PF_FREE);
return ret;
}
static void answer_finalize(struct kr_request *request)
{
struct kr_rplan *rplan = &request->rplan;
knot_pkt_t *answer = request->answer;
const uint8_t *q_wire = request->qsource.packet->wire;
if (answer->rrset_count != 0) {
/* Non-standard: we assume the answer had been constructed.
* Let's check we don't have a "collision". */
const ranked_rr_array_t *selected[] = kr_request_selected(request);
for (int psec = KNOT_ANSWER; psec <= KNOT_ADDITIONAL; ++psec) {
const ranked_rr_array_t *arr = selected[psec];
for (ssize_t i = 0; i < arr->len; ++i) {
if (kr_fails_assert(!arr->at[i]->to_wire)) {
answer_fail(request);
return;
}
}
}
/* We only add EDNS, and we even assume AD bit was correct. */
if (answer_append_edns(request)) {
answer_fail(request);
return;
}
return;
}
struct kr_query *const last =
rplan->resolved.len > 0 ? array_tail(rplan->resolved) : NULL;
/* TODO ^^^^ this is slightly fragile */
if (!last) {
/* Suspicious: no kr_query got resolved (not even from cache),
* so let's (defensively) SERVFAIL the request.
* ATM many checks below depend on `last` anyway,
* so this helps to avoid surprises. */
answer_fail(request);
return;
}
/* TODO: clean this up in !660 or followup, and it isn't foolproof anyway. */
if (last->flags.DNSSEC_BOGUS
|| (rplan->pending.len > 0 && array_tail(rplan->pending)->flags.DNSSEC_BOGUS)) {
if (!knot_wire_get_cd(q_wire)) {
answer_fail(request);
return;
}
}
/* AD flag. We can only change `secure` from true to false.
* Be conservative. Primary approach: check ranks of all RRs in wire.
* Only "negative answers" need special handling. */
bool secure = request->state == KR_STATE_DONE /*< suspicious otherwise */
&& knot_pkt_qtype(answer) != KNOT_RRTYPE_RRSIG;
if (last->flags.STUB) {
secure = false; /* don't trust forwarding for now */
}
if (last->flags.DNSSEC_OPTOUT) {
VERBOSE_MSG(last, "insecure because of opt-out\n");
secure = false; /* the last answer is insecure due to opt-out */
}
/* Write all RRsets meant for the answer. */
bool answ_all_cnames = false/*arbitrary*/;
if (knot_pkt_begin(answer, KNOT_ANSWER)
|| write_extra_ranked_records(&request->answ_selected, last->reorder,
answer, &secure, &answ_all_cnames)
|| knot_pkt_begin(answer, KNOT_AUTHORITY)
|| write_extra_ranked_records(&request->auth_selected, last->reorder,
answer, &secure, NULL)
|| knot_pkt_begin(answer, KNOT_ADDITIONAL)
|| write_extra_ranked_records(&request->add_selected, last->reorder,
answer, NULL/*not relevant to AD*/, NULL)
|| answer_append_edns(request)
)
{
answer_fail(request);
return;
}
/* AD: "negative answers" need more handling. */
if (kr_response_classify(answer) != PKT_NOERROR
/* Additionally check for CNAME chains that "end in NODATA",
* as those would also be PKT_NOERROR. */
|| (answ_all_cnames && knot_pkt_qtype(answer) != KNOT_RRTYPE_CNAME)) {
secure = secure && last->flags.DNSSEC_WANT
&& !last->flags.DNSSEC_BOGUS && !last->flags.DNSSEC_INSECURE;
}
if (secure) {
struct kr_query *cname_parent = last->cname_parent;
while (cname_parent != NULL) {
if (cname_parent->flags.DNSSEC_OPTOUT) {
secure = false;
break;
}
cname_parent = cname_parent->cname_parent;
}
}
/* No detailed analysis ATM, just _SECURE or not.
* LATER: request->rank might better be computed in validator's finish phase. */
VERBOSE_MSG(last, "AD: request%s classified as SECURE\n", secure ? "" : " NOT");
request->rank = secure ? KR_RANK_SECURE : KR_RANK_INITIAL;
/* Set AD if secure and AD bit "was requested". */
if (secure && !knot_wire_get_cd(q_wire)
&& (knot_pkt_has_dnssec(answer) || knot_wire_get_ad(q_wire))) {
knot_wire_set_ad(answer->wire);
}
}
static int query_finalize(struct kr_request *request, struct kr_query *qry, knot_pkt_t *pkt)
{
knot_pkt_begin(pkt, KNOT_ADDITIONAL);
const bool is_iter = !(qry->flags.STUB || qry->flags.FORWARD);
if (!is_iter)
knot_wire_set_rd(pkt->wire);
// The rest of this function is all about EDNS.
if (qry->flags.NO_EDNS)
return kr_ok();
// Replace any EDNS records from any previous iteration.
int ret = edns_erase_and_reserve(pkt);
if (ret == 0) ret = edns_create(pkt, request);
if (ret) return ret;
if (!qry->flags.STUB)
knot_edns_set_do(pkt->opt_rr);
// CD flag is a bit controversial for .FORWARD:
// The original DNSSEC RFCs assume that if someone is validating,
// they will use CD=1 in requests to upstream. The intention was that
// this way both sides could use independent sets of trust anchors.
//
// However, in practice the trust anchor differences seem rather rare/small.
// And some of the normal use cases get harmed. With CD=1, the upstream
// (e.g. 1.1.1.1) can keep returning a cached bogus answer, even though they could
// instead retry with a different authoritative server and get a good one.
//
// Therefore if we want validaton (CD from client, negative trust anchors),
// we send CD=0 and then propagate returned SERVFAIL (but some retry logic remains).
//
// Theoretically it might be best to use both CD=0 and CD=1, with either of them
// in some kind of DNSSEC fallback, but I see bad complexity/improvement ratio.
if (is_iter) {
knot_wire_set_cd(pkt->wire);
} else {
if (knot_wire_get_cd(request->qsource.packet->wire) || !qry->flags.DNSSEC_WANT)
knot_wire_set_cd(pkt->wire);
}
return kr_ok();
}
int kr_resolver_init(module_array_t *modules, knot_mm_t *pool)
{
the_resolver = &the_resolver_value;
/* Default options (request flags). */
the_resolver->options.REORDER_RR = true;
the_resolver->vld_limit_crypto = KR_VLD_LIMIT_CRYPTO_DEFAULT;
/* Open resolution context */
the_resolver->trust_anchors = trie_create(NULL);
the_resolver->negative_anchors = trie_create(NULL);
the_resolver->pool = pool;
the_resolver->modules = modules;
the_resolver->cache_rtt_tout_retry_interval = KR_NS_TIMEOUT_RETRY_INTERVAL;
/* Create OPT RR */
the_resolver->downstream_opt_rr = mm_alloc(pool, sizeof(knot_rrset_t));
the_resolver->upstream_opt_rr = mm_alloc(pool, sizeof(knot_rrset_t));
if (!the_resolver->downstream_opt_rr || !the_resolver->upstream_opt_rr) {
return kr_error(ENOMEM);
}
knot_edns_init(the_resolver->downstream_opt_rr, KR_EDNS_PAYLOAD, 0, KR_EDNS_VERSION, pool);
knot_edns_init(the_resolver->upstream_opt_rr, KR_EDNS_PAYLOAD, 0, KR_EDNS_VERSION, pool);
/* Use default TLS padding */
the_resolver->tls_padding = -1;
/* Empty init; filled via ./lua/postconfig.lua */
kr_zonecut_init(&the_resolver->root_hints, (const uint8_t *)"", pool);
lru_create(&the_resolver->cache_cookie, LRU_COOKIES_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
return kr_ok();
}
void kr_resolver_deinit(void)
{
kr_zonecut_deinit(&the_resolver->root_hints);
kr_cache_close(&the_resolver->cache);
/* The LRUs are currently malloc-ated and need to be freed. */
lru_free(the_resolver->cache_cookie);
kr_ta_clear(the_resolver->trust_anchors);
trie_free(the_resolver->trust_anchors);
kr_ta_clear(the_resolver->negative_anchors);
trie_free(the_resolver->negative_anchors);
the_resolver = NULL;
}
int kr_resolve_begin(struct kr_request *request, struct kr_context *ctx)
{
/* Initialize request */
request->ctx = ctx;
request->answer = NULL;
request->options = ctx->options;
request->state = KR_STATE_CONSUME;
request->current_query = NULL;
array_init(request->answ_selected);
array_init(request->auth_selected);
array_init(request->add_selected);
request->answ_validated = false;
request->auth_validated = false;
request->rank = KR_RANK_INITIAL;
request->trace_log = NULL;
request->trace_finish = NULL;
/* Expect first query */
kr_rplan_init(&request->rplan, request, &request->pool);
return KR_STATE_CONSUME;
}
static int resolve_query(struct kr_request *request, const knot_pkt_t *packet)
{
struct kr_rplan *rplan = &request->rplan;
const knot_dname_t *qname = knot_pkt_qname(packet);
uint16_t qclass = knot_pkt_qclass(packet);
uint16_t qtype = knot_pkt_qtype(packet);
struct kr_query *qry = NULL;
struct kr_context *ctx = request->ctx;
struct kr_cookie_ctx *cookie_ctx = ctx ? &ctx->cookie_ctx : NULL;
if (qname != NULL) {
qry = kr_rplan_push(rplan, NULL, qname, qclass, qtype);
} else if (cookie_ctx && cookie_ctx->srvr.enabled &&
knot_wire_get_qdcount(packet->wire) == 0 &&
knot_pkt_has_edns(packet) &&
knot_pkt_edns_option(packet, KNOT_EDNS_OPTION_COOKIE)) {
/* Plan empty query only for cookies. */
qry = kr_rplan_push_empty(rplan, NULL);
}
if (!qry) {
return KR_STATE_FAIL;
}
if (qname != NULL) {
/* Deferred zone cut lookup for this query. */
qry->flags.AWAIT_CUT = true;
/* Want DNSSEC if it's possible to secure this name (e.g. is covered by any TA) */
if ((knot_wire_get_ad(packet->wire) || knot_pkt_has_dnssec(packet)) &&
kr_ta_closest(request->ctx, qry->sname, qtype)) {
qry->flags.DNSSEC_WANT = true;
}
}
/* Expect answer, pop if satisfied immediately */
ITERATE_LAYERS(request, qry, begin);
if ((request->state & KR_STATE_DONE) != 0) {
kr_rplan_pop(rplan, qry);
} else if (qname == NULL) {
/* it is an empty query which must be resolved by
`begin` layer of cookie module.
If query isn't resolved, fail. */
request->state = KR_STATE_FAIL;
}
return request->state;
}
knot_rrset_t* kr_request_ensure_edns(struct kr_request *request)
{
kr_require(request && request->answer && request->qsource.packet && request->ctx);
knot_pkt_t* answer = request->answer;
bool want_edns = knot_pkt_has_edns(request->qsource.packet);
if (!want_edns) {
kr_assert(!answer->opt_rr);
return answer->opt_rr;
} else if (answer->opt_rr) {
return answer->opt_rr;
}
kr_assert(request->ctx->downstream_opt_rr);
answer->opt_rr = knot_rrset_copy(request->ctx->downstream_opt_rr, &answer->mm);
if (!answer->opt_rr)
return NULL;
if (knot_pkt_has_dnssec(request->qsource.packet))
knot_edns_set_do(answer->opt_rr);
return answer->opt_rr;
}
knot_pkt_t *kr_request_ensure_answer(struct kr_request *request)
{
if (request->options.NO_ANSWER) {
kr_assert(request->state & KR_STATE_FAIL);
return NULL;
}
if (request->answer)
return request->answer;
const knot_pkt_t *qs_pkt = request->qsource.packet;
if (kr_fails_assert(qs_pkt))
goto fail;
// Find answer_max: limit on DNS wire length.
uint16_t answer_max;
const struct kr_request_qsource_flags *qs_flags = &request->qsource.flags;
const struct kr_request_qsource_flags *qs_cflags = &request->qsource.comm_flags;
if (kr_fails_assert(!(qs_flags->tls || qs_cflags->tls) || qs_flags->tcp || qs_cflags->http))
goto fail;
if (!request->qsource.addr || qs_flags->tcp || qs_cflags->tcp) {
// not on UDP
answer_max = KNOT_WIRE_MAX_PKTSIZE;
} else if (knot_pkt_has_edns(qs_pkt)) {
// UDP with EDNS
answer_max = MIN(knot_edns_get_payload(qs_pkt->opt_rr),
knot_edns_get_payload(request->ctx->downstream_opt_rr));
answer_max = MAX(answer_max, KNOT_WIRE_MIN_PKTSIZE);
} else {
// UDP without EDNS
answer_max = KNOT_WIRE_MIN_PKTSIZE;
}
// Allocate the packet.
uint8_t *wire = NULL;
if (request->alloc_wire_cb) {
wire = request->alloc_wire_cb(request, &answer_max);
if (!wire)
goto enomem;
}
knot_pkt_t *answer = request->answer =
knot_pkt_new(wire, answer_max, &request->pool);
if (!answer || knot_pkt_init_response(answer, qs_pkt) != 0) {
kr_assert(!answer); // otherwise we messed something up
goto enomem;
}
if (!wire)
wire = answer->wire;
// Much was done by knot_pkt_init_response()
knot_wire_set_ra(wire);
knot_wire_set_rcode(wire, KNOT_RCODE_NOERROR);
if (knot_wire_get_cd(qs_pkt->wire)) {
knot_wire_set_cd(wire);
}
// Prepare EDNS if required.
if (knot_pkt_has_edns(qs_pkt) && kr_fails_assert(kr_request_ensure_edns(request)))
goto enomem; // answer is on mempool, so "leak" is OK
return request->answer;
enomem:
fail:
request->state = KR_STATE_FAIL; // TODO: really combine with another flag?
return request->answer = NULL;
}
int kr_resolve_consume(struct kr_request *request, struct kr_transport **transport, knot_pkt_t *packet)
{
struct kr_rplan *rplan = &request->rplan;
/* Empty resolution plan, push packet as the new query */
if (packet && kr_rplan_empty(rplan)) {
return resolve_query(request, packet);
}
/* Different processing for network error */
struct kr_query *qry = array_tail(rplan->pending);
/* Check overall resolution time */
if (kr_now() - qry->creation_time_mono >= KR_RESOLVE_TIME_LIMIT) {
kr_query_inform_timeout(request, qry);
return KR_STATE_FAIL;
}
bool tried_tcp = (qry->flags.TCP);
if (!packet || packet->size == 0)
return KR_STATE_PRODUCE;
/* Packet cleared, derandomize QNAME. */
knot_dname_t *qname_raw = kr_pkt_qname_raw(packet);
if (qname_raw && qry->secret != 0) {
randomized_qname_case(qname_raw, qry->secret);
}
request->state = KR_STATE_CONSUME;
if (qry->flags.CACHED) {
ITERATE_LAYERS(request, qry, consume, packet);
} else {
/* Fill in source and latency information. */
request->upstream.rtt = kr_now() - qry->timestamp_mono;
request->upstream.transport = transport ? *transport : NULL;
ITERATE_LAYERS(request, qry, consume, packet);
/* Clear temporary information */
request->upstream.transport = NULL;
request->upstream.rtt = 0;
}
if (transport && !qry->flags.CACHED) {
if (!(request->state & KR_STATE_FAIL)) {
/* Do not complete NS address resolution on soft-fail. */
if (kr_fails_assert(packet->wire))
return KR_STATE_FAIL;
const int rcode = knot_wire_get_rcode(packet->wire);
if (rcode != KNOT_RCODE_SERVFAIL && rcode != KNOT_RCODE_REFUSED) {
qry->flags.AWAIT_IPV6 = false;
qry->flags.AWAIT_IPV4 = false;
}
}
}
if (request->state & KR_STATE_FAIL) {
qry->flags.RESOLVED = false;
}
if (!qry->flags.CACHED) {
if (request->state & KR_STATE_FAIL) {
if (++request->count_fail_row > KR_CONSUME_FAIL_ROW_LIMIT) {
if (kr_log_is_debug(RESOLVER, request)) { /* logging optimization */
kr_log_req(request, 0, 2, RESOLVER,
"=> too many failures in a row, "
"bail out (mitigation for NXNSAttack "
"CVE-2020-12667)\n");
}
if (!qry->flags.NO_NS_FOUND) {
qry->flags.NO_NS_FOUND = true;
return KR_STATE_PRODUCE;
}
/* Construct EDE message. We need it on mempool. */
char cut_buf[KR_DNAME_STR_MAXLEN];
char *msg = knot_dname_to_str(cut_buf, qry->zone_cut.name, sizeof(cut_buf));
if (!kr_fails_assert(msg)) {
if (*qry->zone_cut.name != '\0') /* Strip trailing dot. */
cut_buf[strlen(cut_buf) - 1] = '\0';
msg = kr_strcatdup_pool(&request->pool, 2,
"OLX2: delegation ", cut_buf);
}
kr_request_set_extended_error(request, KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NREACH_AUTH, msg);
return KR_STATE_FAIL;
}
} else {
request->count_fail_row = 0;
}
}
/* Pop query if resolved. */
if (request->state == KR_STATE_YIELD) { // NOLINT(bugprone-branch-clone)
return KR_STATE_PRODUCE; /* Requery */
} else if (qry->flags.RESOLVED) {
kr_rplan_pop(rplan, qry);
} else if (!tried_tcp && (qry->flags.TCP)) {
return KR_STATE_PRODUCE; /* Requery over TCP */
} else { /* Clear query flags for next attempt */
qry->flags.CACHED = false;
if (!request->options.TCP) {
qry->flags.TCP = false;
}
}
ITERATE_LAYERS(request, qry, reset);
/* Do not finish with bogus answer. */
if (qry->flags.DNSSEC_BOGUS) {
if (qry->flags.FORWARD || qry->flags.STUB
/* Probably CPU exhaustion attempt, so do not retry. */
|| qry->vld_limit_crypto_remains <= 0) {
return KR_STATE_FAIL;
}
/* Other servers might not have broken DNSSEC. */
qry->flags.DNSSEC_BOGUS = false;
return KR_STATE_PRODUCE;
}
return kr_rplan_empty(&request->rplan) ? KR_STATE_DONE : KR_STATE_PRODUCE;
}
#if ENABLE_COOKIES
/** Update DNS cookie data in packet. */
static bool outbound_request_update_cookies(struct kr_request *req,
const struct sockaddr *src,
const struct sockaddr *dst)
{
if (kr_fails_assert(req))
return false;
/* RFC7873 4.1 strongly requires server address. */
if (!dst)
return false;
struct kr_cookie_settings *clnt_sett = &req->ctx->cookie_ctx.clnt;
/* Cookies disabled or packet has no EDNS section. */
if (!clnt_sett->enabled)
return true;
/*
* RFC7873 4.1 recommends using also the client address. The matter is
* also discussed in section 6.
*/
kr_request_put_cookie(&clnt_sett->current, req->ctx->cache_cookie,
src, dst, req);
return true;
}
#endif /* ENABLE_COOKIES */
int kr_resolve_checkout(struct kr_request *request, const struct sockaddr *src,
struct kr_transport *transport, knot_pkt_t *packet)
{
/* @todo: Update documentation if this function becomes approved. */
struct kr_rplan *rplan = &request->rplan;
if (knot_wire_get_qr(packet->wire) != 0) {
return kr_ok();
}
/* No query left for resolution */
if (kr_rplan_empty(rplan)) {
return kr_error(EINVAL);
}
struct kr_query *qry = array_tail(rplan->pending);
#if ENABLE_COOKIES
/* Update DNS cookies in request. */
if (type == SOCK_DGRAM) { /* @todo: Add cookies also over TCP? */
/*
* The actual server IP address is needed before generating the
* actual cookie. If we don't know the server address then we
* also don't know the actual cookie size.
*/
if (!outbound_request_update_cookies(request, src, &transport->address.ip)) {
return kr_error(EINVAL);
}
}
#endif /* ENABLE_COOKIES */
int ret = query_finalize(request, qry, packet);
if (ret != 0) {
return kr_error(EINVAL);
}
/* Track changes in minimization secret to enable/disable minimization */
uint32_t old_minimization_secret = qry->secret;
/* Run the checkout layers and cancel on failure.
* The checkout layer doesn't persist the state, so canceled subrequests
* don't affect the resolution or rest of the processing. */
int type = -1;
switch(transport->protocol) {
case KR_TRANSPORT_UDP:
type = SOCK_DGRAM;
break;
case KR_TRANSPORT_TCP:
case KR_TRANSPORT_TLS:
type = SOCK_STREAM;
break;
default:
kr_assert(false);
}
int state = request->state;
ITERATE_LAYERS(request, qry, checkout, packet, &transport->address.ip, type);
if (request->state & KR_STATE_FAIL) {
request->state = state; /* Restore */
return kr_error(ECANCELED);
}
/* Randomize query case (if secret changed) */
knot_dname_t *qname_raw = kr_pkt_qname_raw(packet);
if (qry->secret != old_minimization_secret) {
randomized_qname_case(qname_raw, qry->secret);
}
/* Write down OPT unless in safemode */
if (!(qry->flags.NO_EDNS)) {
/* TLS padding */
if (transport->protocol == KR_TRANSPORT_TLS) {
size_t padding_size = edns_padding_option_size(request->ctx->tls_padding);
ret = knot_pkt_reserve(packet, padding_size);
if (ret)
return kr_error(EINVAL);
ret = pkt_padding(packet, request->ctx->tls_padding);
if (ret)
return kr_error(EINVAL);
}
ret = edns_put(packet, true);
if (ret != 0) {
return kr_error(EINVAL);
}
}
if (kr_log_is_debug_qry(RESOLVER, qry)) {
KR_DNAME_GET_STR(qname_str, knot_pkt_qname(packet));
KR_DNAME_GET_STR(ns_name, transport->ns_name);
KR_DNAME_GET_STR(zonecut_str, qry->zone_cut.name);
KR_RRTYPE_GET_STR(type_str, knot_pkt_qtype(packet));
const char *ns_str = kr_straddr(&transport->address.ip);
VERBOSE_MSG(qry,
"=> id: '%05u' querying: '%s'@'%s' zone cut: '%s' "
"qname: '%s' qtype: '%s' proto: '%s'\n",
qry->id, ns_name, ns_str ? ns_str : "", zonecut_str,
qname_str, type_str, (qry->flags.TCP) ? "tcp" : "udp");
}
return kr_ok();
}
int kr_resolve_finish(struct kr_request *request, int state)
{
request->state = state;
/* Finalize answer and construct whole wire-format (unless dropping). */
knot_pkt_t *answer = kr_request_ensure_answer(request);
if (answer) {
ITERATE_LAYERS(request, NULL, answer_finalize);
answer_finalize(request);
/* Defensive style, in case someone has forgotten.
* Beware: non-empty answers do make sense even with SERVFAIL case, etc. */
if (request->state != KR_STATE_DONE) {
uint8_t *wire = answer->wire;
switch (knot_wire_get_rcode(wire)) {
case KNOT_RCODE_NOERROR:
case KNOT_RCODE_NXDOMAIN:
knot_wire_clear_ad(wire);
knot_wire_clear_aa(wire);
knot_wire_set_rcode(wire, KNOT_RCODE_SERVFAIL);
default:; // Do nothing
}
}
}
ITERATE_LAYERS(request, NULL, finish);
struct kr_rplan *rplan = &request->rplan;
struct kr_query *last = kr_rplan_last(rplan);
VERBOSE_MSG(last, "finished in state: %d, queries: %zu, mempool: %zu B\n",
request->state, rplan->resolved.len, (size_t) mp_total_size(request->pool.ctx));
/* Trace request finish */
if (request->trace_finish) {
request->trace_finish(request);
}
/* Uninstall all tracepoints */
request->trace_finish = NULL;
request->trace_log = NULL;
return KR_STATE_DONE;
}
struct kr_rplan *kr_resolve_plan(struct kr_request *request)
{
if (request) {
return &request->rplan;
}
return NULL;
}
knot_mm_t *kr_resolve_pool(struct kr_request *request)
{
if (request) {
return &request->pool;
}
return NULL;
}
static int ede_priority(int info_code)
{
switch(info_code) {
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_TOO_EARLY:
return 910;
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_DNSKEY_BIT:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_DNSKEY_MISS:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_SIG_EXPIRED:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_SIG_NOTYET:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_RRSIG_MISS:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NSEC_MISS:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_EXPIRED_INV:
return 900; /* Specific DNSSEC failures */
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_BOGUS:
return 800; /* Generic DNSSEC failure */
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_FORGED:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_FILTERED:
return 700; /* Considered hard fail by firefox */
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_PROHIBITED:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_BLOCKED:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_CENSORED:
return 600; /* Policy related */
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_DNSKEY_ALG:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_DS_DIGEST:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NSEC3_ITERS:
return 500; /* Non-critical DNSSEC issues */
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_STALE:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_STALE_NXD:
return 300; /* Serve-stale answers. */
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_INDETERMINATE:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_CACHED_ERR:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NOT_READY:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NOTAUTH:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NOTSUP:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NREACH_AUTH:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NETWORK:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_INV_DATA:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_SYNTHESIZED:
return 200; /* Assorted codes */
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_OTHER:
return 100; /* Most generic catch-all error */
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NONE:
case KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NONCONF_POLICY: /* Defined by an expired Internet Draft */
return 0; /* No error - allow overriding */
default:
kr_assert(false); /* Unknown info_code */
return 50;
}
}
int kr_request_set_extended_error(struct kr_request *request, int info_code, const char *extra_text)
{
if (kr_fails_assert(request))
return KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NONE;
struct kr_extended_error *ede = &request->extended_error;
/* Clear any previously set error. */
if (info_code == KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NONE) {
kr_assert(extra_text == NULL);
ede->info_code = KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NONE;
ede->extra_text = NULL;
return KNOT_EDNS_EDE_NONE;
}
if (ede_priority(info_code) > ede_priority(ede->info_code)) {
ede->info_code = info_code;
ede->extra_text = extra_text;
}
return ede->info_code;
}
#undef VERBOSE_MSG
|