#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# this file is part of kuvert, a mailer wrapper that
# does gpg signing/signing+encrypting transparently, based
# on the content of your public keyring(s) and your preferences.
#
# copyright (c) 1999-2017 Alexander Zangerl <az@snafu.priv.at>
#
#   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
#   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2
#   as published by the Free Software Foundation.
#
#   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
#   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
#   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
#   GNU General Public License for more details.
#
#   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
#   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
#   Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
#
#--

use strict;
use Sys::Syslog qw(setlogsock openlog syslog closelog);
use Fcntl qw(:flock);
use Getopt::Std;
use MIME::Parser;		# for parsing the mime-stream
use Mail::Address;		# for parsing to and cc-headers
use Net::SMTP 1.28;		# for sending email, smtp, smtps and starttls
use IO::Socket::SSL;	# ssl is not on always but less hassle to depend on the module here
use Sys::Hostname;		# ditto
use Net::Server::Mail::ESMTP;	# for receiving via smtp
use IO::Socket::INET;		# ditto

use FileHandle;
use File::Slurp;
use File::Find;
use File::Temp qw(:mktemp);
use Time::HiRes;
use Proc::ProcessTable;
use Encode;
use Encode::Locale;
use POSIX qw();

# some global stuff
# the version number is inserted by make install
my $version="INSERT_VERSION";
my $progname="kuvert";
$0=$progname;
my $listenername="$progname-smtp";

# who are we gonna pretend to be today?
my($username,$home)=(getpwuid($<))[0,7];

# where is the configuration file
my $rcfile="$home/.kuvert";

my $timeout=600;		# seconds to wait for gpg

# configuration directives
my (%config,$debug,%email2key);

my %options;
if (!getopts("dorkc:",\%options) || @ARGV)
{
	die "usage: $progname [-d] [-o] [-r|-k] [-c configfile]
-k: kill running $progname daemon
-d: debug mode
-r: reload keyrings and configfile
-o: one-shot mode, run queue once and exit
-c <configfile>: use alternate config file instead of ~/.kuvert
This is: $progname $version.\n";
}

# now handle the kill/reload stuff
my $piddir=($ENV{'TMPDIR'}?$ENV{'TMPDIR'}:"/tmp");
my $pidname="$progname.$<";
my $pidf="$piddir/$pidname.pid";
$debug=$options{"d"};

# who's there?
my %instances;
if (-f $pidf && (my $knownpids = read_file($pidf)))
{
	my $proctable = Proc::ProcessTable->new->table;

	$knownpids =~ s/\D+/ /g;
	for my $maybe (split(/\s/, $knownpids))
	{
		next if ($maybe == $$);			# not likely, but...

		# really mine?
		my ($ptentry) = grep($_->pid eq $maybe, @$proctable);
		if ($ptentry && $ptentry->cmndline =~ /^$progname/
				&& $ptentry->uid == $<)
		{
			$instances{$maybe} = $ptentry->cmndline;
		}
	}
}

if ($options{"k"} || $options{"r"})
{
	my $sig=($options{"r"}?'USR1':'TERM'); # -r reload, -k kill
	my $ssig='TERM';		# the smtp listener must always die

	for my $mine (keys %instances)
	{
		my $signal = ($instances{$mine} =~ /^$listenername/? $ssig:$sig);
		dlogit("sending sig $signal to $mine ($instances{$mine})");
		logit("can't send signal to process $mine: $!\n")
				if (!kill($signal,$mine));
	}
	unlink($pidf) if ($options{k}); # remove the pidfile on kills
	exit 0;
}

# anybody in the way?
die("other instance(s) with pids ".join(", ",keys %instances)
		." are running!\n")
    if (keys %instances);

# read in the config, setup dirs, logging, defaultkey etc.
$rcfile = $options{c} if ($options{c});

die("no configuration file exists. See man $progname(1) for details.\n")
    if (!-e $rcfile);
%config=&read_config;
dlogit("reading config file");
# log startup after config is read and logging prefs are known
logit("$progname version $version starting");

# install the handlers for conf reread
$SIG{'USR1'}=\&handle_reload;
# and the termination-handler
map { $SIG{$_}=\&handle_term; } qw(HUP INT QUIT TERM);

if (!$options{o} && $config{"can-detach"})
{
	my $pid=fork;
	if (!defined $pid)
	{
		&bailout("fork failed: $!");
	}
	elsif ($pid)
	{
		exit 0;			# parent is done
	}
	chdir("/");
	POSIX::setsid();
}

# fire up smtp server, iff not oneshot
if (!$options{o} &&
    $config{"ma-user"} && $config{"ma-pass"} && $config{"maport"})
{
	# fork off the smtp-to-queue daemon
	my $pid = &start_mailserver;
	$instances{$pid} = 1;
}

# now we're daemon or sole process
write_file($pidf, join("\n", keys %instances, $$));
cleanup($config{tempdir},0);		# bsts

%email2key=&read_keyring;

# let's (re)use just one parser object
my $parser = MIME::Parser->new()
    || bailout("can't create mime parser object: $!");

# dump mime objects to tempdir - reset on reload signal
$parser->output_dir($config{tempdir});
# retain rfc1522-encoded headers, please
$parser->decode_headers(0);
# make the parser ignore all filename info and just invent filenames.
$parser->filer->ignore_filename(1);

# the main loop, left only via signal handler handle_term
while (1)
{
	&bailout("cant open $config{queuedir}: $!")
			if (!opendir(D,"$config{queuedir}"));

	my $file;
	foreach $file (sort grep(/^\d+$/,readdir(D)))
	{
		if (!open(FH,"$config{queuedir}/$file"))
		{
	    logit("huh? $file suddenly disappeared? $!");
	    next;
		}
		# lock it if possible
		if (!flock(FH,LOCK_NB|LOCK_EX))
		{
	    close(FH);
	    logit("$file is locked, skipping.");
	    next;
		}

		#ok, open & locked, let's proceed
		logit("processing $file for $username");

		my @res=process_file(*FH,"$config{queuedir}/$file");
		if (@res)
		{
	    rename("$config{queuedir}/$file","$config{queuedir}/.$file")
					|| &bailout("cant rename $config{queuedir}/$file: $!");
	    alert($res[0],
						"Your mail \"$config{queuedir}/$file\" could not be processed and $progname has given up on it.
Please review the following error details to determine what went wrong:\n\n",
						@res,
						"\n$progname has renamed the problematic mail to \"$config{queuedir}/.$file\";
if you want $progname to retry, rename it to an all-numeric filename. Otherwise you should delete the file.\n");
		}
		else
		{
	    logit("done handling file $file");
	    unlink("$config{queuedir}/$file")
					|| &bailout("cant unlink $config{queuedir}/$file: $!");
		}
		# and clean up the cruft left behind, please!
		cleanup("$config{tempdir}",0);

		# close and thus unlock the file
		bailout("problem closing $config{queuedir}/$file: $!")
				if (!close(FH));
	}
	closedir(D);
	&handle_term("oneshot mode") if ($options{o});
	sleep($config{interval});
}
exit(1);												# shouldn't reach here


# sign an entity and send the resulting email to the listed recipients
# args: entity, location of dump of entity, outermost headers, envelope from,
# signkey and recipients
# returns nothing if fine, @error msgs otherwise
sub sign_send
{
	my ($ent,$dumpfile,$header,$from,$signkey,@recips)=@_;
	my $output=mktemp($config{tempdir}."/cryptoout.XXXX");

	# generate a new top-entity to be mailed
	my $newent=new MIME::Entity;
	# make a private copy of the main header and set this one
	$newent->head($header->dup);
	# make it a multipart/signed
	# and set the needed content-type-fields on this top entity
	$newent->head->mime_attr("MIME-Version"=>"1.0");
	$newent->head->mime_attr("Content-Type"=>"multipart/signed");
	$newent->head->mime_attr("Content-Type.Boundary"=>
													 &MIME::Entity::make_boundary);
	$newent->head->mime_attr("Content-Type.Protocol"=>
													 "application/pgp-signature");

	# set/suppress the preamble
	$newent->preamble($config{"preamble"}?
										["This is a multi-part message in MIME format.\n",
										 "It has been signed conforming to RFC3156.\n",
										 "You need GPG to check the signature.\n"]:[]);

	# add the passed entity as part
	$newent->add_part($ent);

	# generate the signature, repeat until proper passphrase given
	# or until gpg gives up with a different error indication
	my @res;
	my $backoff = 0;
	while (1)
	{
		@res=&sign_encrypt($signkey,$dumpfile,$output,());
		last if ($res[0]!=1);	#  no error or fatal error
		dlogit("gpg reported bad passphrase, retrying.");
		if ($config{"query-secret"})
		{
	    # be polite to the query tool and back off up to 8 sec
	    sleep($backoff);
	    $backoff += 2  if ($backoff < 8);
		}
		if (!$config{"use-agent"} && $config{"flush-secret"} && $signkey)
		{
	    dlogit("invalidating passphrase for $signkey");
	    my $cmd=sprintf($config{"flush-secret"},$signkey);
	    system($cmd);	# ignore the flushing result; best effort only
		}
	}
	my $hashname = $res[1];
	return @res[1..$#res] if ($res[0]); # fatal error: give up

	$newent->head->mime_attr("Content-Type.Micalg"=>$hashname);

	# attach the signature
	$newent->attach(Type => "application/pgp-signature",
									Path => $output,
									Filename => "signature.asc",
									Disposition => "inline",
									Description=> "Digital Signature",
									Encoding => "7bit");
	# and send the resulting thing, not cleaning up
	return &send_entity($newent,$from,@recips);
}

# encrypt and sign an entity, send the resulting email to the listed recipients
# args: entity, location of dump of entity, outermost headers,
# envelope from address, recipient keys arrayref, recipient addresses
# returns nothing if fine, @error msgs otherwise
sub crypt_send
{
	my ($ent,$dumpfile,$header,$from,$signkey,$rec_keys,@recips)=@_;
	my $output=mktemp($config{tempdir}."/cryptoout.XXXX");

	# generate a new top-entity to be mailed
	my $newent=new MIME::Entity;
	# make a private copy of the main header and set this one
	$newent->head($header->dup);
	# make it a multipart/encrypted
	# and set the needed content-type-fields on this top entity
	$newent->head->mime_attr("MIME-Version"=>"1.0");
	$newent->head->mime_attr("Content-Type"=>"multipart/encrypted");
	$newent->head->mime_attr("Content-Type.Boundary"=>
													 &MIME::Entity::make_boundary);
	$newent->head->mime_attr("Content-Type.Protocol"=>
													 "application/pgp-encrypted");
	# set/suppress the new preamble
	$newent->preamble($config{"preamble"}?
										["This is a multi-part message in MIME format.\n",
										 "It has been encrypted conforming to RFC3156.\n",
										 "You need GPG to view the content.\n"]:[]);

	# attach the needed dummy-part
	$newent->attach(Type=>"application/pgp-encrypted",
									Data=>"Version: 1\n",
									Encoding=>"7bit");

	# generate the encrypted data, repeat until proper passphrase given
	my @res;
	my $backoff = 0;
	while (1)
	{
		@res=&sign_encrypt($signkey,$dumpfile,$output,@{$rec_keys});
		last if ($res[0]!=1);	#  no error or fatal error
		dlogit("gpg reported bad passphrase, retrying.");
		if ($config{"query-secret"})
		{
	    # be polite to the query tool and back off up to 8 sec
	    sleep($backoff);
	    $backoff += 2  if ($backoff < 8);
		}
		if (!$config{"use-agent"} && $config{"flush-secret"} && $signkey)
		{
	    dlogit("invalidating passphrase for $signkey");
	    my $cmd=sprintf($config{"flush-secret"},$signkey);
	    system($cmd);	# ignore the flushing result; best effort only
		}
	}
	return @res[1..$#res] if ($res[0]); # fatal error: give up

	# attach the encrypted data
	$newent->attach(Type => "application/octet-stream",
									Path => $output,
									Filename => undef,
									Disposition => "inline",
									Encoding=>"7bit");

	# and send the resulting thing
	return &send_entity($newent,$from,@recips);
}

# processes a file in the queue,
# leaves the file in the queue
# returns nothing if ok or @error msgs - first one short enough for subject
sub process_file
{
	my ($fh,$file)=@_;

	my $in_ent;
	eval { $in_ent=$parser->parse(\$fh); };
	return ("Parsing of $file failed!","parser errors: $@",$parser->last_error)
			if ($@);

	# extract and clean envelope x-kuvert-from and -to
	my @erecips=extract_addresses($in_ent->head->get("x-kuvert-to"));
	my @efrom=extract_addresses($in_ent->head->get("x-kuvert-from"));
	$in_ent->head->delete("x-kuvert-to");
	$in_ent->head->delete("x-kuvert-from");

	# extract and parse the from
	# each is addr, phrase, comment, formatted, directive
	my @froms=extract_addresses($in_ent->head->get("from"));
	return "Could not parse From: header!" if (!@froms);

	# envelope from is: x-kuvert-from if present or from
	my $fromaddr=@efrom?$efrom[0]->[0]:$froms[0]->[3];

	my $signkey=$config{defaultkey};
	# do we have a key override
	if ($froms[0]->[4]=~/key=((0x)?[0-9a-f]+)/i)
	{
		$signkey=$1;
		dlogit("local signkey override: $signkey");
		$in_ent->head->replace("from",$froms[0]->[3]);
	}

	# add version header
	$in_ent->head->add('X-Mailer',"$progname $version")
			if ($config{identify});

	# extract and delete blanket instruction header
	my $override;
	if (lc($in_ent->head->get("x-kuvert"))=~
			/^\s*(none|fallback|fallback-all|signonly|mustencrypt)\s*$/)
	{
		$override=$1;
	}
	$in_ent->head->delete("x-kuvert");

	# resend-request-header present and no more specific recipients given?
	# then send this as-it-is
	if (!@erecips && (my $rsto=$in_ent->head->get("resent-to")))
	{
		logit("resending requested, doing so.");
		my @prstos=Mail::Address->parse($rsto);
		return "Could not parse Resent-To: header!"
				if (!@prstos);
		my @rstos=map { $_->address } (@prstos);

		return send_entity($in_ent,$fromaddr,@rstos);
	}

	# extract and analyze normal and bcc recipients
	my @tos=extract_addresses($in_ent->head->get("to"));
	my @ccs=extract_addresses($in_ent->head->get("cc"));
	my @recips=(@tos,@ccs);

	my @recip_bcc=extract_addresses($in_ent->head->get("bcc"));
	# and don't leak Bcc...
	$in_ent->head->delete("bcc");

	# replace to and cc with cleaned headers: we don't want to
	# leak directives
	my $newto=join(", ",map { $_->[3] } (@tos));
	my $newcc=join(", ",map { $_->[3] } (@ccs));
	$in_ent->head->replace("To",$newto);
	$in_ent->head->replace("Cc",$newcc) if ($newcc);

	# cry out loud if there is a problem with the submitted mail
	# and no recipients were distinguishable...
	# happens sometimes, with mbox-style 'From bla' lines in the headers...
	return("No recipients found!","The mail headers seem to be garbled, and no To, Cc or Bcc headers could be identified.")
			if (!@erecips && !@recips && !@recip_bcc);

	# remember the addresses' nature
	my (%is_bcc);
	map { $is_bcc{$_->[0]}=1; } (@recip_bcc);

	# now deal with envelope-vs-mailheader recipients:
	# whatever the envelope says, wins.
	if (@erecips)
	{
		# no need to distinguish these otherwise
		my (%is_normal,%is_envelope);
		map { $is_normal{$_->[0]}=1; } (@recips);
		map { $is_envelope{$_->[0]}=1; } (@erecips);

		for my $e (@erecips)
		{
	    # in the envelope but not the headers -> fake bcc
	    if (!$is_normal{$e->[0]} && !$is_bcc{$e->[0]})
	    {
				push @recip_bcc,$e;
				$is_bcc{$e->[0]}=1;
	    }
		}
		# in the headers but not the envelope -> ignore it
		my @reallyr;
		for my $n (@recips)
		{
	    push @reallyr,$n if ($is_envelope{$n->[0]});
		}
		@recips=@reallyr;
	}

	# figure out what to do for specific recipients
	my %actions=findaction($override,\@recips,\@recip_bcc);

	# handle reject indications
	if (my @unsatisfied = grep($actions{$_} eq "reject", keys %actions))
	{
		return ("Config prohibits unencrypted email!",
						"The configuration for ". join(", ", @unsatisfied).
						" requires that email must be encrypted, but no keys were known or given for these addresses.");
	}

	# send out unsigned mails first
	my @rawrecips=grep($actions{$_} eq "none",keys %actions);
	if (@rawrecips)
	{
		logit("sending mail (unchanged) to ".join(", ",@rawrecips));
		my @res=send_entity($in_ent,$fromaddr,@rawrecips);
		return @res if (@res);
	}

	my ($orig_header,$cryptoin);
	# prepare various stuff we need only when signing+encrypting or signing
	if(grep($_ ne "none", values(%actions)))
	{
		# copy (mail)header, split header info
		# in mime-related (remains with the entity) and non-mime
		# (is saved in the new, outermost header-object)
		$orig_header=$in_ent->head->dup;

		# content-* stays with the entity and the rest moves to orig_header
		foreach my $headername ($in_ent->head->tags)
		{
	    if ($headername !~ /^content-/i)
	    {
				# remove the stuff from the entity
				$in_ent->head->delete($headername);
	    }
	    else
	    {
				# remove this stuff from the orig_header
				$orig_header->delete($headername);
	    }
		}

		# any text/plain parts of the entity have to be fixed with the
		# correct content-transfer-encoding (qp), since any transfer 8->7bit
		# on the way otherwise will break the signature.
		# this is not necessary if encrypting, but done anyways since
		# it doesnt hurt and we want to be on the safe side.
		my $res=qp_fix_parts($in_ent);
		return $res if ($res);

		# now we've got a in entity which is ready to be encrypted/signed
		# and the mail-headers are saved in $orig_header
		# next we dump this entity into a file for crypto ops
		my $fh;
		($fh,$cryptoin)=mkstemp($config{tempdir}."/cryptoin.XXXX");
		return("Can't create file $cryptoin: $!")
				if (!$fh);
		$in_ent->print($fh);
		close($fh);
	}

	# send the mail signed to the appropriate recips
	my @signto=grep($actions{$_} eq "signonly",keys %actions);
	if (@signto)
	{
		logit("sending mail (signed with $signkey) to ".join(", ",@signto));
		my @res=&sign_send($in_ent,$cryptoin,$orig_header,$fromaddr,$signkey,
											 @signto);
		return @res if (@res);
	}

	# send mail encrypted+signed to appropriate recips.
	# note: bcc's must be handled separately!
	my @encto=grep($actions{$_}!~/^(none|signonly)$/ && !$is_bcc{$_}, keys %actions);
	if (@encto)
	{
		logit("sending mail (encrypted+signed with $signkey) to "
					.join(", ",@encto));
		my @enckeys = map { $actions{$_} } (@encto);
		my @res=&crypt_send($in_ent,$cryptoin,$orig_header,$fromaddr,$signkey,
												\@enckeys,@encto);
		return @res if (@res);
	}
	for my $bcc (grep($actions{$_}!~/^(none|signonly)$/ && $is_bcc{$_},
										keys %actions))
	{
		logit("sending mail (bcc,encrypted+signed with $signkey) to $bcc");
		my @res=&crypt_send($in_ent,$cryptoin,$orig_header,$fromaddr,$signkey,
												[$actions{$bcc}],$bcc);
		return @res if (@res);
	}
	return;
}

# find the correct action for the given email addresses
# input: override header, normal and bcc-addresses
# returns hash with address as key, value is "none", "signonly", "reject"
# or recipient key id
sub findaction
{
	my ($override,$normalref,$bccref)=@_;
	my(%actions,%specialkeys,$groupfallback);

	# address lookup in the list of configured choices
	foreach my $a (@{$normalref},@{$bccref})
	{
		my $addr=$a->[0];
		foreach (@{$config{overrides}})
		{
	    if ($addr =~ $_->{re})
	    {
				$actions{$addr}=$_->{action};
				# remember config-file key overrides
				$specialkeys{$addr}=$_->{key}
				if ($_->{key});
				last;
	    }
		}
		# nothing configured? then default action
		$actions{$addr}||=($config{defaultaction}||"none");
		dlogit("action $actions{$addr} for $addr");

		# blanket override? then override the config but not where
		# "none" is specified
		if ($override && $actions{$addr} ne "none")
		{
	    dlogit("override header: $override for $addr");
	    $actions{$addr}=$override;
		}

		# next: check individual action=x directives
		if ($a->[4] =~/action=(none|fallback-all|fallback|signonly)/)
		{
	    my $thisaction=$1;
	    $actions{$addr}=$thisaction;
	    dlogit("local override: action $thisaction for $addr");
		}

		if ($a->[4] =~/key=([0-9a-fA-FxX]+)/)
		{
	    $specialkeys{$addr}=$1;
	    dlogit("local key override: $specialkeys{$addr} for $addr");
		}

		# now test for key existence and downgrade action to signonly
		# where necessary - or abort is mustencrypt is selected
		if ($actions{$addr}=~/^(fallback|mustencrypt)/)
		{
	    # group fallback is relevant for normal recipients only
	    $groupfallback ||= ($actions{$addr} eq "fallback-all")
					if (!grep($_->[0] eq $addr, @{$bccref}));

			my $cando = $specialkeys{$addr}||$email2key{$addr}||"signonly";
			if ($cando eq "signonly" && $actions{$addr} eq "mustencrypt")
			{
				$actions{$addr} = "reject";
				dlogit("$addr requires encryption but no key known or given!");
			}
			else
			{
				$actions{$addr}= $cando;
			}
		}
	}
	return %actions if (grep($_ eq "reject", values %actions));

	# were there any fallback-all? if so and also none or signonly present,
	# then all recips are downgraded.
	my @allactions=values %actions;
	if ($groupfallback && grep(/^(none|signonly)$/,@allactions))
	{
		# time to downgrade everybody to signing...
		for my $a (@{$normalref})
		{
	    my $addr=$a->[0];
	    if ($actions{$addr} ne "none")
	    {
				$actions{$addr}="signonly";
				dlogit("downgrading to signonly for $addr");
	    }
		}
	}
	return %actions;
}

# parses an address-line, extracts all addresses from it
# and splits them into address, phrase, comment, full and directive
# returns array of arrays
sub extract_addresses
{
	my (@lines)=@_;
	my @details;

	for my $a (Mail::Address->parse(@lines))
	{
		my ($addr,$comment,$phrase)=(lc($a->address),$a->comment,$a->phrase);
		# some name "directive,directive..." <an@addre.ss>
		if ($phrase=~s/\s*\"([^\"]+)\"\s*//)
		{
	    my $directive=$1;
	    # clean the phrase up
	    my $newa=Mail::Address->new($phrase,$addr,$comment);
	    push @details,[$addr,$phrase,$comment,$newa->format,$directive];
		}
		else
		{
	    push @details,[$addr,$phrase,$comment,$a->format,undef];
		}
	}
	return @details;
}

# traverses a mime entity and changes all parts with
# type == text/plain, charset != us-ascii, transfer-encoding 8bit
# to transfer-encoding qp.
# input: entity, retval: undef if ok, error message otherwise
sub qp_fix_parts
{
	my ($entity)=@_;
	if ($entity->is_multipart)
	{
		foreach ($entity->parts)
		{
	    my $res=&qp_fix_parts($_);
	    return $res if ($res);
		}
	}
	else
	{
		if ($entity->head->mime_type eq "text/plain"
				&& $entity->head->mime_encoding eq "8bit"
				&& lc($entity->head->mime_attr("content-type.charset"))
				ne "us-ascii")
		{
	    return("Changing Content-Transfer-Encoding failed!")
					if ($entity->head->mime_attr("Content-Transfer-Encoding"
																			 => "quoted-printable")
							!="quoted-printable");
		}
	}
	return;
}

# log termination, cleanup, exit
sub handle_term
{
	my ($sig)=@_;

	$sig="SIG$sig" if (!$options{o});
	logit("Termination requested ($sig), cleaning up");
	&cleanup($config{tempdir},1);
	close $config{logfh} if ($config{logfh});
	exit 0;
}

# reread configuration file and keyrings
# no args or return value; intended as a sighandler.
sub handle_reload
{
	my ($sig)=@_;
	logit("received SIG$sig, reloading");
	%config=&read_config;
	$parser->output_dir($config{tempdir}); # that thing persists otherwise
	%email2key=&read_keyring;
	# restart mailserver if required
	# also update pidfile
	if ($config{"ma-user"} && $config{"ma-pass"} && $config{"maport"})
	{
		# fork off a new  smtp-to-queue daemon
		my $pid=&start_mailserver;
		write_file($pidf, join("\n", $pid, $$));
	}
}

# remove temporary stuff left behind in directory $what
# remove_what set: remove the dir, too.
# exception on error, no retval
sub cleanup
{
	my ($what,$remove_what)=@_;
	my ($name,$res);

	finddepth(sub { next if $_ =~ /^\.{1,2}$/; my $fn = $File::Find::name;
									if (-d $fn)
									{
										rmdir($fn) || bailout("cannod rmdir $fn: $!");
									}
									else
									{
										unlink($fn) || bailout("cannot unlink $fn: $!");
									}
						},
						$what);
	$remove_what && (rmdir("$what") || bailout("cant rmdir $what: $!"));
	return;
}

# (re)reads the configuration file
# calls bailout on problems
# needs user-specific vars to be setup
# returns %options on success, bailout on error
sub read_config
{
	my %options = (
		defaultkey=>undef,
		identify=>undef,
		defaultaction=>"none",
		msserver=>undef,
		msuser=>undef,
		mspass=>undef,
		ssl=>undef,
		"ssl-cert"=>undef,
		"ssl-key"=>undef,
		"ssl-ca"=>undef,
		'mspass-from-query-secret'=>undef,
		msport=>587,
		msp=>"/usr/sbin/sendmail -om -oi -oem",
		"use-agent"=>undef,
		syslog=>undef,
		logfile=>undef,
		queuedir=>"$home/.kuvert_queue",
		# $$ not good in tempdir: config is read before fork, then possibly again on -r but by a different process
		tempdir=>($ENV{'TMPDIR'}?$ENV{'TMPDIR'}:"/tmp")."/kuvert.$username",
		alwaystrust=>undef,
		gpg => "gpg",
		interval=>60,
		"query-secret"=>"/bin/sh -c 'stty -echo; read -p \"Passphrase %s: \" X; stty echo; echo \$X'",
		"flush-secret"=>undef,
		"mail-on-error"=>undef,
		"can-detach"=>0,
		maport=>2587,
		"ma-user"=>undef,
		"ma-pass"=>undef,
		preamble=>1, );

	my @over;
	&bailout("cant open $rcfile: $!")
			if (!open (F,$rcfile));
	logit("reading config file");
	my @stuff=<F>;
	close F;

	for (@stuff)
	{
		chomp;
		next if (/^\s*\#/ || /^\s*$/); # strip comments and empty lines

		# trigger on old config-file style
		if (/^([[:upper:]]+)\s+(\S.*)\s*$/)
		{
	    my $nf=rewrite_conf(@stuff);
	    die("Can't work with old config, terminating!
$progname has found an old config file and attempted a ROUGH auto-conversion.

The result has been left in $nf and likely needs to be adjusted
for ${progname}'s new features. Please do so and restart $progname
with the new config file in place.\n");
		}

		if (/^\s+(\S+)\s+(fallback(-all)?(,(0x)?[a-fA-F0-9]+)?|signonly|none|mustencrypt)\s*(\#.*)?$/)
		{
	    my ($who,$action)=($1,$2);
	    my $key;
	    if ($action =~ s/^(fallback(-all)?),((0x)?[a-fA-F0-9]+)/$1/)
	    {
				$key=$3;
	    }
	    push @over, { "who"=>$who,
										"re"=>qr/$who/,
										"action"=>$action,
										"key"=>$key };
	    dlogit("got override $action "
						 .($key?"key $key ":"")."for $who");
	    next;
		}

		if (/^\S/)
		{
	    my ($key,$value)=split(/\s+/,$_,2);
	    $key=lc($key);
	    $value=~s/^(\"|\')(.*)\1$/$2/;

	    bailout("unknown config key \"$key\"")
					if (!exists $options{$key});

	    # booleans
	    if ($key =~ /^(identify|use-agent|alwaystrust|can-detach|mspass-from-query-secret|preamble)$/)
	    {
				bailout("bad value \"$value\" for key \"$key\"")
						if ($value !~ /^(0|1|t|f|on|off)$/i);
				$options{$key}=($value=~/^(1|on|t)$/);
	    }
	    # numbers
	    elsif ($key =~ /^(msport|interval|maport)$/)
	    {
				bailout("bad value \"$value\" for key \"$key\"")
						if ($value!~/^\d+$/);
				$options{$key}=$value;
	    }
	    # nothing or string
	    elsif ($key =~ /^(ma-pass|ma-user|mail-on-error|msserver|ssl(-cert|-key|-ca)?|msuser|mspass)$/)
	    {
				$options{$key}=$value;
	    }
	    # nothing or program and args
	    elsif ($key eq "msp")
	    {
				bailout("bad value \"$value\" for key \"$key\"")
						if ($value && !-x (split(/\s+/,$value))[0]);
				$options{$key}=$value;
	    }
			# full program path
			elsif ($key eq "gpg")
			{
				bailout("bad value \"$value\" for key \"$key\": not executable")
						if (!-x $value);
				$options{$key} = $value;
			}
	    # program with %s escape
	    elsif ($key =~ /^(query-secret|flush-secret)$/)
	    {
				my ($cmd,$args)=split(/\s+/,$value,2);
				bailout("bad value \"$value\" for key \"$key\"")
						if (!-x $cmd || $args!~/%s/);
				$options{$key}=$value;
	    }
	    # dirs to create
	    elsif ($key=~/^(queuedir|tempdir)$/)
	    {
				$options{$key}=$value;
	    }
	    # the rest are special cases
	    elsif ($key eq "defaultkey")
	    {
				bailout("bad value \"$value\" for key \"$key\"")
						if ($value !~ /^(0x)?[a-f0-9]+$/i);
				$options{$key}=$value;
	    }
	    elsif ($key eq "defaultaction")
	    {
				bailout("bad value \"$value\" for key \"$key\"")
						if ($value!~/^(fallback|fallback-all|signonly|none|mustencrypt)$/);
				$options{$key}=$value;
	    }
	    elsif ($key eq "syslog")
	    {
				# syslog: nothing or a facility
				bailout("bad value \"$value\" for key \"$key\"")
						if ($value &&
								$value!~/^(authpriv|cron|daemon|ftp|kern|local[0-7]|lpr|mail|news|syslog|user|uucp)$/);
				$options{$key}=$value;
	    }
	    elsif ($key eq "logfile")
	    {
				bailout("bad value \"$value\" for key \"$key\"")
						if (-e $value && !-w $value);

				if ($config{$key} ne $value) # deal with changing logfiles
				{
					close($config{logfh}) if (defined $config{logfh});
					delete $config{logfh};
				}
				$options{$key}=$value;
	    }
	    dlogit("got config $key=$value");
		}
	}

	# post-config-reading sanity checking
	if ($options{msserver} && $options{msuser})
	{
		bailout("smtp auth requires mspass or mspass-from-query-secret options")
				if (!$options{mspass} && !$options{"mspass-from-query-secret"});
	}

	# post-config-reading directory fixes
	for my $v ($options{queuedir}, $options{tempdir})
	{
		if (!-d $v)
		{
	    mkdir($v,0700) or bailout("cannot create directory $v: $!\n");
		}
		my @stat=stat($v);
		if ($stat[4] != $< or ($stat[2]&0777) != 0700)
		{
	    bailout("directory $v does not belong to you or has bad mode.");
		}
	}

	$options{overrides}=\@over;
	return %options;
}

sub rewrite_conf
{
	my @old=@_;

	my ($fh,$fn)=mkstemp(($ENV{'TMPDIR'}?$ENV{'TMPDIR'}:"/tmp")."/config.XXXX");
	my %xlat=qw(NGKEY defaultkey
		GETSECRET query-secret
		DELSECRET flush-secret
		MTA msp
		ALWAYSTRUST alwaystrust
		INTERVAL interval
		TEMPDIR tempdir
		QUEUEDIR queuedir
		LOGFILE logfile
		IDENTIFY identify);

	for (@old)
	{
		chomp;
		next if (/^\#/ || /^\s*$/); # strip comments and empty lines

		if (/^(\S+)\s+((none|std(sign)?|ng(sign)?|fallback)(-force)?)\s*$/)
		{
	    my ($k,$v)=($1,$2);
	    $v=~s/(std|ng)sign/signonly/;
	    $v=~s/(std|ng)/fallback/;
	    $v=~s/fallback-force/fallback-all/;

	    print $fh ($k eq "DEFAULT"?"defaultaction":" $k")." $v\n\n";
		}
		elsif (/^([[:upper:]]+)\s+(\S.*)\s*$/)
		{
	    my ($k,$v)=($1,$2);
	    if ($xlat{$k})
	    {
				$k=$xlat{$k};
				print $fh "$k $v\n\n";
	    }
		}
    }
	close $fh;
	return $fn;
}

# read keyring
# needs global %config,$debug
# returns email-to-keyid hash, bails out on error
sub read_keyring
{
	my %badcauses=('i'=>'invalid, no selfsig','d'=>'disabled',
								 'r'=>'revoked','e'=>'expired');
	my %email2key;										# email address to key id

	logit("reading keyring...");
	my $tf="$config{tempdir}/subproc";

	my @tmp=`$config{gpg} -q --batch --list-keys --with-colons --no-expensive-trust-checks 2>$tf`;
	bailout("keyring reading failed: $?",(-r $tf && readfile($tf)))
			if ($? or $? >> 8);
	logit("finished reading keyring");
	unlink($tf);

	my $lastkey;
	foreach (@tmp)
	{
		# gpg docs say output is utf8-encoded
		my $native = Encode::decode('utf-8', $_, Encode::FB_DEFAULT);
		my @info=split(/:/, $native);
		# only public keys and uids are of interest
		next if ($info[0] ne "pub" && $info[0] ne "uid");
		undef $lastkey if ($info[0] eq "pub"); # clean slate, before the skipping begins

		$info[9] =~ s/\\x3a/:/g; # re-insert colons, please

		# ignore expired, revoked and other bad keys
		if (my $skip = $badcauses{$info[1]})
		{
			my $msg = "ignoring $info[0] "
					. ($info[4]? "key 0x$info[4] " : "")
					. ($info[9]? "address $info[9] " : "") . ", reason: $skip";
			&logit($msg);
			dlogit($msg);
			next;
		}

		# if no address given: remember this key and look at the uids for addresses
		my $address = lc($2) if ($info[9] =~ /(^|\s|<)([^\s<]+\@[^\s>]+)>?/);

		# check the key: public part or uid?
		if ($info[0] eq "pub")
		{
			$lastkey = $info[4];
			if ($address)
	    {
				$email2key{$address}="0x$lastkey";
				dlogit("got key 0x$lastkey for $address");
	    }
	    else
	    {
				dlogit("memorised key 0x$lastkey, no address known yet");
	    }
		}
		else
		{
	    # uid: associate the current address with the key
	    # given in the most recent public key line
	    if ($address && $lastkey)
	    {
				$email2key{$address}="0x$lastkey";
				dlogit("got key (uid) 0x$lastkey for $address");
	    }
	    else
	    {
				dlogit("ignoring uid without valid address or valid key: $native");
	    }
		}
	}
	return %email2key;
}

# send this mime entity out
# if msserver+port known: use smtp, envelope from is $from
# otherwise use local msp program with @recips
# uses global %config
# returns nothing if ok, @error messages otherwise
sub send_entity
{
	my ($ent,$from,@recips,)=@_;


	if ($config{msserver} && $config{msport})
	{
		my $dom=hostname;

		$IO::Socket::SSL::DEBUG = 3 if ($config{ssl} && $debug);
		my $s=Net::SMTP->new( $config{msserver},
													Port => $config{msport},
													Hello => $dom,
													SSL => (defined $config{ssl} && $config{ssl} eq "ssl"? 1 : undef),
													SSL_key_file => $config{"ssl-key"},
													SSL_cert_file => $config{"ssl-cert"},
													SSL_ca_file => $config{"ssl-ca"},
													Debug => $debug);
		return("Cannot connect to mail server ".$config{msserver}.": $@")
				if (!$s);
		# do negotiate starttls if asked to
		if (defined $config{ssl} && $config{ssl} eq "starttls")
		{
			$s->starttls or return ("Cannot negotiate STARTTLS: $@");
		}
		# do smtp auth if asked to
		if ($config{msuser})
		{
	    my $authed;
	    while (!$authed)
	    {
				if (!$config{mspass} && $config{"mspass-from-query-secret"})
				{
					my $cmd=sprintf($config{"query-secret"},"smtp-password");
					$config{mspass}=`$cmd`;

					return("Couldn't get smtp password via query-secret: $!")
							if (!$config{mspass});
					chomp($config{mspass});
				}

				$authed=$s->auth($config{msuser},$config{mspass});

				# bailout if we can't requery
				if (!$authed)
				{
					# get rid of the apparently dud password and try again
					delete $config{mspass};
					if ($config{"mspass-from-query-secret"})
					{
						my $cmd=sprintf($config{"flush-secret"},"smtp-password");
						system($cmd);	# ignore the flushing result; best effort only
					}
					else
					{
						return("SMTP auth failed: ".$s->code." ".$s->message);
					}
				}
	    }
		}

		$s->mail($from)
				or return("Mailserver rejected our from address \"$from\": ".$s->code." ".$s->message);
		my @okrecips=$s->to(@recips, { SkipBad => 1 });
		if (@okrecips != @recips)
		{
	    my %seen;
	    map { $seen{$_}=1; } (@recips);
	    map { ++$seen{$_}; } (@okrecips);
	    my @missed=grep $seen{$_}==1, keys %seen;

	    return ("Mailserver rejected some recipients!",
							"rejected: ".join(", ",@missed),
							"info: ".$s->code." ".$s->message);
		}
		$s->data($ent->as_string) or return("Mailserver rejected our data: ".$s->code." ".$s->message);
		$s->quit;
	}
	else
	{
		# pipeline to msp, but we do it ourselves: safe cmd handling
		my $pid=open(TOMTA,"|-");
		return("Can't open pipe to MSP: $!") if (!defined $pid);
		if ($pid)
		{
	    $ent->print(\*TOMTA);
	    close(TOMTA) || return("Error talking to MSP: $?");
		}
		else
		{
	    my @cmd=split(/\s+/,$config{msp});
	    push @cmd,'-f',$from;
	    push @cmd,@recips;
	    exec(@cmd) or return("Error executing MSP: $!");
		}
	}
	return;
}

# sign or sign+encrypt a file
# input: sign key, infile and outfile path, recipient keys if encryption wanted.
# input must be existing filename, outfile must not exist.
# signkey overrides config-defaultkey, and is optional.
# uses global %config
# returns: (undef,hashalgname) if ok, (1,undef) if bad passphrase,
#(2,errorinfo) otherwise
sub sign_encrypt
{
	my ($signkey,$infile,$outfile,@recips)=@_;
	my @cmd = ($config{gpg},qw(-q -t -a --batch --status-fd 2));
	my ($precmd,$pid);

	push @cmd,"--always-trust" if ($config{alwaystrust});
	$signkey=$config{defaultkey} if ($config{defaultkey} && !$signkey);
	push @cmd,"--default-key",$signkey if ($signkey);

	# should we leave the passphrase handling to gpg/gpg-agent?
	# otherwise, we run a query program in a pipeline
	# after determining what passphrase gpg is looking for
	if ($config{"use-agent"})
	{
		push @cmd,"--use-agent";
	}

	if (@recips)
	{
		push @cmd, qw(--encrypt --sign), map { ("-r",$_) } (@recips);
	}
	else
	{
		push @cmd,"--detach-sign";
	}

	if (!$config{"use-agent"})
	{
		# now determine which passphrase to query for:
		# run gpg once without data, and analyze the status text
		$pid=open(F,"-|");
		if (!defined $pid)
		{
	    return (2,"Could not run gpg: $!");
		}
		elsif (!$pid)
		{
	    # child: dup stderr to stdout and exec gpg
	    open STDERR, ">&",\*STDOUT
					or bailout("Can't dup2 stderr onto stdout: $!\n");
	    exec(@cmd) or bailout("exec gpg failed: $!\n");
		}
		# read the status stuff in and determine the passphrase required
		for my $l (<F>)
		{
	    if ($l=~/^\[GNUPG:\] NEED_PASSPHRASE ([a-fA-F0-9]+) ([a-fA-F0-9]+) \d+ \d+$/)
	    {
				$precmd=sprintf($config{"query-secret"},"0x$2");
				push @cmd,"--passphrase-fd",0;
				last;
	    }
		}
		close(F);
	}
	push @cmd,"-o",$outfile,$infile;

	# now run gpg, read back stdout/stderr
	$pid=open(F,"-|");
	if (!defined $pid)
	{
		return (2, "Could not run gpg: $!");
	}
	elsif (!$pid)
	{
		# with agent: simply run gpg
		if ($config{"use-agent"})
		{
	    # collapse stderr and stdout
	    open STDERR, ">&",\*STDOUT
					or bailout("can't dup2 stderr onto stdout: $!\n");
	    exec(@cmd) or bailout("exec gpg failed: $!\n");
		}
		else
		{
	    # without agent: run the query program
	    # in yet another pipeline to gpg

	    # read from child: query prog in child
	    # whereas we run gpg
	    my $pidc=open(G,"-|");
	    if (!defined($pidc))
	    {
				bailout("Error: couldn't fork: $!\n");
	    }
	    elsif (!$pidc)
	    {
				# child: run query prog with stderr separated
				exec($precmd) or die("exec $precmd failed: $!\n");
	    }
	    # parent: we run gpg
	    # dup stderr to stdout and exec gpg
	    open STDERR, ">&",\*STDOUT
					or bailout("can't dup2 stderr onto stdout: $!\n");
	    open STDIN, ">&", \*G
					or bailout("can't dup stdin onto child-pipe: $!\n");
	    exec(@cmd) or bailout("exec gpg failed: $!\n");
		}
	}
	# outermost parent: read gpg status info
	my @output;
	eval {
		local $SIG{ALRM}=sub { die "alarm\n"; };
		alarm $timeout;
		@output=<F>;
		alarm 0;
		close(F);
	};
	if ($@)
	{
		logit("gpg timeout!");
		kill("TERM",$pid);
		return (1, undef);
	}
	elsif ($? or $?>>8)
	{
		#  no complaints if gpg just dislikes the passphrase
		return (1,undef)
				if (grep(/(MISSING|BAD)_PASSPHRASE/,@output));

		return (2,"gpg terminated with $?",
						"Detailed error messages:",@output);
	}

	if (my @infoline = grep(/^\[GNUPG:\] SIG_CREATED/, @output))
	{
		# output format:
		# [GNUPG:] SIG_CREATED <type> <pubkey algo> <hash algo> <class> <timestamp> <key fpr>
		my @infoparts = split(/\s+/,$infoline[0]);

		# from rfc4880, section 9.4. required for multipart/signed
		# to translate gpg's numeric status output into names that
		# rfc3156 likes
		my %hashalgos = (
			1 => "pgp-md5",
			2 => "pgp-sha1",
			3 => "pgp-ripemd160",
			8 => "pgp-sha256",
			9 => "pgp-sha384",
			10 => "pgp-sha512",
			11 => "pgp-sha224", );

		my $hashname = $hashalgos{$infoparts[4]};
		return (undef,$hashname) if defined $hashname;
	}

	# cheap catch-all, including unknown hash algo identifiers
	return (2, "gpg did not complete the operation",
					"Detailed error messages:",@output);
}

# logs the argument strings to syslog and/or the logfile
# uses global %config
# output encoding is whatever the locale specifies, fallback is to use replacement characters
# returns nothing
sub logit
{
	my (@msgs)=@_;

	if ($config{logfile}) 	# our own logfile?
	{
		if (!$config{logfh})	# not open yet?
		{
	    $config{logfh}=FileHandle->new(">> $config{logfile}");
	    die "can't open logfile $config{logfile}: $!\n"
					if (!$config{logfh});
	    $config{logfh}->autoflush(1);
		}
		# replacement chars, please.
		print { $config{logfh} } scalar(localtime)
				." " .Encode::encode(locale => join("\n\t",@msgs)."\n", Encode::FB_DEFAULT);
	}

	if ($config{syslog})
	{
		setlogsock('unix');
		openlog($progname,"pid,cons",$config{syslog});
		syslog("notice", Encode::encode(locale => join("\n",@msgs), Encode::FB_DEFAULT));
		closelog;
	}
}

# debug log to stderr
# uses the locale-sourced encoding, with replacement character where the encoding doesn't cover the data
sub dlogit
{
	print STDERR Encode::encode(locale => join("\n",@_)."\n", Encode::FB_DEFAULT) if ($debug);
}

# alerts the user of some problem
# this is done via the normal logging channels,
# plus: stderr if can-detach is not set
# plus: email if mail-on-error is set to some email addy
# for email the program name plus first message line are used as subject
# sender and recipient are set to mail-on-error config entry
sub alert
{
	my (@msgs)=@_;

	logit(@msgs);
	if (!$config{"can-detach"})
	{
		print STDERR join("\n\t",@msgs)."\n";
	}
	if ($config{"mail-on-error"})
	{
		my $heading=shift @msgs;
		my $out=join("\n",@msgs);
		my $ent=MIME::Entity->build(From=>$config{"mail-on-error"},
																To=>$config{"mail-on-error"},
																Subject=>($progname.": $heading"),
																Data=>\$out);
		send_entity($ent,$config{"mail-on-error"},$config{"mail-on-error"});
	}
}

# alert of a problem and die
sub bailout
{
	my (@msgs)=@_;
	$msgs[0]="Fatal: ".$msgs[0];
	alert(@msgs);

	# don't bother writing to stderr if alert already took care of that
	exit(1)
			if (!$config{"can-detach"});
	die(scalar(localtime).join("\n\t",@msgs)."\n");
}

# returns pid of new mailserver process
# dies if unsuccessful
sub start_mailserver
{
	# fork off the smtp-to-queue daemon
	my $pid=fork;
	if (!defined($pid))
	{
		bailout("cannot fork: $!\n");
	}
	elsif (!$pid)
	{
		# run mailserver, which does never reload the config
		$0=$listenername;
		open(STDIN, "/dev/null") or die "cannot open /dev/null: $!\n";
		# default sighandlers
		map { $SIG{$_}='DEFAULT'; } qw(USR1 HUP INT QUIT TERM);
		&accept_mail;
	}
	# parent
	return $pid;
}

# run a receive-only mailserver on localhost and spool to queue
# does not terminate except signalled
sub accept_mail
{
	my $server = IO::Socket::INET->new(Listen=>1,
																		 ReuseAddr=>1,
																		 LocalAddr=>"127.0.0.1",
																		 LocalPort=>$config{"maport"},);
	bailout("setting up listening port failed: $!") if (!$server);

	while(my $conn = $server->accept)
	{
		my $esmtp = Net::Server::Mail::ESMTP->new(socket=>$conn);
		$esmtp->register('Net::Server::Mail::ESMTP::plainAUTH');

		$esmtp->set_callback(MAIL=>\&req_auth);
		$esmtp->set_callback(RCPT=>\&req_auth);
		$esmtp->set_callback(AUTH=>\&check_auth);
		$esmtp->set_callback("DATA-INIT"=>\&start_mail);
		$esmtp->set_callback("DATA-PART"=>\&cont_mail);
		$esmtp->set_callback(DATA => \&finish_mail);
		$esmtp->process();
		$conn->close();
	}
}

# small helper for accept_mail, to enforce our submitter credentials
# has to return 0/1
sub check_auth
{
	my ($session,$user,$pwd)=@_;
	return ($user eq $config{'ma-user'} and $pwd eq $config{'ma-pass'});
}

# small helper for accept_mail, to enforce auth in general
# has to return (ok or not, smtp error code, message)
sub req_auth
{
	my ($session,$input)=@_;
	if (!$session->{AUTH}->{completed})
	{
		return(0,530,"5.7.0 Authentication Required");
	}
	return(0,550,"Invalid Address.")
			if (!extract_addresses($input));
	return 1;
}

# small helper for accept_mail, checks the things
# when the DATA command is issued
# has to return (ok or not, smtp error code, message)
sub start_mail
{
	my($session,$data) = @_;

	my @recipients = $session->get_recipients();
	my $sender = $session->get_sender();
	return(0,554,'No recipients given.') if (!@recipients);
	return(0,554,'No sender given.') if (!$sender);

	my $qid=join("",Time::HiRes::gettimeofday);
	my $fn=$config{queuedir}."/".$qid;
	if (!open(F,">$fn"))
	{
		alert("can't open new queuefile $fn: $!");
		return(0,450,"can't create queuefile. please try again later.");
	}
	if (!flock(F,LOCK_NB|LOCK_EX))
	{
		alert("can't lock queuefile $qid: $!");
		return(0,450,"can't lock queuefile. please try again later.");
	}
	print F "X-Kuvert-From: $sender\nX-Kuvert-To: "
			.join(", ",@recipients)."\n";
	logit("queueing email from $sender to ".join(", ",@recipients));

	$session->{DATA}->{qfh}=\*F;
	$session->{DATA}->{qid}=$qid;
	return 1;
}

# small helper for accept_mail, handles interim DATA blobs
sub cont_mail
{
    my ($session,$dr)=@_;
    print {$session->{DATA}->{qfh}} $$dr;
    undef $$dr;
    return 1;
}

# small helper for accept_mail, handles the end
# of the DATA phase
# has to return (ok or not, smtp error code, message)
sub finish_mail
{
	my ($session,$dr)=@_;
	print {$session->{DATA}->{qfh}} $$dr;
	undef $$dr;

	my $qid=$session->{DATA}->{qid};
	if (!close($session->{DATA}->{qfh}))
	{
		alert("could not close queuefile $qid: $!");
		return(0,450,"could not close queuefile");
	}
	logit("finished enqueueing mail $qid");
	return(1,250,"Mail enqueued as $qid");
}


__END__

=pod

=head1 NAME

kuvert - Automatically sign and/or encrypt emails based on the recipients

=head1 SYNOPSIS

kuvert [-d] [-o] [-r|-k] [-c configfile]

=head1 DESCRIPTION

Kuvert is a tool to protect the integrity and secrecy of your outgoing email
independent of your mail client and with minimal user interaction.

It reads mails from its queue (or accepts SMTP submissions),
analyzes the recipients and decides to whom it should encrypt and/or
sign the mail. The resulting mail is coerced into the PGP-MIME framework
defined in RFC3156 and finally sent to your outbound mail server.
Kuvert uses GnuPG for all cryptographic tasks and is designed to interface
cleanly with external secret caching tools.

=head1 OPTIONS

After startup kuvert periodically scans its queue directory and processes
mails from there; depending on your GnuPG passphrase setup kuvert
may daemonize itself. In either case, kuvert runs forever until
actively terminated.

Kuvert's behaviour is configured primarily using a configuration file,
with exception of the following commandline options:

=over

=item -d

Enables debugging mode: extra debugging information is written to STDERR.
(This is independent of normal logging.)

=item -o

Enables one-shot mode: kuvert does not loop forever but processes
only the current queue contents and then exits. Kuvert does also not
start an SMTP listener in this mode.

=item -r

Tells a running kuvert daemon to reload the configuration file
and the gpg keyring. This is equivalent to sending a SIGUSR1 to the
respective process.

=item -k

Tells a running kuvert daemon to terminate cleanly. This is equivalent
to sending a SIGTERM to the respective process.

=item -c <configfile>

Tells kuvert to use the given config file instead of ~/.kuvert.

=back

=head1 OPERATION

At startup kuvert reads its configuration file and your gnugp keyring and
remembers the association of email addresses to keys.

Kuvert then works as a wrapper around your mail transfer agent (MTA):
you author your emails like always but instead of sending them out
directly you submit them to kuvert.

Periodically kuvert scans its queue and processes any email therein.
If your keyring contains a key for a recipient, kuvert will
encrypt and sign the email to that recipient. If no key is available, kuvert
will only (clear/detached-)sign the email. Subsequently, the email
is sent onwards using your MTA program or SMTP.

Emails to be processed can
have any valid MIME structure; kuvert unpacks the
MIME structure losslessly and repacks the (encrypted/signed) mail
into a PGP/MIME object as described in RFC3156. The mail's structure is
preserved. Signature and encryption cover all of the mail content with
the exception of the top-level headers: for example the "Subject" header
will be passed in clear, whereas any body or attached MIME object will be
signed/encrypted.

The encrypt-or-sign decision can be overridden on a per-address basis
using the configuration file or, even more fine-grainedly, by using directives
in the actual email. Kuvert can also be told not to modify an email
at all.

=head2 Submitting Emails to Kuvert

Kuvert primarily relies on mails being dumped into its queue directory.
Kuvert operates on files with numeric file names only. Anything that you
store in its queue directory with such a filename will be treated as containing
a single RFC2822-formatted email.

However, no mainstream MUA supports such a drop-your-files-somewhere scheme,
and therefore kuvert comes with a helper program
called kuvert_submit (see L<kuvert_submit(1)>)  which mimics
sendmail's mail submission
behaviour but feeds to the kuvert queue. If your MUA can be instructed
to run a program for mail submission, kuvert_submit can be used.

Alternatively, you can send your email to kuvert via SMTP. Kuvert comes with
a built-in receive-only mail server, which feeds to the queue directory.
As allowing others to submit emails for your signature would be
silly and dangerous, kuvert's mail server only listens on the localhost IP
address and requires that your MUA uses SMTP Authentication to ensure
that only your submissions are accepted. If your MUA supports SMTP AUTH
PLAIN or LOGIN and can be told to use localhost and a specific port
for outbound email, then you can use this mechanism.

=head2 Transporting Emails Onwards

Kuvert can send outbound emails either by running a local MTA program
or by speaking SMTP to some (fixed) outbound mail server of your choice.

=head2 Recipients, Identities and the SMTP Envelope

In general kuvert identifies recipients using the To, Cc, Bcc and
Resent-To headers of the queued email. If the mechanism you used
to submit the mail to kuvert did explicitely set recipients, then
these B<override> the headers within the email.

This is the case if kuvert_submit is called with a list of recipients
and no -t option and for SMTP submission.

If kuvert enqueues email via inbound SMTP, the SMTP envelope
B<overrides> the email headers: recipients that are present in the
envelope but not the headers are treated as Bcc'd, and recipients listed
in the headers but not the envelope are B<ignored>. Any Resent-To header
is ignored for SMTP-submitted email.

Only if no overriding recipients are given, kuvert checks the mail
for a Resent-To header. If present, the email is sent out immediately
to the Resent-To addresses I<without further processing>. (This is the
standard "bounce" behaviour for MUAs that don't pass
recipients on to an MSP/MTA directly.)

When sending outbound email, kuvert usually uses the From header from
the queued email as identity. If the email was queued via SMTP,
the envelope again B<overrides> the mail headers.

Note that kuvert sets the envelope sender using "-f" if sending email
via a local MTA program; if you are not sufficiently trusted by your MTA
to do such, your mail may get an X-Authentication-Warning header tacked on
that indicates your username and the fact that the envelope was
set explicitely.

=head2 Passphrase Handling

Kuvert does not handle your precious keys' passphrases. You can either
elect to use gpg-agent as an (on-demand or caching) passphrase store, or
you can tell kuvert what program it should run to query for a passphrase
when required. Such a query program will be run in a pipeline to GnuPG, and
kuvert will not access, store or cache the passphrases themselves:
there are better options available for secret caching, for example
the Linux in-kernel keystorage (L<keyctl(1)>).

=head2 How Kuvert Decides What (Not) To Do

For each recipient, kuvert can be told to apply one of
five different action overrides:

=over

=item none

The email is sent as-is (except for configuration directive removal).

=item signonly

The email is (clear/detached-) signed.

=item fallback

The email is encrypted and signed if there is a key available for this
recipient or only signed if not.

=item fallback-all

The email is encrypted and signed if keys are available for B<all>
recipients, or only signed otherwise. Recipients whose action is
set to "none" and Bcc'd recipients are not affected by this action.

The fallback-all action is an "all-or-nothing" action as far as encryption
is concerned and ensures that no mix of encrypted or unencrypted versions
of this email are sent out: if we can we use encryption for everybody, or
otherwise everybody gets it signed (or even unsigned).
(Bcc'd recipients are the exception.)

=item mustencrypt

The mustencrypt action is an "all-or-nothing" action and ensures
that any emails involving such addresses are only sent out if the emmail
can be encrypted for every recipient.

The email is rejected and B<not sent to anybody at all>, if any addresses
are present that have the mustencrypt directive set but where no key is known.
Bcc'd recipients I<are> included in this decision.

This action overrides fallback-all.

=back

=head2 Specifying Actions

Kuvert uses four sources for action specifications:
directives in the individual email addresses,
action directives in the configuration file, an X-Kuvert header in your email,
and finally the default action given in the configuration file.

=over

=item 1.

First kuvert looks for action directives in your configuration file.
Such directives are given as action plus regular expression
to be matched against an address, and the first matching directive is used.

=item 2.

If no matching directive is found, the default action given in
the configuration file is applied.

=item 3.

Kuvert now checks for the presence of an X-Kuvert header: its content
must be an action keyword, which is applied to all recipients of this email
except the ones whose action at this stage is "none".
(In other words: if you specify "no encryption and no signing" for
some addresses, then this cannot be overridden in a blanket fashion.)

=item 4.

Kuvert then analyzes each recipient email address. If an address
has the format
 Some Text "action=someaction" <user@some.host>",
kuvert strips the quoted part and overrides the addressee's
action with someaction.

=item 5.

If any "mustencrypt" recipient action is present, but no key is
known (or given in an override, see section L</"Key Selection">), then the whole mail
is rejected and not sent to anybody.

=item 6.

Finally kuvert checks if any recipient has action "fallback-all". If so,
kuvert

=over

=item a)

checks if any recipients (except Bcc'd) have action "signonly" or
"none". If this is the case, all "fallback" and "fallback-all" actions are downgraded to
"signonly".

=item b)

checks if keys for all recipients (except Bcc'd) are available. If not,
all "fallback" and "fallback-all" actions are downgraded to "signonly".

=back

=item 7.

Recipients which are given in a Bcc: header are always treated independently
and separately from all others (except for mustencrypt):
any "fallback-all" action is downgraded to "fallback" for Bcc'd addresses,
and if encryption is used, the email is encrypted separately so that no record
of the Bcc'd recipient is visible in the email as sent out to the "normal"
recipients. Also, any Bcc: header is removed before sending an email onwards.

=back

=head2 Key Selection

Kuvert depends on the order of keys in your keyring to determine which
key (of potentially many) with a given address should be used for encryption.
By default kuvert uses the B<last> key that it encounters for a given address.
For people who have multiple keys for a single address this can cause
problems, and therefore kuvert has override mechanisms for encryption
key selection: You can specify a key to encrypt to for an address
in the configuration file (see below), or you can override the key selection
for and within a single mail:

If the recipient address is given in the format

 Some Name "key=keyid" <user@some.host>

Kuvert will strip the double-quoted part and use this particular
key for this recipient and for this single email. The keyid must be given as
the hex key identifier. This mechanism overrides
whatever associations your keyring contains and should be used with caution.
Note that both key and action overrides can be given concurrently as a single
comma-separated entry like this:

 Some Name "action=fallback,key=0x12345" <user@some.host>

The signing key can be overridden in a similar fashion: if the From
address contains a "key=B<keyid>" stanza, kuvert will use this key for
signing this single email.

=head1 CONFIGURATION

The kuvert configuration file is plain text,
blank lines and lines that start with "#" are ignored.

The configuration has of two categories: options and address/action
specifications.

=head2 Address and Action

Address+action specifications are given one per line.
Such lines must start with some whitespace, followed
by an address regexp, followed by some whitespace and the action keyword.
For actions "fallback" and "fallback-all" kuvert also allows
you to specify a single key identifier like this: "fallback,0x42BD645D".
The remainder of the line is ignored.

The address regexp is a full Perl regular expression and will be
applied to the raw SMTP address (i.e. not to the comment or name
in the email address), case-insensitively. The regular expression
may need to be anchored with ^ and $; kuvert does not do that for you.
You must give just the core of the regexp (no m// or //), like in this
example:

 # don't confuse mailing list robots
 ^.*-request@.*$	none

The action keyword must be one of "none", "signonly", "fallback", "fallback-all"
or "mustencrypt"; see section L</"How Kuvert Decides What (Not) To Do">
for semantics. Order of action specifications
in the config file is significant: the search terminates on first match.

=head2 Options

Options are given one per line, and option lines must start with
the option name followed by some whitespace. All options are case-sensitive.
Depending on the option content, some or all of the remainder of
the option line will be assigned as option value. Inline comments are
not supported.

In the following list of options angle brackets denote required
arguments like this:

 defaultkey <hexkeyid>

Options that have boolean arguments recognize "1", "on" and "t" as true
and "0", "off", "f" as false (plus their upper-case versions).
Other options have more restricted argument types; kuvert generally
sanity-checks options at startup.

=head2 Known Options

=over

=item syslog <syslog facility or blank>

Whether kuvert should use syslog for logging, and if so, what facility to
use. Default: nothing. This is independent of the logfile option below.
kuvert uses your locale's encoding for all messages sent to syslog.

=item logfile <path or blank>

Whether kuvert should write log messages to a file, appending to it.
Default: not set. This is independent of the syslog option above.
kuvert uses your locale's encoding for saving data to the logfile.

=item mail-on-error <email address or blank>

If kuvert encounters serious or fatal errors, an email is sent back
to this address if set. Default: undef. This email is sent in addition to the
normal logging via syslog or logfile.

=item queuedir <path>

Where kuvert and its helper programs store mails to be processed.
Default: ~/.kuvert_queue. The directory is created if necessary. The directory
must be owned by the user running kuvert and have mode 0700.

=item tempdir <path>

Where kuvert stores temporary files. Default: a directory called
kuvert.<username> in $TMPDIR or /tmp. The directory is created if
necessary, and must be owned by the user running kuvert and have mode 0700.
This directory is completely emptied after processing an email.

=item identify <boolean>

Whether kuvert should add an X-Mailer header to outbound emails.
Default: false. The X-Mailer header consists of the program name and version.

=item preamble <boolean>

Whether kuvert should include an explanatory preamble in the generated
MIME mail. Default: true

=item interval <number>

This sets the queue checking interval in seconds. Default: 60 seconds.

=item msserver <hostname-or-address>

Mail Submission Server for outbound email. Default: unset.
If this is set, kuvert will use SMTP to send outbound emails.
If not set, kuvert uses the mail submission program on the local machine.
See msp below.

=item msport <portnumber>

The TCP port on which the Mail Submission Server listens. Default: 587.
Ignored if msserver is not set.

=item ssl <string>

Whether SSL or STARTTLS are to be used for outbound SMTP submission.
The value must be either "starttls" to use STARTTLS or "ssl" for raw SSL.
SSL encryption is not used if this option is unset.

=item ssl-cert <client cert path.pem>

=item ssl-key <client key path.pem>

=item ssl-ca <ca cert path.pem>

If an SSL client certificate is to be presented to the SMTP server, set
both ssl-cert and ssl-key. If your system-wide CA certificate setup doesn't
include the certificate your SMTP server uses, set ssl-ca to point to a
PEM file containing all the relevant CA certificates. All these are ignored
if the ssl option isn't set.

=item msuser <username>

The username to use for SMTP authentication at the Mail Submission Server.
SMTP Auth is not attempted if msuser isn't set. Ignored if msserver is not
set.

=item mspass <password>

The password for SMTP authentication. Ignored if msserver or msuser are not set.

=item mspass-from-query-secret <boolean>

Whether the mspass should be retrieved using the query-secret program
instead of giving the mspass in the config file. Ignored if msserver or
msuser are not set. If this option is set, the query-secret program will be used to ask for
the "smtp-password" when the first mail is processed. The password will be
cached if authentication succeeds or you will be asked again, until
authentication succeeds.

=item msp <program-path and args>

Defines the program kuvert should use to deliver email.
Default: "/usr/sbin/sendmail -om -oi -oem".
This is ignored if msserver is set. The argument must include the
full path to the program, and the program must accept the common mail transfer
agent arguments as defined in the Linux Standards Base
(see L<http://refspecs.linux-foundation.org/LSB_2.0.0/LSB-Core/LSB-Core.html#BASELIB-SENDMAIL-1>).

=item gpg <program-path>

Defines which custom GnuPG executable kuvert should use.
If this option is given the argument must be a full path to an executable.
Default: "gpg", i.e. anywhere in the path.

=item can-detach <boolean>

Indicates to kuvert that it can background itself on startup,
detaching from the terminal. Default: false.

Detaching works only if your chosen mechanism for passphrase entry
doesn't require interaction via the original terminal. This is the
case if you delegate passphrase handling to gpg-agent and
configure it for X11 pinentry, or if your secret-query program is an
X11 program with its own window.

=item maport <portnumber>

Kuvert can accept email for processing via SMTP. This option sets
the TCP port kuvert listens on (localhost only). Default: 2587.
Ignored if ma-user and ma-pass are not both set. If you want to use this
mechanism, tell your mail program to use localhost or 127.0.0.1 as outgoing
mail server and enable SMTP Authentication (see below).

=item ma-user <username>

This option sets the required SMTP authentication username for accepting
mails via SMTP. Default: undef.
Kuvert does not listen for SMTP submissions unless both ma-user
and ma-pass are set.
Kuvert does not accept emails for processing via SMTP unless you prove your
identity with SMTP Authentication (or anybody on your local machine could
use kuvert to send emails signed by you!). Kuvert currently supports only
AUTH PLAIN and LOGIN (which is not a major problem as we listen on the loopback
interface only). This option sets the username kuvert recognizes as yours.
This can be anything and doesn't have to be a real account name.

=item ma-pass <password>

This option sets the password your mail user agent must use for
SMTP Authentication if submitting mails via SMTP. Default: unset.
Kuvert does not listen for SMTP submissions unless both ma-user
and ma-pass are set. This password does not have to be (actually shouldn't be)
your real account's password. Note that using SMTP submission
requires that you protect your kuvert configuration file with strict
permissions (0600 is suggested).

=item defaultkey <hexkeyid>

Specifies a default key to use as signing key. Default: unset,
which means GnuPG gets to choose (usually the first available secret key).
Can be overridden in the From: address, see section L</"Key Selection">.

=item defaultaction <action>

Which action is to be taken if no overrides are found for a recipient.
Default: none. See section L</"How Kuvert Decides What (Not) To Do"> for recognized actions.

=item alwaystrust <boolean>

Whether gpg should be told to trust all keys for encryption or not.
Default: false.

=item use-agent <boolean>

Whether kuvert should delegate all passphrase handling to the gpg-agent
and call gpg with appropriate options. Default: false.
If not set, kuvert will ask the user (or some nominated passphrase store)
for passphrases on demand.

=item query-secret <program-path and args with %s>

Tells kuvert which program to use for passphrase retrieval.
Default: "/bin/sh -c 'stty -echo; read -p \"Passphrase %s: \" X; \
stty echo; echo $X'"
Ignored if use-agent is set. Kuvert does not store passphrases internally
but rather runs the indicated program in a pipeline with gpg when signing.
If you use a passphrase store (like the Linux-kernel keyutils or secret-agent
or the like), enter your retrieval program here.
The program is run with kuvert's environment, the first %s in the argument
spec is replaced with the hex keyid and the passphrase is expected on stdout.
The exit code is ignored. If can-detach is not set, the program
has access to kuvert's terminal.
Note that the default query program prohibits kuvert from backgrounding itself.

=item flush-secret <program-path and args with %s>

This program is called to invalidate an external passphrase cache if
kuvert is notified by gpg of the passphrase being invalid. Default: undef.
Ignored if use-agent is set. The program is run with kuvert's environment
and with the first %s of its argument spec being replaced by the hex keyid
in question. Its exit code is ignored. If can-detach is not set, the program
has access to kuvert's terminal.

=back

=head1 DIAGNOSTICS

Kuvert usually logs informational messages to syslog and/or its own logfile,
both of which can be disabled and adjusted.

If kuvert detects a fault that makes successful processing of
a particular email impossible, kuvert will report that on STDERR (if not
detached) and also email an error report if the option mail-on-error
is enabled. Such partially or completely unprocessed mails are left
in the queue but are renamed (the name is prefixed with "failed.");
it is up to you to either remove such leftovers or rename them to something
all-numeric once the problem has been resolved.

The behaviour is similar if fatal problems are encountered; after
alerting kuvert will terminate with exit code 1.

=head1 ENVIRONMENT AND SIGNALS

Kuvert itself uses only on environment variable: $TMPDIR provides
the fallback location for kuvert's temporary directory.

Kuvert passes its complete environment to child processes, namely
gpg and any passphrase-query programs.

On reception of SIGUSR1, kuvert reloads its configuration file and keyring.
Any one of SIGHUP, SIGINT, SIGQUIT and SIGTERM causes kuvert to terminate
cleanly, invalidating the passphrases if a query program is used.
All other signals are ignored.

=head1 FILES

=over

=item ~/.kuvert

The configuration file read by kuvert and kuvert_submit.

=item ~/.kuvert_queue

The default queue directory.

=item /tmp/kuvert.pid.E<lt>uidE<gt>

holds the pid of a running kuvert daemon.

=back

=head1 SEE ALSO

L<gpg(1)>, L<kuvert_submit(1)>, RFC3156, RFC4880, RFC2015

=head1 AUTHOR

Alexander Zangerl <az@snafu.priv.at>

=head1 COPYRIGHT AND LICENCE

copyright 1999-2014 Alexander Zangerl <az@snafu.priv.at>

This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2
as published by the Free Software Foundation.

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