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/***************************************************************************
* Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Open Information Security Foundation
* Copyright (c) 2010-2013 Qualys, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
* met:
*
* - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* - Neither the name of the Qualys, Inc. nor the names of its
* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
* this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
* A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
* HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
***************************************************************************/
/**
* @file
* @author Ivan Ristic <ivanr@webkreator.com>
*/
#include "htp_config_auto.h"
#include "htp_private.h"
/**
* Extract one request header. A header can span multiple lines, in
* which case they will be folded into one before parsing is attempted.
*
* @param[in] connp
* @param[in] data
* @param[in] len
* @return HTP_OK or HTP_ERROR
*/
htp_status_t htp_process_request_header_generic(htp_connp_t *connp, unsigned char *data, size_t len) {
// Create a new header structure.
htp_header_t *h = calloc(1, sizeof (htp_header_t));
if (h == NULL) return HTP_ERROR;
// Now try to parse the header.
if (htp_parse_request_header_generic(connp, h, data, len) != HTP_OK) {
free(h);
return HTP_ERROR;
}
#ifdef HTP_DEBUG
fprint_bstr(stderr, "Header name", h->name);
fprint_bstr(stderr, "Header value", h->value);
#endif
// Do we already have a header with the same name?
htp_header_t *h_existing = htp_table_get(connp->in_tx->request_headers, h->name);
if (h_existing != NULL) {
// TODO Do we want to have a list of the headers that are
// allowed to be combined in this way?
if ((h_existing->flags & HTP_FIELD_REPEATED) == 0) {
// This is the second occurence for this header.
htp_log(connp, HTP_LOG_MARK, HTP_LOG_WARNING, 0, "Repetition for header");
} else {
// For simplicity reasons, we count the repetitions of all headers
if (connp->in_tx->req_header_repetitions < HTP_MAX_HEADERS_REPETITIONS) {
connp->in_tx->req_header_repetitions++;
} else {
bstr_free(h->name);
bstr_free(h->value);
free(h);
return HTP_OK;
}
}
// Keep track of repeated same-name headers.
h_existing->flags |= HTP_FIELD_REPEATED;
// Having multiple C-L headers is against the RFC but
// servers may ignore the subsequent headers if the values are the same.
if (bstr_cmp_c_nocase(h->name, "Content-Length") == 0) {
// Don't use string comparison here because we want to
// ignore small formatting differences.
int64_t existing_cl = htp_parse_content_length(h_existing->value, NULL);
int64_t new_cl = htp_parse_content_length(h->value, NULL);
// Ambiguous response C-L value.
if ((existing_cl == -1) || (new_cl == -1) || (existing_cl != new_cl)) {
htp_log(connp, HTP_LOG_MARK, HTP_LOG_WARNING, 0, "Ambiguous request C-L value");
}
// Ignoring the new C-L header that has the same value as the previous ones.
} else {
// Add to the existing header.
bstr *new_value = bstr_expand(h_existing->value, bstr_len(h_existing->value) + 2 + bstr_len(h->value));
if (new_value == NULL) {
bstr_free(h->name);
bstr_free(h->value);
free(h);
return HTP_ERROR;
}
h_existing->value = new_value;
bstr_add_mem_noex(h_existing->value, ", ", 2);
bstr_add_noex(h_existing->value, h->value);
}
// The new header structure is no longer needed.
bstr_free(h->name);
bstr_free(h->value);
free(h);
} else {
// Add as a new header.
if (htp_table_add(connp->in_tx->request_headers, h->name, h) != HTP_OK) {
bstr_free(h->name);
bstr_free(h->value);
free(h);
}
}
return HTP_OK;
}
/**
* Generic request header parser.
*
* @param[in] connp
* @param[in] h
* @param[in] data
* @param[in] len
* @return HTP_OK or HTP_ERROR
*/
htp_status_t htp_parse_request_header_generic(htp_connp_t *connp, htp_header_t *h, unsigned char *data, size_t len) {
size_t name_start, name_end;
size_t value_start, value_end;
htp_chomp(data, &len);
name_start = 0;
// Look for the colon.
size_t colon_pos = 0;
while ((colon_pos < len) && (data[colon_pos] != '\0') && (data[colon_pos] != ':')) colon_pos++;
if ((colon_pos == len) || (data[colon_pos] == '\0')) {
// Missing colon.
h->flags |= HTP_FIELD_UNPARSEABLE;
// Log only once per transaction.
if (!(connp->in_tx->flags & HTP_FIELD_UNPARSEABLE)) {
connp->in_tx->flags |= HTP_FIELD_UNPARSEABLE;
htp_log(connp, HTP_LOG_MARK, HTP_LOG_WARNING, 0, "Request field invalid: colon missing");
}
// We handle this case as a header with an empty name, with the value equal
// to the entire input string.
// TODO Apache will respond to this problem with a 400.
// Now extract the name and the value
h->name = bstr_dup_c("");
if (h->name == NULL) return HTP_ERROR;
h->value = bstr_dup_mem(data, len);
if (h->value == NULL) {
bstr_free(h->name);
return HTP_ERROR;
}
return HTP_OK;
}
if (colon_pos == 0) {
// Empty header name.
h->flags |= HTP_FIELD_INVALID;
// Log only once per transaction.
if (!(connp->in_tx->flags & HTP_FIELD_INVALID)) {
connp->in_tx->flags |= HTP_FIELD_INVALID;
htp_log(connp, HTP_LOG_MARK, HTP_LOG_WARNING, 0, "Request field invalid: empty name");
}
}
name_end = colon_pos;
// Ignore LWS after field-name.
size_t prev = name_end;
while ((prev > name_start) && (htp_is_lws(data[prev - 1]))) {
// LWS after header name.
prev--;
name_end--;
h->flags |= HTP_FIELD_INVALID;
// Log only once per transaction.
if (!(connp->in_tx->flags & HTP_FIELD_INVALID)) {
connp->in_tx->flags |= HTP_FIELD_INVALID;
htp_log(connp, HTP_LOG_MARK, HTP_LOG_WARNING, 0, "Request field invalid: LWS after name");
}
}
// Header value.
value_start = colon_pos;
// Go over the colon.
if (value_start < len) {
value_start++;
}
// Ignore LWS before field-content.
while ((value_start < len) && (htp_is_lws(data[value_start]))) {
value_start++;
}
// Look for the end of field-content.
value_end = len;
// Ignore LWS after field-content.
prev = value_end - 1;
while ((prev > value_start) && (htp_is_lws(data[prev]))) {
prev--;
value_end--;
}
// Check that the header name is a token.
size_t i = name_start;
while (i < name_end) {
if (!htp_is_token(data[i])) {
// Incorrectly formed header name.
h->flags |= HTP_FIELD_INVALID;
// Log only once per transaction.
if (!(connp->in_tx->flags & HTP_FIELD_INVALID)) {
connp->in_tx->flags |= HTP_FIELD_INVALID;
htp_log(connp, HTP_LOG_MARK, HTP_LOG_WARNING, 0, "Request header name is not a token");
}
break;
}
i++;
}
// Now extract the name and the value
h->name = bstr_dup_mem(data + name_start, name_end - name_start);
if (h->name == NULL) return HTP_ERROR;
h->value = bstr_dup_mem(data + value_start, value_end - value_start);
if (h->value == NULL) {
bstr_free(h->name);
return HTP_ERROR;
}
return HTP_OK;
}
/**
* Generic request line parser.
*
* @param[in] connp
* @return HTP_OK or HTP_ERROR
*/
htp_status_t htp_parse_request_line_generic(htp_connp_t *connp) {
return htp_parse_request_line_generic_ex(connp, 0 /* NUL does not terminates line */);
}
htp_status_t htp_parse_request_line_generic_ex(htp_connp_t *connp, int nul_terminates) {
htp_tx_t *tx = connp->in_tx;
unsigned char *data = bstr_ptr(tx->request_line);
size_t len = bstr_len(tx->request_line);
size_t pos = 0;
size_t mstart = 0;
size_t start;
size_t bad_delim;
if (nul_terminates) {
// The line ends with the first NUL byte.
size_t newlen = 0;
while ((pos < len) && (data[pos] != '\0')) {
pos++;
newlen++;
}
// Start again, with the new length.
len = newlen;
pos = 0;
}
// skip past leading whitespace. IIS allows this
while ((pos < len) && htp_is_space(data[pos])) pos++;
if (pos) {
htp_log(connp, HTP_LOG_MARK, HTP_LOG_WARNING, 0, "Request line: leading whitespace");
mstart = pos;
if (connp->cfg->requestline_leading_whitespace_unwanted != HTP_UNWANTED_IGNORE) {
// reset mstart so that we copy the whitespace into the method
mstart = 0;
// set expected response code to this anomaly
tx->response_status_expected_number = connp->cfg->requestline_leading_whitespace_unwanted;
}
}
// The request method starts at the beginning of the
// line and ends with the first whitespace character.
while ((pos < len) && (!htp_is_space(data[pos]))) pos++;
// No, we don't care if the method is empty.
tx->request_method = bstr_dup_mem(data + mstart, pos - mstart);
if (tx->request_method == NULL) return HTP_ERROR;
#ifdef HTP_DEBUG
fprint_raw_data(stderr, __func__, bstr_ptr(tx->request_method), bstr_len(tx->request_method));
#endif
tx->request_method_number = htp_convert_method_to_number(tx->request_method);
bad_delim = 0;
// Ignore whitespace after request method. The RFC allows
// for only one SP, but then suggests any number of SP and HT
// should be permitted. Apache uses isspace(), which is even
// more permitting, so that's what we use here.
while ((pos < len) && (isspace(data[pos]))) {
if (!bad_delim && data[pos] != 0x20) {
bad_delim++;
}
pos++;
}
// Too much performance overhead for fuzzing
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
if (bad_delim) {
htp_log(connp, HTP_LOG_MARK, HTP_LOG_WARNING, 0, "Request line: non-compliant delimiter between Method and URI");
}
#endif
// Is there anything after the request method?
if (pos == len) {
// No, this looks like a HTTP/0.9 request.
tx->is_protocol_0_9 = 1;
tx->request_protocol_number = HTP_PROTOCOL_0_9;
if (tx->request_method_number == HTP_M_UNKNOWN)
htp_log(connp, HTP_LOG_MARK, HTP_LOG_WARNING, 0, "Request line: unknown method only");
return HTP_OK;
}
start = pos;
bad_delim = 0;
if (tx->connp->cfg->allow_space_uri) {
pos = len - 1;
// Skips the spaces at the end of line (after protocol)
while (pos > start && htp_is_space(data[pos])) pos--;
// The URI ends with the last whitespace.
while ((pos > start) && (data[pos] != 0x20)) {
if (!bad_delim && htp_is_space(data[pos])) {
bad_delim++;
}
pos--;
}
/* if we've seen some 'bad' delimiters, we retry with those */
if (bad_delim && pos == start) {
// special case: even though RFC's allow only SP (0x20), many
// implementations allow other delimiters, like tab or other
// characters that isspace() accepts.
pos = len - 1;
while ((pos > start) && (!htp_is_space(data[pos]))) pos--;
} else {
// reset bad_delim found in protocol part
bad_delim = 0;
for (size_t i = start; i < pos; i++) {
if (data[i] != 0x20 && htp_is_space(data[i])) {
bad_delim = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (bad_delim) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
// warn regardless if we've seen non-compliant chars
htp_log(connp, HTP_LOG_MARK, HTP_LOG_WARNING, 0, "Request line: URI contains non-compliant delimiter");
#endif
} else if (pos == start) {
pos = len;
}
} else {
// The URI ends with the first whitespace.
while ((pos < len) && (data[pos] != 0x20)) {
if (!bad_delim && htp_is_space(data[pos])) {
bad_delim++;
}
pos++;
}
/* if we've seen some 'bad' delimiters, we retry with those */
if (bad_delim && pos == len) {
// special case: even though RFC's allow only SP (0x20), many
// implementations allow other delimiters, like tab or other
// characters that isspace() accepts.
pos = start;
while ((pos < len) && (!htp_is_space(data[pos]))) pos++;
}
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
if (bad_delim) {
// warn regardless if we've seen non-compliant chars
htp_log(connp, HTP_LOG_MARK, HTP_LOG_WARNING, 0, "Request line: URI contains non-compliant delimiter");
}
#endif
}
tx->request_uri = bstr_dup_mem(data + start, pos - start);
if (tx->request_uri == NULL) return HTP_ERROR;
#ifdef HTP_DEBUG
fprint_raw_data(stderr, __func__, bstr_ptr(tx->request_uri), bstr_len(tx->request_uri));
#endif
// Ignore whitespace after URI.
while ((pos < len) && (htp_is_space(data[pos]))) pos++;
// Is there protocol information available?
if (pos == len) {
// No, this looks like a HTTP/0.9 request.
tx->is_protocol_0_9 = 1;
tx->request_protocol_number = HTP_PROTOCOL_0_9;
if (tx->request_method_number == HTP_M_UNKNOWN)
htp_log(connp, HTP_LOG_MARK, HTP_LOG_WARNING, 0, "Request line: unknown method and no protocol");
return HTP_OK;
}
// The protocol information continues until the end of the line.
tx->request_protocol = bstr_dup_mem(data + pos, len - pos);
if (tx->request_protocol == NULL) return HTP_ERROR;
tx->request_protocol_number = htp_parse_protocol(tx->request_protocol);
if (tx->request_method_number == HTP_M_UNKNOWN && tx->request_protocol_number == HTP_PROTOCOL_INVALID)
htp_log(connp, HTP_LOG_MARK, HTP_LOG_WARNING, 0, "Request line: unknown method and invalid protocol");
#ifdef HTP_DEBUG
fprint_raw_data(stderr, __func__, bstr_ptr(tx->request_protocol), bstr_len(tx->request_protocol));
#endif
return HTP_OK;
}
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