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/*
* support.c
*
* Support functions for pam_krb5
*/
#include "config.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <krb5.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#include <security/pam_modules.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "pam_krb5.h"
/*
* Given the context (if any), the PAM arguments and the user we're
* authenticating, see if we should ignore that user because they're root or
* have a low-numbered UID and we were configured to ignore such users.
* Returns true if we should ignore them, false otherwise.
*/
int
pamk5_should_ignore(struct context *ctx, struct pam_args *args,
const char *username)
{
struct passwd *pwd;
if (args->ignore_root && strcmp("root", username) == 0) {
pamk5_debug(ctx, args, "ignoring root user");
return 1;
}
if (args->minimum_uid > 0) {
pwd = getpwnam(username);
if (pwd != NULL && pwd->pw_uid < args->minimum_uid) {
pamk5_debug(ctx, args, "ignoring low-UID user (%d < %d)",
pwd->pw_uid, args->minimum_uid);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Used to support trying each principal in the .k5login file. Read through
* each line that parses correctly as a principal and use the provided
* password to try to authenticate as that user. If at any point we succeed,
* fill out creds, set princ to the successful principal in the context, and
* return PAM_SUCCESS. Otherwise, return PAM_AUTH_ERR for a general
* authentication error or PAM_SERVICE_ERR for a system error. If
* PAM_AUTH_ERR is returned, retval will be filled in with the Kerberos error
* if available, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
k5login_password_auth(struct context *ctx, krb5_creds *creds,
krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opts, char *in_tkt_service,
char *pass, int *retval)
{
char *filename;
char line[BUFSIZ];
size_t len;
FILE *k5login;
struct passwd *pwd;
struct stat st;
int k5_errno;
krb5_principal princ;
/* Assume no Kerberos error. */
*retval = 0;
/*
* C sucks at string manipulation. Generate the filename for the user's
* .k5login file. This function always fails if the user isn't a local
* user.
*/
pwd = getpwnam(ctx->name);
if (pwd == NULL)
return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
len = strlen(pwd->pw_dir) + strlen("/.k5login");
filename = malloc(len + 1);
if (filename == NULL)
return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
strncpy(filename, pwd->pw_dir, len);
filename[len] = '\0';
strncat(filename, "/.k5login", len - strlen(pwd->pw_dir));
/* If there is no file, do this the easy way. */
if (access(filename, R_OK) != 0) {
k5_errno = krb5_parse_name(ctx->context, ctx->name, &ctx->princ);
if (k5_errno != 0)
return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
*retval = krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx->context, creds,
ctx->princ, pass, pamk5_prompter_krb5, ctx->pamh, 0,
in_tkt_service, opts);
return (*retval == 0) ? PAM_SUCCESS : PAM_AUTH_ERR;
}
/*
* Make sure the ownership on .k5login is okay. The user must own their
* own .k5login or it must be owned by root.
*/
k5login = fopen(filename, "r");
free(filename);
if (k5login == NULL)
return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
if (fstat(fileno(k5login), &st) != 0)
goto fail;
if (st.st_uid != 0 && (st.st_uid != pwd->pw_uid))
goto fail;
/*
* Parse the .k5login file and attempt authentication for each principal.
* Ignore any lines that are too long or that don't parse into a Kerberos
* principal.
*/
while (fgets(line, BUFSIZ, k5login) != NULL) {
len = strlen(line);
if (line[len - 1] != '\n') {
while (fgets(line, BUFSIZ, k5login) != NULL) {
len = strlen(line);
if (line[len - 1] == '\n')
break;
}
continue;
}
line[len - 1] = '\0';
k5_errno = krb5_parse_name(ctx->context, line, &princ);
if (k5_errno != 0)
continue;
/* Now, attempt to authenticate as that user. */
*retval = krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx->context, creds,
princ, pass, pamk5_prompter_krb5, ctx->pamh, 0,
in_tkt_service, opts);
/*
* If that worked, update ctx->princ and return success. Otherwise,
* continue on to the next line.
*/
if (*retval == 0) {
if (ctx->princ)
krb5_free_principal(ctx->context, ctx->princ);
ctx->princ = princ;
fclose(k5login);
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
krb5_free_principal(ctx->context, princ);
}
fail:
fclose(k5login);
return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
}
/*
* Prompt the user for a password and authenticate the password with the KDC.
* If correct, fill in credlist with the obtained TGT or ticket.
* in_tkt_service, if non-NULL, specifies the service to get tickets for; the
* only interesting non-null case is kadmin/changepw for changing passwords.
* Therefore, if it is non-null, we look for the password in PAM_OLDAUTHOK and
* save it there instead of using PAM_AUTHTOK.
*/
int
pamk5_password_auth(struct context *ctx, struct pam_args *args,
char *in_tkt_service, struct credlist **credlist)
{
krb5_get_init_creds_opt opts;
krb5_creds creds;
krb5_verify_init_creds_opt verify_opts;
int retval, retry, success;
char *pass = NULL;
int authtok = in_tkt_service == NULL ? PAM_AUTHTOK : PAM_OLDAUTHTOK;
/* Bail if we should be ignoring this user. */
if (pamk5_should_ignore(ctx, args, ctx->name)) {
retval = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
goto done;
}
pamk5_credlist_new(ctx, credlist);
memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(krb5_creds));
/* Set ticket options. */
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_init(&opts);
#ifdef HAVE_KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_SET_DEFAULT_FLAGS
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_default_flags(ctx->context, "pam",
args->realm_data, &opts);
#endif
if (args->forwardable)
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_forwardable(&opts, 1);
if (args->renew_lifetime != 0)
krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_renew_life(&opts, args->renew_lifetime);
/* Fill in the principal to authenticate as. */
retval = krb5_parse_name(ctx->context, ctx->name, &ctx->princ);
if (retval != 0) {
pamk5_debug_krb5(ctx, args, "krb5_parse_name", retval);
retval = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
goto done;
}
/*
* If try_first_pass or use_first_pass is set, grab the old password (if
* set) instead of prompting. If try_first_pass is set, and the old
* password doesn't work, prompt for the password (loop).
*
* pass is a char * so &pass is a char **, which due to the stupid C type
* rules isn't convertable to a const void **. If we cast directly to a
* const void **, gcc complains about type-punned pointers, even though
* void and char shouldn't worry about that rule. So cast it to a void *
* to turn off type-checking entirely.
*/
retry = args->try_first_pass ? 1 : 0;
if (args->try_first_pass || args->use_first_pass || args->use_authtok)
retval = pam_get_item(ctx->pamh, authtok, (void *) &pass);
if (args->use_authtok && retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pamk5_debug_pam(ctx, args, "no stored password", retval);
retval = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
goto done;
}
do {
if (pass == NULL) {
retry = 0;
retval = pamk5_prompt(ctx->pamh, "Password: ",
PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF, &pass);
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pamk5_debug_pam(ctx, args, "error getting password", retval);
retval = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
goto done;
}
/* Set this for the next PAM module's try_first_pass. */
retval = pam_set_item(ctx->pamh, authtok, pass);
memset(pass, 0, strlen(pass));
free(pass);
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pamk5_debug_pam(ctx, args, "error storing password", retval);
retval = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
goto done;
}
pam_get_item(ctx->pamh, authtok, (void *) &pass);
}
/* Get a TGT */
if (args->search_k5login) {
success = k5login_password_auth(ctx, &creds, &opts,
in_tkt_service, pass, &retval);
} else {
retval = krb5_get_init_creds_password(ctx->context,
&creds, ctx->princ, pass, pamk5_prompter_krb5,
ctx->pamh, 0, in_tkt_service, &opts);
success = (retval == 0) ? PAM_SUCCESS : PAM_AUTH_ERR;
}
if (success == PAM_SUCCESS) {
retval = pamk5_credlist_append(ctx, credlist, creds);
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto done;
break;
}
pass = NULL;
} while (retry && retval == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY);
/*
* Last step. Verify the obtained TGT by obtaining and checking a service
* ticket. This is required to verify that no one is spoofing the KDC,
* but requires read access to a keytab with an appropriate key. By
* default, the Kerberos library will silently succeed if no verification
* keys are available, but the user can change this by setting
* verify_ap_req_nofail in [libdefaults] in /etc/krb5.conf.
*
* Don't do this if we're authenticating for password changes. We can't
* get a service ticket from a kadmin/changepw ticket and the user
* probably isn't going to have access to a keytab to check KDC spoofing
* anyway.
*/
if (retval == 0 && in_tkt_service == NULL) {
krb5_verify_init_creds_opt_init(&verify_opts);
retval = krb5_verify_init_creds(ctx->context, &creds, NULL, NULL,
&ctx->cache, &verify_opts);
if (retval != 0) {
pamk5_error(ctx, "credential verification failed: %s",
pamk5_compat_get_err_text(ctx->context, retval));
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
goto done;
}
}
/* If we failed, return the appropriate PAM error code. */
if (retval != 0) {
pamk5_debug_krb5(ctx, args, "krb5_get_init_creds_password", retval);
if (retval == KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN)
retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
else if (retval == KRB5_KDC_UNREACH)
retval = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
else
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
goto done;
}
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
done:
return retval;
}
/*
* Given a cache name and a credential list, initialize the cache, store the
* credentials in that cache, and return a pointer to the new cache in the
* cache argument. Returns a PAM success or error code.
*/
int
pamk5_ccache_init(struct context *ctx, struct pam_args *args,
const char *ccname, struct credlist *clist,
krb5_ccache *cache)
{
struct credlist *cred;
int retval;
retval = krb5_cc_resolve(ctx->context, ccname, cache);
if (retval != 0) {
pamk5_debug_krb5(ctx, args, "krb5_cc_resolve", retval);
retval = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
goto done;
}
retval = krb5_cc_initialize(ctx->context, *cache, ctx->princ);
if (retval != 0) {
pamk5_debug_krb5(ctx, args, "krb5_cc_initialize", retval);
retval = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
goto done;
}
for (cred = clist; cred != NULL; cred = cred->next) {
retval = krb5_cc_store_cred(ctx->context, *cache, &cred->creds);
if (retval != 0) {
pamk5_debug_krb5(ctx, args, "krb5_cc_store_cred", retval);
retval = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
goto done;
}
}
done:
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS && *cache != NULL)
krb5_cc_destroy(ctx->context, *cache);
return retval;
}
/*
* Get info from the user. Disallow null responses (regardless of flags).
* response is allocated and filled in on successful return. Caller is
* responsible for freeing it.
*/
int
pamk5_prompt(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *prompt, int type,
char **response)
{
int pamret;
struct pam_message msg;
const struct pam_message *pmsg;
struct pam_response *resp = NULL;
struct pam_conv *conv;
pamret = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_CONV, (void *) &conv);
if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS)
return pamret;
pmsg = &msg;
msg.msg_style = type;
msg.msg = prompt;
pamret = conv->conv(1, &pmsg, &resp, conv->appdata_ptr);
if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS)
return pamret;
/* Caller should ignore errors for non-response conversations. */
if (resp == NULL)
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
if (resp->resp == NULL || resp->resp[0] == '\0') {
free(resp);
return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
}
*response = resp->resp;
free(resp);
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* Verify the user authentication. Call krb5_kuserok if this is a local
* account, or do the krb5_aname_to_localname verification if ignore_k5login
* was requested. For non-local accounts, the principal must match the
* authentication identity.
*/
int
pamk5_validate_auth(struct context *ctx, struct pam_args *args)
{
krb5_context c;
struct passwd *pwd;
char kuser[65]; /* MAX_USERNAME == 65 (MIT Kerberos 1.4.1). */
if (ctx == NULL || ctx->context == NULL)
return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
if (ctx->name == NULL)
return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
c = ctx->context;
/*
* If the name to which we're authenticating contains @ (is fully
* qualified), it must match the principal exactly.
*/
if (strchr(ctx->name, '@') != NULL) {
char *principal;
int retval;
retval = krb5_unparse_name(c, ctx->princ, &principal);
if (retval != 0)
return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
if (strcmp(principal, ctx->name) != 0) {
free(principal);
return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
}
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* Otherwise, apply either krb5_aname_to_localname or krb5_kuserok
* depending on the situation.
*/
pwd = getpwnam(ctx->name);
if (args->ignore_k5login || pwd == NULL) {
krb5_context c = ctx->context;
if (krb5_aname_to_localname(c, ctx->princ, sizeof(kuser), kuser) != 0)
return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
if (strcmp(kuser, ctx->name) != 0)
return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
} else {
if (!krb5_kuserok(ctx->context, ctx->princ, ctx->name))
return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
}
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
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