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/*
* libwebsockets - small server side websockets and web server implementation
*
* Copyright (C) 2010 - 2019 Andy Green <andy@warmcat.com>
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
* of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
* deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
* rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
* sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
* AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
* FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS
* IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "libwebsockets.h"
#include "lws-ssh.h"
#include <string.h>
/*
* ssh-keygen -t ed25519
* head -n-1 srv-key-25519 | tail -n +2 | base64 -d | hexdump -C
*/
static void
lws_sized_blob(uint8_t **p, void *blob, uint32_t len)
{
lws_p32((*p), len);
*p += 4;
memcpy(*p, blob, len);
*p += len;
}
static const char key_leadin[] = "openssh-key-v1\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04none"
"\x00\x00\x00\x04none\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x33"
"\x00\x00\x00\x0bssh-ed25519\x00\x00\x00\x20",
key_sep[] = "\x00\x00\x00\x90\xb1\x4f\xa7\x28"
"\xb1\x4f\xa7\x28\x00\x00\x00\x0bssh-ed25519"
"\x00\x00\x00\x20",
key_privl[] = "\x00\x00\x00\x40",
key_trail[] = "\x00\x00\x00\x0cself-gen@cbl\x01";
static size_t
lws_gen_server_key_ed25519(struct lws_context *context, uint8_t *buf256,
size_t max_len)
{
uint8_t *p = buf256 + sizeof(key_leadin) - 1;
if (max_len < sizeof(key_leadin) - 1 + 32 + sizeof(key_sep) - 1 + 32 +
sizeof(key_privl) - 1 + 64 + sizeof(key_trail) - 1)
return 0;
memcpy(buf256, key_leadin, sizeof(key_leadin) - 1);
crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(context, p, p + 32 + sizeof(key_sep) - 1 +
32 + sizeof(key_privl) - 1);
memcpy(p + 32 + sizeof(key_sep) - 1, p, 32);
p += 32;
memcpy(p, key_sep, sizeof(key_sep) - 1);
p += sizeof(key_sep) - 1 + 32;
memcpy(p, key_privl, sizeof(key_privl) - 1);
p += sizeof(key_privl) - 1 + 64;
memcpy(p, key_trail, sizeof(key_trail) - 1);
p += sizeof(key_trail) - 1;
lwsl_notice("%s: Generated key len %ld\n", __func__, (long)(p - buf256));
return (size_t)(p - buf256);
}
static int
lws_mpint_rfc4251(uint8_t *dest, const uint8_t *src, int bytes, int uns)
{
uint8_t *odest = dest;
while (!*src && bytes > 1) {
src++;
bytes--;
}
if (!*src) {
*dest++ = 0;
*dest++ = 0;
*dest++ = 0;
*dest++ = 0;
return 4;
}
if (uns && (*src) & 0x80)
bytes++;
*dest++ = (uint8_t)(bytes >> 24);
*dest++ = (uint8_t)(bytes >> 16);
*dest++ = (uint8_t)(bytes >> 8);
*dest++ = (uint8_t)(bytes);
if (uns && (*src) & 0x80) {
*dest++ = 0;
bytes--;
}
while (bytes--)
*dest++ = *src++;
return lws_ptr_diff(dest, odest);
}
int
ed25519_key_parse(uint8_t *p, size_t len, char *type, size_t type_len,
uint8_t *pub, uint8_t *pri)
{
uint32_t l, publ, m;
uint8_t *op = p;
if (len < 180)
return 1;
if (memcmp(p, "openssh-key-v1", 14))
return 2;
p += 15;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* ciphername */
if (l != 4 || memcmp(p, "none", 4))
return 3;
p += l;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* kdfname */
if (l != 4 || memcmp(p, "none", 4))
return 4;
p += l;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* kdfoptions */
if (l)
return 5;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* number of keys */
if (l != 1)
return 6;
publ = lws_g32(&p); /* length of pubkey block */
if ((size_t)((uint32_t)(p - op) + publ) >= len)
return 7;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* key type length */
if (l > 31)
return 8;
m = l;
if (m >= type_len)
m = (uint32_t)type_len -1 ;
lws_strncpy(type, (const char *)p, m + 1);
p += l;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* pub key length */
if (l != 32)
return 10;
p += l;
publ = lws_g32(&p); /* length of private key block */
if ((size_t)((uint32_t)(p - op) + publ) != len)
return 11;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* checkint 1 */
if (lws_g32(&p) != l) /* must match checkint 2 */
return 12;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* key type length */
p += l;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* public key part length */
if (l != LWS_SIZE_EC25519_PUBKEY)
return 15;
if (pub)
memcpy(pub, p, LWS_SIZE_EC25519_PUBKEY);
p += l;
l = lws_g32(&p); /* private key part length */
if (l != LWS_SIZE_EC25519_PRIKEY)
return 16;
if (pri)
memcpy(pri, p, LWS_SIZE_EC25519_PRIKEY);
return 0;
}
static int
_genhash_update_len(struct lws_genhash_ctx *ctx, const void *input, size_t ilen)
{
uint32_t be;
lws_p32((uint8_t *)&be, (uint32_t)ilen);
if (lws_genhash_update(ctx, (uint8_t *)&be, 4))
return 1;
if (lws_genhash_update(ctx, input, ilen))
return 1;
return 0;
}
static int
kex_ecdh_dv(uint8_t *dest, int dest_len, const uint8_t *kbi, int kbi_len,
const uint8_t *H, char c, const uint8_t *session_id)
{
uint8_t pool[LWS_SIZE_SHA256];
struct lws_genhash_ctx ctx;
int n = 0, m;
/*
* Key data MUST be taken from the beginning of the hash output.
* As many bytes as needed are taken from the beginning of the hash
* value.
*
* If the key length needed is longer than the output of the HASH,
* the key is extended by computing HASH of the concatenation of K
* and H and the entire key so far, and appending the resulting
* bytes (as many as HASH generates) to the key. This process is
* repeated until enough key material is available; the key is taken
* from the beginning of this value. In other words:
*
* K1 = HASH(K || H || X || session_id) (X is e.g., "A")
* K2 = HASH(K || H || K1)
* K3 = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2)
* ...
* key = K1 || K2 || K3 || ...
*/
while (n < dest_len) {
if (lws_genhash_init(&ctx, LWS_GENHASH_TYPE_SHA256))
return 1;
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, kbi, (unsigned int)kbi_len))
goto hash_failed;
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, H, LWS_SIZE_SHA256))
goto hash_failed;
if (!n) {
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, (void *)&c, 1))
goto hash_failed;
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, session_id,
LWS_SIZE_EC25519))
goto hash_failed;
} else
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, pool, LWS_SIZE_EC25519))
goto hash_failed;
lws_genhash_destroy(&ctx, pool);
m = LWS_SIZE_EC25519;
if (m > (dest_len - n))
m = dest_len - n;
memcpy(dest, pool, (unsigned int)m);
n += m;
dest += m;
}
return 0;
hash_failed:
lws_genhash_destroy(&ctx, NULL);
return 1;
}
static const unsigned char basepoint[32] = { 9 };
size_t
get_gen_server_key_25519(struct per_session_data__sshd *pss, uint8_t *b,
size_t len)
{
size_t s, mylen;
mylen = pss->vhd->ops->get_server_key(pss->wsi, b, len);
if (mylen)
return mylen;
/* create one then */
lwsl_notice("Generating server hostkey\n");
s = lws_gen_server_key_ed25519(pss->vhd->context, b, len);
lwsl_notice(" gen key len %ld\n", (long)s);
if (!s)
return 0;
/* set the key */
if (!pss->vhd->ops->set_server_key(pss->wsi, b, s))
return 0;
/* new key stored OK */
return s;
}
int
kex_ecdh(struct per_session_data__sshd *pss, uint8_t *reply, uint32_t *plen)
{
uint8_t pri_key[64], temp[64], payload_sig[64 + 32], a, *lp, kbi[64];
struct lws_kex *kex = pss->kex;
struct lws_genhash_ctx ctx;
unsigned long long smlen;
uint8_t *p = reply + 5;
uint32_t be, kbi_len;
uint8_t servkey[256];
char keyt[33];
int r, c;
r = (int)get_gen_server_key_25519(pss, servkey, (int)sizeof(servkey));
if (!r) {
lwsl_err("%s: Failed to get or gen server key\n", __func__);
return 1;
}
r = ed25519_key_parse(servkey, (unsigned int)r, keyt, sizeof(keyt),
pss->K_S /* public key */, pri_key);
if (r) {
lwsl_notice("%s: server key parse failed: %d\n", __func__, r);
return 1;
}
keyt[32] = '\0';
lwsl_info("Server key type: %s\n", keyt);
/*
* 1) Generate ephemeral key pair [ eph_pri_key | kex->Q_S ]
* 2) Compute shared secret.
* 3) Generate and sign exchange hash.
*
* 1) A 32 bytes private key should be generated for each new
* connection, using a secure PRNG. The following actions
* must be done on the private key:
*
* mysecret[0] &= 248;
* mysecret[31] &= 127;
* mysecret[31] |= 64;
*/
lws_get_random(pss->vhd->context, kex->eph_pri_key, LWS_SIZE_EC25519);
kex->eph_pri_key[0] &= 248;
kex->eph_pri_key[31] &= 127;
kex->eph_pri_key[31] |= 64;
/*
* 2) The public key is calculated using the cryptographic scalar
* multiplication:
*
* const unsigned char privkey[32];
* unsigned char pubkey[32];
*
* crypto_scalarmult (pubkey, privkey, basepoint);
*/
crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(kex->Q_S, kex->eph_pri_key, basepoint);
a = 0;
for (r = 0; r < (int)sizeof(kex->Q_S); r++)
a |= kex->Q_S[r];
if (!a) {
lwsl_notice("all zero pubkey\n");
return SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED;
}
/*
* The shared secret, k, is defined in SSH specifications to be a big
* integer. This number is calculated using the following procedure:
*
* X is the 32 bytes point obtained by the scalar multiplication of
* the other side's public key and the local private key scalar.
*/
crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(pss->K, kex->eph_pri_key, kex->Q_C);
/*
* The whole 32 bytes of the number X are then converted into a big
* integer k. This conversion follows the network byte order. This
* step differs from RFC5656.
*/
kbi_len = (uint32_t)lws_mpint_rfc4251(kbi, pss->K, LWS_SIZE_EC25519, 1);
/*
* The exchange hash H is computed as the hash of the concatenation of
* the following:
*
* string V_C, the client's identification string (CR and LF
* excluded)
* string V_S, the server's identification string (CR and LF
* excluded)
* string I_C, the payload of the client's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
* string I_S, the payload of the server's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
* string K_S, the host key
* mpint Q_C, exchange value sent by the client
* mpint Q_S, exchange value sent by the server
* mpint K, the shared secret
*
* However there are a lot of unwritten details in the hash
* definition...
*/
if (lws_genhash_init(&ctx, LWS_GENHASH_TYPE_SHA256)) {
lwsl_notice("genhash init failed\n");
return 1;
}
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, pss->V_C, strlen(pss->V_C)))
goto hash_probs;
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, pss->vhd->ops->server_string, /* aka V_S */
strlen(pss->vhd->ops->server_string)))
goto hash_probs;
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, kex->I_C, kex->I_C_payload_len))
goto hash_probs;
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, kex->I_S, kex->I_S_payload_len))
goto hash_probs;
/*
* K_S (host public key)
*
* sum of name + key lengths and headers
* name length: name
* key length: key
* ---> */
lws_p32((uint8_t *)&be, (uint32_t)(8 + (int)strlen(keyt) + LWS_SIZE_EC25519));
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, (void *)&be, 4))
goto hash_probs;
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, keyt, strlen(keyt)))
goto hash_probs;
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, pss->K_S, LWS_SIZE_EC25519))
goto hash_probs;
/* <---- */
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, kex->Q_C, LWS_SIZE_EC25519))
goto hash_probs;
if (_genhash_update_len(&ctx, kex->Q_S, LWS_SIZE_EC25519))
goto hash_probs;
if (lws_genhash_update(&ctx, kbi, kbi_len))
goto hash_probs;
if (lws_genhash_destroy(&ctx, temp))
goto hash_probs;
/*
* Sign the 32-byte SHA256 "exchange hash" in temp
* The signature is itself 64 bytes
*/
smlen = LWS_SIZE_EC25519 + 64;
if (crypto_sign_ed25519(payload_sig, &smlen, temp, LWS_SIZE_EC25519,
pri_key))
return 1;
#if 0
l = LWS_SIZE_EC25519;
n = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(temp, &l, payload_sig, smlen, pss->K_S);
lwsl_notice("own sig sanity check says %d\n", n);
#endif
/* sig [64] and payload [32] concatenated in payload_sig
*
* The server then responds with the following
*
* uint32 packet length (exl self + mac)
* byte padding len
* byte SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY
* string server public host key and certificates (K_S)
* string Q_S (exchange value sent by the server)
* string signature of H
* padding
*/
*p++ = SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY;
/* server public host key and certificates (K_S) */
lp = p;
p +=4;
lws_sized_blob(&p, keyt, (uint32_t)strlen(keyt));
lws_sized_blob(&p, pss->K_S, LWS_SIZE_EC25519);
lws_p32(lp, (uint32_t)(lws_ptr_diff(p, lp) - 4));
/* Q_S (exchange value sent by the server) */
lws_sized_blob(&p, kex->Q_S, LWS_SIZE_EC25519);
/* signature of H */
lp = p;
p +=4;
lws_sized_blob(&p, keyt, (uint32_t)strlen(keyt));
lws_sized_blob(&p, payload_sig, 64);
lws_p32(lp, (uint32_t)(lws_ptr_diff(p, lp) - 4));
/* end of message */
lws_pad_set_length(pss, reply, &p, &pss->active_keys_stc);
*plen = (uint32_t)lws_ptr_diff(p, reply);
if (!pss->active_keys_stc.valid)
memcpy(pss->session_id, temp, LWS_SIZE_EC25519);
/* RFC4253 7.2:
*
* The key exchange produces two values: a shared secret K,
* and an exchange hash H. Encryption and authentication
* keys are derived from these. The exchange hash H from the
* first key exchange is additionally used as the session
* identifier, which is a unique identifier for this connection.
* It is used by authentication methods as a part of the data
* that is signed as a proof of possession of a private key.
* Once computed, the session identifier is not changed,
* even if keys are later re-exchanged.
*
* The hash alg used in the KEX must be used for key derivation.
*
* 1) Initial IV client to server:
*
* HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id)
*
* (Here K is encoded as mpint and "A" as byte and session_id
* as raw data. "A" means the single character A, ASCII 65).
*
*
*/
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
kex_ecdh_dv(kex->keys_next_cts.key[c], LWS_SIZE_CHACHA256_KEY,
kbi, (int)kbi_len, temp, (char)('A' + (c * 2)),
pss->session_id);
kex_ecdh_dv(kex->keys_next_stc.key[c], LWS_SIZE_CHACHA256_KEY,
kbi, (int)kbi_len, temp, (char)('B' + (c * 2)),
pss->session_id);
}
lws_explicit_bzero(temp, sizeof(temp));
return 0;
hash_probs:
lws_genhash_destroy(&ctx, NULL);
return 1;
}
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