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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd">
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<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A>
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<HR>
<H1><A name="background">Linux FreeS/WAN background</A></H1>
<P>This section discusses a number of issues which have three things in
common:</P>
<UL>
<LI>They are not specifically FreeS/WAN problems</LI>
<LI>You may have to understand them to get FreeS/WAN working right</LI>
<LI>They are not simple questions</LI>
</UL>
<P>Grouping them here lets us provide the explanations some users will
need without unduly complicating the main text.</P>
<P>The explanations here are intended to be adequate for FreeS/WAN
purposes (please comment to the<A href="mail.html"> users mailing list</A>
if you don't find them so), but they are not trying to be complete or
definitive. If you need more information, see the references provided
in each section.</P>
<H2><A name="dns.background">Some DNS background</A></H2>
<P><A href="glossary.html#carpediem">Opportunistic encryption</A>
requires that the gateway systems be able to fetch public keys, and
other IPsec-related information, from each other's DNS (Domain Name
Service) records.</P>
<P><A href="glossary.html#DNS">DNS</A> is a distributed database that
maps names to IP addresses and vice versa.</P>
<P>Much good reference material is available for DNS, including:</P>
<UL>
<LI>the<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/HOWTO/DNS-HOWTO.html"> DNS HowTo</A>
</LI>
<LI>the standard<A href="biblio.html#DNS.book"> DNS reference</A> book</LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/LDP/nag2/index.html">Linux Network
Administrator's Guide</A></LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.nominum.com/resources/whitepapers/bind-white-paper.html">
BIND overview</A></LI>
<LI><A href="http://www.nominum.com/resources/documentation/Bv9ARM.pdf">
BIND 9 Administrator's Reference</A></LI>
</UL>
<P>We give only a brief overview here, intended to help you use DNS for
FreeS/WAN purposes.</P>
<H3><A name="forward.reverse">Forward and reverse maps</A></H3>
<P>Although the implementation is distributed, it is often useful to
speak of DNS as if it were just two enormous tables:</P>
<UL>
<LI>the forward map: look up a name, get an IP address</LI>
<LI>the reverse map: look up an IP address, get a name</LI>
</UL>
<P>Both maps can optionally contain additional data. For opportunistic
encryption, we insert the data need for IPsec authentication.</P>
<P>A system named gateway.example.com with IP address 10.20.30.40 should
have at least two DNS records, one in each map:</P>
<DL>
<DT>gateway.example.com. IN A 10.20.30.40</DT>
<DD>used to look up the name and get an IP address</DD>
<DT>40.30.20.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR gateway.example.com.</DT>
<DD>used for reverse lookups, looking up an address to get the
associated name. Notice that the digits here are in reverse order; the
actual address is 10.20.30.40 but we use 40.30.20.10 here.</DD>
</DL>
<H3><A NAME="17_1_2">Hierarchy and delegation</A></H3>
<P>For both maps there is a hierarchy of DNS servers and a system of
delegating authority so that, for example:</P>
<UL>
<LI>the DNS administrator for example.com can create entries of the form<VAR>
name</VAR>.example.com</LI>
<LI>the example.com admin cannot create an entry for counterexample.com;
only someone with authority for .com can do that</LI>
<LI>an admin might have authority for 20.10.in-addr.arpa.</LI>
<LI>in either map, authority can be delegated
<UL>
<LI>the example.com admin could give you authority for
westcoast.example.com</LI>
<LI>the 20.10.in-addr.arpa admin could give you authority for
30.20.10.in-addr.arpa</LI>
</UL>
</LI>
</UL>
<P>DNS zones are the units of delegation. There is a hierarchy of zones.</P>
<H3><A NAME="17_1_3">Syntax of DNS records</A></H3>
<P>Returning to the example records:</P>
<PRE> gateway.example.com. IN A 10.20.30.40
40.30.20.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR gateway.example.com.</PRE>
<P>some syntactic details are:</P>
<UL>
<LI>the IN indicates that these records are for<STRONG> In</STRONG>
ternet addresses</LI>
<LI>The final periods in '.com.' and '.arpa.' are required. They
indicate the root of the domain name system.</LI>
</UL>
<P>The capitalised strings after IN indicate the type of record.
Possible types include:</P>
<UL>
<LI><STRONG>A</STRONG>ddress, for forward lookups</LI>
<LI><STRONG>P</STRONG>oin<STRONG>T</STRONG>e<STRONG>R</STRONG>, for
reverse lookups</LI>
<LI><STRONG>C</STRONG>anonical<STRONG> NAME</STRONG>, records to support
aliasing, multiple names for one address</LI>
<LI><STRONG>M</STRONG>ail e<STRONG>X</STRONG>change, used in mail
routing</LI>
<LI><STRONG>SIG</STRONG>nature, used in<A href="glossary.html#SDNS">
secure DNS</A></LI>
<LI><STRONG>KEY</STRONG>, used in<A href="glossary.html#SDNS"> secure
DNS</A></LI>
<LI><STRONG>T</STRONG>e<STRONG>XT</STRONG>, a multi-purpose record type</LI>
</UL>
<P>To set up for opportunistic encryption, you add some TXT records to
your DNS data. Details are in our<A href="quickstart.html"> quickstart</A>
document.</P>
<H3><A NAME="17_1_4">Cacheing, TTL and propagation delay</A></H3>
<P>DNS information is extensively cached. With no caching, a lookup by
your system of "www.freeswan.org" might involve:</P>
<UL>
<LI>your system asks your nameserver for "www.freeswan.org"</LI>
<LI>local nameserver asks root server about ".org", gets reply</LI>
<LI>local nameserver asks .org nameserver about "freeswan.org", gets
reply</LI>
<LI>local nameserver asks freeswan.org nameserver about
"www.freeswan.org", gets reply</LI>
</UL>
<P>However, this can be a bit inefficient. For example, if you are in
the Phillipines, the closest a root server is in Japan. That might send
you to a .org server in the US, and then to freeswan.org in Holland. If
everyone did all those lookups every time they clicked on a web link,
the net would grind to a halt.</P>
<P>Nameservers therefore cache information they look up. When you click
on another link at www.freeswan.org, your local nameserver has the IP
address for that server in its cache, and no further lookups are
required.</P>
<P>Intermediate results are also cached. If you next go to
lists.freeswan.org, your nameserver can just ask the freeswan.org
nameserver for that address; it does not need to query the root or .org
nameservers because it has a cached address for the freeswan.org zone
server.</P>
<P>Of course, like any cacheing mechanism, this can create problems of
consistency. What if the administrator for freeswan.org changes the IP
address, or the authentication key, for www.freeswan.org? If you use
old information from the cache, you may get it wrong. On the other
hand, you cannot afford to look up fresh information every time. Nor
can you expect the freeswan.org server to notify you; that isn't in the
protocols.</P>
<P>The solution that is in the protocols is fairly simple. Cacheable
records are marked with Time To Live (TTL) information. When the time
expires, the caching server discards the record. The next time someone
asks for it, the server fetches a fresh copy. Of course, a server may
also discard records before their TTL expires if it is running out of
cache space.</P>
<P>This implies that there will be some delay before the new version of
a changed record propagates around the net. Until the TTLs on all
copies of the old record expire, some users will see it because that is
what is in their cache. Other users may see the new record immediately
because they don't have an old one cached.</P>
<H2><A name="MTU.trouble">Problems with packet fragmentation</A></H2>
<P>It seems, from mailing list reports, to be moderately common for
problems to crop up in which small packets pass through the IPsec
tunnels just fine but larger packets fail.</P>
<P>These problems are caused by various devices along the way
mis-handling either packet fragments or<A href="glossary.html#pathMTU">
path MTU discovery</A>.</P>
<P>IPsec makes packets larger by adding an ESP or AH header. This can
tickle assorted bugs in fragment handling in routers and firewalls, or
in path MTU discovery mechanisms, and cause a variety of symptoms which
are both annoying and, often, quite hard to diagnose.</P>
<P>An explanation from project technical lead Henry Spencer:</P>
<PRE>The problem is IP fragmentation; more precisely, the problem is that the
second, third, etc. fragments of an IP packet are often difficult for
filtering mechanisms to classify.
Routers cannot rely on reassembling the packet, or remembering what was in
earlier fragments, because the fragments may be out of order or may even
follow different routes. So any general, worst-case filtering decision
pretty much has to be made on each fragment independently. (If the router
knows that it is the only route to the destination, so all fragments
*must* pass through it, reassembly would be possible... but most routers
don't want to bother with the complications of that.)
All fragments carry roughly the original IP header, but any higher-level
header is (for IP purposes) just the first part of the packet data... so
only the first fragment carries that. So, for example, on examining the
second fragment of a TCP packet, you could tell that it's TCP, but not
what port number it is destined for -- that information is in the TCP
header, which appears in the first fragment only.
The result of this classification difficulty is that stupid routers and
over-paranoid firewalls may just throw fragments away. To get through
them, you must reduce your MTU enough that fragmentation will not occur.
(In some cases, they might be willing to attempt reassembly, but have very
limited resources to devote to it, meaning that packets must be small and
fragments few in number, leading to the same conclusion: smaller MTU.)</PRE>
<P>In addition to the problem Henry describes, you may also have trouble
with<A href="glossary.html#pathMTU"> path MTU discovery</A>.</P>
<P>By default, FreeS/WAN uses a large<A href="glossary.html#MTU"> MTU</A>
for the ipsec device. This avoids some problems, but may complicate
others. Here's an explanation from Claudia:</P>
<PRE>Here are a couple of pieces of background information. Apologies if you
have seen these already. An excerpt from one of my old posts:
An MTU of 16260 on ipsec0 is usual. The IPSec device defaults to this
high MTU so that it does not fragment incoming packets before encryption
and encapsulation. If after IPSec processing packets are larger than 1500,
[ie. the mtu of eth0] then eth0 will fragment them.
Adding IPSec headers adds a certain number of bytes to each packet.
The MTU of the IPSec interface refers to the maximum size of the packet
before the IPSec headers are added. In some cases, people find it helpful
to set ipsec0's MTU to 1500-(IPSec header size), which IIRC is about 1430.
That way, the resulting encapsulated packets don't exceed 1500. On most
networks, packets less than 1500 will not need to be fragmented.
and... (from Henry Spencer)
The way it *ought* to work is that the MTU advertised by the ipsecN
interface should be that of the underlying hardware interface, less a
pinch for the extra headers needed.
Unfortunately, in certain situations this breaks many applications.
There is a widespread implicit assumption that the smallest MTUs are
at the ends of paths, not in the middle, and another that MTUs are
never less than 1500. A lot of code is unprepared to handle paths
where there is an "interior minimum" in the MTU, especially when it's
less than 1500. So we advertise a big MTU and just let the resulting
big packets fragment.
This usually works, but we do get bitten in cases where some intermediate
point can't handle all that fragmentation. We can't win on this one.</PRE>
<P>The MTU can be changed with an<VAR> overridemtu=</VAR> statement in
the<VAR> config setup</VAR> section of<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">
ipsec.conf.5</A>.</P>
<P>For a discussion of MTU issues and some possible solutions using
Linux advanced routing facilities, see the<A href="http://www.linuxguruz.org/iptables/howto/2.4routing-15.html#ss15.6">
Linux 2.4 Advanced Routing HOWTO</A>. For a discussion of MTU and NAT
(Network Address Translation), see<A HREF="http://harlech.math.ucla.edu/services/ipsec.html">
James Carter's MTU notes</A>.</P>
<H2><A name="nat.background">Network address translation (NAT)</A></H2>
<P><STRONG>N</STRONG>etwork<STRONG> A</STRONG>ddress<STRONG> T</STRONG>
ranslation is a service provided by some gateway machines. Calling it
NAPT (adding the word<STRONG> P</STRONG>ort) would be more precise, but
we will follow the widespread usage.</P>
<P>A gateway doing NAT rewrites the headers of packets it is forwarding,
changing one or more of:</P>
<UL>
<LI>source address</LI>
<LI>source port</LI>
<LI>destination address</LI>
<LI>destination port</LI>
</UL>
<P>On Linux 2.4, NAT services are provided by the<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org">
netfilter(8)</A> firewall code. There are several<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org/documentation/index.html#HOWTO">
Netfilter HowTos</A> including one on NAT.</P>
<P>For older versions of Linux, this was referred to as "IP masquerade"
and different tools were used. See this<A href="http://www.e-infomax.com/ipmasq/">
resource page</A>.</P>
<P>Putting an IPsec gateway behind a NAT gateway is not recommended. See
our<A href="firewall.html#NAT"> firewalls document</A>.</P>
<H3><A NAME="17_3_1">NAT to non-routable addresses</A></H3>
<P>The most common application of NAT uses private<A href="glossary.html#non-routable">
non-routable</A> addresses.</P>
<P>Often a home or small office network will have:</P>
<UL>
<LI>one connection to the Internet</LI>
<LI>one assigned publicly visible IP address</LI>
<LI>several machines that all need access to the net</LI>
</UL>
<P>Of course this poses a problem since several machines cannot use one
address. The best solution might be to obtain more addresses, but often
this is impractical or uneconomical.</P>
<P>A common solution is to have:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="glossary.html#non-routable">non-routable</A> addresses on
the local network</LI>
<LI>the gateway machine doing NAT</LI>
<LI>all packets going outside the LAN rewritten to have the gateway as
their source address</LI>
</UL>
<P>The client machines are set up with reserved<A href="glossary.html#non-routable">
non-routable</A> IP addresses defined in RFC 1918. The masquerading
gateway, the machine with the actual link to the Internet, rewrites
packet headers so that all packets going onto the Internet appear to
come from one IP address, that of its Internet interface. It then gets
all the replies, does some table lookups and more header rewriting, and
delivers the replies to the appropriate client machines.</P>
<P>As far as anyone else on the Internet is concerned, the systems
behind the gateway are completely hidden. Only one machine with one IP
address is visible.</P>
<P>For IPsec on such a gateway, you can entirely ignore the NAT in:</P>
<UL>
<LI><A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</A></LI>
<LI>firewall rules affecting your Internet-side interface</LI>
</UL>
<P>Those can be set up exactly as they would be if your gateway had no
other systems behind it.</P>
<P>You do, however, have to take account of the NAT in firewall rules
which affect packet forwarding.</P>
<H3><A NAME="17_3_2">NAT to routable addresses</A></H3>
<P>NAT to routable addresses is also possible, but is less common and
may make for rather tricky routing problems. We will not discuss it
here. See the<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org/documentation/index.html#HOWTO">
Netfilter HowTos</A>.</P>
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