1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1041 1042 1043 1044 1045 1046 1047 1048 1049 1050 1051 1052 1053 1054 1055 1056 1057 1058 1059 1060 1061 1062 1063 1064 1065 1066 1067 1068 1069 1070 1071 1072 1073 1074 1075 1076 1077 1078 1079 1080 1081 1082 1083 1084 1085 1086 1087 1088 1089 1090 1091 1092 1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 1098 1099 1100 1101 1102 1103 1104 1105 1106 1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1146 1147 1148 1149 1150 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 1169 1170 1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 1182 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 1188 1189 1190 1191 1192 1193 1194 1195 1196 1197 1198 1199 1200 1201 1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212 1213 1214 1215 1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 1237 1238 1239 1240 1241 1242 1243 1244 1245 1246 1247 1248 1249 1250 1251 1252 1253 1254 1255 1256 1257 1258 1259 1260 1261 1262 1263 1264 1265 1266 1267 1268 1269 1270 1271 1272 1273 1274 1275 1276 1277 1278 1279 1280 1281 1282 1283 1284 1285 1286 1287 1288 1289 1290 1291 1292 1293 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 1299 1300 1301 1302 1303 1304 1305 1306 1307 1308 1309 1310 1311 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 1318 1319 1320 1321 1322 1323 1324 1325 1326 1327 1328 1329 1330 1331 1332 1333 1334 1335 1336 1337 1338 1339 1340 1341 1342 1343 1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364 1365 1366 1367 1368 1369 1370 1371 1372 1373 1374 1375 1376 1377 1378 1379 1380 1381 1382 1383 1384 1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 1398 1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 1408 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 1483 1484 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491 1492 1493 1494 1495 1496 1497 1498 1499 1500 1501 1502 1503 1504 1505 1506 1507 1508 1509 1510 1511 1512 1513 1514 1515 1516 1517 1518 1519 1520 1521 1522 1523 1524 1525 1526 1527 1528 1529 1530 1531 1532 1533 1534 1535 1536 1537 1538 1539 1540 1541 1542 1543 1544 1545 1546 1547 1548 1549 1550 1551 1552 1553 1554 1555 1556 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 1562 1563 1564 1565 1566 1567 1568 1569 1570 1571 1572 1573 1574 1575 1576 1577 1578 1579 1580 1581 1582 1583 1584 1585 1586 1587 1588 1589 1590 1591 1592 1593 1594 1595 1596 1597 1598 1599 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 1606 1607 1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 1613 1614 1615 1616 1617 1618 1619 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624 1625 1626 1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050 2051 2052 2053 2054 2055 2056 2057 2058 2059 2060 2061 2062 2063 2064 2065 2066 2067 2068 2069 2070 2071 2072 2073 2074 2075 2076 2077 2078 2079 2080 2081 2082 2083 2084 2085 2086 2087 2088 2089 2090 2091 2092 2093 2094 2095 2096 2097 2098 2099 2100 2101 2102 2103 2104 2105 2106 2107 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 2116 2117 2118 2119 2120 2121 2122 2123 2124 2125 2126 2127 2128 2129 2130 2131 2132 2133 2134 2135 2136 2137 2138 2139 2140 2141 2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2148 2149 2150 2151 2152 2153 2154 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 2163 2164 2165 2166 2167 2168 2169 2170 2171 2172 2173 2174 2175 2176 2177 2178 2179 2180 2181 2182 2183 2184 2185 2186 2187 2188 2189 2190 2191 2192 2193 2194 2195 2196 2197 2198 2199 2200 2201 2202 2203 2204 2205 2206 2207 2208 2209 2210 2211 2212 2213 2214 2215 2216 2217 2218 2219 2220 2221 2222 2223 2224 2225 2226 2227 2228 2229 2230 2231 2232 2233 2234 2235 2236 2237 2238 2239 2240 2241 2242 2243 2244 2245 2246 2247 2248 2249 2250 2251 2252 2253 2254 2255 2256 2257 2258 2259 2260 2261 2262 2263 2264 2265 2266 2267 2268 2269 2270 2271 2272 2273 2274 2275 2276 2277 2278 2279 2280 2281 2282 2283 2284 2285 2286 2287 2288 2289 2290 2291 2292 2293 2294 2295 2296 2297 2298 2299 2300 2301 2302 2303 2304 2305 2306 2307 2308 2309 2310 2311 2312 2313 2314 2315 2316 2317 2318 2319 2320 2321 2322 2323 2324 2325 2326 2327 2328 2329 2330 2331 2332 2333 2334 2335 2336 2337 2338 2339 2340 2341 2342 2343 2344 2345 2346 2347 2348 2349 2350 2351 2352 2353 2354 2355 2356 2357 2358 2359 2360 2361 2362 2363 2364 2365 2366 2367 2368 2369 2370 2371 2372 2373 2374 2375 2376 2377 2378 2379 2380 2381 2382 2383 2384 2385 2386 2387 2388 2389 2390 2391 2392 2393 2394 2395 2396 2397 2398 2399 2400 2401 2402 2403 2404 2405 2406 2407 2408 2409 2410 2411 2412 2413 2414 2415 2416 2417 2418 2419 2420 2421 2422 2423 2424 2425 2426 2427 2428 2429 2430 2431 2432 2433 2434 2435 2436 2437 2438 2439 2440 2441 2442 2443 2444 2445 2446 2447 2448 2449 2450 2451 2452 2453 2454 2455 2456 2457 2458 2459 2460 2461 2462 2463 2464 2465 2466 2467 2468 2469 2470 2471 2472 2473 2474 2475 2476 2477 2478 2479 2480 2481 2482 2483 2484 2485 2486 2487 2488 2489 2490 2491 2492 2493 2494 2495 2496 2497 2498 2499 2500 2501 2502 2503 2504 2505 2506 2507 2508 2509 2510 2511 2512 2513 2514 2515 2516 2517 2518 2519 2520 2521 2522 2523 2524 2525 2526 2527 2528 2529 2530 2531 2532 2533 2534 2535 2536 2537 2538 2539 2540 2541 2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2559 2560 2561 2562 2563 2564 2565 2566 2567 2568 2569 2570 2571 2572 2573 2574 2575 2576 2577 2578 2579 2580 2581 2582 2583 2584 2585 2586 2587 2588 2589 2590 2591 2592 2593 2594 2595 2596 2597 2598 2599 2600 2601 2602 2603 2604 2605 2606 2607 2608 2609 2610 2611 2612 2613 2614 2615 2616 2617 2618 2619 2620 2621 2622 2623 2624 2625 2626 2627 2628 2629 2630 2631 2632 2633 2634 2635 2636 2637 2638 2639 2640 2641 2642 2643 2644 2645 2646 2647 2648 2649 2650 2651 2652 2653 2654 2655 2656 2657 2658 2659 2660 2661 2662 2663 2664 2665 2666 2667 2668 2669 2670 2671 2672 2673 2674 2675 2676 2677 2678 2679 2680 2681 2682 2683 2684 2685 2686 2687 2688 2689 2690 2691 2692 2693 2694 2695 2696 2697 2698 2699 2700 2701 2702 2703 2704 2705 2706 2707 2708 2709 2710 2711 2712 2713 2714 2715 2716 2717 2718 2719 2720 2721 2722 2723 2724 2725 2726 2727 2728 2729 2730 2731 2732 2733 2734 2735 2736 2737 2738 2739 2740 2741 2742 2743 2744 2745 2746 2747 2748 2749 2750 2751 2752 2753 2754 2755 2756 2757 2758 2759 2760 2761 2762 2763 2764 2765 2766 2767 2768 2769 2770 2771 2772 2773 2774 2775 2776 2777 2778 2779 2780 2781 2782 2783 2784 2785 2786 2787 2788 2789 2790 2791 2792 2793 2794 2795 2796 2797 2798 2799 2800 2801 2802 2803 2804 2805 2806 2807 2808 2809 2810 2811 2812 2813 2814 2815 2816 2817 2818 2819 2820 2821 2822 2823 2824 2825 2826 2827 2828 2829 2830 2831 2832 2833 2834 2835 2836 2837 2838 2839 2840 2841 2842 2843 2844 2845 2846 2847 2848 2849 2850 2851 2852 2853 2854 2855 2856 2857 2858 2859 2860 2861 2862 2863 2864 2865 2866 2867 2868 2869 2870 2871 2872 2873 2874 2875 2876 2877 2878 2879 2880 2881 2882 2883 2884 2885 2886 2887 2888 2889 2890 2891 2892 2893 2894 2895 2896 2897 2898 2899 2900 2901 2902 2903 2904 2905 2906 2907 2908 2909 2910 2911 2912 2913 2914 2915 2916 2917 2918 2919 2920 2921 2922 2923 2924 2925 2926 2927 2928 2929 2930 2931 2932 2933 2934 2935 2936 2937 2938 2939 2940 2941 2942 2943 2944 2945 2946 2947 2948 2949 2950 2951 2952 2953 2954 2955 2956 2957 2958 2959 2960 2961 2962 2963 2964 2965 2966 2967 2968 2969 2970 2971 2972 2973 2974 2975 2976 2977 2978 2979 2980 2981 2982 2983 2984 2985 2986 2987 2988 2989 2990 2991 2992 2993 2994 2995 2996 2997 2998 2999 3000 3001 3002 3003 3004 3005 3006 3007 3008 3009 3010 3011 3012 3013 3014 3015 3016 3017 3018 3019 3020 3021 3022 3023 3024 3025 3026 3027 3028 3029 3030 3031 3032 3033 3034 3035 3036 3037 3038 3039 3040 3041 3042 3043 3044 3045 3046 3047 3048 3049 3050 3051 3052 3053 3054 3055 3056 3057 3058 3059 3060 3061 3062 3063 3064 3065 3066 3067 3068 3069 3070 3071 3072 3073 3074 3075 3076 3077 3078 3079 3080 3081 3082 3083 3084 3085 3086 3087 3088 3089 3090 3091 3092 3093 3094 3095 3096 3097 3098 3099 3100 3101 3102 3103 3104 3105 3106 3107 3108 3109 3110 3111 3112 3113 3114 3115 3116 3117 3118 3119 3120 3121 3122 3123 3124 3125 3126 3127 3128 3129 3130 3131 3132 3133 3134 3135 3136 3137 3138 3139 3140 3141 3142 3143 3144 3145 3146 3147 3148 3149 3150 3151 3152 3153 3154 3155 3156 3157 3158 3159 3160 3161 3162 3163 3164 3165 3166 3167 3168 3169 3170 3171 3172 3173 3174 3175 3176 3177 3178 3179 3180 3181 3182 3183 3184 3185 3186 3187 3188 3189 3190 3191 3192 3193 3194 3195 3196 3197 3198 3199 3200 3201 3202 3203 3204 3205 3206 3207 3208 3209 3210 3211 3212 3213 3214 3215 3216 3217 3218 3219 3220 3221 3222 3223 3224 3225 3226 3227 3228 3229 3230 3231 3232 3233 3234 3235 3236 3237 3238 3239 3240 3241 3242 3243 3244 3245 3246 3247 3248 3249 3250 3251 3252 3253 3254 3255 3256 3257 3258 3259 3260 3261 3262 3263 3264 3265 3266 3267 3268 3269 3270 3271 3272 3273 3274 3275 3276 3277 3278 3279 3280 3281 3282 3283 3284 3285 3286 3287 3288 3289 3290 3291 3292 3293 3294 3295 3296 3297 3298 3299 3300 3301 3302 3303 3304 3305 3306 3307 3308 3309 3310 3311 3312 3313 3314 3315 3316 3317 3318 3319 3320 3321 3322 3323 3324 3325 3326 3327 3328 3329 3330 3331 3332 3333 3334 3335 3336 3337 3338 3339 3340 3341 3342 3343 3344 3345 3346 3347 3348 3349 3350 3351 3352 3353 3354 3355 3356 3357 3358 3359 3360 3361 3362 3363 3364 3365 3366 3367 3368 3369 3370 3371 3372 3373 3374 3375 3376 3377 3378 3379 3380 3381 3382 3383 3384 3385 3386 3387 3388 3389 3390 3391 3392 3393 3394 3395 3396 3397 3398 3399 3400 3401 3402 3403 3404 3405 3406 3407 3408 3409 3410 3411 3412 3413 3414 3415 3416 3417 3418 3419 3420 3421 3422 3423 3424 3425 3426 3427 3428 3429 3430 3431 3432 3433 3434 3435 3436 3437 3438 3439 3440 3441 3442 3443 3444 3445 3446 3447 3448 3449 3450 3451 3452 3453 3454 3455 3456 3457 3458 3459 3460 3461 3462 3463 3464 3465 3466 3467 3468 3469 3470 3471 3472 3473 3474 3475 3476 3477 3478 3479 3480 3481 3482 3483 3484 3485 3486 3487 3488 3489 3490 3491 3492 3493 3494 3495 3496 3497 3498 3499 3500 3501 3502 3503 3504 3505 3506 3507 3508 3509 3510 3511 3512 3513 3514 3515 3516 3517 3518 3519 3520 3521 3522 3523 3524 3525 3526 3527 3528 3529 3530 3531 3532 3533 3534 3535 3536 3537 3538 3539 3540 3541 3542 3543 3544 3545 3546 3547 3548 3549 3550 3551 3552 3553 3554 3555 3556 3557 3558 3559 3560 3561 3562 3563 3564 3565 3566 3567 3568 3569 3570 3571 3572 3573 3574 3575 3576 3577 3578 3579 3580 3581 3582 3583 3584 3585 3586 3587 3588 3589 3590 3591 3592 3593 3594 3595 3596 3597 3598 3599 3600 3601 3602 3603 3604 3605 3606 3607 3608 3609 3610 3611 3612 3613 3614 3615 3616 3617 3618 3619 3620 3621 3622 3623 3624 3625 3626 3627 3628 3629 3630 3631 3632 3633 3634 3635 3636 3637 3638 3639 3640 3641 3642 3643 3644 3645 3646 3647 3648 3649 3650 3651 3652 3653 3654 3655 3656 3657 3658 3659 3660 3661 3662 3663 3664 3665 3666 3667 3668 3669 3670 3671 3672 3673 3674 3675 3676 3677 3678 3679 3680 3681 3682 3683 3684 3685 3686 3687 3688 3689 3690 3691 3692 3693 3694 3695 3696 3697 3698 3699 3700 3701 3702 3703 3704 3705 3706 3707 3708 3709 3710 3711 3712 3713 3714 3715 3716 3717 3718 3719 3720 3721 3722 3723 3724 3725 3726 3727 3728 3729 3730 3731 3732 3733 3734 3735 3736 3737 3738 3739 3740 3741 3742 3743 3744 3745 3746 3747 3748 3749 3750 3751 3752 3753 3754 3755 3756 3757 3758 3759 3760 3761 3762 3763 3764 3765 3766 3767 3768 3769 3770 3771 3772 3773 3774 3775 3776 3777 3778 3779 3780 3781 3782 3783 3784 3785 3786 3787 3788 3789 3790 3791 3792 3793 3794 3795 3796 3797 3798 3799 3800 3801 3802 3803 3804 3805 3806 3807 3808 3809 3810 3811 3812 3813 3814 3815 3816 3817 3818 3819 3820 3821 3822 3823 3824 3825 3826 3827 3828 3829 3830 3831 3832 3833 3834 3835 3836 3837 3838 3839 3840 3841 3842 3843 3844 3845 3846 3847 3848 3849 3850 3851 3852 3853 3854 3855 3856 3857 3858 3859 3860 3861 3862 3863 3864 3865 3866 3867 3868 3869 3870 3871 3872 3873 3874 3875 3876 3877 3878 3879 3880 3881 3882 3883 3884 3885 3886 3887 3888 3889 3890 3891 3892 3893 3894 3895 3896 3897 3898 3899 3900 3901 3902 3903 3904 3905 3906 3907 3908 3909 3910 3911 3912 3913 3914 3915 3916 3917 3918 3919 3920 3921 3922 3923 3924 3925 3926 3927 3928 3929 3930 3931 3932 3933 3934 3935 3936 3937 3938 3939 3940 3941 3942 3943 3944 3945 3946 3947 3948 3949 3950 3951 3952 3953 3954 3955 3956 3957 3958 3959 3960 3961 3962 3963 3964 3965 3966 3967 3968 3969 3970 3971 3972 3973 3974 3975 3976 3977 3978 3979 3980 3981 3982 3983 3984 3985 3986 3987 3988 3989 3990 3991 3992 3993 3994 3995 3996 3997 3998 3999 4000 4001 4002 4003 4004 4005 4006 4007 4008 4009 4010 4011 4012 4013 4014 4015 4016 4017 4018 4019 4020 4021 4022 4023 4024 4025 4026 4027 4028 4029 4030 4031 4032 4033 4034 4035 4036 4037 4038 4039 4040 4041 4042 4043 4044 4045 4046 4047 4048 4049 4050 4051 4052 4053 4054 4055 4056 4057 4058 4059 4060 4061 4062 4063 4064 4065 4066 4067 4068 4069 4070 4071 4072 4073 4074 4075 4076 4077 4078 4079 4080 4081 4082 4083 4084 4085 4086 4087 4088 4089 4090 4091 4092 4093 4094 4095 4096 4097 4098 4099 4100 4101 4102 4103 4104 4105 4106 4107 4108 4109 4110 4111 4112 4113 4114 4115 4116 4117 4118 4119 4120 4121 4122 4123 4124 4125 4126 4127 4128 4129 4130 4131 4132 4133 4134 4135 4136 4137 4138 4139 4140 4141 4142 4143 4144 4145 4146 4147 4148 4149 4150 4151 4152 4153 4154 4155 4156 4157 4158 4159 4160 4161 4162 4163 4164 4165 4166 4167 4168 4169 4170 4171 4172 4173 4174 4175 4176 4177 4178 4179 4180 4181 4182 4183 4184 4185 4186 4187 4188 4189 4190 4191 4192 4193 4194 4195 4196 4197 4198 4199 4200 4201 4202 4203 4204 4205 4206 4207 4208 4209 4210 4211 4212 4213 4214 4215 4216 4217 4218 4219 4220 4221 4222 4223 4224 4225 4226 4227 4228 4229 4230 4231 4232 4233 4234 4235 4236 4237 4238 4239 4240 4241 4242 4243 4244 4245 4246 4247 4248 4249 4250 4251 4252 4253 4254 4255 4256 4257 4258 4259 4260 4261 4262 4263 4264 4265 4266 4267 4268 4269 4270 4271 4272 4273 4274 4275 4276 4277 4278 4279 4280 4281 4282 4283 4284 4285 4286 4287 4288 4289 4290 4291 4292 4293 4294 4295 4296 4297 4298 4299 4300 4301 4302 4303 4304 4305 4306 4307 4308 4309 4310 4311 4312 4313 4314 4315 4316 4317 4318 4319 4320 4321 4322 4323 4324 4325 4326 4327 4328 4329 4330 4331 4332 4333 4334 4335 4336 4337 4338 4339 4340 4341 4342 4343 4344 4345 4346 4347 4348 4349 4350 4351 4352 4353 4354 4355 4356 4357 4358 4359 4360 4361 4362 4363 4364 4365 4366 4367 4368 4369 4370 4371 4372 4373 4374 4375 4376 4377 4378 4379 4380 4381 4382 4383 4384 4385 4386 4387 4388 4389 4390 4391 4392 4393 4394 4395 4396 4397 4398 4399 4400 4401 4402 4403 4404 4405 4406 4407 4408 4409 4410 4411 4412 4413 4414 4415 4416 4417 4418 4419 4420 4421 4422 4423 4424 4425 4426 4427 4428 4429 4430 4431 4432 4433 4434 4435 4436 4437 4438 4439 4440 4441 4442 4443 4444 4445 4446 4447 4448 4449 4450 4451 4452 4453 4454 4455 4456 4457 4458 4459 4460 4461 4462 4463 4464 4465 4466 4467 4468 4469 4470 4471 4472 4473 4474 4475 4476 4477 4478 4479 4480 4481 4482 4483 4484 4485 4486 4487 4488 4489 4490 4491 4492 4493 4494 4495 4496 4497 4498 4499 4500 4501 4502 4503 4504 4505 4506 4507 4508 4509 4510 4511 4512 4513 4514 4515 4516 4517 4518 4519 4520 4521 4522 4523 4524 4525 4526 4527 4528 4529 4530 4531 4532 4533 4534 4535 4536 4537 4538 4539 4540 4541 4542 4543 4544 4545 4546 4547 4548 4549 4550 4551 4552 4553 4554 4555 4556 4557 4558 4559 4560 4561 4562 4563 4564 4565 4566 4567 4568 4569 4570 4571 4572 4573 4574 4575 4576 4577 4578 4579 4580 4581 4582 4583 4584 4585 4586 4587 4588 4589 4590 4591 4592 4593 4594 4595 4596 4597 4598 4599 4600 4601 4602 4603 4604 4605 4606 4607 4608 4609 4610 4611 4612 4613 4614 4615 4616 4617 4618 4619 4620 4621 4622 4623 4624 4625 4626 4627 4628 4629 4630 4631 4632 4633 4634 4635 4636 4637 4638 4639 4640 4641 4642 4643 4644 4645 4646 4647 4648 4649 4650 4651 4652 4653 4654 4655 4656 4657 4658 4659 4660 4661 4662 4663 4664 4665 4666 4667 4668 4669 4670 4671 4672 4673 4674 4675 4676 4677 4678 4679 4680 4681 4682 4683 4684 4685 4686 4687 4688 4689 4690 4691 4692 4693 4694 4695 4696 4697 4698 4699 4700 4701 4702 4703 4704 4705 4706 4707 4708 4709 4710 4711 4712 4713 4714 4715 4716 4717 4718 4719 4720 4721 4722 4723 4724 4725 4726 4727 4728 4729 4730 4731 4732 4733 4734 4735 4736 4737 4738 4739 4740 4741 4742 4743 4744 4745 4746 4747 4748 4749 4750 4751 4752 4753 4754 4755 4756 4757 4758 4759 4760 4761 4762 4763 4764 4765 4766 4767 4768 4769 4770 4771 4772 4773 4774 4775 4776 4777 4778 4779 4780 4781 4782 4783 4784 4785 4786 4787 4788 4789 4790 4791 4792 4793 4794 4795 4796 4797 4798 4799 4800 4801 4802 4803 4804 4805 4806 4807 4808 4809 4810 4811 4812 4813 4814 4815 4816 4817 4818 4819 4820 4821 4822 4823 4824 4825 4826 4827 4828 4829 4830 4831 4832 4833 4834 4835 4836 4837 4838 4839 4840 4841 4842 4843 4844 4845 4846 4847 4848 4849 4850 4851 4852 4853 4854 4855 4856 4857 4858 4859 4860 4861 4862 4863 4864 4865 4866 4867 4868 4869 4870 4871 4872 4873 4874 4875 4876 4877 4878 4879 4880 4881 4882 4883 4884 4885 4886 4887 4888 4889 4890 4891 4892 4893 4894 4895 4896 4897 4898 4899 4900 4901 4902 4903 4904 4905 4906 4907 4908 4909 4910 4911 4912 4913 4914 4915 4916 4917 4918 4919 4920 4921 4922 4923 4924 4925 4926 4927 4928 4929 4930 4931 4932 4933 4934 4935 4936 4937 4938 4939 4940 4941 4942 4943 4944 4945 4946 4947 4948 4949 4950 4951 4952 4953 4954 4955 4956 4957 4958 4959 4960 4961 4962 4963 4964 4965 4966 4967 4968 4969 4970 4971 4972 4973 4974 4975 4976 4977 4978 4979 4980 4981 4982 4983 4984 4985 4986 4987 4988 4989 4990 4991 4992 4993 4994 4995 4996 4997 4998 4999 5000 5001 5002 5003 5004 5005 5006 5007 5008 5009 5010 5011 5012 5013 5014 5015 5016 5017 5018 5019 5020 5021 5022 5023 5024 5025 5026 5027 5028 5029 5030 5031 5032 5033 5034 5035 5036 5037 5038 5039 5040 5041 5042 5043 5044 5045 5046 5047 5048 5049 5050 5051 5052 5053 5054 5055 5056 5057 5058 5059 5060 5061 5062 5063 5064 5065 5066 5067 5068 5069 5070 5071 5072 5073 5074 5075 5076 5077 5078 5079 5080 5081 5082 5083 5084 5085 5086 5087 5088 5089 5090 5091 5092 5093 5094 5095 5096 5097 5098 5099 5100 5101 5102 5103 5104 5105 5106 5107 5108 5109 5110 5111 5112 5113 5114 5115 5116 5117 5118 5119 5120 5121 5122 5123 5124 5125 5126 5127 5128 5129 5130 5131 5132 5133 5134 5135 5136 5137 5138 5139 5140 5141 5142 5143 5144 5145 5146 5147 5148 5149 5150 5151 5152 5153 5154 5155 5156 5157 5158 5159 5160 5161 5162 5163 5164 5165 5166 5167 5168 5169 5170 5171 5172 5173 5174 5175 5176 5177 5178 5179 5180 5181 5182 5183 5184 5185 5186 5187 5188 5189 5190 5191 5192 5193 5194 5195 5196 5197 5198 5199 5200 5201 5202 5203 5204 5205 5206 5207 5208 5209 5210 5211 5212 5213 5214 5215 5216 5217 5218 5219 5220 5221 5222 5223 5224 5225 5226 5227 5228 5229 5230 5231 5232 5233 5234 5235 5236 5237 5238 5239 5240 5241 5242 5243 5244 5245 5246 5247 5248 5249 5250 5251 5252 5253 5254 5255 5256 5257 5258 5259 5260 5261 5262 5263 5264 5265 5266 5267 5268 5269 5270 5271 5272 5273 5274 5275 5276 5277 5278 5279 5280 5281 5282 5283 5284 5285 5286 5287 5288 5289 5290 5291 5292 5293 5294 5295 5296 5297 5298 5299 5300 5301 5302 5303 5304 5305 5306 5307 5308 5309 5310 5311 5312 5313 5314 5315 5316 5317 5318 5319 5320 5321 5322 5323 5324 5325 5326 5327 5328 5329 5330 5331 5332 5333 5334 5335 5336 5337 5338 5339 5340 5341 5342 5343 5344 5345 5346 5347 5348 5349 5350 5351 5352 5353 5354 5355 5356 5357 5358 5359 5360 5361 5362 5363 5364 5365 5366 5367 5368 5369 5370 5371 5372 5373 5374 5375 5376 5377 5378 5379 5380 5381 5382 5383 5384 5385 5386 5387 5388 5389 5390 5391 5392 5393 5394 5395 5396 5397 5398 5399 5400 5401 5402 5403 5404 5405 5406 5407 5408 5409 5410 5411 5412 5413 5414 5415 5416 5417 5418 5419 5420 5421 5422 5423 5424 5425 5426 5427 5428 5429 5430 5431 5432 5433 5434 5435 5436 5437 5438 5439 5440 5441 5442 5443 5444 5445 5446 5447 5448 5449 5450 5451 5452 5453 5454 5455 5456 5457 5458 5459 5460 5461 5462 5463 5464 5465 5466 5467 5468 5469 5470 5471 5472 5473 5474 5475 5476 5477 5478 5479 5480 5481 5482 5483 5484 5485 5486 5487 5488 5489 5490 5491 5492 5493 5494 5495 5496 5497 5498 5499 5500 5501 5502 5503 5504 5505 5506 5507 5508 5509 5510 5511 5512 5513 5514 5515 5516 5517 5518 5519 5520 5521 5522 5523 5524 5525 5526 5527 5528 5529 5530 5531 5532 5533 5534 5535 5536 5537 5538 5539 5540 5541 5542 5543 5544 5545 5546 5547 5548 5549 5550 5551 5552 5553 5554 5555 5556 5557 5558 5559 5560 5561 5562 5563 5564 5565 5566 5567 5568 5569 5570 5571 5572 5573 5574 5575 5576 5577 5578 5579 5580 5581 5582 5583 5584 5585 5586 5587 5588 5589 5590 5591 5592 5593 5594 5595 5596 5597 5598 5599 5600 5601 5602 5603 5604 5605 5606 5607 5608 5609 5610 5611 5612 5613 5614 5615 5616 5617 5618 5619 5620 5621 5622 5623 5624 5625 5626 5627 5628 5629 5630 5631 5632 5633 5634 5635 5636 5637 5638 5639 5640 5641 5642 5643 5644 5645 5646 5647 5648 5649 5650 5651 5652 5653 5654 5655 5656 5657 5658 5659 5660 5661 5662 5663 5664 5665 5666 5667 5668 5669 5670 5671 5672 5673 5674 5675 5676 5677 5678 5679 5680 5681 5682 5683 5684 5685 5686 5687 5688 5689 5690 5691 5692 5693 5694 5695 5696 5697 5698 5699 5700 5701 5702 5703 5704 5705 5706 5707 5708 5709 5710 5711 5712 5713 5714 5715 5716 5717 5718 5719 5720 5721 5722 5723 5724 5725 5726 5727 5728 5729 5730 5731 5732 5733 5734 5735 5736 5737 5738 5739 5740 5741 5742 5743 5744 5745 5746 5747 5748 5749 5750 5751 5752 5753 5754 5755 5756 5757 5758 5759 5760 5761 5762 5763 5764 5765 5766 5767 5768 5769 5770 5771 5772 5773 5774 5775 5776 5777 5778 5779 5780 5781 5782 5783 5784 5785 5786 5787 5788 5789 5790 5791 5792 5793 5794 5795 5796 5797 5798 5799 5800 5801 5802 5803 5804 5805 5806 5807 5808 5809 5810 5811 5812 5813 5814 5815 5816 5817 5818 5819 5820 5821 5822 5823 5824 5825 5826 5827 5828 5829 5830 5831 5832 5833 5834 5835 5836 5837 5838 5839 5840 5841 5842 5843 5844 5845 5846 5847 5848 5849 5850 5851 5852 5853 5854 5855 5856 5857 5858 5859 5860 5861 5862 5863 5864 5865 5866 5867 5868 5869 5870 5871 5872 5873 5874 5875 5876 5877 5878 5879 5880 5881 5882 5883 5884 5885 5886 5887 5888 5889 5890 5891 5892 5893 5894 5895 5896 5897 5898 5899 5900 5901 5902 5903 5904 5905 5906 5907 5908 5909 5910 5911 5912 5913 5914 5915 5916 5917 5918 5919 5920 5921 5922 5923 5924 5925 5926 5927 5928 5929 5930 5931 5932 5933 5934 5935 5936 5937 5938 5939 5940 5941 5942 5943 5944 5945 5946 5947 5948 5949 5950 5951 5952 5953 5954 5955 5956 5957 5958 5959 5960 5961 5962 5963 5964 5965 5966 5967 5968 5969 5970 5971 5972 5973 5974 5975 5976 5977 5978 5979 5980 5981 5982 5983 5984 5985 5986 5987 5988 5989 5990 5991 5992 5993 5994 5995 5996 5997 5998 5999 6000 6001 6002 6003 6004 6005 6006 6007 6008 6009 6010 6011 6012 6013 6014 6015 6016 6017 6018 6019 6020 6021 6022 6023 6024 6025 6026 6027 6028 6029 6030 6031 6032 6033 6034 6035 6036 6037 6038 6039 6040 6041 6042 6043 6044 6045 6046 6047 6048 6049 6050 6051 6052 6053 6054 6055 6056 6057 6058 6059 6060 6061 6062 6063 6064 6065 6066 6067 6068 6069 6070 6071 6072 6073 6074 6075 6076 6077 6078 6079 6080 6081 6082 6083 6084 6085 6086 6087 6088 6089 6090 6091 6092 6093 6094 6095 6096 6097 6098 6099 6100 6101 6102 6103 6104 6105 6106 6107 6108 6109 6110 6111 6112 6113 6114 6115 6116 6117 6118 6119 6120 6121 6122 6123 6124 6125 6126 6127 6128 6129 6130 6131 6132 6133 6134 6135 6136 6137 6138 6139 6140 6141 6142 6143 6144 6145 6146 6147 6148 6149 6150 6151 6152 6153 6154 6155 6156 6157 6158 6159 6160 6161 6162 6163 6164 6165 6166 6167 6168 6169 6170 6171 6172 6173 6174 6175 6176 6177 6178 6179 6180 6181 6182 6183 6184 6185 6186 6187 6188 6189 6190 6191 6192 6193 6194 6195 6196 6197 6198 6199 6200 6201 6202 6203 6204 6205 6206 6207 6208 6209 6210 6211 6212 6213 6214 6215 6216 6217 6218 6219 6220 6221 6222 6223 6224 6225 6226 6227 6228 6229 6230 6231 6232 6233 6234 6235 6236 6237 6238 6239 6240 6241 6242 6243 6244 6245 6246 6247 6248 6249 6250 6251 6252 6253 6254 6255 6256 6257 6258 6259 6260 6261 6262 6263 6264 6265 6266 6267 6268 6269 6270 6271 6272 6273 6274 6275 6276 6277 6278 6279 6280 6281 6282 6283 6284 6285 6286 6287 6288 6289 6290 6291 6292 6293 6294 6295 6296 6297 6298 6299 6300 6301 6302 6303 6304 6305 6306 6307 6308 6309 6310 6311 6312 6313 6314 6315 6316 6317 6318 6319 6320 6321 6322 6323 6324 6325 6326 6327 6328 6329 6330 6331 6332 6333 6334 6335 6336 6337 6338 6339 6340 6341 6342 6343 6344 6345 6346 6347 6348 6349 6350 6351 6352 6353 6354 6355 6356 6357 6358 6359 6360 6361 6362 6363 6364 6365 6366 6367 6368 6369 6370 6371 6372 6373 6374 6375 6376 6377 6378 6379 6380 6381 6382 6383 6384 6385 6386 6387 6388 6389 6390 6391 6392 6393 6394 6395 6396 6397 6398 6399 6400 6401 6402 6403 6404 6405 6406 6407 6408 6409 6410 6411 6412 6413 6414 6415 6416 6417 6418 6419 6420 6421 6422 6423 6424 6425 6426 6427 6428 6429 6430 6431 6432 6433 6434 6435 6436 6437 6438 6439 6440 6441 6442 6443 6444 6445 6446 6447 6448 6449 6450 6451 6452 6453 6454 6455 6456 6457 6458 6459 6460 6461 6462 6463 6464 6465 6466 6467 6468 6469 6470 6471 6472 6473 6474 6475 6476 6477 6478 6479 6480 6481 6482 6483 6484 6485 6486 6487 6488 6489 6490 6491 6492 6493 6494 6495 6496 6497 6498 6499 6500 6501 6502 6503 6504 6505 6506 6507 6508 6509 6510 6511 6512 6513 6514 6515 6516 6517 6518 6519 6520 6521 6522 6523 6524 6525 6526 6527 6528 6529 6530 6531 6532 6533 6534 6535 6536 6537 6538 6539 6540 6541 6542 6543 6544 6545 6546 6547 6548 6549 6550 6551 6552 6553 6554 6555 6556 6557 6558 6559 6560 6561 6562 6563 6564 6565 6566 6567 6568 6569 6570 6571 6572 6573 6574 6575 6576 6577 6578 6579 6580 6581 6582 6583 6584 6585 6586 6587 6588 6589 6590 6591 6592 6593 6594 6595 6596 6597 6598 6599 6600 6601 6602 6603 6604 6605 6606 6607 6608 6609 6610 6611 6612 6613 6614 6615 6616 6617 6618 6619 6620 6621 6622 6623 6624 6625 6626 6627 6628 6629 6630 6631 6632 6633 6634 6635 6636 6637 6638 6639 6640 6641 6642 6643 6644 6645 6646 6647 6648 6649 6650 6651 6652 6653 6654 6655 6656 6657 6658 6659 6660 6661 6662 6663 6664 6665 6666 6667 6668 6669 6670 6671 6672 6673 6674 6675 6676 6677 6678 6679 6680 6681 6682 6683 6684 6685 6686 6687 6688 6689 6690 6691 6692 6693 6694 6695 6696 6697 6698 6699 6700 6701 6702 6703 6704 6705 6706 6707 6708 6709 6710 6711 6712 6713 6714 6715 6716 6717 6718 6719 6720 6721 6722 6723 6724 6725 6726 6727 6728 6729 6730 6731 6732 6733 6734 6735 6736 6737 6738 6739 6740 6741 6742 6743 6744 6745 6746 6747 6748 6749 6750 6751 6752 6753 6754 6755 6756 6757 6758 6759 6760 6761 6762 6763 6764 6765 6766 6767 6768 6769 6770 6771 6772 6773 6774 6775 6776 6777 6778 6779 6780 6781 6782 6783 6784 6785 6786 6787 6788 6789 6790 6791 6792 6793 6794 6795 6796 6797 6798 6799 6800 6801 6802 6803 6804 6805 6806 6807 6808 6809 6810 6811 6812 6813 6814 6815 6816 6817 6818 6819 6820 6821 6822 6823 6824 6825 6826 6827 6828 6829 6830 6831 6832 6833 6834 6835 6836 6837 6838 6839 6840 6841 6842 6843 6844 6845 6846 6847 6848 6849 6850 6851 6852 6853 6854 6855 6856 6857 6858 6859 6860 6861 6862 6863 6864 6865 6866 6867 6868 6869 6870 6871 6872 6873 6874 6875 6876 6877 6878 6879 6880 6881 6882 6883 6884 6885 6886 6887 6888 6889 6890 6891 6892 6893 6894 6895 6896 6897 6898 6899 6900 6901 6902 6903 6904 6905 6906 6907 6908 6909 6910 6911 6912 6913 6914 6915 6916 6917 6918 6919 6920 6921 6922 6923 6924 6925 6926 6927 6928 6929 6930 6931 6932 6933 6934 6935 6936 6937 6938 6939 6940 6941 6942 6943 6944 6945 6946 6947 6948 6949 6950 6951 6952 6953 6954 6955 6956 6957 6958 6959 6960 6961 6962 6963 6964 6965 6966 6967 6968 6969 6970 6971 6972 6973 6974 6975 6976 6977 6978 6979 6980 6981 6982 6983 6984 6985 6986 6987 6988 6989 6990 6991 6992 6993 6994 6995 6996 6997 6998 6999 7000 7001 7002 7003 7004 7005 7006 7007 7008 7009 7010 7011 7012 7013 7014 7015 7016 7017 7018 7019 7020 7021 7022 7023 7024 7025 7026 7027 7028 7029 7030 7031 7032 7033 7034 7035 7036 7037 7038 7039 7040 7041 7042 7043 7044 7045 7046 7047 7048 7049 7050 7051 7052 7053 7054 7055 7056 7057 7058 7059 7060 7061 7062 7063 7064 7065 7066 7067 7068 7069 7070 7071 7072 7073 7074 7075 7076 7077 7078 7079 7080 7081 7082 7083 7084 7085 7086 7087 7088 7089 7090 7091 7092 7093 7094 7095 7096 7097 7098 7099 7100 7101 7102 7103 7104 7105 7106 7107 7108 7109 7110 7111 7112 7113 7114 7115 7116 7117 7118 7119 7120 7121 7122 7123 7124 7125 7126 7127 7128 7129 7130 7131 7132 7133 7134 7135 7136 7137 7138 7139 7140 7141 7142 7143 7144 7145 7146 7147 7148 7149 7150 7151 7152 7153 7154 7155 7156 7157 7158 7159 7160 7161 7162 7163 7164 7165 7166 7167 7168 7169 7170 7171 7172 7173 7174 7175 7176 7177 7178 7179 7180 7181 7182 7183 7184 7185 7186 7187 7188 7189 7190 7191 7192 7193 7194 7195 7196 7197 7198 7199 7200 7201 7202 7203 7204 7205 7206 7207 7208 7209 7210 7211 7212 7213 7214 7215 7216 7217 7218 7219 7220 7221 7222 7223 7224 7225 7226 7227 7228 7229 7230 7231 7232 7233 7234 7235 7236 7237 7238 7239 7240 7241 7242 7243 7244 7245 7246 7247 7248 7249 7250 7251 7252 7253 7254 7255 7256 7257 7258 7259 7260 7261 7262 7263 7264 7265 7266 7267 7268 7269 7270 7271 7272 7273 7274 7275 7276 7277 7278 7279 7280 7281 7282 7283 7284 7285 7286 7287 7288 7289 7290 7291 7292 7293 7294 7295 7296 7297 7298 7299 7300 7301 7302 7303 7304 7305 7306 7307 7308 7309 7310 7311 7312 7313 7314 7315 7316 7317 7318 7319 7320 7321 7322 7323 7324 7325 7326 7327 7328 7329 7330 7331 7332 7333 7334 7335 7336 7337 7338 7339 7340 7341 7342 7343 7344 7345 7346 7347 7348 7349 7350 7351 7352 7353 7354 7355 7356 7357 7358 7359 7360 7361 7362 7363 7364 7365 7366
|
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.0/Makefile.in
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/Makefile.in Mon Jan 14 02:17:09 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.0/Makefile.in Thu Jan 17 21:30:50 2002
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@
src/lmtp src/trivial-rewrite src/qmgr src/smtp src/bounce src/pipe \
src/showq src/postalias src/postcat src/postconf src/postdrop \
src/postkick src/postlock src/postlog src/postmap src/postqueue \
- src/postsuper src/nqmgr src/qmqpd src/spawn src/flush src/virtual
+ src/postsuper src/nqmgr src/qmqpd src/spawn src/flush src/virtual \
+ src/tlsmgr
MANDIRS = proto man html
default: update
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/conf/master.cf postfix-1.1.0/conf/master.cf
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/conf/master.cf Thu Jan 10 21:24:59 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.0/conf/master.cf Thu Jan 17 21:30:50 2002
@@ -69,11 +69,16 @@
# (yes) (yes) (yes) (never) (50)
# ==========================================================================
smtp inet n - n - - smtpd
+#smtps inet n - n - - smtpd
+# -o smtpd_tls_wrappermode=yes -o smtpd_sasl_auth_enable=yes
+#submission inet n - n - - smtpd
+# -o smtpd_enforce_tls=yes -o smtpd_sasl_auth_enable=yes
#628 inet n - n - - qmqpd
pickup fifo n - n 60 1 pickup
cleanup unix n - n - 0 cleanup
qmgr fifo n - n 300 1 qmgr
#qmgr fifo n - n 300 1 nqmgr
+#tlsmgr fifo - - n 300 1 tlsmgr
rewrite unix - - n - - trivial-rewrite
bounce unix - - n - 0 bounce
defer unix - - n - 0 bounce
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/conf/postfix-files postfix-1.1.0/conf/postfix-files
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/conf/postfix-files Thu Jan 17 18:50:55 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.0/conf/postfix-files Thu Jan 17 21:30:50 2002
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
$daemon_directory/smtp:f:root:-:755
$daemon_directory/smtpd:f:root:-:755
$daemon_directory/spawn:f:root:-:755
+$daemon_directory/tlsmgr:f:root:-:755
$daemon_directory/trivial-rewrite:f:root:-:755
$daemon_directory/virtual:f:root:-:755
$command_directory/postalias:f:root:-:755
@@ -138,6 +139,7 @@
$manpage_directory/man8/smtp.8:f:root:-:644
$manpage_directory/man8/smtpd.8:f:root:-:644
$manpage_directory/man8/spawn.8:f:root:-:644
+$manpage_directory/man8/tlsmgr.8:f:root:-:644
$manpage_directory/man8/trivial-rewrite.8:f:root:-:644
$manpage_directory/man8/virtual.8:f:root:-:644
$sample_directory/sample-aliases.cf:f:root:-:644
@@ -164,6 +166,7 @@
$sample_directory/sample-rewrite.cf:f:root:-:644
$sample_directory/sample-smtp.cf:f:root:-:644
$sample_directory/sample-smtpd.cf:f:root:-:644
+$sample_directory/sample-tls.cf:f:root:-:644
$sample_directory/sample-transport.cf:f:root:-:644
$sample_directory/sample-virtual.cf:f:root:-:644
$readme_directory/DB_README:f:root:-:644
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/conf/sample-auth.cf postfix-1.1.0/conf/sample-auth.cf
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/conf/sample-auth.cf Tue Nov 6 16:19:40 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.0/conf/sample-auth.cf Thu Jan 17 21:30:50 2002
@@ -108,3 +108,15 @@
#
#smtp_sasl_security_options =
smtp_sasl_security_options = noplaintext
+
+# Sending AUTH data over an unencrypted channel poses a security risk. When
+# smtpd_tls_enforce_tls is set, AUTH will only be announced and accepted,
+# once the TLS layer has been activated via the STARTTLS protocol. If
+# TLS layer encryption is optional, it may however still be useful to only
+# offer AUTH, when TLS is active. To not break compatiblity with unpatched
+# postfix versions, the default is to accept AUTH without encryption. In
+# order to change this behaviour, set smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes.
+# THIS OPTION ONLY WORKS WITH SSL/TLS SUPPORT COMPILED IN.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_auth_only = no
+
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/conf/sample-smtp.cf postfix-1.1.0/conf/sample-smtp.cf
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/conf/sample-smtp.cf Tue Dec 11 02:04:51 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.0/conf/sample-smtp.cf Thu Jan 17 21:30:50 2002
@@ -176,6 +176,14 @@
#
smtp_helo_timeout = 300s
+# The smtp_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time in seconds to write and
+# read operations during TLS start and stop handhake procedures.
+#
+# In case of problems the client does NOT try the next address on
+# the mail exchanger list.
+#
+# smtp_starttls_timeout = 300s
+
# The smtp_mail_timeout parameter specifies the SMTP client timeout
# for sending the SMTP MAIL FROM command, and for receiving the server
# response.
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/conf/sample-smtpd.cf postfix-1.1.0/conf/sample-smtpd.cf
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/conf/sample-smtpd.cf Wed Dec 26 23:11:37 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.0/conf/sample-smtpd.cf Thu Jan 17 21:30:50 2002
@@ -116,6 +116,11 @@
#
strict_rfc821_envelopes = no
+# The smtpd_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time in seconds to write and
+# read operations during TLS start and stop handhake procedures.
+#
+# smtpd_starttls_timeout = 300s
+
#
# TARPIT CONTROLS
#
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/conf/sample-tls.cf postfix-1.1.0/conf/sample-tls.cf
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/conf/sample-tls.cf Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.0/conf/sample-tls.cf Thu Jan 17 21:30:50 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,493 @@
+# DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE. EDIT THE MAIN.CF FILE INSTEAD. THE STUFF
+# HERE JUST SERVES AS AN EXAMPLE.
+#
+# This file contains example settings of Postfix configuration
+# parameters that control the behaviour of the TLS extensions.
+#
+# We strictly seperate between server side TLS (smtpd_) and client side
+# TLS (smtp_), as for practical reasons we might choose differently.
+
+# Section with SMTPD specific settings
+
+# To use TLS we do need a certificate and a private key. Both must be in
+# "pem" format, the private key must not be encrypted, that does mean:
+# it must be accessable without password. Both parts (certificate and
+# private key) may be in the same file.
+#
+# Both RSA and DSA are certificates are supported. Typically you will only
+# have RSA certificates issued by a commercial CA, also the tools supplied
+# with OpenSSL will by default issue RSA certificates.
+# You can have both at the same time, in this case the cipher used decides,
+# which certificate is presented. For Netscape and OpenSSL clients without
+# special cipher choices, the RSA certificate is preferred.
+#
+# In order to check the certificates, the CA-certificate (in case of a
+# certificate chain, all CA-certificates) must be available.
+# You should add these certificates to the server certificate, the server
+# certificate first, then the issuing CA(s).
+#
+# Example: the certificate for "server.dom.ain" was issued by "intermediate CA"
+# which itself has a certificate of "root CA". Create the server.pem file by
+# 'cat server_cert.pem intemediate_CA.pem root_CA.pem > server.pem'
+#
+# If you want to accept certificates issued by these CAs yourself, you can
+# also add the CA-certificates to the smtpd_tls_CAfile, in which case it is
+# not necessary to have them in the smtpd_tls_[d]cert_file.
+#
+# A certificate supplied here must be useable as SSL server certificate and
+# hence pass the "openssl verify -purpose sslserver ..." test.
+#
+smtpd_tls_cert_file = /etc/postfix/server.pem
+smtpd_tls_key_file = $smtpd_tls_cert_file
+#
+# Its DSA counterparts:
+smtpd_tls_dcert_file = /etc/postfix/server-dsa.pem
+smtpd_tls_dkey_file = $smtpd_tls_dcert_file
+
+# The certificate was issued by a certification authority (CA), the CA-cert
+# of which must be available, if not in the certificate file.
+# This file may also contain the the CA certificates of other trusted CAs.
+# You must use this file for the list of trusted CAs if you want to use
+# chroot-mode. No default is supplied for this value as of now.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_CAfile = /etc/postfix/CAcert.pem
+
+# To verify the peer certificate, we need to know the certificates of
+# certification authorities. These certificates in "pem" format are
+# collected in a directory. The same CAs are offered to clients for
+# client verification. Don't forget to create the necessary "hash"
+# links with $OPENSSL_HOME/bin/c_rehash /etc/postfix/certs. A typical
+# place for the CA-certs may also be $OPENSSL_HOME/certs, so there is
+# no default and you explicitly have to set the value here!
+#
+# To use this option in chroot mode, this directory itself or a copy of it
+# must be inside the chroot jail. Please note also, that the CAs in this
+# directory are not listed to the client, so that e.g. Netscape might not
+# offer certificates issued by them.
+#
+# I therefore discourage the use of this option.
+#
+smtpd_tls_CApath = /etc/postfix/certs
+
+# To get additional information during the TLS setup and negotiations
+# you can increase the loglevel from 0..4:
+# 0: No output about the TLS subsystem
+# 1: Printout startup and certificate information
+# 2: 1 + Printout of levels during negotiation
+# 3: 2 + Hex and ASCII dump of negotiation process
+# 4: 3 + Hex and ASCII dump of complete transmission after STARTTLS
+# Use loglevel 3 only in case of problems. Use of loglevel 4 is strongly
+# discouraged.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_loglevel = 0
+
+# To include information about the protocol and cipher used as well as the
+# client and issuer CommonName into the "Received:" header, set the
+# smtpd_tls_received_header variable to true. The default is no, as the
+# information is not necessarily authentic. Only the final destination
+# is reliable, since the headers might have been changed in between.
+#
+#smtpd_tls_received_header = yes
+
+# By default TLS is disabled, so no difference to plain postfix is visible.
+# Explicitely switch it on here:
+#
+smtpd_use_tls = yes
+
+# You can ENFORCE the use of TLS, so that no commands (except QUIT of course)
+# are allowed without TLS. According to RFC2487 this MUST NOT be applied
+# in case of a publicly-referenced SMTP server. So this option is off
+# by default and should only seldom be used. Using this option implies
+# smtpd_use_tls = yes
+#
+# smtpd_enforce_tls = no
+
+# Besides RFC2487 some clients, namely Outlook [Express] prefer to run the
+# non-standard "wrapper" mode, not the STARTTLS enhancement to SMTP.
+# This is true for OE (Win32 < 5.0 and Win32 >=5.0 when run on a port!=25
+# and OE (5.01 Mac on all ports).
+# It is strictly discouraged to use this mode from main.cf. If you want to
+# support this service, enable a special port in master.cf. Port 465 (smtps)
+# was once chosen for this feature.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_wrappermode = no
+
+# To receive a client certificate, the server must explicitly ask for one.
+# Hence netscape will either complain if no certificate is available (for
+# the list of CAs in /etc/postfix/certs) or will offer you client certificates
+# to choose from. This might be annoying, so this option is "off" by default.
+# You will however need the certificate if you want to to e.g. certificate
+# based relaying.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_ask_ccert = no
+
+# You may also decide to REQUIRE a client certificate to allow TLS connections.
+# I don't think it will be necessary often, it is however included here for
+# completeness. This option implies smtpd_tls_ask_ccert = yes
+#
+# Please be aware, that this will inhibit TLS connections without a proper
+# certificate and only makes sense, when normal submission is disabled and
+# TLS is enforced (smtpd_enforce_tls). Otherwise clients may bypass by simply
+# not using STARTTLS at all. When TLS is not enforced, the connection will be
+# handled, as if only smtpd_tls_ask_ccert = yes would be set and an information
+# is logged.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_req_ccert = no
+
+# The verification depth for client certificates. A depth of 1 is sufficient,
+# if the certificate ist directly issued by a CA listed in the CA locations.
+# The default value (5) should also suffice for longer chains (root CA issues
+# special CA which then issues the actual certificate...)
+#
+# smtpd_tls_ccert_verifydepth = 5
+
+# Sending AUTH data over an unencrypted channel poses a security risk. When
+# smtpd_tls_enforce_tls is set, AUTH will only be announced and accepted,
+# once the TLS layer has been activated via the STARTTLS protocol. If
+# TLS layer encryption is optional, it may however still be useful to only
+# offer AUTH, when TLS is active. To not break compatiblity with unpatched
+# postfix versions, the default is to accept AUTH without encryption. In
+# order to change this behaviour, set smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_auth_only = no
+
+# The server and client negotiate a session, which takes some computer time
+# and network bandwidth. The session is cached only in the smtpd process
+# actually using this session and is lost when the process dies.
+# To share the session information between the smtpd processes, a disc based
+# session cache can be used based on the SDBM databases (routines included
+# in Postfix/TLS). Since concurrent writing must be supported, only SDBM
+# can be used.
+#
+smtpd_tls_session_cache_database = sdbm:/etc/postfix/smtpd_scache
+
+# The cached sessions time out after a certain amount of time. For Postfix/TLS
+# I do not use the OpenSSL default of 300sec, but a longer time of 3600sec
+# (=1 hour). RFC2246 recommends a maximum of 24 hours.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout = 3600s
+
+# Two additional options has been added for relay control to the UCE rules:
+# permit_tls_clientcerts (a)
+# and
+# permit_tls_all_clientcerts. (b)
+#
+# If one of these options is added to
+# smtpd_recipient_restrictions,
+# postfix will relay if
+# (a) a valid (it passed the verification) client certificate is presented
+# and its fingerprint is listed in the list of client certs
+# (relay_clientcerts),
+# (b) any valid (it passed the verification) client certificate is presented.
+#
+# Option (b) must only be used, if a special CA issues the certificates and
+# only this CA is listed as trusted CA. If other CAs are trusted, any owner
+# of a valid (SSL client)-certificate can relay. Option (b) can be practical
+# for a specically created email relay. It is however recommended to stay with
+# option (a) and list all certificates, as (b) does not permit any control
+# when a certificate must no longer be used (e.g. an employee leaving).
+#
+# smtpd_recipient_restrictions = ... permit_tls_clientcerts ...
+
+# The list of client certificates for which relaying will be allowed.
+# Unfortunately the routines for lists in postfix use whitespaces as
+# seperators and choke on special chars. So using the certificate
+# X509ONELINES is quite impractical. We will use the fingerprints at
+# this point, as they are difficult to fake but easy to use for lookup.
+# As postmap (when using e.g. db) insists of having a pair of key and value,
+# but we only need the key, the value can be chosen freely, e.g. the name
+# of the user or host:
+# D7:04:2F:A7:0B:8C:A5:21:FA:31:77:E1:41:8A:EE:80 lutzpc.at.home
+#
+# relay_clientcerts = hash:/etc/postfix/relay_clientcerts
+
+# To influence the cipher selection scheme, you can give cipherlist-string.
+# A detailed description would go to far here, please refer to the openssl
+# documentation.
+# If you don't know what to do with it, simply don't touch it and leave the
+# (openssl-)compiled in default!
+#
+# DO NOT USE " to enclose the string, just the string!!!
+#
+# smtpd_tls_cipherlist = DEFAULT
+
+# If you want to take advantage of ciphers with EDH, DH parameters are needed.
+# There are built in DH parameters for both 1025bit and 512bit available. It
+# is however better to have "own" parameters, since otherwise it would "pay"
+# for a possible attacker to start a brute force attack against these
+# parameters commonly used by everybody. For this reason, the parameters
+# chosen are already different from those distributed with other TLS packages.
+#
+# To generate your own set of parameters, use
+# openssl gendh -out /etc/postfix/dh_1024.pem -2 -rand /var/run/egd-pool 1024
+# openssl gendh -out /etc/postfix/dh_512.pem -2 -rand /var/run/egd-pool 512
+# (your source for "entropy" might vary; on Linux there is /dev/random, on
+# other system, you might consider the "Entropy Gathering Daemon EGD",
+# available at http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/.
+#
+smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file = /etc/postfix/dh_1024.pem
+smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file = /etc/postfix/dh_512.pem
+
+# The smtpd_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time in seconds to write and
+# read operations during TLS start and stop handhake procedures.
+#
+# smtpd_starttls_timeout = 300s
+
+# Section with SMTP specific settings
+
+# During the startup negotiation we might present a certificate to the server.
+# Netscape is rather clever here and lets the user select between only those
+# certs that will match the CAs accepted from the server. As I simply use
+# the integrated "SSL_connect()" from the OpenSSL package, this is not
+# possible by now and we have to chose just one cert.
+# So for now the default is to use _no_ cert and key unless explictly
+# set here. It is possible to use the same key/cert pair as for the server.
+# If a cert is to be presented, it must be in "pem" format, the private key
+# must not be encrypted, that does mean: it must be accessable without
+# password. Both parts (certificate and private key) may be in the
+# same file.
+#
+# In order to check the certificates, the CA-certificate (in case of a
+# certificate chain, all CA-certificates) must be available.
+# You should add these certificates to the server certificate, the server
+# certificate first, then the issuing CA(s).
+#
+# Example: the certificate for "client.dom.ain" was issued by "intermediate CA"
+# which itself has a certificate of "root CA". Create the client.pem file by
+# 'cat client_cert.pem intemediate_CA.pem root_CA.pem > client.pem'
+#
+# If you want to accept certificates issued by these CAs yourself, you can
+# also add the CA-certificates to the smtp_tls_CAfile, in which case it is
+# not necessary to have them in the smtp_tls_[d]cert_file.
+#
+# A certificate supplied here must be useable as SSL client certificate and
+# hence pass the "openssl verify -purpose sslclient ..." test.
+#
+smtp_tls_cert_file = /etc/postfix/client.pem
+smtp_tls_key_file = $smtp_tls_cert_file
+
+# The certificate was issued by a certification authority (CA), the CA-cert
+# of which must be available, if not in the certificate file.
+# This file may also contain the the CA certificates of other trusted CAs.
+# You must use this file for the list of trusted CAs if you want to use
+# chroot-mode. No default is supplied for this value as of now.
+#
+smtp_tls_CAfile = /etc/postfix/CAcert.pem
+
+# To verify the peer certificate, we need to know the certificates of
+# certification authorities. These certificates in "pem" format are
+# collected in a directory. Don't forget to create the necessary "hash"
+# links with $OPENSSL_HOME/bin/c_rehash /etc/postfix/certs. A typical
+# place for the CA-certs may also be $OPENSSL_HOME/certs, so there is
+# no default and you explicitly have to set the value here!
+#
+# To use this option in chroot mode, this directory itself or a copy of it
+# must be inside the chroot jail.
+#
+smtp_tls_CApath = /etc/postfix/certs
+
+# To get additional information during the TLS setup and negotiations
+# you can increase the loglevel from 0..4:
+# 0: No output about the TLS subsystem
+# 1: Printout startup and certificate information
+# 2: 1 + Printout of levels during negotiation
+# 3: 2 + Hex and ASCII dump of negotiation process
+# 4: 3 + Hex and ASCII dump of complete transmission after STARTTLS
+# Use loglevel 3 only in case of problems. Use of loglevel 4 is strongly
+# discouraged.
+#
+smtp_tls_loglevel = 0
+
+# The server and client negotiate a session, which takes some computer time
+# and network bandwidth. The session is cached only in the smtpd process
+# actually using this session and is lost when the process dies.
+# To share the session information between the smtp processes, a disc based
+# session cache can be used based on the SDBM databases (routines included
+# in Postfix/TLS). Since concurrent writing must be supported, only SDBM
+# can be used.
+#
+smtp_tls_session_cache_database = sdbm:/etc/postfix/smtp_scache
+
+# The cached sessions time out after a certain amount of time. For Postfix/TLS
+# I do not use the OpenSSL default of 300sec, but a longer time of 3600sec
+# (=1 hour). RFC2246 recommends a maximum of 24 hours.
+#
+# smtp_tls_session_cache_timeout = 3600s
+
+# By default TLS is disabled, so no difference to plain postfix is visible.
+# If you enable TLS it will be used when offered by the server.
+# WARNING: I didn't have access to other software (except those explicitely
+# listed) to test the interaction. On corresponding mailing list
+# there was a discussion going on about MS exchange servers offering
+# STARTTLS even if it is not configured, so it might be wise to not
+# use this option on your central mail hub, as you don't know in advance
+# whether you are going to hit such host. Use the recipient/site specific
+# options instead.
+# HINT: I have it switched on on my mailservers and did experience one
+# single failure since client side TLS is implemented. (There was one
+# misconfired MS Exchange server; I contacted ths admin.) Hence, I am happy
+# with it running all the time, but I am interested in testing anyway.
+# You have been warned, however :-)
+#
+# In case of failure, a "4xx" code is issued and the mail stays in the queue.
+#
+# Explicitely switch it on here, if you want it.
+#
+smtp_use_tls = yes
+
+# You can ENFORCE the use of TLS, so that only connections with TLS will
+# be accepted. Additionally, the hostname of the receiving host is matched
+# against the CommonName in the certificate. Also, the certificate must
+# be verified "Ok", so that a CA trusted by the client must have issued
+# the certificate. If the certificate doesn't verify or the hostname doesn't
+# match, a "4xx" will be issued and the mail stays in the queue.
+# The hostname used in the check is beyond question, as it must be the
+# principle hostname (no CNAME allowed here).
+# The behaviour may be changed with the smtp_tls_enforce_peername option
+#
+# This option is useful only if you are definitely sure that you will only
+# connect to servers supporting RFC2487 _and_ with valid certificates.
+# I use it for my clients which will only send email to one mailhub, which
+# does offer the necessary STARTTLS support.
+#
+# smtp_enforce_tls = no
+
+# As of RFC2487 the requirements for hostname checking for MTA clients are
+# not set. When in smtp_enforce_tls mode, the option smtp_tls_enforce_peername
+# can be set to "no" to disable strict peername checking. In this case, the
+# mail delivery will be continued, if a TLS connection was established
+# _and_ the peer certificate passed verification _but_ regardless of the
+# CommonName listed in the certificate. This option only applies to the
+# default setting smtp_enforce_tls_mode, special settings in the
+# smtp_tls_per_site table override smtp_tls_enforce_peername.
+#
+# This can make sense in closed environment where special CAs are created.
+# If not used carefully, this option opens the danger of a "man-in-the-middle"
+# attack (the CommonName of this attacker is logged).
+#
+# smtp_tls_enforce_peername = yes
+
+# As generally trying TLS can be a bad idea (some hosts offer STARTTLS but
+# the negotiation will fail leading to unexplainable failures, it may be
+# a good idea to decide based on the recipient or the mailhub to which you are
+# connecting.
+#
+# Deciding per recipient may be difficult, since a singe email can have
+# several recipients. We use the "nexthop" mechanism inside postfix.
+# When an email is to be delivered, the "nexthop" is obtained. If it matches
+# an entry in the smtp_tls_per_site list, appropriate action is taken.
+# Since entries in the transport table or the use of a relay_host override
+# the nexthop setting, in these cases the relay_host etc must be listed
+# in the table. In any case, the hostname of the peer to be contacted is
+# looked up (that is: the MX or the name of the host, if no MX is given).
+#
+# Special hint for enforcement mode:
+# Since there is no secure mechanism for DNS lookups available, the
+# recommended setup is: put the sensible domains with their mailhost
+# into the transport table (since you can asure security of this table
+# unlike DNS), then set MUST mode for this mailhost.
+#
+# Format of the table:
+# The keys entries are on the left hand side, no wildcards allowed. On the
+# right hand side the keywords NONE (don't use TLS at all), MAY (try to use
+# STARTTLS if offered, no problem if not), MUST (enforce usage of STARTTLS,
+# check server certificate CommonName against server FQDN), MUST_NOPEERMATCH
+# (enforce usage of STARTTLS and verify certificate, but ignore differences
+# between CommonName and server FQDN).
+# dom.ain NONE
+# host.dom.ain MAY
+# important.host MUST
+# some.host.dom.ain MUST_NOPEERMATCH
+#
+# If an entry is not matched, the default policy is applied; if the default
+# policy is "enforce", NONE explicitely switches it off, otherwise the
+# "enforce" mode is used even for MAY entries.
+#
+smtp_tls_per_site = hash:/etc/postfix/tls_per_site
+
+# The verification depth for server certificates. A depth of 1 is sufficient,
+# if the certificate ist directly issued by a CA listed in the CA locations.
+# The default value (5) should also suffice for longer chains (root CA issues
+# special CA which then issues the actual certificate...)
+#
+# smtp_tls_scert_verifydepth = 5
+
+# As we decide on a "per site" basis, wether to use TLS or not, it would be
+# good to have a list of sites, that offered "STARTTLS'. We can collect it
+# ourselves with this option.
+#
+# If activated and TLS is not already enabled for this host, a line is added
+# to the logfile:
+# postfix/smtp[pid]: Host offered STARTTLS: [name.of.host]
+#
+smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer = yes
+
+# To influence the cipher selection scheme, you can give cipherlist-string.
+# A detailed description would go to far here, please refer to the openssl
+# documentation.
+# If you don't know what to do with it, simply don't touch it and leave the
+# (openssl-)compiled in default!
+#
+# DO NOT USE " to enclose the string, just the string!!!
+#
+# smtp_tls_cipherlist = DEFAULT
+
+# The smtp_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time in seconds to write and
+# read operations during TLS start and stop handhake procedures.
+#
+# In case of problems the client does NOT try the next address on
+# the mail exchanger list.
+#
+# smtp_starttls_timeout = 300s
+
+# In order to seed the PRNG Pseude Random Number Generator, random data is
+# needed. The PRNG pool is maintained by the "tlsmgr" daemon and is used
+# (read) by the smtp[d] processes after adding some more entropy by stirring
+# in time and process id.
+# The file, which is from time to time rewritten by the tlsmgr, is created
+# if not existant. A default value is given; the default should probably
+# be on the /var partition but _not_ inside chroot jail.
+#
+# tls_random_exchange_name = /etc/postfix/prng_exch
+
+# To feed the PRNG pool, entropy is being read from an external source,
+# both at startup and during run.
+# Specify a good entropy source here, like EGD or /dev/urandom; make sure
+# to only use non-blocking sources.
+# In both cases, 32 bytes are read at each re-seeding event (which is an
+# amount of 256bits and hence good enough for 128bit symmetric keys).
+# You must specify the type of source: "dev:" for a device special file
+# or "egd:" for a source with EGD compatible socket interface. A maximum
+# 255 bytes is read from these sources in each step.
+# If you specify a normal file, a larger amount of data can be read.
+#
+# The entropy source is queried again after a certain amount of time. The
+# time is calculated using the PRNG, it is between 0 and the time specified,
+# default is a maximum of 1 hour.
+#
+# tls_random_source = dev:/dev/urandom
+tls_random_source = egd:/var/run/egd-pool
+# tls_random_bytes = 32
+# tls_random_reseed_period = 3600s
+
+# The PRNG pool inside tlsmgr is used to re-generate the 1024 byte file
+# being read by smtp[d]. The time, after which the exchange file is
+# rewritten is calculated using the PRNG, it is between 0 and the time
+# specified, default is a maximum of 60 seconds.
+#
+# tls_random_upd_period = 60s
+
+# If you have a entropy source available, that is not easily drained (like
+# /dev/urandom), the daemons can also load additional entropy on startup from
+# the source specified. By default an amount of 32 bytes is read, the
+# equivalent to 256 bits. This is more than enough to generate a 128bit
+# (or 168bit) session key, but we may have to generate more than one.
+# Usage of this option may drain EGD (consider the case of 50 smtp starting
+# up with a full queue and "postfix start", which will request 1600bytes
+# of entropy). This is however not fatal, as long as "entropy" data could
+# be read from the exchange file.
+#
+# tls_daemon_random_source = dev:/dev/urandom
+tls_daemon_random_source = egd:/var/run/egd-pool
+# tls_daemon_random_bytes = 32
+
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/man/man8/tlsmgr.8 postfix-1.1.0/man/man8/tlsmgr.8
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/man/man8/tlsmgr.8 Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.0/man/man8/tlsmgr.8 Thu Jan 17 21:30:50 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+.TH TLSMGR 8
+.ad
+.fi
+.SH NAME
+tlsmgr
+\-
+Postfix TLS session cache and PRNG handling manager
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.na
+.nf
+\fBtlsmgr\fR [generic Postfix daemon options]
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.ad
+.fi
+The tlsmgr process does housekeeping on the session cache database
+files. It runs through the databases and removes expired entries
+and entries written by older (incompatible) versions.
+
+The tlsmgr is responsible for the PRNG handling. The used internal
+OpenSSL PRNG has a pool size of 8192 bits (= 1024 bytes). The pool
+is initially seeded at startup from an external source (EGD or
+/dev/urandom) and additional seed is obtained later during program
+run at a configurable period. The exact time of seed query is
+using random information and is equally distributed in the range of
+[0-\fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR] with a \fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR
+having a default of 1 hour.
+
+Tlsmgr can be run chrooted and with dropped privileges, as it will
+connect to the entropy source at startup.
+
+The PRNG is additionally seeded internally by the data found in the
+session cache and timevalues.
+
+Tlsmgr reads the old value of the exchange file at startup to keep
+entropy already collected during previous runs.
+
+From the PRNG random pool a cryptographically strong 1024 byte random
+sequence is written into the PRNG exchange file. The file is updated
+periodically with the time changing randomly from
+[0-\fBtls_random_prng_update_period\fR].
+.SH STANDARDS
+.na
+.nf
+.SH SECURITY
+.na
+.nf
+.ad
+.fi
+Tlsmgr is not security-sensitive. It only deals with external data
+to be fed into the PRNG, the contents is never trusted. The session
+cache housekeeping will only remove entries if expired and will never
+touch the contents of the cached data.
+.SH DIAGNOSTICS
+.ad
+.fi
+Problems and transactions are logged to the syslog daemon.
+.SH BUGS
+.ad
+.fi
+There is no automatic means to limit the number of entries in the
+session caches and/or the size of the session cache files.
+.SH CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS
+.na
+.nf
+.ad
+.fi
+The following \fBmain.cf\fR parameters are especially relevant to
+this program. See the Postfix \fBmain.cf\fR file for syntax details
+and for default values. Use the \fBpostfix reload\fR command after
+a configuration change.
+.SH Session Cache
+.ad
+.fi
+.IP \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_database\fR
+Name of the SDBM file (type sdbm:) containing the SMTP server session
+cache. If the file does not exist, it is created.
+.IP \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+Expiry time of SMTP server session cache entries in seconds. Entries
+older than this are removed from the session cache. A cleanup-run is
+performed periodically every \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+seconds. Default is 3600 (= 1 hour).
+.IP \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_database\fR
+Name of the SDBM file (type sdbm:) containing the SMTP client session
+cache. If the file does not exist, it is created.
+.IP \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+Expiry time of SMTP client session cache entries in seconds. Entries
+older than this are removed from the session cache. A cleanup-run is
+performed periodically every \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+seconds. Default is 3600 (= 1 hour).
+.SH Pseudo Random Number Generator
+.ad
+.fi
+.IP \fBtls_random_source\fR
+Name of the EGD socket or device or regular file to obtain entropy
+from. The type of entropy source must be specified by preceding the
+name with the appropriate type: egd:/path/to/egd_socket,
+dev:/path/to/devicefile, or /path/to/regular/file.
+tlsmgr opens \fBtls_random_source\fR and tries to read
+\fBtls_random_bytes\fR from it.
+.IP \fBtls_random_bytes\fR
+Number of bytes to be read from \fBtls_random_source\fR.
+Default value is 32 bytes. If using EGD, a maximum of 255 bytes is read.
+.IP \fBtls_random_exchange_name\fR
+Name of the file written by tlsmgr and read by smtp and smtpd at
+startup. The length is 1024 bytes. Default value is
+/etc/postfix/prng_exch.
+.IP \fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR
+Time in seconds until the next reseed from external sources is due.
+This is the maximum value. The actual point in time is calculated
+with a random factor equally distributed between 0 and this maximum
+value. Default is 3600 (= 60 minutes).
+.IP \fBtls_random_prng_update_period\fR
+Time in seconds until the PRNG exchange file is updated with new
+pseude random values. This is the maximum value. The actual point
+in time is calculated with a random factor equally distributed
+between 0 and this maximum value. Default is 60 (= 1 minute).
+.SH SEE ALSO
+.na
+.nf
+smtp(8) SMTP client
+smtpd(8) SMTP server
+.SH LICENSE
+.na
+.nf
+.ad
+.fi
+The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
+.SH AUTHOR(S)
+.na
+.nf
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/global/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.0/src/global/Makefile.in
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/global/Makefile.in Tue Jan 15 16:25:09 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/global/Makefile.in Thu Jan 17 21:30:50 2002
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
timed_ipc.c tok822_find.c tok822_node.c tok822_parse.c \
tok822_resolve.c tok822_rewrite.c tok822_tree.c xtext.c bounce_log.c \
flush_clnt.c mail_conf_time.c mbox_conf.c mbox_open.c abounce.c \
- verp_sender.c match_parent_style.c
+ verp_sender.c match_parent_style.c pfixtls.c
OBJS = been_here.o bounce.o canon_addr.o cleanup_strerror.o clnt_stream.o \
debug_peer.o debug_process.o defer.o deliver_completed.o \
deliver_flock.o deliver_pass.o deliver_request.o domain_list.o \
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
timed_ipc.o tok822_find.o tok822_node.o tok822_parse.o \
tok822_resolve.o tok822_rewrite.o tok822_tree.o xtext.o bounce_log.o \
flush_clnt.o mail_conf_time.o mbox_conf.o mbox_open.o abounce.o \
- verp_sender.o match_parent_style.o
+ verp_sender.o match_parent_style.o pfixtls.o
HDRS = been_here.h bounce.h canon_addr.h cleanup_user.h clnt_stream.h \
config.h debug_peer.h debug_process.h defer.h deliver_completed.h \
deliver_flock.h deliver_pass.h deliver_request.h domain_list.h \
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
rewrite_clnt.h sent.h smtp_stream.h split_addr.h string_list.h \
sys_exits.h timed_ipc.h tok822.h xtext.h bounce_log.h flush_clnt.h \
mbox_conf.h mbox_open.h abounce.h qmqp_proto.h verp_sender.h \
- match_parent_style.h
+ match_parent_style.h pfixtls.h
TESTSRC = rec2stream.c stream2rec.c recdump.c
WARN = -W -Wformat -Wimplicit -Wmissing-prototypes \
-Wparentheses -Wstrict-prototypes -Wswitch -Wuninitialized \
@@ -1072,3 +1072,16 @@
xtext.o: ../../include/vbuf.h
xtext.o: ../../include/vstring.h
xtext.o: xtext.h
+pfixtls.o: pfixtls.c
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/iostuff.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/mymalloc.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/vstring.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/vstream.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/dict.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/myflock.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/stringops.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/msg.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/connect.h
+pfixtls.o: mail_params.h
+pfixtls.o: pfixtls.h
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/global/mail_params.c postfix-1.1.0/src/global/mail_params.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/global/mail_params.c Thu Jan 17 16:50:56 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/global/mail_params.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:50 2002
@@ -199,6 +199,31 @@
int var_in_flow_delay;
char *var_par_dom_match;
char *var_config_dirs;
+char *var_tls_rand_exch_name;
+char *var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
+char *var_smtpd_tls_key_file;
+char *var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file;
+char *var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file;
+char *var_smtpd_tls_CAfile;
+char *var_smtpd_tls_CApath;
+char *var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist;
+char *var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file;
+char *var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file;
+int var_smtpd_tls_loglevel;
+char *var_smtpd_tls_scache_db;
+int var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout;
+char *var_smtp_tls_cert_file;
+char *var_smtp_tls_key_file;
+char *var_smtp_tls_dcert_file;
+char *var_smtp_tls_dkey_file;
+char *var_smtp_tls_CAfile;
+char *var_smtp_tls_CApath;
+char *var_smtp_tls_cipherlist;
+int var_smtp_tls_loglevel;
+char *var_smtp_tls_scache_db;
+int var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout;
+char *var_tls_daemon_rand_source;
+int var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes;
char *var_import_environ;
char *var_export_environ;
@@ -413,6 +438,26 @@
VAR_VERP_FILTER, DEF_VERP_FILTER, &var_verp_filter, 1, 0,
VAR_PAR_DOM_MATCH, DEF_PAR_DOM_MATCH, &var_par_dom_match, 0, 0,
VAR_CONFIG_DIRS, DEF_CONFIG_DIRS, &var_config_dirs, 0, 0,
+ VAR_TLS_RAND_EXCH_NAME, DEF_TLS_RAND_EXCH_NAME, &var_tls_rand_exch_name, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_cert_file, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_key_file, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_CAfile, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, &var_smtpd_tls_CApath, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CLIST, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CLIST, &var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHE_DB, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHE_DB, &var_smtpd_tls_scache_db, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_CERT_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_CERT_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_cert_file, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_KEY_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_KEY_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_key_file, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_DCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_DCERT_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_dcert_file, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_DKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_DKEY_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_dkey_file, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_CAfile, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_CA_PATH, DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_PATH, &var_smtp_tls_CApath, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_CLIST, DEF_SMTP_TLS_CLIST, &var_smtp_tls_cipherlist, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCACHE_DB, DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCACHE_DB, &var_smtp_tls_scache_db, 0, 0,
+ VAR_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_SOURCE, DEF_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_SOURCE, &var_tls_daemon_rand_source, 0, 0,
0,
};
static CONFIG_STR_FN_TABLE function_str_defaults_2[] = {
@@ -429,6 +474,9 @@
VAR_FLOCK_TRIES, DEF_FLOCK_TRIES, &var_flock_tries, 1, 0,
VAR_DEBUG_PEER_LEVEL, DEF_DEBUG_PEER_LEVEL, &var_debug_peer_level, 1, 0,
VAR_FAULT_INJ_CODE, DEF_FAULT_INJ_CODE, &var_fault_inj_code, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, &var_smtpd_tls_loglevel, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_LOGLEVEL, DEF_SMTP_TLS_LOGLEVEL, &var_smtp_tls_loglevel, 0, 0,
+ VAR_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES, DEF_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES, &var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes, 0, 0,
0,
};
static CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_defaults[] = {
@@ -439,6 +487,8 @@
VAR_FORK_DELAY, DEF_FORK_DELAY, &var_fork_delay, 1, 0,
VAR_FLOCK_DELAY, DEF_FLOCK_DELAY, &var_flock_delay, 1, 0,
VAR_FLOCK_STALE, DEF_FLOCK_STALE, &var_flock_stale, 1, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHTIME, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHTIME, &var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCACHTIME, DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCACHTIME, &var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout, 0, 0,
VAR_DAEMON_TIMEOUT, DEF_DAEMON_TIMEOUT, &var_daemon_timeout, 1, 0,
VAR_IN_FLOW_DELAY, DEF_IN_FLOW_DELAY, &var_in_flow_delay, 0, 10,
0,
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/global/mail_params.h postfix-1.1.0/src/global/mail_params.h
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/global/mail_params.h Tue Jan 15 16:24:34 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/global/mail_params.h Thu Jan 17 21:30:50 2002
@@ -458,6 +458,34 @@
#define DEF_DUP_FILTER_LIMIT 1000
extern int var_dup_filter_limit;
+#define VAR_TLS_RAND_EXCH_NAME "tls_random_exchange_name"
+#define DEF_TLS_RAND_EXCH_NAME "${config_directory}/prng_exch"
+extern char *var_tls_rand_exch_name;
+
+#define VAR_TLS_RAND_SOURCE "tls_random_source"
+#define DEF_TLS_RAND_SOURCE ""
+extern char *var_tls_rand_source;
+
+#define VAR_TLS_RAND_BYTES "tls_random_bytes"
+#define DEF_TLS_RAND_BYTES 32
+extern int var_tls_rand_bytes;
+
+#define VAR_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_SOURCE "tls_daemon_random_source"
+#define DEF_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_SOURCE ""
+extern char *var_tls_daemon_rand_source;
+
+#define VAR_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES "tls_daemon_random_bytes"
+#define DEF_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES 32
+extern int var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes;
+
+#define VAR_TLS_RESEED_PERIOD "tls_random_reseed_period"
+#define DEF_TLS_RESEED_PERIOD "3600s"
+extern int var_tls_reseed_period;
+
+#define VAR_TLS_PRNG_UPD_PERIOD "tls_random_prng_update_period"
+#define DEF_TLS_PRNG_UPD_PERIOD "60s"
+extern int var_tls_prng_upd_period;
+
/*
* Queue manager: relocated databases.
*/
@@ -678,6 +706,10 @@
#define DEF_SMTP_HELO_TMOUT "300s"
extern int var_smtp_helo_tmout;
+#define VAR_SMTP_STARTTLS_TMOUT "smtp_starttls_timeout"
+#define DEF_SMTP_STARTTLS_TMOUT "300s"
+extern int var_smtp_starttls_tmout;
+
#define VAR_SMTP_MAIL_TMOUT "smtp_mail_timeout"
#define DEF_SMTP_MAIL_TMOUT "300s"
extern int var_smtp_mail_tmout;
@@ -763,6 +795,10 @@
#define DEF_SMTPD_TMOUT "300s"
extern int var_smtpd_tmout;
+#define VAR_SMTPD_STARTTLS_TMOUT "smtpd_starttls_timeout"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_STARTTLS_TMOUT "300s"
+extern int var_smtpd_starttls_tmout;
+
#define VAR_SMTPD_RCPT_LIMIT "smtpd_recipient_limit"
#define DEF_SMTPD_RCPT_LIMIT 1000
extern int var_smtpd_rcpt_limit;
@@ -791,6 +827,150 @@
#define DEF_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS ""
extern char *var_smtpd_noop_cmds;
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER "smtpd_tls_wrappermode"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER 0
+extern bool var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_USE_TLS "smtpd_use_tls"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_USE_TLS 0
+extern bool var_smtpd_use_tls;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS "smtpd_enforce_tls"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS 0
+extern bool var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY "smtpd_tls_auth_only"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY 0
+extern bool var_smtpd_tls_auth_only;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT "smtpd_tls_ask_ccert"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT 0
+extern bool var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT "smtpd_tls_req_ccert"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT 0
+extern bool var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD "smtpd_tls_ccert_verifydepth"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD 5
+extern int var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE "smtpd_tls_cert_file"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE ""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE "smtpd_tls_key_file"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE "$smtpd_tls_cert_file"
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_key_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE "smtpd_tls_dcert_file"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE ""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE "smtpd_tls_dkey_file"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE "$smtpd_tls_dcert_file"
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE "smtpd_tls_CAfile"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE ""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_CAfile;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH "smtpd_tls_CApath"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH ""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_CApath;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CLIST "smtpd_tls_cipherlist"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CLIST ""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE "smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE ""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE "smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE ""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL "smtpd_tls_loglevel"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL 0
+extern int var_smtpd_tls_loglevel;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD "smtpd_tls_received_header"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD 0
+extern bool var_smtpd_tls_received_header;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHE_DB "smtpd_tls_session_cache_database"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHE_DB ""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_scache_db;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHTIME "smtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHTIME "3600s"
+extern int var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE "smtp_tls_per_site"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE ""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_per_site;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_USE_TLS "smtp_use_tls"
+#define DEF_SMTP_USE_TLS 0
+extern bool var_smtp_use_tls;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_ENFORCE_TLS "smtp_enforce_tls"
+#define DEF_SMTP_ENFORCE_TLS 0
+extern bool var_smtp_enforce_tls;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_ENFORCE_PN "smtp_tls_enforce_peername"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_ENFORCE_PN 1
+extern bool var_smtp_tls_enforce_peername;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCERT_VD "smtp_tls_scert_verifydepth"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCERT_VD 5
+extern int var_smtp_tls_scert_vd;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_CERT_FILE "smtp_tls_cert_file"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_CERT_FILE ""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_cert_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_KEY_FILE "smtp_tls_key_file"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_KEY_FILE "$smtp_tls_cert_file"
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_key_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_DCERT_FILE "smtp_tls_dcert_file"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_DCERT_FILE ""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_dcert_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_DKEY_FILE "smtp_tls_dkey_file"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_DKEY_FILE "$smtp_tls_dcert_file"
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_dkey_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE "smtp_tls_CAfile"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE ""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_CAfile;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_CA_PATH "smtp_tls_CApath"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_PATH ""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_CApath;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_CLIST "smtp_tls_cipherlist"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_CLIST ""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_cipherlist;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_LOGLEVEL "smtp_tls_loglevel"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_LOGLEVEL 0
+extern int var_smtp_tls_loglevel;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_NOTEOFFER "smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_NOTEOFFER 0
+extern bool var_smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCACHE_DB "smtp_tls_session_cache_database"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCACHE_DB ""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_scache_db;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCACHTIME "smtp_tls_session_cache_timeout"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCACHTIME "3600s"
+extern int var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout;
+
/*
* SASL authentication support, SMTP server side.
*/
@@ -1072,6 +1252,10 @@
#define DEF_RELAY_DOMAINS "$mydestination"
extern char *var_relay_domains;
+#define VAR_RELAY_CCERTS "relay_clientcerts"
+#define DEF_RELAY_CCERTS ""
+extern char *var_relay_ccerts;
+
#define VAR_CLIENT_CHECKS "smtpd_client_restrictions"
#define DEF_CLIENT_CHECKS ""
extern char *var_client_checks;
@@ -1151,6 +1335,8 @@
#define PERMIT_AUTH_DEST "permit_auth_destination"
#define REJECT_UNAUTH_DEST "reject_unauth_destination"
#define CHECK_RELAY_DOMAINS "check_relay_domains"
+#define PERMIT_TLS_CLIENTCERTS "permit_tls_clientcerts"
+#define PERMIT_TLS_ALL_CLIENTCERTS "permit_tls_all_clientcerts"
#define VAR_RELAY_CODE "relay_domains_reject_code"
#define DEF_RELAY_CODE 554
extern int var_relay_code;
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/global/mail_proto.h postfix-1.1.0/src/global/mail_proto.h
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/global/mail_proto.h Fri Nov 2 21:51:28 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/global/mail_proto.h Thu Jan 17 21:30:50 2002
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#define MAIL_SERVICE_LOCAL "local"
#define MAIL_SERVICE_PICKUP "pickup"
#define MAIL_SERVICE_QUEUE "qmgr"
+#define MAIL_SERVICE_TLSMGR "tlsmgr"
#define MAIL_SERVICE_RESOLVE "resolve"
#define MAIL_SERVICE_REWRITE "rewrite"
#define MAIL_SERVICE_VIRTUAL "virtual"
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/global/pfixtls.c postfix-1.1.0/src/global/pfixtls.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/global/pfixtls.c Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/global/pfixtls.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:50 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,2740 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/* pfixtls
+/* SUMMARY
+/* interface to openssl routines
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/* #include <pfixtls.h>
+/*
+/* const long scache_db_version;
+/* const long openssl_version;
+/*
+/* int pfixtls_serverengine;
+/*
+/* int pfixtls_clientengine;
+/*
+/* int pfixtls_timed_read(fd, buf, len, timeout, unused_context)
+/* int fd;
+/* void *buf;
+/* unsigned len;
+/* int timeout;
+/* void *context;
+/*
+/* int pfixtls_timed_write(fd, buf, len, timeout, unused_context);
+/* int fd;
+/* void *buf;
+/* unsigned len;
+/* int timeout;
+/* void *context;
+/*
+/* int pfixtls_init_serverengine(verifydepth, askcert);
+/* int verifydepth;
+/* int askcert;
+/*
+/* int pfixtls_start_servertls(stream, timeout, peername, peeraddr,
+/* tls_info, requirecert);
+/* VSTREAM *stream;
+/* int timeout;
+/* const char *peername;
+/* const char *peeraddr;
+/* tls_info_t *tls_info;
+/* int requirecert;
+/*
+/* int pfixtls_stop_servertls(stream, failure, tls_info);
+/* VSTREAM *stream;
+/* int failure;
+/* tls_info_t *tls_info;
+/*
+/* int pfixtls_init_clientengine(verifydepth);
+/* int verifydepth;
+/*
+/* int pfixtls_start_clienttls(stream, timeout, peername, peeraddr,
+/* tls_info);
+/* VSTREAM *stream;
+/* int timeout;
+/* const char *peername;
+/* const char *peeraddr;
+/* tls_info_t *tls_info;
+/*
+/* int pfixtls_stop_clienttls(stream, failure, tls_info);
+/* VSTREAM *stream;
+/* int failure;
+/* tls_info_t *tls_info;
+/*
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* This module is the interface between Postfix and the OpenSSL library.
+/*
+/* pfixtls_timed_read() reads the requested number of bytes calling
+/* SSL_read(). pfixtls_time_read() will only be called indirect
+/* as a VSTREAM_FN function.
+/* pfixtls_timed_write() is the corresponding write function.
+/*
+/* pfixtls_init_serverengine() is called once when smtpd is started
+/* in order to initialize as much of the TLS stuff as possible.
+/* The certificate handling is also decided during the setup phase,
+/* so that a peer specific handling is not possible.
+/*
+/* pfixtls_init_clientengine() is the corresponding function called
+/* in smtp. Here we take the peer's (server's) certificate in any
+/* case.
+/*
+/* pfixtls_start_servertls() activates the TLS feature for the VSTREAM
+/* passed as argument. We expect that all buffers are flushed and the
+/* TLS handshake can begin immediately. Information about the peer
+/* is stored into the tls_info structure passed as argument.
+/*
+/* pfixtls_stop_servertls() sends the "close notify" alert via
+/* SSL_shutdown() to the peer and resets all connection specific
+/* TLS data. As RFC2487 does not specify a seperate shutdown, it
+/* is supposed that the underlying TCP connection is shut down
+/* immediately afterwards, so we don't care about additional data
+/* coming through the channel.
+/* If the failure flag is set, the session is cleared from the cache.
+/*
+/* pfixtls_start_clienttls() and pfixtls_stop_clienttls() are the
+/* corresponding functions for smtp.
+/*
+/* Once the TLS connection is initiated, information about the TLS
+/* state is available via the tls_info structure:
+/* protocol holds the protocol name (SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1),
+/* tls_info->cipher_name the cipher name (e.g. RC4/MD5),
+/* tls_info->cipher_usebits the number of bits actually used (e.g. 40),
+/* tls_info->cipher_algbits the number of bits the algorithm is based on
+/* (e.g. 128).
+/* The last two values may be different when talking to a crippled
+/* - ahem - export controled peer (e.g. 40/128).
+/*
+/* The status of the peer certificate verification is available in
+/* pfixtls_peer_verified. It is set to 1, when the certificate could
+/* be verified.
+/* If the peer offered a certifcate, part of the certificate data are
+/* available as:
+/* tls_info->peer_subject X509v3-oneline with the DN of the peer
+/* tls_info->peer_CN extracted CommonName of the peer
+/* tls_info->peer_issuer X509v3-oneline with the DN of the issuer
+/* tls_info->peer_CN extracted CommonName of the issuer
+/* tls_info->PEER_FINGERPRINT fingerprint of the certificate
+/*
+/* DESCRIPTION (SESSION CACHING)
+/* In order to achieve high performance when using a lot of connections
+/* with TLS, session caching is implemented. It reduces both the CPU load
+/* (less cryptograpic operations) and the network load (the amount of
+/* certificate data exchanged is reduced).
+/* Since postfix uses a setup of independent processes for receiving
+/* and sending email, the processes must exchange the session information.
+/* Several connections at the same time between the identical peers can
+/* occur, so uniqueness and race conditions have to be taken into
+/* account.
+/* I have checked both Apache-SSL (Ben Laurie), using a seperate "gcache"
+/* process and Apache mod_ssl (Ralf S. Engelshall), using shared memory
+/* between several identical processes spawned from one parent.
+/*
+/* Postfix/TLS uses a database approach based on the internal "dict"
+/* interface. Since the session cache information is approximately
+/* 1300 bytes binary data, it will not fit into the dbm/ndbm model.
+/* It also needs write access to the database, ruling out most other
+/* interface, leaving Berkeley DB, which however cannot handle concurrent
+/* access by several processes. Hence a modified SDBM (public domain DBM)
+/* with enhanced buffer size is used and concurrent write capability
+/* is used. SDBM is part of Postfix/TLS.
+/*
+/* Realization:
+/* Both (client and server) session cache are realized by individual
+/* cache databases. A common database would not make sense, since the
+/* key criteria are different (session ID for server, peername for
+/* client).
+/*
+/* Server side:
+/* Session created by OpenSSL have a 32 byte session id, yielding a
+/* 64 char file name. I consider these sessions to be unique. If they
+/* are not, the last session will win, overwriting the older one in
+/* the database. Remember: everything that is lost is a temporary
+/* information and not more than a renegotiation will happen.
+/* Originating from the same client host, several sessions can come
+/* in (e.g. from several users sending mail with Netscape at the same
+/* time), so the session id is the correct identifier; the hostname
+/* is of no importance, here.
+/*
+/* Client side:
+/* We cannot recall sessions based on their session id, because we would
+/* have to check every session on disk for a matching server name, so
+/* the lookup has to be done based on the FQDN of the peer (receiving
+/* host).
+/* With regard to uniqueness, we might experience several open connections
+/* to the same server at the same time. This is even very likely to
+/* happen, since we might have several mails for the same destination
+/* in the queue, when a queue run is started. So several smtps might
+/* negotiate sessions at the same time. We can however only save one
+/* session for one host.
+/* Like on the server side, the "last write" wins. The reason is
+/* quite simple. If we dont want to overwrite old sessions, an old
+/* session file will just stay in place until it is expired. In the
+/* meantime we would lose "fresh" session however. So we will keep the
+/* fresh one instead to avoid unnecessary renegotiations.
+/*
+/* Session lifetime:
+/* RFC2246 recommends a session lifetime of less than 24 hours. The
+/* default is 300 seconds (5 minutes) for OpenSSL and is also used
+/* this way in e.g. mod_ssl. The typical usage for emails might be
+/* humans typing in emails and sending them, which might take just
+/* a while, so I think 3600 seconds (1 hour) is a good compromise.
+/* If the environment is save (the cached session contains secret
+/* key data), one might even consider using a longer timeout. Anyway,
+/* since everlasting sessions must be avoided, the session timeout
+/* is done based on the creation date of the session and so each
+/* session will timeout eventually.
+/*
+/* Connection failures:
+/* RFC2246 requires us to remove sessions if something went wrong.
+/* Since the in-memory session cache of other smtp[d] processes cannot
+/* be controlled by simple means, we completely rely on the disc
+/* based session caching and remove all sessions from memory after
+/* connection closure.
+/*
+/* Cache cleanup:
+/* Since old entries have to be removed from the session cache, a
+/* cleanup process is needed that runs through the collected session
+/* files on regular basis. The task is performed by tlsmgr based on
+/* the timestamp created by pfixtls and included in the saved session,
+/* so that tlsmgr has not to care about the SSL_SESSION internal data.
+/*
+/* BUGS
+/* The memory allocation policy of the OpenSSL library is not well
+/* documented, especially when loading sessions from disc. Hence there
+/* might be memory leaks.
+/*
+/* LICENSE
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/* Lutz Jaenicke
+/* BTU Cottbus
+/* Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
+/* Universitaetsplatz 3-4
+/* D-03044 Cottbus, Germany
+/*--*/
+
+/* System library. */
+
+#include <sys_defs.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h> /* gettimeofday, not in POSIX */
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include <iostuff.h>
+#include <mymalloc.h>
+#include <vstring.h>
+#include <vstream.h>
+#include <dict.h>
+#include <myflock.h>
+#include <stringops.h>
+#include <msg.h>
+#include <connect.h>
+
+/* Application-specific. */
+
+#include "mail_params.h"
+#include "pfixtls.h"
+
+#define STR vstring_str
+
+const tls_info_t tls_info_zero = {
+ 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, 0
+};
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+
+/* OpenSSL library. */
+
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+/* We must keep some of the info available */
+static const char hexcodes[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+
+/*
+ * When saving sessions, we want to make sure, that the lenght of the key
+ * is somehow limited. When saving client sessions, the hostname is used
+ * as key. According to HP-UX 10.20, MAXHOSTNAMELEN=64. Maybe new standards
+ * will increase this value, but as this will break compatiblity with existing
+ * implementations, we won't see this for long. We therefore choose a limit
+ * of 64 bytes.
+ * The length of the (TLS) session id can be up to 32 bytes according to
+ * RFC2246, so it fits well into the 64bytes limit.
+ */
+#define ID_MAXLENGTH 64 /* Max ID length in bytes */
+
+/*
+ * The session_id_context is set, such that the client knows which services
+ * on a host share the same session information (on the postfix host may
+ * as well run a TLS-enabled webserver.
+ */
+static char server_session_id_context[] = "Postfix/TLS"; /* anything will do */
+static int TLScontext_index = -1;
+static int TLSpeername_index = -1;
+static int do_dump = 0;
+static DH *dh_512 = NULL, *dh_1024 = NULL;
+static SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+static int rand_exch_fd = -1;
+
+static DICT *scache_db = NULL;
+const long scache_db_version = 0x00000003L;
+const long openssl_version = OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER;
+
+
+int pfixtls_serverengine = 0;
+static int pfixtls_serveractive = 0; /* available or not */
+
+int pfixtls_clientengine = 0;
+static int pfixtls_clientactive = 0; /* available or not */
+
+/*
+ * Define a maxlength for certificate onelines. The length is checked by
+ * all routines when copying.
+ */
+#define CCERT_BUFSIZ 256
+
+typedef struct {
+ SSL *con;
+ BIO *internal_bio; /* postfix/TLS side of pair */
+ BIO *network_bio; /* netsork side of pair */
+ char peer_subject[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
+ char peer_issuer[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
+ char peer_CN[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
+ char issuer_CN[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ char fingerprint[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3];
+ char peername_save[129];
+ int enforce_verify_errors;
+ int enforce_CN;
+} TLScontext_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+ int pid;
+ struct timeval tv;
+} randseed_t;
+
+static randseed_t randseed;
+
+/*
+ * Finally some "backup" DH-Parameters to be loaded, if no parameters are
+ * explicitely loaded from file.
+ */
+static unsigned char dh512_p[] = {
+ 0x88, 0x3F, 0x00, 0xAF, 0xFC, 0x0C, 0x8A, 0xB8, 0x35, 0xCD, 0xE5, 0xC2,
+ 0x0F, 0x55, 0xDF, 0x06, 0x3F, 0x16, 0x07, 0xBF, 0xCE, 0x13, 0x35, 0xE4,
+ 0x1C, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xF3, 0xAB, 0x17, 0xF6, 0x63, 0x50, 0x63, 0x67, 0x3E,
+ 0x10, 0xD7, 0x3E, 0xB4, 0xEB, 0x46, 0x8C, 0x40, 0x50, 0xE6, 0x91, 0xA5,
+ 0x6E, 0x01, 0x45, 0xDE, 0xC9, 0xB1, 0x1F, 0x64, 0x54, 0xFA, 0xD9, 0xAB,
+ 0x4F, 0x70, 0xBA, 0x5B,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dh512_g[] = {
+ 0x02,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
+ 0xB0, 0xFE, 0xB4, 0xCF, 0xD4, 0x55, 0x07, 0xE7, 0xCC, 0x88, 0x59, 0x0D,
+ 0x17, 0x26, 0xC5, 0x0C, 0xA5, 0x4A, 0x92, 0x23, 0x81, 0x78, 0xDA, 0x88,
+ 0xAA, 0x4C, 0x13, 0x06, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0x2F, 0x9E, 0xBC, 0x96, 0xB8, 0x51,
+ 0x00, 0x9D, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x75, 0xAD, 0xFD, 0x3B, 0xB1, 0x7E, 0x71, 0x4F,
+ 0x3F, 0x91, 0x54, 0x14, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x30, 0x25, 0x1C, 0xEB, 0xDF, 0x72,
+ 0x9C, 0x4C, 0xF1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0x68, 0x3F, 0x94, 0x8E, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0x76,
+ 0x89, 0x18, 0xB2, 0x91, 0x16, 0x90, 0x01, 0x99, 0x66, 0x8C, 0x53, 0x81,
+ 0x4E, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x99, 0xE7, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0xD5, 0xEC, 0xE2, 0x7E,
+ 0xFA, 0xED, 0x01, 0x18, 0xC2, 0x78, 0x25, 0x59, 0x06, 0x5C, 0x39, 0xF6,
+ 0xCD, 0x49, 0x54, 0xAF, 0xC1, 0xB1, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0xF9, 0x53, 0xD0, 0xDF,
+ 0x6D, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xBA, 0xAE, 0x9B,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dh1024_g[] = {
+ 0x02,
+};
+
+/*
+ * DESCRIPTION: Keeping control of the network interface using BIO-pairs.
+ *
+ * When the TLS layer is active, all input/output must be filtered through
+ * it. On the other hand to handle timeout conditions, full control over
+ * the network socket must be kept. This rules out the "normal way" of
+ * connecting the TLS layer directly to the socket.
+ * The TLS layer is realized with a BIO-pair:
+ *
+ * postfix | TLS-engine
+ * | |
+ * +--------> SSL_operations()
+ * | /\ ||
+ * | || \/
+ * | BIO-pair (internal_bio)
+ * +--------< BIO-pair (network_bio)
+ * | |
+ * socket |
+ *
+ * The normal postfix operations connect to the SSL operations to send
+ * and retrieve (cleartext) data. Inside the TLS-engine the data are converted
+ * to/from TLS protocol. The TLS functionality itself is only connected to
+ * the internal_bio and hence only has status information about this internal
+ * interface.
+ * Thus, if the SSL_operations() return successfully (SSL_ERROR_NONE) or want
+ * to read (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) there may as well be data inside the buffering
+ * BIO-pair. So whenever an SSL_operation() returns without a fatal error,
+ * the BIO-pair internal buffer must be flushed to the network.
+ * NOTE: This is especially true in the SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ case: the TLS-layer
+ * might want to read handshake data, that will never come since its own
+ * written data will only reach the peer after flushing the buffer!
+ *
+ * The BIO-pair buffer size has been set to 8192 bytes, this is an arbitrary
+ * value that can hold more data than the typical PMTU, so that it does
+ * not force the generation of packets smaller than necessary.
+ * It is also larger than the default VSTREAM_BUFSIZE (4096, see vstream.h),
+ * so that large write operations could be handled within one call.
+ * The internal buffer in the network/network_bio handling layer has been
+ * set to the same value, since this seems to be reasonable. The code is
+ * however able to handle arbitrary values smaller or larger than the
+ * buffer size in the BIO-pair.
+ */
+
+const ssize_t BIO_bufsiz = 8192;
+
+/*
+ * The interface layer between network and BIO-pair. The BIO-pair buffers
+ * the data to/from the TLS layer. Hence, at any time, there may be data
+ * in the buffer that must be written to the network. This writing has
+ * highest priority because the handshake might fail otherwise.
+ * Only then a read_request can be satisfied.
+ */
+static int network_biopair_interop(int fd, int timeout, BIO *network_bio)
+{
+ int want_write;
+ int num_write;
+ int write_pos;
+ int from_bio;
+ int want_read;
+ int num_read;
+ int to_bio;
+#define NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE 8192
+ char buffer[8192];
+
+ while ((want_write = BIO_ctrl_pending(network_bio)) > 0) {
+ if (want_write > NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE)
+ want_write = NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE;
+ from_bio = BIO_read(network_bio, buffer, want_write);
+
+ /*
+ * Write the complete contents of the buffer. Since TLS performs
+ * underlying handshaking, we cannot afford to leave the buffer
+ * unflushed, as we could run into a deadlock trap (the peer
+ * waiting for a final byte and we already waiting for his reply
+ * in read position).
+ */
+ write_pos = 0;
+ do {
+ if (timeout > 0 && write_wait(fd, timeout) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+ num_write = write(fd, buffer + write_pos, from_bio - write_pos);
+ if (num_write <= 0)
+ return (-1); /* something happened to the socket */
+ write_pos += num_write;
+ } while (write_pos < from_bio);
+ }
+
+ while ((want_read = BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(network_bio)) > 0) {
+ if (want_read > NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE)
+ want_read = NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE;
+ if (timeout > 0 && read_wait(fd, timeout) < 0)
+ return (-1);
+ num_read = read(fd, buffer, want_read);
+ if (num_read <= 0)
+ return (-1); /* something happened to the socket */
+ to_bio = BIO_write(network_bio, buffer, num_read);
+ if (to_bio != num_read)
+ msg_fatal("to_bio != num_read");
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static void pfixtls_print_errors(void);
+
+ /*
+ * Function to perform the handshake for SSL_accept(), SSL_connect(),
+ * and SSL_shutdown() and perform the SSL_read(), SSL_write() operations.
+ * Call the underlying network_biopair_interop-layer to make sure the
+ * write buffer is flushed after every operation (that did not fail with
+ * a fatal error).
+ */
+static int do_tls_operation(int fd, int timeout, TLScontext_t *TLScontext,
+ int (*hsfunc)(SSL *),
+ int (*rfunc)(SSL *, void *, int),
+ int (*wfunc)(SSL *, const void *, int),
+ char *buf, int num)
+{
+ int status;
+ int err;
+ int retval = 0;
+ int biop_retval;
+ int done = 0;
+
+ while (!done) {
+ if (hsfunc)
+ status = hsfunc(TLScontext->con);
+ else if (rfunc)
+ status = rfunc(TLScontext->con, buf, num);
+ else
+ status = wfunc(TLScontext->con, (const char *)buf, num);
+ err = SSL_get_error(TLScontext->con, status);
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x0090581fL)
+ /*
+ * There is a bug up to and including OpenSSL-0.9.5a: if an error
+ * occurs while checking the peers certificate due to some certificate
+ * error (e.g. as happend with a RSA-padding error), the error is put
+ * onto the error stack. If verification is not enforced, this error
+ * should be ignored, but the error-queue is not cleared, so we
+ * can find this error here. The bug has been fixed on May 28, 2000.
+ *
+ * This bug so far has only manifested as
+ * 4800:error:0407006A:rsa routines:RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1:block type is not 01:rsa_pk1.c:100:
+ * 4800:error:04067072:rsa routines:RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT:padding check failed:rsa_eay.c:396:
+ * 4800:error:0D079006:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_verify:bad get asn1 object call:a_verify.c:109:
+ * so that we specifically test for this error. We print the errors
+ * to the logfile and automatically clear the error queue. Then we
+ * retry to get another error code. We cannot do better, since we
+ * can only retrieve the last entry of the error-queue without
+ * actually cleaning it on the way.
+ *
+ * This workaround is secure, as verify_result is set to "failed"
+ * anyway.
+ */
+ if (err == SSL_ERROR_SSL) {
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0x0407006AL) {
+ pfixtls_print_errors(); /* Keep information for the logfile */
+ msg_info("OpenSSL <= 0.9.5a workaround called: certificate errors ignored");
+ err = SSL_get_error(TLScontext->con, status);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ switch (err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* success */
+ retval = status;
+ done = 1; /* no break, flush buffer before */
+ /* leaving */
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ biop_retval = network_biopair_interop(fd, timeout,
+ TLScontext->network_bio);
+ if (biop_retval < 0)
+ return (-1); /* fatal network error */
+ break;
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* connection was closed cleanly */
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ default:
+ retval = status;
+ done = 1;
+ ;
+ }
+ };
+ return retval;
+}
+
+int pfixtls_timed_read(int fd, void *buf, unsigned buf_len, int timeout,
+ void *context)
+{
+ int i;
+ int ret;
+ char mybuf[40];
+ char *mybuf2;
+ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+
+ TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)context;
+ if (!TLScontext)
+ msg_fatal("Called tls_timed_read() without TLS-context");
+
+ ret = do_tls_operation(fd, timeout, TLScontext, NULL, SSL_read, NULL,
+ (char *)buf, buf_len);
+ if ((pfixtls_serveractive && var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 4) ||
+ (pfixtls_clientactive && var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 4)) {
+ mybuf2 = (char *) buf;
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ i = 0;
+ while ((i < 39) && (i < ret) && (mybuf2[i] != 0)) {
+ mybuf[i] = mybuf2[i];
+ i++;
+ }
+ mybuf[i] = '\0';
+ msg_info("Read %d chars: %s", ret, mybuf);
+ }
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int pfixtls_timed_write(int fd, void *buf, unsigned len, int timeout,
+ void *context)
+{
+ int i;
+ char mybuf[40];
+ char *mybuf2;
+ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+
+ TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)context;
+ if (!TLScontext)
+ msg_fatal("Called tls_timed_write() without TLS-context");
+
+ if ((pfixtls_serveractive && var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 4) ||
+ (pfixtls_clientactive && var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 4)) {
+ mybuf2 = (char *) buf;
+ if (len > 0) {
+ i = 0;
+ while ((i < 39) && (i < len) && (mybuf2[i] != 0)) {
+ mybuf[i] = mybuf2[i];
+ i++;
+ }
+ mybuf[i] = '\0';
+ msg_info("Write %d chars: %s", len, mybuf);
+ }
+ }
+ return (do_tls_operation(fd, timeout, TLScontext, NULL, NULL, SSL_write,
+ buf, len));
+}
+
+/* Add some more entropy to the pool by adding the actual time */
+
+static void pfixtls_stir_seed(void)
+{
+ GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
+ RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Skeleton taken from OpenSSL crypto/err/err_prn.c.
+ * Query the error stack and print the error string into the logging facility.
+ * Clear the error stack on the way.
+ */
+
+static void pfixtls_print_errors(void)
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+ char buf[256];
+ const char *file;
+ const char *data;
+ int line;
+ int flags;
+ unsigned long es;
+
+ es = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+ while ((l = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0) {
+ if (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING)
+ msg_info("%lu:%s:%s:%d:%s:", es, ERR_error_string(l, buf),
+ file, line, data);
+ else
+ msg_info("%lu:%s:%s:%d:", es, ERR_error_string(l, buf),
+ file, line);
+ }
+}
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the cert things on the server side. We do need both the
+ * private key (in key_file) and the cert (in cert_file).
+ * Both files may be identical.
+ *
+ * This function is taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c
+ */
+
+static int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX * ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
+{
+ if (cert_file != NULL) {
+ if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, cert_file) <= 0) {
+ msg_info("unable to get certificate from '%s'", cert_file);
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (key_file == NULL)
+ key_file = cert_file;
+ if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file,
+ SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
+ msg_info("unable to get private key from '%s'", key_file);
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
+ * the SSL context */
+ if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
+ msg_info("Private key does not match the certificate public key");
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c */
+
+static RSA *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL * s, int export, int keylength)
+{
+ static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL;
+
+ if (rsa_tmp == NULL) {
+ rsa_tmp = RSA_generate_key(keylength, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ return (rsa_tmp);
+}
+
+
+static DH *get_dh512(void)
+{
+ DH *dh;
+
+ if (dh_512 == NULL) {
+ /* No parameter file loaded, use the compiled in parameters */
+ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return(NULL);
+ dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL);
+ dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL);
+ if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
+ return(NULL);
+ else
+ dh_512 = dh;
+ }
+ return (dh_512);
+}
+
+static DH *get_dh1024(void)
+{
+ DH *dh;
+
+ if (dh_1024 == NULL) {
+ /* No parameter file loaded, use the compiled in parameters */
+ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return(NULL);
+ dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL);
+ dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL);
+ if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
+ return(NULL);
+ else
+ dh_1024 = dh;
+ }
+ return (dh_1024);
+}
+
+/* partly inspired by mod_ssl */
+
+static DH *tmp_dh_cb(SSL *s, int export, int keylength)
+{
+ DH *dh_tmp = NULL;
+
+ if (export) {
+ if (keylength == 512)
+ dh_tmp = get_dh512(); /* export cipher */
+ else if (keylength == 1024)
+ dh_tmp = get_dh1024(); /* normal */
+ else
+ dh_tmp = get_dh1024(); /* not on-the-fly (too expensive) */
+ /* so use the 1024bit instead */
+ }
+ else {
+ dh_tmp = get_dh1024(); /* sign-only certificate */
+ }
+ return (dh_tmp);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Skeleton taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c
+ *
+ * The verify_callback is called several times (directly or indirectly) from
+ * crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c. It is called as a last check for several issues,
+ * so this verify_callback() has the famous "last word". If it does return "0",
+ * the handshake is immediately shut down and the connection fails.
+ *
+ * Postfix/TLS has two modes, the "use" mode and the "enforce" mode:
+ *
+ * In the "use" mode we never want the connection to fail just because there is
+ * something wrong with the certificate (as we would have sent happily without
+ * TLS). Therefore the return value is always "1".
+ *
+ * In the "enforce" mode we can shut down the connection as soon as possible.
+ * In server mode TLS itself may be enforced (e.g. to protect passwords),
+ * but certificates are optional. In this case the handshake must not fail
+ * if we are unhappy with the certificate and return "1" in any case.
+ * Only if a certificate is required the certificate must pass the verification
+ * and failure to do so will result in immediate termination (return 0).
+ * In the client mode the decision is made with respect to the peername
+ * enforcement. If we strictly enforce the matching of the expected peername
+ * the verification must fail immediatly on verification errors. We can also
+ * immediatly check the expected peername, as it is the CommonName at level 0.
+ * In all other cases, the problem is logged, so the SSL_get_verify_result()
+ * will inform about the verification failure, but the handshake (and SMTP
+ * connection will continue).
+ *
+ * The only error condition not handled inside the OpenSSL-Library is the
+ * case of a too-long certificate chain, so we check inside verify_callback().
+ * We only take care of this problem, if "ok = 1", because otherwise the
+ * verification already failed because of another problem and we don't want
+ * to overwrite the other error message. And if the verification failed,
+ * there is no such thing as "more failed", "most failed"... :-)
+ */
+
+static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ char *CN_lowercase;
+ char *peername_left;
+ X509 *err_cert;
+ int err;
+ int depth;
+ int verify_depth;
+ int hostname_matched;
+ SSL *con;
+ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+
+ err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+ err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+
+ con = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+ TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(con, TLScontext_index);
+
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
+ if (((pfixtls_serverengine) && (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)) ||
+ ((pfixtls_clientengine) && (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)))
+ msg_info("Peer cert verify depth=%d %s", depth, buf);
+
+ verify_depth = SSL_get_verify_depth(con);
+ if (ok && (verify_depth >= 0) && (depth > verify_depth)) {
+ ok = 0;
+ err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
+ }
+ if (!ok) {
+ msg_info("verify error:num=%d:%s", err,
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+ }
+
+ if (ok && (depth == 0) && pfixtls_clientengine) {
+ /*
+ * Check out the name certified against the hostname expected.
+ * In case it does not match, print an information about the result.
+ * If a matching is enforced, bump out with a verification error
+ * immediately.
+ */
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),
+ NID_commonName, buf, 256)) {
+ msg_info("Could not parse server's subject CN");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ }
+ CN_lowercase = lowercase(buf);
+ hostname_matched = 0;
+ if (!strcmp(TLScontext->peername_save, CN_lowercase))
+ hostname_matched = 1;
+ else if ((strlen(CN_lowercase) > 2) &&
+ (CN_lowercase[0] == '*') && (CN_lowercase[1] == '.')) {
+ /*
+ * Allow wildcard certificate matching. The proposed rules in
+ * RFCs (2818: HTTP/TLS, 2830: LDAP/TLS) are different, RFC2874
+ * does not specify a rule, so here the strict rule is applied.
+ * An asterisk '*' is allowed as the leftmost component and may
+ * replace the left most part of the hostname. Matching is done
+ * by removing '*.' from the wildcard name and the `name.` from
+ * the peername and compare what is left.
+ */
+ peername_left = strchr(TLScontext->peername_save, '.');
+ if (peername_left) {
+ if (!strcmp(peername_left + 1, CN_lowercase + 2))
+ hostname_matched = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!hostname_matched) {
+ msg_info("Peer verification: CommonName in certificate does not match: %s != %s", CN_lowercase, TLScontext->peername_save);
+ if (TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors && TLScontext->enforce_CN) {
+ err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
+ msg_info("Verify failure: Hostname mismatch");
+ ok = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (ctx->error) {
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf, 256);
+ msg_info("issuer= %s", buf);
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+ msg_info("cert not yet valid");
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+ msg_info("cert has expired");
+ break;
+ }
+ if (((pfixtls_serverengine) && (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)) ||
+ ((pfixtls_clientengine) && (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)))
+ msg_info("verify return:%d", ok);
+
+ if (TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors)
+ return (ok);
+ else
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c */
+
+static void apps_ssl_info_callback(SSL * s, int where, int ret)
+{
+ char *str;
+ int w;
+
+ w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK;
+
+ if (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+ str = "SSL_connect";
+ else if (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+ str = "SSL_accept";
+ else
+ str = "undefined";
+
+ if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) {
+ msg_info("%s:%s", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ } else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
+ str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write";
+ if ((ret & 0xff) != SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
+ msg_info("SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s", str,
+ SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret),
+ SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
+ } else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
+ if (ret == 0)
+ msg_info("%s:failed in %s",
+ str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ else if (ret < 0) {
+ msg_info("%s:error in %s",
+ str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * taken from OpenSSL crypto/bio/b_dump.c, modified to save a lot of strcpy
+ * and strcat by Matti Aarnio.
+ */
+
+#define TRUNCATE
+#define DUMP_WIDTH 16
+
+static int pfixtls_dump(const char *s, int len)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ char buf[160 + 1];
+ char *ss;
+ int i;
+ int j;
+ int rows;
+ int trunc;
+ unsigned char ch;
+
+ trunc = 0;
+
+#ifdef TRUNCATE
+ for (; (len > 0) && ((s[len - 1] == ' ') || (s[len - 1] == '\0')); len--)
+ trunc++;
+#endif
+
+ rows = (len / DUMP_WIDTH);
+ if ((rows * DUMP_WIDTH) < len)
+ rows++;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
+ buf[0] = '\0'; /* start with empty string */
+ ss = buf;
+
+ sprintf(ss, "%04x ", i * DUMP_WIDTH);
+ ss += strlen(ss);
+ for (j = 0; j < DUMP_WIDTH; j++) {
+ if (((i * DUMP_WIDTH) + j) >= len) {
+ strcpy(ss, " ");
+ } else {
+ ch = ((unsigned char) *((char *) (s) + i * DUMP_WIDTH + j))
+ & 0xff;
+ sprintf(ss, "%02x%c", ch, j == 7 ? '|' : ' ');
+ ss += 3;
+ }
+ }
+ ss += strlen(ss);
+ *ss++ = ' ';
+ for (j = 0; j < DUMP_WIDTH; j++) {
+ if (((i * DUMP_WIDTH) + j) >= len)
+ break;
+ ch = ((unsigned char) *((char *) (s) + i * DUMP_WIDTH + j)) & 0xff;
+ *ss++ = (((ch >= ' ') && (ch <= '~')) ? ch : '.');
+ if (j == 7) *ss++ = ' ';
+ }
+ *ss = 0;
+ /*
+ * if this is the last call then update the ddt_dump thing so that
+ * we will move the selection point in the debug window
+ */
+ msg_info("%s", buf);
+ ret += strlen(buf);
+ }
+#ifdef TRUNCATE
+ if (trunc > 0) {
+ sprintf(buf, "%04x - <SPACES/NULS>\n", len + trunc);
+ msg_info("%s", buf);
+ ret += strlen(buf);
+ }
+#endif
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+
+
+/* taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c */
+
+static long bio_dump_cb(BIO * bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi,
+ long argl, long ret)
+{
+ if (!do_dump)
+ return (ret);
+
+ if (cmd == (BIO_CB_READ | BIO_CB_RETURN)) {
+ msg_info("read from %08X [%08lX] (%d bytes => %ld (0x%X))", bio, argp,
+ argi, ret, ret);
+ pfixtls_dump(argp, (int) ret);
+ return (ret);
+ } else if (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE | BIO_CB_RETURN)) {
+ msg_info("write to %08X [%08lX] (%d bytes => %ld (0x%X))", bio, argp,
+ argi, ret, ret);
+ pfixtls_dump(argp, (int) ret);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+
+ /*
+ * Callback to retrieve a session from the external session cache.
+ */
+static SSL_SESSION *get_session_cb(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *SessionID,
+ int length, int *copy)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *session;
+ char idstring[2 * ID_MAXLENGTH + 1];
+ int n;
+ int uselength;
+ int hex_length;
+ const char *session_hex;
+ pfixtls_scache_info_t scache_info;
+ unsigned char nibble, *data, *sess_data;
+
+ if (length > ID_MAXLENGTH)
+ uselength = ID_MAXLENGTH; /* Limit length of ID */
+ else
+ uselength = length;
+
+ for(n=0 ; n < uselength ; n++)
+ sprintf(idstring + 2 * n, "%02x", SessionID[n]);
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+ msg_info("Trying to reload Session from disc: %s", idstring);
+
+ session = NULL;
+
+ session_hex = dict_get(scache_db, idstring);
+ if (session_hex) {
+ hex_length = strlen(session_hex);
+ data = (unsigned char *)mymalloc(hex_length / 2);
+ if (!data) {
+ msg_info("could not allocate memory for session reload");
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+ memset(data, 0, hex_length / 2);
+ for (n = 0; n < hex_length; n++) {
+ if ((session_hex[n] >= '0') && (session_hex[n] <= '9'))
+ nibble = session_hex[n] - '0';
+ else
+ nibble = session_hex[n] - 'A' + 10;
+ if (n % 2)
+ data[n / 2] |= nibble;
+ else
+ data[n / 2] |= (nibble << 4);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * First check the version numbers, since wrong session data might
+ * hit us hard (SEGFAULT). We also have to check for expiry.
+ */
+ memcpy(&scache_info, data, sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
+ if ((scache_info.scache_db_version != scache_db_version) ||
+ (scache_info.openssl_version != openssl_version) ||
+ (scache_info.timestamp + var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout < time(NULL)))
+ dict_del(scache_db, idstring);
+ else {
+ sess_data = data + sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
+ session = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &sess_data,
+ hex_length / 2 - sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
+ if (!session)
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ }
+ myfree((char *)data);
+ }
+
+ if (session && (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3))
+ msg_info("Successfully reloaded session from disc");
+
+ return (session);
+}
+
+
+static SSL_SESSION *load_clnt_session(const char *hostname,
+ int enforce_peername)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
+ char idstring[ID_MAXLENGTH + 1];
+ int n;
+ int uselength;
+ int length;
+ int hex_length;
+ const char *session_hex;
+ pfixtls_scache_info_t scache_info;
+ unsigned char nibble, *data, *sess_data;
+
+ length = strlen(hostname);
+ if (length > ID_MAXLENGTH)
+ uselength = ID_MAXLENGTH; /* Limit length of ID */
+ else
+ uselength = length;
+
+ for(n=0 ; n < uselength ; n++)
+ idstring[n] = tolower(hostname[n]);
+ idstring[uselength] = '\0';
+ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+ msg_info("Trying to reload Session from disc: %s", idstring);
+
+ session_hex = dict_get(scache_db, idstring);
+ if (session_hex) {
+ hex_length = strlen(session_hex);
+ data = (unsigned char *)mymalloc(hex_length / 2);
+ if (!data) {
+ msg_info("could not allocate memory for session reload");
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+ memset(data, 0, hex_length / 2);
+ for (n = 0; n < hex_length; n++) {
+ if ((session_hex[n] >= '0') && (session_hex[n] <= '9'))
+ nibble = session_hex[n] - '0';
+ else
+ nibble = session_hex[n] - 'A' + 10;
+ if (n % 2)
+ data[n / 2] |= nibble;
+ else
+ data[n / 2] |= (nibble << 4);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * First check the version numbers, since wrong session data might
+ * hit us hard (SEGFAULT). We also have to check for expiry.
+ * When we enforce_peername, we may find an old session, that was
+ * saved when enforcement was not set. In this case the session will
+ * be removed and a fresh session will be negotiated.
+ */
+ memcpy(&scache_info, data, sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
+ if ((scache_info.scache_db_version != scache_db_version) ||
+ (scache_info.openssl_version != openssl_version) ||
+ (scache_info.timestamp + var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout < time(NULL)))
+ dict_del(scache_db, idstring);
+ else if (enforce_peername && (!scache_info.enforce_peername))
+ dict_del(scache_db, idstring);
+ else {
+ sess_data = data + sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
+ session = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &sess_data,
+ hex_length / 2 - sizeof(time_t));
+ strncpy(SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(session, TLSpeername_index),
+ idstring, ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
+ if (!session)
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ }
+ myfree((char *)data);
+ }
+
+ if (session && (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3))
+ msg_info("Successfully reloaded session from disc");
+
+ return (session);
+}
+
+
+static void create_client_lookup_id(char *idstring, char *hostname)
+{
+ int n, len, uselength;
+
+ len = strlen(hostname);
+ if (len > ID_MAXLENGTH)
+ uselength = ID_MAXLENGTH; /* Limit length of ID */
+ else
+ uselength = len;
+
+ for (n = 0 ; n < uselength ; n++)
+ idstring[n] = tolower(hostname[n]);
+ idstring[uselength] = '\0';
+}
+
+
+static void create_server_lookup_id(char *idstring, SSL_SESSION *session)
+{
+ int n, uselength;
+
+ if (session->session_id_length > ID_MAXLENGTH)
+ uselength = ID_MAXLENGTH; /* Limit length of ID */
+ else
+ uselength = session->session_id_length;
+
+ for(n = 0; n < uselength ; n++)
+ sprintf(idstring + 2 * n, "%02x", session->session_id[n]);
+}
+
+
+static void remove_session_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session)
+{
+ char idstring[2 * ID_MAXLENGTH + 1];
+ char *hostname;
+
+ if (pfixtls_clientengine) {
+ hostname = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(session, TLSpeername_index);
+ create_client_lookup_id(idstring, hostname);
+ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+ msg_info("Trying to remove session from disc: %s", idstring);
+ }
+ else {
+ create_server_lookup_id(idstring, session);
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+ msg_info("Trying to remove session from disc: %s", idstring);
+ }
+
+ if (scache_db)
+ dict_del(scache_db, idstring);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * We need space to save the peername into the SSL_SESSION, as we must
+ * look up the external database for client sessions by peername, not
+ * by session id. We therefore allocate place for the peername string,
+ * when a new SSL_SESSION is generated. It is filled later.
+ */
+static int new_peername_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+ int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+ char *peername;
+
+ peername = (char *)mymalloc(ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
+ if (!peername)
+ return 0;
+ peername[0] = '\0'; /* initialize */
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(ad, idx, peername);
+}
+
+/*
+ * When the SSL_SESSION is removed again, we must free the memory to avoid
+ * leaks.
+ */
+static void free_peername_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+ int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+ myfree(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(ad, idx));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Duplicate application data, when a SSL_SESSION is duplicated
+ */
+static int dup_peername_func(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from,
+ void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+ char *peername_old, *peername_new;
+
+ peername_old = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(from, idx);
+ peername_new = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(to, idx);
+ if (!peername_old || !peername_new)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(peername_new, peername_old, ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+ /*
+ * Save a new session to the external cache
+ */
+static int new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
+{
+ char idstring[2 * ID_MAXLENGTH + 1];
+ int n;
+ int dsize;
+ int len;
+ unsigned char *data, *sess_data;
+ pfixtls_scache_info_t scache_info;
+ char *hexdata, *hostname;
+ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+
+ if (pfixtls_clientengine) {
+ TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, TLScontext_index);
+ hostname = TLScontext->peername_save;
+ create_client_lookup_id(idstring, hostname);
+ strncpy(SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(session, TLSpeername_index),
+ hostname, ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
+ /*
+ * Remember, whether peername matching was enforced when the session
+ * was created. If later enforce mode is enabled, we do not want to
+ * reuse a session that was not sufficiently checked.
+ */
+ scache_info.enforce_peername =
+ (TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors && TLScontext->enforce_CN);
+
+ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+ msg_info("Trying to save session for hostID to disc: %s", idstring);
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906011L) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x00907000L)
+ /*
+ * Ugly Hack: OpenSSL before 0.9.6a does not store the verify
+ * result in sessions for the client side.
+ * We modify the session directly which is version specific,
+ * but this bug is version specific, too.
+ *
+ * READ: 0-09-06-01-1 = 0-9-6-a-beta1: all versions before
+ * beta1 have this bug, it has been fixed during development
+ * of 0.9.6a. The development version of 0.9.7 can have this
+ * bug, too. It has been fixed on 2000/11/29.
+ */
+ session->verify_result = SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con);
+#endif
+
+ }
+ else {
+ create_server_lookup_id(idstring, session);
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+ msg_info("Trying to save Session to disc: %s", idstring);
+ }
+
+
+ /*
+ * Get the session and convert it into some "database" useable form.
+ * First, get the length of the session to allocate the memory.
+ */
+ dsize = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, NULL);
+ if (dsize < 0) {
+ msg_info("Could not access session");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ data = (unsigned char *)mymalloc(dsize + sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
+ if (!data) {
+ msg_info("could not allocate memory for SSL session");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * OpenSSL is not robust against wrong session data (might SEGFAULT),
+ * so we secure it against version ids (session cache structure as well
+ * as OpenSSL version).
+ */
+ scache_info.scache_db_version = scache_db_version;
+ scache_info.openssl_version = openssl_version;
+
+ /*
+ * Put a timestamp, so that expiration can be checked without
+ * analyzing the session data itself. (We would need OpenSSL funtions,
+ * since the SSL_SESSION is a private structure.)
+ */
+ scache_info.timestamp = time(NULL);
+
+ memcpy(data, &scache_info, sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
+ sess_data = data + sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
+
+ /*
+ * Now, obtain the session. Unfortunately, it is binary and dict_update
+ * cannot handle binary data (it could contain '\0' in it) directly.
+ * To save memory we could use base64 encoding. To make handling easier,
+ * we simply use hex format.
+ */
+ len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, &sess_data);
+ len += sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
+
+ hexdata = (char *)mymalloc(2 * len + 1);
+
+ if (!hexdata) {
+ msg_info("could not allocate memory for SSL session (HEX)");
+ myfree((char *)data);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (n = 0; n < len; n++) {
+ hexdata[n * 2] = hexcodes[(data[n] & 0xf0) >> 4];
+ hexdata[(n * 2) + 1] = hexcodes[(data[n] & 0x0f)];
+ }
+ hexdata[len * 2] = '\0';
+
+ /*
+ * The session id is a hex string, all uppercase. We are using SDBM as
+ * compiled into Postfix with 8kB maximum entry size, so we set a limit
+ * when caching. If the session is not cached, we have to renegotiate,
+ * not more, not less. For a real session, this limit should never be
+ * met
+ */
+ if (strlen(idstring) + strlen(hexdata) < 8000)
+ dict_put(scache_db, idstring, hexdata);
+
+ myfree(hexdata);
+ myfree((char *)data);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+
+ /*
+ * pfixtls_exchange_seed: read bytes from the seed exchange-file (expect
+ * 1024 bytes)and immediately write back random bytes. Do so with EXCLUSIVE
+ * lock, so * that each process will find a completely different (and
+ * reseeded) file.
+ */
+static void pfixtls_exchange_seed(void)
+{
+ unsigned char buffer[1024];
+
+ if (rand_exch_fd == -1)
+ return;
+
+ if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) != 0)
+ msg_info("Could not lock random exchange file: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ lseek(rand_exch_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
+ if (read(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("reading exchange file failed");
+ RAND_seed(buffer, 1024);
+
+ RAND_bytes(buffer, 1024);
+ lseek(rand_exch_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
+ if (write(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024) != 1024)
+ msg_fatal("Writing exchange file failed");
+
+ if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) != 0)
+ msg_fatal("Could not unlock random exchange file: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+}
+
+ /*
+ * This is the setup routine for the SSL server. As smtpd might be called
+ * more than once, we only want to do the initialization one time.
+ *
+ * The skeleton of this function is taken from OpenSSL apps/s_server.c.
+ */
+
+int pfixtls_init_serverengine(int verifydepth, int askcert)
+{
+ int off = 0;
+ int verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+ int rand_bytes;
+ int rand_source_dev_fd;
+ int rand_source_socket_fd;
+ unsigned char buffer[255];
+ char *CApath;
+ char *CAfile;
+ char *s_cert_file;
+ char *s_key_file;
+ char *s_dcert_file;
+ char *s_dkey_file;
+ FILE *paramfile;
+
+ if (pfixtls_serverengine)
+ return (0); /* already running */
+
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+ msg_info("starting TLS engine");
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the OpenSSL library by the book!
+ * To start with, we must initialize the algorithms.
+ * We want cleartext error messages instead of just error codes, so we
+ * load the error_strings.
+ */
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+ OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
+
+ /*
+ * Side effect, call a non-existing function to disable TLS usage with an
+ * outdated OpenSSL version. There is a security reason (verify_result
+ * is not stored with the session data).
+ */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00905100L)
+ needs_openssl_095_or_later();
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator with some seed.
+ */
+ randseed.pid = getpid();
+ GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
+ RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
+
+ /*
+ * Access the external sources for random seed. We will only query them
+ * once, this should be sufficient and we will stir our entropy by using
+ * the prng-exchange file anyway.
+ * For reliability, we don't consider failure to access the additional
+ * source fatal, as we can run happily without it (considering that we
+ * still have the exchange-file). We also don't care how much entropy
+ * we get back, as we must run anyway. We simply stir in the buffer
+ * regardless how many bytes are actually in it.
+ */
+ if (*var_tls_daemon_rand_source) {
+ if (!strncmp(var_tls_daemon_rand_source, "dev:", 4)) {
+ /*
+ * Source is a random device
+ */
+ rand_source_dev_fd = open(var_tls_daemon_rand_source + 4, 0, 0);
+ if (rand_source_dev_fd == -1)
+ msg_info("Could not open entropy device %s",
+ var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+ else {
+ if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 255)
+ var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes = 255;
+ read(rand_source_dev_fd, buffer, var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
+ RAND_seed(buffer, var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
+ close(rand_source_dev_fd);
+ }
+ } else if (!strncmp(var_tls_daemon_rand_source, "egd:", 4)) {
+ /*
+ * Source is a EGD compatible socket
+ */
+ rand_source_socket_fd = unix_connect(var_tls_daemon_rand_source +4,
+ BLOCKING, 10);
+ if (rand_source_socket_fd == -1)
+ msg_info("Could not connect to %s", var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+ else {
+ if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 255)
+ var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes = 255;
+ buffer[0] = 1;
+ buffer[1] = var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes;
+ if (write(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 2) != 2)
+ msg_info("Could not talk to %s",
+ var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+ else if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 1) != 1)
+ msg_info("Could not read info from %s",
+ var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+ else {
+ rand_bytes = buffer[0];
+ read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, rand_bytes);
+ RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
+ }
+ close(rand_source_socket_fd);
+ }
+ } else {
+ RAND_load_file(var_tls_daemon_rand_source,
+ var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (*var_tls_rand_exch_name) {
+ rand_exch_fd = open(var_tls_rand_exch_name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600);
+ if (rand_exch_fd != -1)
+ pfixtls_exchange_seed();
+ }
+
+ randseed.pid = getpid();
+ GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
+ RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
+
+ /*
+ * The SSL/TLS speficications require the client to send a message in
+ * the oldest specification it understands with the highest level it
+ * understands in the message.
+ * Netscape communicator can still communicate with SSLv2 servers, so it
+ * sends out a SSLv2 client hello. To deal with it, our server must be
+ * SSLv2 aware (even if we dont like SSLv2), so we need to have the
+ * SSLv23 server here. If we want to limit the protocol level, we can
+ * add an option to not use SSLv2/v3/TLSv1 later.
+ */
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ return (-1);
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Here we might set SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1.
+ * Of course, the last one would not make sense, since RFC2487 is only
+ * defined for TLS, but we also want to accept Netscape communicator
+ * requests, and it only supports SSLv3.
+ */
+ off |= SSL_OP_ALL; /* Work around all known bugs */
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, off);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the info_callback, that will print out messages during
+ * communication on demand.
+ */
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+ SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the list of ciphers, if explicitely given; otherwise the
+ * (reasonable) default list is kept.
+ */
+ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist) != 0)
+ if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist) == 0) {
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we must add the necessary certificate stuff: A server key, a
+ * server certificate, and the CA certificates for both the server
+ * cert and the verification of client certificates.
+ * As provided by OpenSSL we support two types of CA certificate handling:
+ * One possibility is to add all CA certificates to one large CAfile,
+ * the other possibility is a directory pointed to by CApath, containing
+ * seperate files for each CA pointed on by softlinks named by the hash
+ * values of the certificate.
+ * The first alternative has the advantage, that the file is opened and
+ * read at startup time, so that you dont have the hassle to maintain
+ * another copy of the CApath directory for chroot-jail. On the other
+ * hand, the file is not really readable.
+ */
+ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_CAfile) == 0)
+ CAfile = NULL;
+ else
+ CAfile = var_smtpd_tls_CAfile;
+ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_CApath) == 0)
+ CApath = NULL;
+ else
+ CApath = var_smtpd_tls_CApath;
+
+ if (CAfile || CApath) {
+ if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) {
+ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load CA data");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
+ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot set verify paths");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we load the certificate and key from the files and check,
+ * whether the cert matches the key (internally done by set_cert_stuff().
+ * We cannot run without (we do not support ADH anonymous Diffie-Hellman
+ * ciphers as of now).
+ * We can use RSA certificates ("cert") and DSA certificates ("dcert"),
+ * both can be made available at the same time. The CA certificates for
+ * both are handled in the same setup already finished.
+ * Which one is used depends on the cipher negotiated (that is: the first
+ * cipher listed by the client which does match the server). A client with
+ * RSA only (e.g. Netscape) will use the RSA certificate only.
+ * A client with openssl-library will use RSA first if not especially
+ * changed in the cipher setup.
+ */
+ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_cert_file) == 0)
+ s_cert_file = NULL;
+ else
+ s_cert_file = var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
+ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_key_file) == 0)
+ s_key_file = NULL;
+ else
+ s_key_file = var_smtpd_tls_key_file;
+
+ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file) == 0)
+ s_dcert_file = NULL;
+ else
+ s_dcert_file = var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file;
+ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file) == 0)
+ s_dkey_file = NULL;
+ else
+ s_dkey_file = var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file;
+
+ if (s_cert_file) {
+ if (!set_cert_stuff(ctx, s_cert_file, s_key_file)) {
+ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load RSA cert/key data");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ if (s_dcert_file) {
+ if (!set_cert_stuff(ctx, s_dcert_file, s_dkey_file)) {
+ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load DSA cert/key data");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ if (!s_cert_file && !s_dcert_file) {
+ msg_info("TLS engine: do need at least RSA _or_ DSA cert/key data");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Sometimes a temporary RSA key might be needed by the OpenSSL
+ * library. The OpenSSL doc indicates, that this might happen when
+ * export ciphers are in use. We have to provide one, so well, we
+ * just do it.
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, tmp_rsa_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * We might also need dh parameters, which can either be loaded from
+ * file (preferred) or we simply take the compiled in values.
+ * First, set the callback that will select the values when requested,
+ * then load the (possibly) available DH parameters from files.
+ * We are generous with the error handling, since we do have default
+ * values compiled in, so we will not abort but just log the error message.
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ctx, tmp_dh_cb);
+ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file) != 0) {
+ if ((paramfile = fopen(var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, "r")) != NULL) {
+ dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (dh_1024 == NULL) {
+ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load 1024bit DH parameters");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load 1024bit DH parameters: %s: %s",
+ var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+ if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file) != 0) {
+ if ((paramfile = fopen(var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, "r")) != NULL) {
+ dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (dh_512 == NULL) {
+ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load 512bit DH parameters");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load 512bit DH parameters: %s: %s",
+ var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we want to check client certificates, we have to indicate it
+ * in advance. By now we only allow to decide on a global basis.
+ * If we want to allow certificate based relaying, we must ask the
+ * client to provide one with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The client now can
+ * decide, whether it provides one or not. We can enforce a failure
+ * of the negotiation with SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, if we
+ * do not allow a connection without one.
+ * In the "server hello" following the initialization by the "client hello"
+ * the server must provide a list of CAs it is willing to accept.
+ * Some clever clients will then select one from the list of available
+ * certificates matching these CAs. Netscape Communicator will present
+ * the list of certificates for selecting the one to be sent, or it will
+ * issue a warning, if there is no certificate matching the available
+ * CAs.
+ *
+ * With regard to the purpose of the certificate for relaying, we might
+ * like a later negotiation, maybe relaying would already be allowed
+ * for other reasons, but this would involve severe changes in the
+ * internal postfix logic, so we have to live with it the way it is.
+ */
+ if (askcert)
+ verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_flags, verify_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile));
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the session cache. We only want external caching to
+ * synchronize between server sessions, so we set it to a minimum value
+ * of 1. If the external cache is disabled, we wont cache at all.
+ * The recall of old sessions "get" and save to disk of just created
+ * sessions "new" is handled by the appropriate callback functions.
+ *
+ * We must not forget to set a session id context to identify to which
+ * kind of server process the session was related. In our case, the
+ * context is just the name of the patchkit: "Postfix/TLS".
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 1);
+ SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout);
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (void*)&server_session_id_context,
+ sizeof(server_session_id_context));
+
+ /*
+ * The session cache is realized by an external database file, that
+ * must be opened before going to chroot jail. Since the session cache
+ * data can become quite large, "[n]dbm" cannot be used as it has a
+ * size limit that is by far to small.
+ */
+ if (*var_smtpd_tls_scache_db) {
+ /*
+ * Insert a test against other dbms here, otherwise while writing
+ * a session (content to large), we will receive a fatal error!
+ */
+ if (strncmp(var_smtpd_tls_scache_db, "sdbm:", 5))
+ msg_warn("Only sdbm: type allowed for %s",
+ var_smtpd_tls_scache_db);
+ else
+ scache_db = dict_open(var_smtpd_tls_scache_db, O_RDWR,
+ DICT_FLAG_DUP_REPLACE | DICT_FLAG_LOCK | DICT_FLAG_SYNC_UPDATE);
+ if (scache_db) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx, get_session_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, new_session_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ctx, remove_session_cb);
+ }
+ else
+ msg_warn("Could not open session cache %s",
+ var_smtpd_tls_scache_db);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally create the global index to access TLScontext information
+ * inside verify_callback.
+ */
+ TLScontext_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "TLScontext ex_data index",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+ pfixtls_serverengine = 1;
+ return (0);
+}
+
+ /*
+ * This is the actual startup routine for the connection. We expect
+ * that the buffers are flushed and the "220 Ready to start TLS" was
+ * send to the client, so that we can immediately can start the TLS
+ * handshake process.
+ */
+int pfixtls_start_servertls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout,
+ const char *peername, const char *peeraddr,
+ tls_info_t *tls_info, int requirecert)
+{
+ int sts;
+ int j;
+ int verify_flags;
+ unsigned int n;
+ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+ SSL_SESSION *session;
+ SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ X509 *peer;
+
+ if (!pfixtls_serverengine) { /* should never happen */
+ msg_info("tls_engine not running");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 1)
+ msg_info("setting up TLS connection from %s[%s]", peername, peeraddr);
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate a new TLScontext for the new connection and get an SSL
+ * structure. Add the location of TLScontext to the SSL to later
+ * retrieve the information inside the verify_callback().
+ */
+ TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)mymalloc(sizeof(TLScontext_t));
+ if (!TLScontext) {
+ msg_fatal("Could not allocate 'TLScontext' with mymalloc");
+ }
+ if ((TLScontext->con = (SSL *) SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) {
+ msg_info("Could not allocate 'TLScontext->con' with SSL_new()");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (!SSL_set_ex_data(TLScontext->con, TLScontext_index, TLScontext)) {
+ msg_info("Could not set application data for 'TLScontext->con'");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the verification parameters to be checked in verify_callback().
+ */
+ if (requirecert) {
+ verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
+ verify_flags |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
+ TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors = 1;
+ SSL_set_verify(TLScontext->con, verify_flags, verify_callback);
+ }
+ else {
+ TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors = 0;
+ }
+ TLScontext->enforce_CN = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The TLS connection is realized by a BIO_pair, so obtain the pair.
+ */
+ if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&TLScontext->internal_bio, BIO_bufsiz,
+ &TLScontext->network_bio, BIO_bufsiz)) {
+ msg_info("Could not obtain BIO_pair");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Before really starting anything, try to seed the PRNG a little bit
+ * more.
+ */
+ pfixtls_stir_seed();
+ pfixtls_exchange_seed();
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the SSL connection to accept state. This should not be
+ * necessary anymore since 0.9.3, but the call is still in the library
+ * and maintaining compatibility never hurts.
+ */
+ SSL_set_accept_state(TLScontext->con);
+
+ /*
+ * Connect the SSL-connection with the postfix side of the BIO-pair for
+ * reading and writing.
+ */
+ SSL_set_bio(TLScontext->con, TLScontext->internal_bio,
+ TLScontext->internal_bio);
+
+ /*
+ * If the debug level selected is high enough, all of the data is
+ * dumped: 3 will dump the SSL negotiation, 4 will dump everything.
+ *
+ * We do have an SSL_set_fd() and now suddenly a BIO_ routine is called?
+ * Well there is a BIO below the SSL routines that is automatically
+ * created for us, so we can use it for debugging purposes.
+ */
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+ BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), bio_dump_cb);
+
+
+ /* Dump the negotiation for loglevels 3 and 4 */
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+ do_dump = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Now we expect the negotiation to begin. This whole process is like a
+ * black box for us. We totally have to rely on the routines build into
+ * the OpenSSL library. The only thing we can do we already have done
+ * by choosing our own callbacks for session caching and certificate
+ * verification.
+ *
+ * Error handling:
+ * If the SSL handhake fails, we print out an error message and remove
+ * everything that might be there. A session has to be removed anyway,
+ * because RFC2246 requires it.
+ */
+ sts = do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout, TLScontext,
+ SSL_accept, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ if (sts <= 0) {
+ msg_info("SSL_accept error from %s[%s]: %d", peername, peeraddr, sts);
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* Only loglevel==4 dumps everything */
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel < 4)
+ do_dump = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Lets see, whether a peer certificate is available and what is
+ * the actual information. We want to save it for later use.
+ */
+ peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(TLScontext->con);
+ if (peer != NULL) {
+ if (SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con) == X509_V_OK)
+ tls_info->peer_verified = 1;
+
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer),
+ TLScontext->peer_subject, CCERT_BUFSIZ);
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+ msg_info("subject=%s", TLScontext->peer_subject);
+ tls_info->peer_subject = TLScontext->peer_subject;
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
+ TLScontext->peer_issuer, CCERT_BUFSIZ);
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+ msg_info("issuer=%s", TLScontext->peer_issuer);
+ tls_info->peer_issuer = TLScontext->peer_issuer;
+ if (X509_digest(peer, EVP_md5(), TLScontext->md, &n)) {
+ for (j = 0; j < (int) n; j++) {
+ TLScontext->fingerprint[j * 3] =
+ hexcodes[(TLScontext->md[j] & 0xf0) >> 4];
+ TLScontext->fingerprint[(j * 3) + 1] =
+ hexcodes[(TLScontext->md[j] & 0x0f)];
+ if (j + 1 != (int) n)
+ TLScontext->fingerprint[(j * 3) + 2] = ':';
+ else
+ TLScontext->fingerprint[(j * 3) + 2] = '\0';
+ }
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 1)
+ msg_info("fingerprint=%s", TLScontext->fingerprint);
+ tls_info->peer_fingerprint = TLScontext->fingerprint;
+ }
+
+ TLScontext->peer_CN[0] = '\0';
+ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(peer),
+ NID_commonName, TLScontext->peer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
+ msg_info("Could not parse client's subject CN");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ }
+ tls_info->peer_CN = TLScontext->peer_CN;
+
+ TLScontext->issuer_CN[0] = '\0';
+ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
+ NID_commonName, TLScontext->issuer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
+ msg_info("Could not parse client's issuer CN");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ }
+ if (!TLScontext->issuer_CN[0]) {
+ /* No issuer CN field, use Organization instead */
+ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
+ NID_organizationName, TLScontext->issuer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
+ msg_info("Could not parse client's issuer Organization");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ }
+ }
+ tls_info->issuer_CN = TLScontext->issuer_CN;
+
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 1) {
+ if (tls_info->peer_verified)
+ msg_info("Verified: subject_CN=%s, issuer=%s",
+ TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN);
+ else
+ msg_info("Unverified: subject_CN=%s, issuer=%s",
+ TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN);
+ }
+
+ X509_free(peer);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * At this point we should have a certificate when required.
+ * We may however have a cached session, so the callback would never
+ * be called. We therefore double-check to make sure and remove the
+ * session, if applicable.
+ */
+ if (requirecert) {
+ if (!tls_info->peer_verified || !tls_info->peer_CN) {
+ msg_info("Re-used session without peer certificate removed");
+ session = SSL_get_session(TLScontext->con);
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(ctx, session);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally, collect information about protocol and cipher for logging
+ */
+ tls_info->protocol = SSL_get_version(TLScontext->con);
+ cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(TLScontext->con);
+ tls_info->cipher_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+ tls_info->cipher_usebits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher,
+ &(tls_info->cipher_algbits));
+
+ pfixtls_serveractive = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * The TLS engine is active, switch to the pfixtls_timed_read/write()
+ * functions and store the context.
+ */
+ vstream_control(stream,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_READ_FN, pfixtls_timed_read,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_WRITE_FN, pfixtls_timed_write,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_CONTEXT, (void *)TLScontext,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_END);
+
+ msg_info("TLS connection established from %s[%s]: %s with cipher %s (%d/%d bits)",
+ peername, peeraddr,
+ tls_info->protocol, tls_info->cipher_name,
+ tls_info->cipher_usebits, tls_info->cipher_algbits);
+ pfixtls_stir_seed();
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+ /*
+ * Shut down the TLS connection, that does mean: remove all the information
+ * and reset the flags! This is needed if the actual running smtpd is to
+ * be restarted. We do not give back any value, as there is nothing to
+ * be reported.
+ * Since our session cache is external, we will remove the session from
+ * memory in any case. The SSL_CTX_flush_sessions might be redundant here,
+ * I however want to make sure nothing is left.
+ * RFC2246 requires us to remove sessions if something went wrong, as
+ * indicated by the "failure" value, so we remove it from the external
+ * cache, too.
+ */
+int pfixtls_stop_servertls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout, int failure,
+ tls_info_t *tls_info)
+{
+ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+ int retval;
+
+ if (pfixtls_serveractive) {
+ TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)vstream_context(stream);
+ /*
+ * Perform SSL_shutdown() twice, as the first attempt may return
+ * to early: it will only send out the shutdown alert but it will
+ * not wait for the peer's shutdown alert. Therefore, when we are
+ * the first party to send the alert, we must call SSL_shutdown()
+ * again.
+ * On failure we don't want to resume the session, so we will not
+ * perform SSL_shutdown() and the session will be removed as being
+ * bad.
+ */
+ if (!failure) {
+ retval = do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout,
+ TLScontext, SSL_shutdown, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ if (retval == 0)
+ do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout, TLScontext,
+ SSL_shutdown, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Free the SSL structure and the BIOs. Warning: the internal_bio is
+ * connected to the SSL structure and is automatically freed with
+ * it. Do not free it again (core dump)!!
+ * Only free the network_bio.
+ */
+ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+ BIO_free(TLScontext->network_bio);
+ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+ vstream_control(stream,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_READ_FN, (VSTREAM_FN) NULL,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_WRITE_FN, (VSTREAM_FN) NULL,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_CONTEXT, (void *) NULL,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_END);
+ SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, time(NULL));
+
+ pfixtls_stir_seed();
+ pfixtls_exchange_seed();
+
+ *tls_info = tls_info_zero;
+ pfixtls_serveractive = 0;
+
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+
+ /*
+ * This is the setup routine for the SSL client. As smtpd might be called
+ * more than once, we only want to do the initialization one time.
+ *
+ * The skeleton of this function is taken from OpenSSL apps/s_client.c.
+ */
+
+int pfixtls_init_clientengine(int verifydepth)
+{
+ int off = 0;
+ int verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+ int rand_bytes;
+ int rand_source_dev_fd;
+ int rand_source_socket_fd;
+ unsigned char buffer[255];
+ char *CApath;
+ char *CAfile;
+ char *c_cert_file;
+ char *c_key_file;
+
+
+ if (pfixtls_clientengine)
+ return (0); /* already running */
+
+ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+ msg_info("starting TLS engine");
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the OpenSSL library by the book!
+ * To start with, we must initialize the algorithms.
+ * We want cleartext error messages instead of just error codes, so we
+ * load the error_strings.
+ */
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+ OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
+
+ /*
+ * Side effect, call a non-existing function to disable TLS usage with an
+ * outdated OpenSSL version. There is a security reason (verify_result
+ * is not stored with the session data).
+ */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00905100L)
+ needs_openssl_095_or_later();
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator with some seed.
+ */
+ randseed.pid = getpid();
+ GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
+ RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
+
+ /*
+ * Access the external sources for random seed. We will only query them
+ * once, this should be sufficient and we will stir our entropy by using
+ * the prng-exchange file anyway.
+ * For reliability, we don't consider failure to access the additional
+ * source fatal, as we can run happily without it (considering that we
+ * still have the exchange-file). We also don't care how much entropy
+ * we get back, as we must run anyway. We simply stir in the buffer
+ * regardless how many bytes are actually in it.
+ */
+ if (*var_tls_daemon_rand_source) {
+ if (!strncmp(var_tls_daemon_rand_source, "dev:", 4)) {
+ /*
+ * Source is a random device
+ */
+ rand_source_dev_fd = open(var_tls_daemon_rand_source + 4, 0, 0);
+ if (rand_source_dev_fd == -1)
+ msg_info("Could not open entropy device %s",
+ var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+ else {
+ if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 255)
+ var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes = 255;
+ read(rand_source_dev_fd, buffer, var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
+ RAND_seed(buffer, var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
+ close(rand_source_dev_fd);
+ }
+ } else if (!strncmp(var_tls_daemon_rand_source, "egd:", 4)) {
+ /*
+ * Source is a EGD compatible socket
+ */
+ rand_source_socket_fd = unix_connect(var_tls_daemon_rand_source +4,
+ BLOCKING, 10);
+ if (rand_source_socket_fd == -1)
+ msg_info("Could not connect to %s", var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+ else {
+ if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 255)
+ var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes = 255;
+ buffer[0] = 1;
+ buffer[1] = var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes;
+ if (write(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 2) != 2)
+ msg_info("Could not talk to %s",
+ var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+ else if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 1) != 1)
+ msg_info("Could not read info from %s",
+ var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+ else {
+ rand_bytes = buffer[0];
+ read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, rand_bytes);
+ RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
+ }
+ close(rand_source_socket_fd);
+ }
+ } else {
+ RAND_load_file(var_tls_daemon_rand_source,
+ var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (*var_tls_rand_exch_name) {
+ rand_exch_fd = open(var_tls_rand_exch_name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600);
+ if (rand_exch_fd != -1)
+ pfixtls_exchange_seed();
+ }
+
+ randseed.pid = getpid();
+ GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
+ RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
+
+ /*
+ * The SSL/TLS speficications require the client to send a message in
+ * the oldest specification it understands with the highest level it
+ * understands in the message.
+ * RFC2487 is only specified for TLSv1, but we want to be as compatible
+ * as possible, so we will start off with a SSLv2 greeting allowing
+ * the best we can offer: TLSv1.
+ * We can restrict this with the options setting later, anyhow.
+ */
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ return (-1);
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Here we might set SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1.
+ * Of course, the last one would not make sense, since RFC2487 is only
+ * defined for TLS, but we dont know what is out there. So leave things
+ * completely open, as of today.
+ */
+ off |= SSL_OP_ALL; /* Work around all known bugs */
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, off);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the info_callback, that will print out messages during
+ * communication on demand.
+ */
+ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+ SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the list of ciphers, if explicitely given; otherwise the
+ * (reasonable) default list is kept.
+ */
+ if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_cipherlist) != 0)
+ if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, var_smtp_tls_cipherlist) == 0) {
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we must add the necessary certificate stuff: A client key, a
+ * client certificate, and the CA certificates for both the client
+ * cert and the verification of server certificates.
+ * In fact, we do not need a client certificate, so the certificates
+ * are only loaded (and checked), if supplied. A clever client would
+ * handle multiple client certificates and decide based on the list
+ * of acceptable CAs, sent by the server, which certificate to submit.
+ * OpenSSL does however not do this and also has no callback hoods to
+ * easily realize it.
+ *
+ * As provided by OpenSSL we support two types of CA certificate handling:
+ * One possibility is to add all CA certificates to one large CAfile,
+ * the other possibility is a directory pointed to by CApath, containing
+ * seperate files for each CA pointed on by softlinks named by the hash
+ * values of the certificate.
+ * The first alternative has the advantage, that the file is opened and
+ * read at startup time, so that you dont have the hassle to maintain
+ * another copy of the CApath directory for chroot-jail. On the other
+ * hand, the file is not really readable.
+ */
+ if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_CAfile) == 0)
+ CAfile = NULL;
+ else
+ CAfile = var_smtp_tls_CAfile;
+ if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_CApath) == 0)
+ CApath = NULL;
+ else
+ CApath = var_smtp_tls_CApath;
+ if (CAfile || CApath) {
+ if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) {
+ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load CA data");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
+ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot set verify paths");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_cert_file) == 0)
+ c_cert_file = NULL;
+ else
+ c_cert_file = var_smtp_tls_cert_file;
+ if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_key_file) == 0)
+ c_key_file = NULL;
+ else
+ c_key_file = var_smtp_tls_key_file;
+ if (c_cert_file || c_key_file)
+ if (!set_cert_stuff(ctx, c_cert_file, c_key_file)) {
+ msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load cert/key data");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Sometimes a temporary RSA key might be needed by the OpenSSL
+ * library. The OpenSSL doc indicates, that this might happen when
+ * export ciphers are in use. We have to provide one, so well, we
+ * just do it.
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, tmp_rsa_cb);
+
+ /*
+ * Finally, the setup for the server certificate checking, done
+ * "by the book".
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_flags, verify_callback);
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the session cache. We only want external caching to
+ * synchronize between server sessions, so we set it to a minimum value
+ * of 1. If the external cache is disabled, we wont cache at all.
+ *
+ * In case of the client, there is no callback used in OpenSSL, so
+ * we must call the session cache functions manually during the process.
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 1);
+ SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout);
+
+ /*
+ * The session cache is realized by an external database file, that
+ * must be opened before going to chroot jail. Since the session cache
+ * data can become quite large, "[n]dbm" cannot be used as it has a
+ * size limit that is by far to small.
+ */
+ if (*var_smtp_tls_scache_db) {
+ /*
+ * Insert a test against other dbms here, otherwise while writing
+ * a session (content to large), we will receive a fatal error!
+ */
+ if (strncmp(var_smtp_tls_scache_db, "sdbm:", 5))
+ msg_warn("Only sdbm: type allowed for %s",
+ var_smtp_tls_scache_db);
+ else
+ scache_db = dict_open(var_smtp_tls_scache_db, O_RDWR,
+ DICT_FLAG_DUP_REPLACE | DICT_FLAG_LOCK | DICT_FLAG_SYNC_UPDATE);
+ if (!scache_db)
+ msg_warn("Could not open session cache %s",
+ var_smtp_tls_scache_db);
+ /*
+ * It is practical to have OpenSSL automatically save newly created
+ * sessions for us by callback. Therefore we have to enable the
+ * internal session cache for the client side. Disable automatic
+ * clearing, as smtp has limited lifetime anyway and we can call
+ * the cleanup routine at will.
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, new_session_cb);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally create the global index to access TLScontext information
+ * inside verify_callback.
+ */
+ TLScontext_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "TLScontext ex_data index",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ TLSpeername_index = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(0,
+ "TLSpeername ex_data index",
+ new_peername_func,
+ dup_peername_func,
+ free_peername_func);
+
+ pfixtls_clientengine = 1;
+ return (0);
+}
+
+ /*
+ * This is the actual startup routine for the connection. We expect
+ * that the buffers are flushed and the "220 Ready to start TLS" was
+ * received by us, so that we can immediately can start the TLS
+ * handshake process.
+ */
+int pfixtls_start_clienttls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout,
+ int enforce_peername,
+ const char *peername,
+ tls_info_t *tls_info)
+{
+ int sts;
+ SSL_SESSION *session, *old_session;
+ SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ X509 *peer;
+ int verify_flags;
+ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+
+ if (!pfixtls_clientengine) { /* should never happen */
+ msg_info("tls_engine not running");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 1)
+ msg_info("setting up TLS connection to %s", peername);
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate a new TLScontext for the new connection and get an SSL
+ * structure. Add the location of TLScontext to the SSL to later
+ * retrieve the information inside the verify_callback().
+ */
+ TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)mymalloc(sizeof(TLScontext_t));
+ if (!TLScontext) {
+ msg_fatal("Could not allocate 'TLScontext' with mymalloc");
+ }
+ if ((TLScontext->con = (SSL *) SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) {
+ msg_info("Could not allocate 'TLScontext->con' with SSL_new()");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (!SSL_set_ex_data(TLScontext->con, TLScontext_index, TLScontext)) {
+ msg_info("Could not set application data for 'TLScontext->con'");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the verification parameters to be checked in verify_callback().
+ */
+ if (enforce_peername) {
+ verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
+ TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors = 1;
+ TLScontext->enforce_CN = 1;
+ SSL_set_verify(TLScontext->con, verify_flags, verify_callback);
+ }
+ else {
+ TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors = 0;
+ TLScontext->enforce_CN = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The TLS connection is realized by a BIO_pair, so obtain the pair.
+ */
+ if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&TLScontext->internal_bio, BIO_bufsiz,
+ &TLScontext->network_bio, BIO_bufsiz)) {
+ msg_info("Could not obtain BIO_pair");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ old_session = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Find out the hashed HostID for the client cache and try to
+ * load the session from the cache.
+ */
+ strncpy(TLScontext->peername_save, peername, ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
+ TLScontext->peername_save[ID_MAXLENGTH] = '\0'; /* just in case */
+ (void)lowercase(TLScontext->peername_save);
+ if (scache_db) {
+ old_session = load_clnt_session(peername, enforce_peername);
+ if (old_session) {
+ SSL_set_session(TLScontext->con, old_session);
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906011L) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x00907000L)
+ /*
+ * Ugly Hack: OpenSSL before 0.9.6a does not store the verify
+ * result in sessions for the client side.
+ * We modify the session directly which is version specific,
+ * but this bug is version specific, too.
+ *
+ * READ: 0-09-06-01-1 = 0-9-6-a-beta1: all versions before
+ * beta1 have this bug, it has been fixed during development
+ * of 0.9.6a. The development version of 0.9.7 can have this
+ * bug, too. It has been fixed on 2000/11/29.
+ */
+ SSL_set_verify_result(TLScontext->con, old_session->verify_result);
+#endif
+
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Before really starting anything, try to seed the PRNG a little bit
+ * more.
+ */
+ pfixtls_stir_seed();
+ pfixtls_exchange_seed();
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the SSL connection to connect state. This should not be
+ * necessary anymore since 0.9.3, but the call is still in the library
+ * and maintaining compatibility never hurts.
+ */
+ SSL_set_connect_state(TLScontext->con);
+
+ /*
+ * Connect the SSL-connection with the postfix side of the BIO-pair for
+ * reading and writing.
+ */
+ SSL_set_bio(TLScontext->con, TLScontext->internal_bio,
+ TLScontext->internal_bio);
+
+ /*
+ * If the debug level selected is high enough, all of the data is
+ * dumped: 3 will dump the SSL negotiation, 4 will dump everything.
+ *
+ * We do have an SSL_set_fd() and now suddenly a BIO_ routine is called?
+ * Well there is a BIO below the SSL routines that is automatically
+ * created for us, so we can use it for debugging purposes.
+ */
+ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+ BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), bio_dump_cb);
+
+
+ /* Dump the negotiation for loglevels 3 and 4 */
+ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+ do_dump = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Now we expect the negotiation to begin. This whole process is like a
+ * black box for us. We totally have to rely on the routines build into
+ * the OpenSSL library. The only thing we can do we already have done
+ * by choosing our own callback certificate verification.
+ *
+ * Error handling:
+ * If the SSL handhake fails, we print out an error message and remove
+ * everything that might be there. A session has to be removed anyway,
+ * because RFC2246 requires it.
+ */
+ sts = do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout, TLScontext,
+ SSL_connect, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ if (sts <= 0) {
+ msg_info("SSL_connect error to %s: %d", peername, sts);
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ session = SSL_get_session(TLScontext->con);
+ if (session) {
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(ctx, session);
+ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+ msg_info("SSL session removed");
+ }
+ if ((old_session) && (!SSL_session_reused(TLScontext->con)))
+ SSL_SESSION_free(old_session); /* Must also be removed */
+ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!SSL_session_reused(TLScontext->con)) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(old_session); /* Remove unused session */
+ }
+ else if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+ msg_info("Reusing old session");
+
+ /* Only loglevel==4 dumps everything */
+ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel < 4)
+ do_dump = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Lets see, whether a peer certificate is available and what is
+ * the actual information. We want to save it for later use.
+ */
+ peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(TLScontext->con);
+ if (peer != NULL) {
+ if (SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con) == X509_V_OK)
+ tls_info->peer_verified = 1;
+
+ TLScontext->peer_CN[0] = '\0';
+ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(peer),
+ NID_commonName, TLScontext->peer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
+ msg_info("Could not parse server's subject CN");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ }
+ tls_info->peer_CN = TLScontext->peer_CN;
+
+ TLScontext->issuer_CN[0] = '\0';
+ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
+ NID_commonName, TLScontext->issuer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
+ msg_info("Could not parse server's issuer CN");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ }
+ if (!TLScontext->issuer_CN[0]) {
+ /* No issuer CN field, use Organization instead */
+ if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
+ NID_organizationName, TLScontext->issuer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
+ msg_info("Could not parse server's issuer Organization");
+ pfixtls_print_errors();
+ }
+ }
+ tls_info->issuer_CN = TLScontext->issuer_CN;
+
+ if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 1) {
+ if (tls_info->peer_verified)
+ msg_info("Verified: subject_CN=%s, issuer=%s",
+ TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN);
+ else
+ msg_info("Unverified: subject_CN=%s, issuer=%s",
+ TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN);
+ }
+ X509_free(peer);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally, collect information about protocol and cipher for logging
+ */
+ tls_info->protocol = SSL_get_version(TLScontext->con);
+ cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(TLScontext->con);
+ tls_info->cipher_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+ tls_info->cipher_usebits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher,
+ &(tls_info->cipher_algbits));
+
+ pfixtls_clientactive = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * The TLS engine is active, switch to the pfixtls_timed_read/write()
+ * functions.
+ */
+ vstream_control(stream,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_READ_FN, pfixtls_timed_read,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_WRITE_FN, pfixtls_timed_write,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_CONTEXT, (void *)TLScontext,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_END);
+
+ msg_info("TLS connection established to %s: %s with cipher %s (%d/%d bits)",
+ peername,
+ tls_info->protocol, tls_info->cipher_name,
+ tls_info->cipher_usebits, tls_info->cipher_algbits);
+
+ pfixtls_stir_seed();
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+ /*
+ * Shut down the TLS connection, that does mean: remove all the information
+ * and reset the flags! This is needed if the actual running smtp is to
+ * be restarted. We do not give back any value, as there is nothing to
+ * be reported.
+ * Since our session cache is external, we will remove the session from
+ * memory in any case. The SSL_CTX_flush_sessions might be redundant here,
+ * I however want to make sure nothing is left.
+ * RFC2246 requires us to remove sessions if something went wrong, as
+ * indicated by the "failure" value,so we remove it from the external
+ * cache, too.
+ */
+int pfixtls_stop_clienttls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout, int failure,
+ tls_info_t *tls_info)
+{
+ TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+ int retval;
+
+ if (pfixtls_clientactive) {
+ TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)vstream_context(stream);
+ /*
+ * Perform SSL_shutdown() twice, as the first attempt may return
+ * to early: it will only send out the shutdown alert but it will
+ * not wait for the peer's shutdown alert. Therefore, when we are
+ * the first party to send the alert, we must call SSL_shutdown()
+ * again.
+ * On failure we don't want to resume the session, so we will not
+ * perform SSL_shutdown() and the session will be removed as being
+ * bad.
+ */
+ if (!failure) {
+ retval = do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout,
+ TLScontext, SSL_shutdown, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ if (retval == 0)
+ do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout, TLScontext,
+ SSL_shutdown, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Free the SSL structure and the BIOs. Warning: the internal_bio is
+ * connected to the SSL structure and is automatically freed with
+ * it. Do not free it again (core dump)!!
+ * Only free the network_bio.
+ */
+ SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+ BIO_free(TLScontext->network_bio);
+ myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+ vstream_control(stream,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_READ_FN, (VSTREAM_FN) NULL,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_WRITE_FN, (VSTREAM_FN) NULL,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_CONTEXT, (void *) NULL,
+ VSTREAM_CTL_END);
+ SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, time(NULL));
+
+ pfixtls_stir_seed();
+ pfixtls_exchange_seed();
+
+ *tls_info = tls_info_zero;
+ pfixtls_clientactive = 0;
+
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+
+#endif /* HAS_SSL */
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/global/pfixtls.h postfix-1.1.0/src/global/pfixtls.h
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/global/pfixtls.h Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/global/pfixtls.h Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/* pfixtls 3h
+/* SUMMARY
+/* TLS routines
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/* include "pfixtls.h"
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* .nf
+/*--*/
+
+#ifndef PFIXTLS_H_INCLUDED
+#define PFIXTLS_H_INCLUDED
+
+typedef struct {
+ int peer_verified;
+ char *peer_subject;
+ char *peer_issuer;
+ char *peer_fingerprint;
+ char *peer_CN;
+ char *issuer_CN;
+ const char *protocol;
+ const char *cipher_name;
+ int cipher_usebits;
+ int cipher_algbits;
+} tls_info_t;
+
+extern const tls_info_t tls_info_zero;
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+
+typedef struct {
+ long scache_db_version;
+ long openssl_version;
+ time_t timestamp; /* We could add other info here... */
+ int enforce_peername;
+} pfixtls_scache_info_t;
+
+extern const long scache_db_version;
+extern const long openssl_version;
+
+int pfixtls_timed_read(int fd, void *buf, unsigned len, int timout,
+ void *unused_timeout);
+int pfixtls_timed_write(int fd, void *buf, unsigned len, int timeout,
+ void *unused_timeout);
+
+extern int pfixtls_serverengine;
+int pfixtls_init_serverengine(int verifydepth, int askcert);
+int pfixtls_start_servertls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout,
+ const char *peername, const char *peeraddr,
+ tls_info_t *tls_info, int require_cert);
+int pfixtls_stop_servertls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout, int failure,
+ tls_info_t *tls_info);
+
+extern int pfixtls_clientengine;
+int pfixtls_init_clientengine(int verifydepth);
+int pfixtls_start_clienttls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout,
+ int enforce_peername,
+ const char *peername,
+ tls_info_t *tls_info);
+int pfixtls_stop_clienttls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout, int failure,
+ tls_info_t *tls_info);
+
+#endif /* PFIXTLS_H_INCLUDED */
+#endif
+
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/* Lutz Jaenicke
+/* BTU Cottbus
+/* Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
+/* Universitaetsplatz 3-4
+/* D-03044 Cottbus, Germany
+/*--*/
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtp/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.0/src/smtp/Makefile.in
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtp/Makefile.in Tue Jan 15 16:25:29 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/smtp/Makefile.in Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
smtp.o: ../../include/iostuff.h
smtp.o: ../../include/attr.h
smtp.o: ../../include/mail_server.h
+smtp.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
smtp.o: smtp.h
smtp.o: smtp_sasl.h
smtp_addr.o: smtp_addr.c
@@ -101,6 +102,7 @@
smtp_addr.o: ../../include/argv.h
smtp_addr.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
smtp_addr.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
+smtp_addr.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
smtp_addr.o: smtp_addr.h
smtp_chat.o: smtp_chat.c
smtp_chat.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
@@ -121,6 +123,7 @@
smtp_chat.o: ../../include/cleanup_user.h
smtp_chat.o: ../../include/mail_error.h
smtp_chat.o: ../../include/name_mask.h
+smtp_chat.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
smtp_chat.o: smtp.h
smtp_connect.o: smtp_connect.c
smtp_connect.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
@@ -141,6 +144,7 @@
smtp_connect.o: ../../include/argv.h
smtp_connect.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
smtp_connect.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
+smtp_connetc.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
smtp_connect.o: smtp_addr.h
smtp_proto.o: smtp_proto.c
smtp_proto.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
@@ -166,6 +170,7 @@
smtp_proto.o: ../../include/off_cvt.h
smtp_proto.o: ../../include/mark_corrupt.h
smtp_proto.o: ../../include/quote_821_local.h
+smtp_proto.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
smtp_proto.o: smtp.h
smtp_proto.o: ../../include/argv.h
smtp_proto.o: smtp_sasl.h
@@ -211,9 +216,12 @@
smtp_session.o: ../../include/stringops.h
smtp_session.o: ../../include/vstring.h
smtp_session.o: smtp.h
+smtp_session.o: ../../include/mail_params.h
+smtp_session.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
smtp_session.o: ../../include/argv.h
smtp_session.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
smtp_session.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
+smtp_session.o: ../../include/maps.h
smtp_state.o: smtp_state.c
smtp_state.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
smtp_state.o: ../../include/mymalloc.h
@@ -225,6 +233,7 @@
smtp_state.o: ../../include/argv.h
smtp_state.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
smtp_state.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
+smtp_state.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
smtp_state.o: smtp_sasl.h
smtp_trouble.o: smtp_trouble.c
smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
@@ -244,6 +253,7 @@
smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/name_mask.h
smtp_trouble.o: smtp.h
smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/argv.h
+smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
smtp_unalias.o: smtp_unalias.c
smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/htable.h
@@ -256,3 +266,4 @@
smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/argv.h
smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
+smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtp/smtp.c postfix-1.1.0/src/smtp/smtp.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtp/smtp.c Tue Dec 11 01:49:22 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/smtp/smtp.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@
#include <debug_peer.h>
#include <mail_error.h>
#include <deliver_pass.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
/* Single server skeleton. */
@@ -237,6 +238,7 @@
*/
int var_smtp_conn_tmout;
int var_smtp_helo_tmout;
+int var_smtp_starttls_tmout;
int var_smtp_mail_tmout;
int var_smtp_rcpt_tmout;
int var_smtp_data0_tmout;
@@ -262,6 +264,12 @@
bool var_smtp_break_lines;
int var_smtp_pix_thresh;
int var_smtp_pix_delay;
+int var_smtp_use_tls;
+int var_smtp_enforce_tls;
+int var_smtp_tls_enforce_peername;
+char *var_smtp_tls_per_site;
+int var_smtp_tls_scert_vd;
+int var_smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer;
/*
* Global variables. smtp_errno is set by the address lookup routines and by
@@ -370,6 +378,7 @@
static void pre_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
{
+
debug_peer_init();
if (var_smtp_sasl_enable)
@@ -379,6 +388,14 @@
msg_warn("%s is true, but SASL support is not compiled in",
VAR_SMTP_SASL_ENABLE);
#endif
+ /*
+ * Initialize the TLS data before entering the chroot jail
+ */
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ if (var_smtp_use_tls || var_smtp_enforce_tls || var_smtp_tls_per_site[0])
+ pfixtls_init_clientengine(var_smtp_tls_scert_vd);
+ smtp_tls_list_init();
+#endif
}
/* pre_accept - see if tables have changed */
@@ -413,6 +430,7 @@
VAR_SMTP_SASL_PASSWD, DEF_SMTP_SASL_PASSWD, &var_smtp_sasl_passwd, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTP_SASL_OPTS, DEF_SMTP_SASL_OPTS, &var_smtp_sasl_opts, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTP_BIND_ADDR, DEF_SMTP_BIND_ADDR, &var_smtp_bind_addr, 0, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE, &var_smtp_tls_per_site, 0, 0,
0,
};
static CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_table[] = {
@@ -426,6 +444,7 @@
VAR_SMTP_QUIT_TMOUT, DEF_SMTP_QUIT_TMOUT, &var_smtp_quit_tmout, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTP_PIX_THRESH, DEF_SMTP_PIX_THRESH, &var_smtp_pix_thresh, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTP_PIX_DELAY, DEF_SMTP_PIX_DELAY, &var_smtp_pix_delay, 1, 0,
+ VAR_SMTP_STARTTLS_TMOUT, DEF_SMTP_STARTTLS_TMOUT, &var_smtp_starttls_tmout, 1, 0,
0,
};
static CONFIG_INT_TABLE int_table[] = {
@@ -441,6 +460,10 @@
VAR_SMTP_SASL_ENABLE, DEF_SMTP_SASL_ENABLE, &var_smtp_sasl_enable,
VAR_SMTP_RAND_ADDR, DEF_SMTP_RAND_ADDR, &var_smtp_rand_addr,
VAR_SMTP_BREAK_LINES, DEF_SMTP_BREAK_LINES, &var_smtp_break_lines,
+ VAR_SMTP_USE_TLS, DEF_SMTP_USE_TLS, &var_smtp_use_tls,
+ VAR_SMTP_ENFORCE_TLS, DEF_SMTP_ENFORCE_TLS, &var_smtp_enforce_tls,
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_ENFORCE_PN, DEF_SMTP_TLS_ENFORCE_PN, &var_smtp_tls_enforce_peername,
+ VAR_SMTP_TLS_NOTEOFFER, DEF_SMTP_TLS_NOTEOFFER, &var_smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer,
0,
};
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtp/smtp.h postfix-1.1.0/src/smtp/smtp.h
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtp/smtp.h Sun Dec 23 17:42:28 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/smtp/smtp.h Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
* Global library.
*/
#include <deliver_request.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
/*
* State information associated with each SMTP delivery. We're bundling the
@@ -77,9 +78,14 @@
char *addr; /* mail exchanger */
char *namaddr; /* mail exchanger */
int best; /* most preferred host */
+ int tls_use_tls; /* can do TLS */
+ int tls_enforce_tls; /* must do TLS */
+ int tls_enforce_peername; /* cert must match */
+ tls_info_t tls_info; /* TLS connection state */
} SMTP_SESSION;
-extern SMTP_SESSION *smtp_session_alloc(VSTREAM *, char *, char *);
+extern void smtp_tls_list_init(void);
+extern SMTP_SESSION *smtp_session_alloc(char *, VSTREAM *, char *, char *);
extern void smtp_session_free(SMTP_SESSION *);
/*
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtp/smtp_connect.c postfix-1.1.0/src/smtp/smtp_connect.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtp/smtp_connect.c Sun Jul 8 21:40:03 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/smtp/smtp_connect.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@
#include <mail_params.h>
#include <own_inet_addr.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
/* DNS library. */
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@
/* smtp_connect_addr - connect to explicit address */
-static SMTP_SESSION *smtp_connect_addr(DNS_RR *addr, unsigned port,
+static SMTP_SESSION *smtp_connect_addr(char *dest, DNS_RR *addr, unsigned port,
VSTRING *why)
{
char *myname = "smtp_connect_addr";
@@ -262,7 +263,7 @@
vstream_fclose(stream);
return (0);
}
- return (smtp_session_alloc(stream, addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr)));
+ return (smtp_session_alloc(dest, stream, addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr)));
}
/* smtp_connect_host - direct connection to host */
@@ -280,7 +281,7 @@
*/
addr_list = smtp_host_addr(host, why);
for (addr = addr_list; addr; addr = addr->next) {
- if ((session = smtp_connect_addr(addr, port, why)) != 0) {
+ if ((session = smtp_connect_addr(host, addr, port, why)) != 0) {
session->best = 1;
break;
}
@@ -309,7 +310,7 @@
*/
addr_list = smtp_domain_addr(name, why, found_myself);
for (addr = addr_list; addr; addr = addr->next) {
- if ((session = smtp_connect_addr(addr, port, why)) != 0) {
+ if ((session = smtp_connect_addr(name, addr, port, why)) != 0) {
session->best = (addr->pref == addr_list->pref);
break;
}
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtp/smtp_proto.c postfix-1.1.0/src/smtp/smtp_proto.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtp/smtp_proto.c Wed Dec 26 22:21:04 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/smtp/smtp_proto.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
#include <off_cvt.h>
#include <mark_corrupt.h>
#include <quote_821_local.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
/* Application-specific. */
@@ -158,6 +159,8 @@
char *words;
char *word;
int n;
+ int oldfeatures;
+ int rval;
/*
* Prepare for disaster.
@@ -219,7 +222,8 @@
session->namaddr,
translit(resp->str, "\n", " ")));
}
-
+ if (var_smtp_always_ehlo)
+ state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_ESMTP;
/*
* Pick up some useful features offered by the SMTP server. XXX Until we
* have a portable routine to convert from string to off_t with proper
@@ -231,6 +235,7 @@
* MicroSoft implemented AUTH based on an old draft.
*/
lines = resp->str;
+ oldfeatures = state->features; /* remember */
while ((words = mystrtok(&lines, "\n")) != 0) {
if (mystrtok(&words, "- ") && (word = mystrtok(&words, " \t=")) != 0) {
if (strcasecmp(word, "8BITMIME") == 0)
@@ -247,6 +252,8 @@
state->size_limit = off_cvt_string(word);
}
}
+ else if (strcasecmp(word, "STARTTLS") == 0)
+ state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS;
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
else if (var_smtp_sasl_enable && strcasecmp(word, "AUTH") == 0)
smtp_sasl_helo_auth(state, words);
@@ -264,6 +271,121 @@
msg_info("server features: 0x%x size %.0f",
state->features, (double) state->size_limit);
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ if ((state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS) &&
+ (var_smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer) &&
+ (!(session->tls_enforce_tls || session->tls_use_tls)))
+ msg_info("Host offered STARTTLS: [%s]", session->host);
+ if ((session->tls_enforce_tls) &&
+ !(state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS))
+ {
+ /*
+ * We are enforced to use TLS but it is not offered, so we will give
+ * up on this host. We won't even try STARTTLS, because we could
+ * receive a "500 command unrecognized" which would bounce the
+ * message. We instead want to delay until STARTTLS becomes
+ * available.
+ */
+ return (smtp_site_fail(state, 450, "Could not start TLS: not offered"));
+ }
+ if ((session->tls_enforce_tls) && !pfixtls_clientengine) {
+ /*
+ * We would like to start client TLS, but our own TLS-engine is
+ * not running.
+ */
+ return (smtp_site_fail(state, 450,
+ "Could not start TLS: our TLS-engine not running"));
+ }
+ if ((state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS) &&
+ ((session->tls_use_tls && pfixtls_clientengine) ||
+ (session->tls_enforce_tls))) {
+ /*
+ * Try to use the TLS feature
+ */
+ smtp_chat_cmd(state, "STARTTLS");
+ if ((resp = smtp_chat_resp(state))->code / 100 != 2) {
+ state->features &= ~SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS;
+ /*
+ * At this point a political decision is necessary. If we
+ * enforce usage of tls, we have to close the connection
+ * now.
+ */
+ if (session->tls_enforce_tls)
+ return (smtp_site_fail(state, resp->code,
+ "host %s refused to start TLS: %s",
+ session->host,
+ translit(resp->str, "\n", " ")));
+ } else {
+ if (rval = pfixtls_start_clienttls(session->stream,
+ var_smtp_starttls_tmout,
+ session->tls_enforce_peername,
+ session->host,
+ &(session->tls_info)))
+ return (smtp_site_fail(state, 450,
+ "Could not start TLS: client failure"));
+
+
+ /*
+ * Now the connection is established and maybe we do have a
+ * validated cert with a CommonName in it.
+ * In enforce_peername state, the handshake would already have
+ * been terminated so the check here is for logging only!
+ */
+ if (session->tls_info.peer_CN != NULL) {
+ if (!session->tls_info.peer_verified) {
+ msg_info("Peer certficate could not be verified");
+ if (session->tls_enforce_tls) {
+ pfixtls_stop_clienttls(session->stream,
+ var_smtp_starttls_tmout, 1,
+ &(session->tls_info));
+ return(smtp_site_fail(state, 450, "TLS-failure: Could not verify certificate"));
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (session->tls_enforce_tls) {
+ pfixtls_stop_clienttls(session->stream,
+ var_smtp_starttls_tmout, 1,
+ &(session->tls_info));
+ return (smtp_site_fail(state, 450, "TLS-failure: Cannot verify hostname"));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * At this point we have to re-negotiate the "EHLO" to reget
+ * the feature-list
+ */
+ state->features = oldfeatures;
+ if (state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_ESMTP) {
+ smtp_chat_cmd(state, "EHLO %s", var_myhostname);
+ if ((resp = smtp_chat_resp(state))->code / 100 != 2)
+ state->features &= ~SMTP_FEATURE_ESMTP;
+ }
+ lines = resp->str;
+ (void) mystrtok(&lines, "\n");
+ while ((words = mystrtok(&lines, "\n")) != 0) {
+ if (mystrtok(&words, "- ") &&
+ (word = mystrtok(&words, " \t")) != 0) {
+ if (strcasecmp(word, "8BITMIME") == 0)
+ state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_8BITMIME;
+ else if (strcasecmp(word, "PIPELINING") == 0)
+ state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_PIPELINING;
+ else if (strcasecmp(word, "SIZE") == 0)
+ state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_SIZE;
+ else if (strcasecmp(word, "STARTTLS") == 0)
+ state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS;
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+ else if (var_smtp_sasl_enable && strcasecmp(word, "AUTH") == 0)
+ smtp_sasl_helo_auth(state, words);
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Actually, at this point STARTTLS should not be offered
+ * anymore, so we could check for a protocol violation, but
+ * what should we do then?
+ */
+
+ }
+ }
+#endif
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
if (var_smtp_sasl_enable && (state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_AUTH))
return (smtp_sasl_helo_login(state));
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtp/smtp_session.c postfix-1.1.0/src/smtp/smtp_session.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtp/smtp_session.c Mon Nov 20 19:06:05 2000
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/smtp/smtp_session.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -42,15 +42,42 @@
#include <vstream.h>
#include <stringops.h>
+#include <mail_params.h>
+#include <maps.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
+
/* Application-specific. */
#include "smtp.h"
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+/* static lists */
+static MAPS *tls_per_site;
+
+/* smtp_tls_list_init - initialize lists */
+
+void smtp_tls_list_init(void)
+{
+ tls_per_site = maps_create(VAR_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE, var_smtp_tls_per_site,
+ DICT_FLAG_LOCK);
+}
+#endif
+
/* smtp_session_alloc - allocate and initialize SMTP_SESSION structure */
-SMTP_SESSION *smtp_session_alloc(VSTREAM *stream, char *host, char *addr)
+SMTP_SESSION *smtp_session_alloc(char *dest, VSTREAM *stream, char *host, char *addr)
{
SMTP_SESSION *session;
+ const char *lookup;
+ char *lookup_key;
+ int host_dont_use = 0;
+ int host_use = 0;
+ int host_enforce = 0;
+ int host_enforce_peername = 0;
+ int recipient_dont_use = 0;
+ int recipient_use = 0;
+ int recipient_enforce = 0;
+ int recipient_enforce_peername = 0;
session = (SMTP_SESSION *) mymalloc(sizeof(*session));
session->stream = stream;
@@ -58,6 +85,61 @@
session->addr = mystrdup(addr);
session->namaddr = concatenate(host, "[", addr, "]", (char *) 0);
session->best = 1;
+ session->tls_use_tls = session->tls_enforce_tls = 0;
+ session->tls_enforce_peername = 0;
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ lookup_key = lowercase(mystrdup(host));
+ if (lookup = maps_find(tls_per_site, lookup_key, 0)) {
+ if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "NONE"))
+ host_dont_use = 1;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MAY"))
+ host_use = 1;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MUST"))
+ host_enforce = host_enforce_peername = 1;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MUST_NOPEERMATCH"))
+ host_enforce = 1;
+ else
+ msg_warn("Unknown TLS state for receiving host %s: '%s', using default policy", session->host, lookup);
+ }
+ myfree(lookup_key);
+ lookup_key = lowercase(mystrdup(dest));
+ if (lookup = maps_find(tls_per_site, dest, 0)) {
+ if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "NONE"))
+ recipient_dont_use = 1;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MAY"))
+ recipient_use = 1;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MUST"))
+ recipient_enforce = recipient_enforce_peername = 1;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MUST_NOPEERMATCH"))
+ recipient_enforce = 1;
+ else
+ msg_warn("Unknown TLS state for recipient domain %s: '%s', using default policy", dest, lookup);
+ }
+ myfree(lookup_key);
+
+ if ((var_smtp_enforce_tls && !host_dont_use) || host_enforce ||
+ recipient_enforce)
+ session->tls_enforce_tls = session->tls_use_tls = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Set up peername checking. We want to make sure that a MUST* entry in
+ * the tls_per_site table always has precedence. MUST always must lead to
+ * a peername check, MUST_NOPEERMATCH must always disable it. Only when
+ * no explicit setting has been found, the default will be used.
+ * There is the case left, that both "host" and "recipient" settings
+ * conflict. In this case, the "host" setting wins.
+ */
+ if (host_enforce && host_enforce_peername)
+ session->tls_enforce_peername = 1;
+ else if (recipient_enforce && recipient_enforce_peername)
+ session->tls_enforce_peername = 1;
+ else if (var_smtp_enforce_tls && var_smtp_tls_enforce_peername)
+ session->tls_enforce_peername = 1;
+
+ else if ((var_smtp_use_tls && !host_dont_use) || host_use || recipient_use)
+ session->tls_use_tls = 1;
+#endif
+ session->tls_info = tls_info_zero;
return (session);
}
@@ -65,6 +147,11 @@
void smtp_session_free(SMTP_SESSION *session)
{
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ vstream_fflush(session->stream);
+ pfixtls_stop_clienttls(session->stream, var_smtp_starttls_tmout, 0,
+ &(session->tls_info));
+#endif
vstream_fclose(session->stream);
myfree(session->host);
myfree(session->addr);
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtpd/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.0/src/smtpd/Makefile.in
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtpd/Makefile.in Tue Jan 15 16:25:19 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/smtpd/Makefile.in Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@
smtpd.o: ../../include/match_list.h
smtpd.o: ../../include/match_ops.h
smtpd.o: ../../include/mail_server.h
+smtpd.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
smtpd.o: smtpd_token.h
smtpd.o: smtpd.h
smtpd.o: smtpd_check.h
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@
smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/cleanup_user.h
smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/mail_error.h
smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/name_mask.h
+smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
smtpd_chat.o: smtpd.h
smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/mail_stream.h
smtpd_chat.o: smtpd_chat.h
@@ -194,6 +196,7 @@
smtpd_check.o: ../../include/mail_addr_find.h
smtpd_check.o: ../../include/match_parent_style.h
smtpd_check.o: ../../include/split_addr.h
+smtpd_check.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
smtpd_check.o: smtpd.h
smtpd_check.o: ../../include/mail_stream.h
smtpd_check.o: smtpd_sasl_glue.h
@@ -210,6 +213,7 @@
smtpd_peer.o: ../../include/vstream.h
smtpd_peer.o: ../../include/argv.h
smtpd_peer.o: ../../include/mail_stream.h
+smtpd_peer.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
smtpd_sasl_glue.o: smtpd_sasl_glue.c
smtpd_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
smtpd_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/msg.h
@@ -263,6 +267,7 @@
smtpd_state.o: ../../include/vstring.h
smtpd_state.o: ../../include/argv.h
smtpd_state.o: ../../include/mail_stream.h
+smtpd_state.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
smtpd_state.o: smtpd_chat.h
smtpd_state.o: smtpd_sasl_glue.h
smtpd_token.o: smtpd_token.c
@@ -272,3 +277,4 @@
smtpd_token.o: smtpd_token.h
smtpd_token.o: ../../include/vstring.h
smtpd_token.o: ../../include/vbuf.h
+smtpd_token.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtpd/smtpd.c postfix-1.1.0/src/smtpd/smtpd.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtpd/smtpd.c Thu Jan 17 17:20:34 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/smtpd/smtpd.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -312,6 +312,7 @@
#include <tok822.h>
#include <verp_sender.h>
#include <string_list.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
/* Single-threaded server skeleton. */
@@ -336,6 +337,7 @@
*/
int var_smtpd_rcpt_limit;
int var_smtpd_tmout;
+char *var_relay_ccerts;
int var_smtpd_soft_erlim;
int var_smtpd_hard_erlim;
int var_queue_minfree; /* XXX use off_t */
@@ -383,6 +385,15 @@
char *var_smtpd_noop_cmds;
char *var_smtpd_null_key;
int var_smtpd_hist_thrsh;
+int var_smtpd_starttls_tmout;
+int var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode;
+int var_smtpd_use_tls;
+int var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
+int var_smtpd_tls_auth_only;
+int var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert;
+int var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert;
+int var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd;
+int var_smtpd_tls_received_header;
/*
* Silly little macros.
@@ -487,11 +498,21 @@
if (var_disable_vrfy_cmd == 0)
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-VRFY");
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-ETRN");
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ if ((state->tls_use_tls || state->tls_enforce_tls) && (!state->tls_active))
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-STARTTLS");
+#endif
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable) {
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ if (!state->tls_auth_only || state->tls_active) {
+#endif
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-AUTH %s", state->sasl_mechanism_list);
if (var_broken_auth_clients)
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-AUTH=%s", state->sasl_mechanism_list);
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ }
+#endif
}
#endif
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-%s", VERP_CMD);
@@ -891,11 +912,76 @@
state->rcpt_count = 0;
}
+/* CN_sanitize - make sure, the CN-string is well behaved */
+
+static void CN_sanitize(char *CNstring)
+{
+ int i;
+ int len;
+ int parencount;
+
+ /*
+ * The information included in the CN (CommonName) of the peer and its
+ * issuer can be included into the Received: header line. The characters
+ * allowed as well as comment nesting are limited by RFC822.
+ */
+
+ len = strlen(CNstring);
+ /*
+ * The Received: header can only contain characters. Make sure that only
+ * acceptable characters are printed. Maybe we could allow more, but
+ * not everything makes sense inside a CommonName.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ if (!((CNstring[i] >= 'A') && (CNstring[i] <='Z')) &&
+ !((CNstring[i] >= 'a') && (CNstring[i] <='z')) &&
+ !((CNstring[i] >= '0') && (CNstring[i] <='9')) &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '(') && (CNstring[i] != ')') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '[') && (CNstring[i] != ']') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '{') && (CNstring[i] != '}') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '<') && (CNstring[i] != '>') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '?') && (CNstring[i] != '!') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != ';') && (CNstring[i] != ':') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '"') && (CNstring[i] != '\'') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '/') && (CNstring[i] != '|') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '+') && (CNstring[i] != '&') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '~') && (CNstring[i] != '@') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '#') && (CNstring[i] != '$') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '%') && (CNstring[i] != '&') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '^') && (CNstring[i] != '*') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '_') && (CNstring[i] != '-') &&
+ (CNstring[i] != '.') && (CNstring[i] != ' '))
+ CNstring[i] = '?';
+
+ /*
+ * This information will go into the Received: header inside a comment.
+ * Since comments can be nested, parentheses '(' and ')' must match.
+ */
+ parencount = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (CNstring[i] == '(')
+ parencount++;
+ else if (CNstring[i] == ')')
+ parencount--;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The necessary condition is violated. Do YOU know, where to correct?
+ * I don't know, so I will practically remove all parentheses.
+ */
+ if (parencount != 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ if ((CNstring[i] == '(') || (CNstring[i] == ')'))
+ CNstring[i] = '/';
+ }
+}
+
/* data_cmd - process DATA command */
static int data_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
{
char *start;
+ char *peer_CN;
+ char *issuer_CN;
int len;
int curr_rec_type;
int prev_rec_type;
@@ -934,6 +1020,35 @@
"Received: from %s (%s [%s])",
state->helo_name ? state->helo_name : state->name,
state->name, state->addr);
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_received_header && state->tls_active) {
+ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+ "\t(using %s with cipher %s (%d/%d bits))",
+ state->tls_info.protocol, state->tls_info.cipher_name,
+ state->tls_info.cipher_usebits,
+ state->tls_info.cipher_algbits);
+ if (state->tls_info.peer_CN) {
+ peer_CN = mystrdup(state->tls_info.peer_CN);
+ CN_sanitize(peer_CN);
+ issuer_CN = mystrdup(state->tls_info.issuer_CN);
+ CN_sanitize(issuer_CN);
+ if (state->tls_info.peer_verified)
+ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+ "\t(Client CN \"%s\", Issuer \"%s\" (verified OK))",
+ peer_CN, issuer_CN);
+ else
+ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+ "\t(Client CN \"%s\", Issuer \"%s\" (not verified))",
+ peer_CN, issuer_CN);
+ myfree(issuer_CN);
+ myfree(peer_CN);
+ }
+ else if (var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert)
+ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+ "\t(Client did not present a certificate)");
+ else
+ rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+ "\t(No client certificate requested)");
+ }
if (state->rcpt_count == 1 && state->recipient) {
rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
"\tby %s (%s) with %s id %s",
@@ -1283,6 +1398,77 @@
}
}
+static int starttls_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+ char *err;
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ if (argc != 1) {
+ state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 Syntax: STARTTLS");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (state->tls_active != 0) {
+ state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 Error: TLS already active");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (state->tls_use_tls == 0) {
+ state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 Error: command not implemented");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ if (!pfixtls_serverengine) {
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "454 TLS not available due to temporary reason");
+ return (0);
+ }
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "220 Ready to start TLS");
+ vstream_fflush(state->client);
+ /*
+ * When deciding about continuing the handshake, we will stop when a
+ * client certificate was _required_ and none was presented or the
+ * verification failed. This however does only make sense when TLS is
+ * enforced. Otherwise we would happily perform perform the SMTP
+ * transaction without any STARTTLS at all! So only have the handshake
+ * fail when TLS is also enforced.
+ */
+ if (pfixtls_start_servertls(state->client, var_smtpd_starttls_tmout,
+ state->name, state->addr, &(state->tls_info),
+ (var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert && state->tls_enforce_tls))) {
+ /*
+ * Typically the connection is hanging at this point, so
+ * we should try to shut it down by force! Unfortunately this
+ * problem is not addressed in postfix!
+ */
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ state->tls_active = 1;
+ helo_reset(state);
+ mail_reset(state);
+ rcpt_reset(state);
+ return (0);
+#else
+ state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 Error: command not implemented");
+ return (-1);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void tls_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+ int failure = 0;
+
+ if (state->reason && state->where && strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_AFTER_DOT))
+ failure = 1;
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ vstream_fflush(state->client);
+ if (state->tls_active)
+ pfixtls_stop_servertls(state->client, var_smtpd_starttls_tmout,
+ failure, &(state->tls_info));
+#endif
+ state->tls_active = 0;
+}
+
/*
* The table of all SMTP commands that we know. Set the junk limit flag on
* any command that can be repeated an arbitrary number of times without
@@ -1300,6 +1486,10 @@
"HELO", helo_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT,
"EHLO", ehlo_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT,
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ "STARTTLS", starttls_cmd, 0,
+#endif
+
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
"AUTH", smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd, 0,
#endif
@@ -1399,9 +1589,28 @@
state->error_count++;
continue;
}
+ if (state->tls_enforce_tls &&
+ !state->tls_active &&
+ cmdp->action != starttls_cmd &&
+ cmdp->action != noop_cmd &&
+ cmdp->action != ehlo_cmd &&
+ cmdp->action != quit_cmd) {
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+ "530 Must issue a STARTTLS command first");
+ state->error_count++;
+ continue;
+ }
state->where = cmdp->name;
- if (cmdp->action(state, argc, argv) != 0)
+ if (cmdp->action(state, argc, argv) != 0) {
state->error_count++;
+ /*
+ * Die after TLS negotiation failure, as there is no
+ * stable way to recover from a possible mixture of
+ * TLS and SMTP protocol from the client.
+ */
+ if (cmdp->action == starttls_cmd)
+ break;
+ }
if ((cmdp->flags & SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT)
&& state->junk_cmds++ > var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit)
state->error_count++;
@@ -1426,6 +1635,7 @@
* Cleanup whatever information the client gave us during the SMTP
* dialog.
*/
+ tls_reset(state);
helo_reset(state);
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable)
@@ -1458,6 +1668,39 @@
* machines.
*/
smtpd_state_init(&state, stream);
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ state.tls_use_tls = var_smtpd_use_tls | var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
+ state.tls_enforce_tls = var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode) {
+ /*
+ * TLS has been set to wrapper mode, meaning that we run on a
+ * seperate port and we must switch to TLS layer before actually
+ * performing the SMTP protocol. This implies enforce-mode.
+ */
+ state.tls_use_tls = state.tls_enforce_tls = 1;
+ if (pfixtls_start_servertls(state.client, var_smtpd_starttls_tmout,
+ state.name, state.addr, &state.tls_info,
+ var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert)) {
+ /*
+ * Typically the connection is hanging at this point, so
+ * we should try to shut it down by force! Unfortunately this
+ * problem is not addressed in postfix!
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+ state.tls_active = 1;
+ }
+ if (var_smtpd_tls_auth_only || state.tls_enforce_tls)
+ state.tls_auth_only = 1;
+#else
+ state.tls_use_tls = 0;
+ state.tls_enforce_tls = 0;
+ state.tls_auth_only = 0;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Provide the SMTP service.
+ */
/*
* See if we need to turn on verbose logging for this client.
@@ -1475,10 +1718,6 @@
smtpd_chat_reply(&state, "220 %s", var_smtpd_banner);
msg_info("connect from %s[%s]", state.name, state.addr);
}
-
- /*
- * Provide the SMTP service.
- */
smtpd_proto(&state);
/*
@@ -1504,7 +1743,6 @@
static void pre_jail_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
{
-
/*
* Initialize blacklist/etc. patterns before entering the chroot jail, in
* case they specify a filename pattern.
@@ -1520,6 +1758,12 @@
msg_warn("%s is true, but SASL support is not compiled in",
VAR_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE);
#endif
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ if (var_smtpd_use_tls || var_smtpd_enforce_tls || var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode)
+ pfixtls_init_serverengine(var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd,
+ var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert);
+#endif
}
/* main - the main program */
@@ -1542,6 +1786,7 @@
VAR_NON_FQDN_CODE, DEF_NON_FQDN_CODE, &var_non_fqdn_code, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_JUNK_CMD, DEF_SMTPD_JUNK_CMD, &var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit, 1, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_HIST_THRSH, DEF_SMTPD_HIST_THRSH, &var_smtpd_hist_thrsh, 1, 0,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, &var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd, 0, 0,
0,
};
static CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_table[] = {
@@ -1557,6 +1802,13 @@
VAR_ALLOW_UNTRUST_ROUTE, DEF_ALLOW_UNTRUST_ROUTE, &var_allow_untrust_route,
VAR_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE, &var_smtpd_sasl_enable,
VAR_BROKEN_AUTH_CLNTS, DEF_BROKEN_AUTH_CLNTS, &var_broken_auth_clients,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER, &var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode,
+ VAR_SMTPD_USE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_USE_TLS, &var_smtpd_use_tls,
+ VAR_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, &var_smtpd_enforce_tls,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY, &var_smtpd_tls_auth_only,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, &var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, &var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert,
+ VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD, &var_smtpd_tls_received_header,
0,
};
static CONFIG_STR_TABLE str_table[] = {
@@ -1585,6 +1837,7 @@
VAR_SMTPD_SND_AUTH_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_SND_AUTH_MAPS, &var_smtpd_snd_auth_maps, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, DEF_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, &var_smtpd_noop_cmds, 0, 0,
VAR_SMTPD_NULL_KEY, DEF_SMTPD_NULL_KEY, &var_smtpd_null_key, 0, 0,
+ VAR_RELAY_CCERTS, DEF_RELAY_CCERTS, &var_relay_ccerts, 0, 0,
0,
};
@@ -1600,3 +1853,4 @@
MAIL_SERVER_PRE_ACCEPT, pre_accept,
0);
}
+
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtpd/smtpd.h postfix-1.1.0/src/smtpd/smtpd.h
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtpd/smtpd.h Tue Nov 6 18:35:29 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/smtpd/smtpd.h Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
* Global library.
*/
#include <mail_stream.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
/*
* Variables that keep track of conversation state. There is only one SMTP
@@ -77,6 +78,11 @@
VSTRING *sasl_decoded;
#endif
int warn_if_reject;
+ int tls_active;
+ int tls_use_tls;
+ int tls_enforce_tls;
+ int tls_auth_only;
+ tls_info_t tls_info;
} SMTPD_STATE;
extern void smtpd_state_init(SMTPD_STATE *, VSTREAM *);
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c postfix-1.1.0/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c Wed Jan 16 19:23:11 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@
#include <namadr_list.h>
#include <domain_list.h>
+#include <string_list.h>
#include <mail_params.h>
#include <canon_addr.h>
#include <resolve_clnt.h>
@@ -345,6 +346,9 @@
static DOMAIN_LIST *relay_domains;
static NAMADR_LIST *mynetworks;
static NAMADR_LIST *perm_mx_networks;
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+static MAPS *relay_ccerts;
+#endif
/*
* How to do parent domain wildcard matching, if any.
@@ -530,6 +534,10 @@
perm_mx_networks =
namadr_list_init(match_parent_style(VAR_PERM_MX_NETWORKS),
var_perm_mx_networks);
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ relay_ccerts = maps_create(VAR_RELAY_CCERTS, var_relay_ccerts,
+ DICT_FLAG_LOCK);
+#endif
/*
* Pre-parse and pre-open the recipient maps.
@@ -966,6 +974,36 @@
static int permit_auth_destination(SMTPD_STATE *state, char *recipient);
+/* permit_tls_clientcerts - OK/DUNNO for message relaying */
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+static int permit_tls_clientcerts(SMTPD_STATE *state, int permit_all_certs)
+{
+ char *low_name;
+ const char *found;
+
+ if (state->tls_info.peer_verified && permit_all_certs) {
+ if (msg_verbose)
+ msg_info("Relaying allowed for all verified client certificates");
+ return(SMTPD_CHECK_OK);
+ }
+
+ if (state->tls_info.peer_verified && state->tls_info.peer_fingerprint) {
+ low_name = lowercase(mystrdup(state->tls_info.peer_fingerprint));
+ found = maps_find(relay_ccerts, low_name, DICT_FLAG_FIXED);
+ myfree(low_name);
+ if (found) {
+ if (msg_verbose)
+ msg_info("Relaying allowed for certified client: %s", found);
+ return (SMTPD_CHECK_OK);
+ } else if (msg_verbose)
+ msg_info("relay_clientcerts: No match for fingerprint '%s'",
+ state->tls_info.peer_fingerprint);
+ }
+ return (SMTPD_CHECK_DUNNO);
+}
+#endif
+
/* check_relay_domains - OK/FAIL for message relaying */
static int check_relay_domains(SMTPD_STATE *state, char *recipient,
@@ -2157,6 +2195,12 @@
status = permit_sasl_auth(state,
SMTPD_CHECK_OK, SMTPD_CHECK_DUNNO);
#endif
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ } else if (strcasecmp(name, PERMIT_TLS_ALL_CLIENTCERTS) == 0) {
+ status = permit_tls_clientcerts(state, 1);
+ } else if (strcasecmp(name, PERMIT_TLS_CLIENTCERTS) == 0) {
+ status = permit_tls_clientcerts(state, 0);
+#endif
} else if (strcasecmp(name, REJECT_UNKNOWN_RCPTDOM) == 0) {
if (state->recipient)
status = reject_unknown_address(state, state->recipient,
@@ -2591,6 +2635,7 @@
char *var_rcpt_checks = "";
char *var_etrn_checks = "";
char *var_relay_domains = "";
+char *var_relay_ccerts = "";
char *var_mynetworks = "";
char *var_notify_classes = "";
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtpd/smtpd_sasl_proto.c postfix-1.1.0/src/smtpd/smtpd_sasl_proto.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtpd/smtpd_sasl_proto.c Tue Sep 12 00:45:40 2000
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/smtpd/smtpd_sasl_proto.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -128,6 +128,13 @@
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 Error: authentication not enabled");
return (-1);
}
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ if (state->tls_auth_only && !state->tls_active) {
+ state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+ smtpd_chat_reply(state, "538 Encryption required for requested authentication mechanism");
+ return (-1);
+ }
+#endif
if (state->sasl_username) {
state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 Error: already authenticated");
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtpd/smtpd_state.c postfix-1.1.0/src/smtpd/smtpd_state.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/smtpd/smtpd_state.c Tue Nov 6 18:35:40 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/smtpd/smtpd_state.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -92,6 +92,11 @@
state->msg_size = 0;
state->junk_cmds = 0;
state->warn_if_reject = 0;
+ state->tls_active = 0;
+ state->tls_use_tls = 0;
+ state->tls_enforce_tls = 0;
+ state->tls_info = tls_info_zero;
+ state->tls_auth_only = 0;
#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state))
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/tlsmgr/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.0/src/tlsmgr/Makefile.in
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/tlsmgr/Makefile.in Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/tlsmgr/Makefile.in Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+SHELL = /bin/sh
+SRCS = tlsmgr.c
+OBJS = tlsmgr.o
+HDRS =
+TESTSRC =
+WARN = -W -Wformat -Wimplicit -Wmissing-prototypes \
+ -Wparentheses -Wstrict-prototypes -Wswitch -Wuninitialized \
+ -Wunused
+DEFS = -I. -I$(INC_DIR) -D$(SYSTYPE)
+CFLAGS = $(DEBUG) $(OPT) $(DEFS)
+TESTPROG=
+PROG = tlsmgr
+INC_DIR = ../../include
+LIBS = ../../lib/libmaster.a ../../lib/libglobal.a ../../lib/libutil.a
+
+.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c
+
+$(PROG): $(OBJS) $(LIBS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS) $(LIBS) $(SYSLIBS)
+
+Makefile: Makefile.in
+ (set -e; echo "# DO NOT EDIT"; $(OPTS) $(SHELL) ../../makedefs; cat $?) >$@
+
+test: $(TESTPROG)
+
+update: ../../libexec/$(PROG)
+
+../../libexec/$(PROG): $(PROG)
+ cp $(PROG) ../../libexec
+
+printfck: $(OBJS) $(PROG)
+ rm -rf printfck
+ mkdir printfck
+ cp *.h printfck
+ sed '1,/^# do not edit/!d' Makefile >printfck/Makefile
+ set -e; for i in *.c; do printfck -f .printfck $$i >printfck/$$i; done
+ cd printfck; make "INC_DIR=../../../../include" `cd ../..; ls *.o`
+
+lint:
+ lint $(DEFS) $(SRCS) $(LINTFIX)
+
+clean:
+ rm -f *.o *core $(PROG) $(TESTPROG) junk
+ rm -rf printfck
+
+tidy: clean
+
+depend: $(MAKES)
+ (sed '1,/^# do not edit/!d' Makefile.in; \
+ set -e; for i in [a-z][a-z0-9]*.c; do \
+ $(CC) -E $(DEFS) $(INCL) $$i | sed -n -e '/^# *1 *"\([^"]*\)".*/{' \
+ -e 's//'`echo $$i|sed 's/c$$/o/'`': \1/' -e 'p' -e '}'; \
+ done) | grep -v '[.][o][:][ ][/]' >$$$$ && mv $$$$ Makefile.in
+ @make -f Makefile.in Makefile
+
+# do not edit below this line - it is generated by 'make depend'
+tlsmgr.o: tlsmgr.c
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/msg.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/events.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/vstream.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/vbuf.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/dict.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/argv.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/vstring.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/stringops.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/mymalloc.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/connect.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/myflock.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/mail_conf.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/mail_params.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/iostuff.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/master_proto.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/mail_server.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/tlsmgr/tlsmgr.c postfix-1.1.0/src/tlsmgr/tlsmgr.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/tlsmgr/tlsmgr.c Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/tlsmgr/tlsmgr.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,598 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/* tlsmgr 8
+/* SUMMARY
+/* Postfix TLS session cache and PRNG handling manager
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/* \fBtlsmgr\fR [generic Postfix daemon options]
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* The tlsmgr process does housekeeping on the session cache database
+/* files. It runs through the databases and removes expired entries
+/* and entries written by older (incompatible) versions.
+/*
+/* The tlsmgr is responsible for the PRNG handling. The used internal
+/* OpenSSL PRNG has a pool size of 8192 bits (= 1024 bytes). The pool
+/* is initially seeded at startup from an external source (EGD or
+/* /dev/urandom) and additional seed is obtained later during program
+/* run at a configurable period. The exact time of seed query is
+/* using random information and is equally distributed in the range of
+/* [0-\fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR] with a \fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR
+/* having a default of 1 hour.
+/*
+/* Tlsmgr can be run chrooted and with dropped privileges, as it will
+/* connect to the entropy source at startup.
+/*
+/* The PRNG is additionally seeded internally by the data found in the
+/* session cache and timevalues.
+/*
+/* Tlsmgr reads the old value of the exchange file at startup to keep
+/* entropy already collected during previous runs.
+/*
+/* From the PRNG random pool a cryptographically strong 1024 byte random
+/* sequence is written into the PRNG exchange file. The file is updated
+/* periodically with the time changing randomly from
+/* [0-\fBtls_random_prng_update_period\fR].
+/* STANDARDS
+/* SECURITY
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* Tlsmgr is not security-sensitive. It only deals with external data
+/* to be fed into the PRNG, the contents is never trusted. The session
+/* cache housekeeping will only remove entries if expired and will never
+/* touch the contents of the cached data.
+/* DIAGNOSTICS
+/* Problems and transactions are logged to the syslog daemon.
+/* BUGS
+/* There is no automatic means to limit the number of entries in the
+/* session caches and/or the size of the session cache files.
+/* CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* The following \fBmain.cf\fR parameters are especially relevant to
+/* this program. See the Postfix \fBmain.cf\fR file for syntax details
+/* and for default values. Use the \fBpostfix reload\fR command after
+/* a configuration change.
+/* .SH Session Cache
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* .IP \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_database\fR
+/* Name of the SDBM file (type sdbm:) containing the SMTP server session
+/* cache. If the file does not exist, it is created.
+/* .IP \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+/* Expiry time of SMTP server session cache entries in seconds. Entries
+/* older than this are removed from the session cache. A cleanup-run is
+/* performed periodically every \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+/* seconds. Default is 3600 (= 1 hour).
+/* .IP \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_database\fR
+/* Name of the SDBM file (type sdbm:) containing the SMTP client session
+/* cache. If the file does not exist, it is created.
+/* .IP \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+/* Expiry time of SMTP client session cache entries in seconds. Entries
+/* older than this are removed from the session cache. A cleanup-run is
+/* performed periodically every \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+/* seconds. Default is 3600 (= 1 hour).
+/* .SH Pseudo Random Number Generator
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* .IP \fBtls_random_source\fR
+/* Name of the EGD socket or device or regular file to obtain entropy
+/* from. The type of entropy source must be specified by preceding the
+/* name with the appropriate type: egd:/path/to/egd_socket,
+/* dev:/path/to/devicefile, or /path/to/regular/file.
+/* tlsmgr opens \fBtls_random_source\fR and tries to read
+/* \fBtls_random_bytes\fR from it.
+/* .IP \fBtls_random_bytes\fR
+/* Number of bytes to be read from \fBtls_random_source\fR.
+/* Default value is 32 bytes. If using EGD, a maximum of 255 bytes is read.
+/* .IP \fBtls_random_exchange_name\fR
+/* Name of the file written by tlsmgr and read by smtp and smtpd at
+/* startup. The length is 1024 bytes. Default value is
+/* /etc/postfix/prng_exch.
+/* .IP \fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR
+/* Time in seconds until the next reseed from external sources is due.
+/* This is the maximum value. The actual point in time is calculated
+/* with a random factor equally distributed between 0 and this maximum
+/* value. Default is 3600 (= 60 minutes).
+/* .IP \fBtls_random_prng_update_period\fR
+/* Time in seconds until the PRNG exchange file is updated with new
+/* pseude random values. This is the maximum value. The actual point
+/* in time is calculated with a random factor equally distributed
+/* between 0 and this maximum value. Default is 60 (= 1 minute).
+/* SEE ALSO
+/* smtp(8) SMTP client
+/* smtpd(8) SMTP server
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/*--*/
+
+/* System library. */
+
+#include <sys_defs.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/time.h> /* gettimeofday, not POSIX */
+
+/* OpenSSL library. */
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+#include <openssl/rand.h> /* For the PRNG */
+#endif
+
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include <msg.h>
+#include <events.h>
+#include <dict.h>
+#include <stringops.h>
+#include <mymalloc.h>
+#include <connect.h>
+#include <myflock.h>
+
+/* Global library. */
+
+#include <mail_conf.h>
+#include <mail_params.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
+
+/* Master process interface */
+
+#include <master_proto.h>
+#include <mail_server.h>
+
+/* Application-specific. */
+
+ /*
+ * Tunables.
+ */
+char *var_tls_rand_source;
+int var_tls_rand_bytes;
+int var_tls_reseed_period;
+int var_tls_prng_upd_period;
+
+static int rand_exch_fd;
+static int rand_source_dev_fd = -1;
+static int rand_source_socket_fd = -1;
+static int srvr_scache_db_active;
+static int clnt_scache_db_active;
+static DICT *srvr_scache_db = NULL;
+static DICT *clnt_scache_db = NULL;
+
+static void tlsmgr_prng_upd_event(int unused_event, char *dummy)
+{
+ struct timeval tv;
+ unsigned char buffer[1024];
+ int next_period;
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ /*
+ * It is time to update the PRNG exchange file. Since other processes might
+ * have added entropy, we do this in a read_stir-back_write cycle.
+ */
+ GETTIMEOFDAY(&tv);
+ RAND_seed(&tv, sizeof(struct timeval));
+
+ if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) != 0)
+ msg_fatal("Could not lock random exchange file: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ lseek(rand_exch_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
+ if (read(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("reading exchange file failed");
+ RAND_seed(buffer, 1024);
+
+ RAND_bytes(buffer, 1024);
+ lseek(rand_exch_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
+ if (write(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024) != 1024)
+ msg_fatal("Writing exchange file failed");
+
+ if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) != 0)
+ msg_fatal("Could not unlock random exchange file: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+
+ /*
+ * Make prediction difficult for outsiders and calculate the time for the
+ * next execution randomly.
+ */
+ next_period = (var_tls_prng_upd_period * buffer[0]) / 255;
+ event_request_timer(tlsmgr_prng_upd_event, dummy, next_period);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+static void tlsmgr_reseed_event(int unused_event, char *dummy)
+{
+ int egd_success;
+ int next_period;
+ int rand_bytes;
+ char buffer[255];
+ struct timeval tv;
+ unsigned char randbyte;
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ /*
+ * It is time to reseed the PRNG.
+ */
+
+ GETTIMEOFDAY(&tv);
+ RAND_seed(&tv, sizeof(struct timeval));
+ if (rand_source_dev_fd != -1) {
+ rand_bytes = read(rand_source_dev_fd, buffer, var_tls_rand_bytes);
+ if (rand_bytes > 0)
+ RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
+ else if (rand_bytes < 0) {
+ msg_fatal("Read from entropy device %s failed",
+ var_tls_rand_source);
+ }
+ } else if (rand_source_socket_fd != -1) {
+ egd_success = 0;
+ buffer[0] = 1;
+ buffer[1] = var_tls_rand_bytes;
+ if (write(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 2) != 2)
+ msg_info("Could not talk to %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+ else if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 1) != 1)
+ msg_info("Could not read info from %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+ else {
+ rand_bytes = buffer[0];
+ if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, rand_bytes) != rand_bytes)
+ msg_info("Could not read data from %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+ else {
+ egd_success = 1;
+ RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
+ }
+ }
+ if (!egd_success) {
+ msg_info("Lost connection to EGD-device, exiting to reconnect.");
+ exit(0);
+ }
+ } else if (*var_tls_rand_source) {
+ rand_bytes = RAND_load_file(var_tls_rand_source, var_tls_rand_bytes);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Make prediction difficult for outsiders and calculate the time for the
+ * next execution randomly.
+ */
+ RAND_bytes(&randbyte, 1);
+ next_period = (var_tls_reseed_period * randbyte) / 255;
+ event_request_timer(tlsmgr_reseed_event, dummy, next_period);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+static int tlsmgr_do_scache_check(DICT *scache_db, int scache_timeout,
+ int start)
+{
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ int func;
+ int len;
+ int n;
+ int delete = 0;
+ int result;
+ struct timeval tv;
+ const char *member;
+ const char *value;
+ char *member_copy;
+ unsigned char nibble, *data;
+ pfixtls_scache_info_t scache_info;
+
+ GETTIMEOFDAY(&tv);
+ RAND_seed(&tv, sizeof(struct timeval));
+
+ /*
+ * Run through the given dictionary and check the stored sessions.
+ * If "start" is set to 1, a new run is initiated, otherwise the next
+ * item is accessed. The state is internally kept in the DICT.
+ */
+ if (start)
+ func = DICT_SEQ_FUN_FIRST;
+ else
+ func = DICT_SEQ_FUN_NEXT;
+ result = dict_seq(scache_db, func, &member, &value);
+
+ if (result > 0)
+ return 0; /* End of list reached */
+ else if (result < 0)
+ msg_fatal("Database fault, should already be caught.");
+ else {
+ member_copy = mystrdup(member);
+ len = strlen(value);
+ RAND_seed(value, len); /* Use it to increase entropy */
+ if (len < 2 * sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t))
+ delete = 1; /* Messed up, delete */
+ else if (len > 2 * sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t))
+ len = 2 * sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
+ if (!delete) {
+ data = (unsigned char *)(&scache_info);
+ memset(data, 0, len / 2);
+ for (n = 0; n < len; n++) {
+ if ((value[n] >= '0') && (value[n] <= '9'))
+ nibble = value[n] - '0';
+ else
+ nibble = value[n] - 'A' + 10;
+ if (n % 2)
+ data[n / 2] |= nibble;
+ else
+ data[n / 2] |= (nibble << 4);
+ }
+
+ if ((scache_info.scache_db_version != scache_db_version) ||
+ (scache_info.openssl_version != openssl_version) ||
+ (scache_info.timestamp + scache_timeout < time(NULL)))
+ delete = 1;
+ }
+ if (delete)
+ result = dict_del(scache_db, member_copy);
+ myfree(member_copy);
+ }
+
+ if (delete && result)
+ msg_info("Could not delete %s", member);
+ return 1;
+
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void tlsmgr_clnt_cache_run_event(int unused_event, char *dummy)
+{
+
+ /*
+ * This routine runs when it is time for another tls session cache scan.
+ * Make sure this routine gets called again in the future.
+ */
+ clnt_scache_db_active = tlsmgr_do_scache_check(clnt_scache_db,
+ var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout, 1);
+ event_request_timer(tlsmgr_clnt_cache_run_event, dummy,
+ var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout);
+}
+
+
+static void tlsmgr_srvr_cache_run_event(int unused_event, char *dummy)
+{
+
+ /*
+ * This routine runs when it is time for another tls session cache scan.
+ * Make sure this routine gets called again in the future.
+ */
+ srvr_scache_db_active = tlsmgr_do_scache_check(srvr_scache_db,
+ var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout, 1);
+ event_request_timer(tlsmgr_srvr_cache_run_event, dummy,
+ var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout);
+}
+
+
+static DICT *tlsmgr_cache_open(const char *dbname)
+{
+ DICT *retval;
+ char *dbpagname;
+ char *dbdirname;
+
+ /*
+ * First, try to find out the real name of the database file, so that
+ * it can be removed.
+ */
+ if (!strncmp(dbname, "sdbm:", 5)) {
+ dbpagname = concatenate(dbname + 5, ".pag", NULL);
+ REMOVE(dbpagname);
+ myfree(dbpagname);
+ dbdirname = concatenate(dbname + 5, ".dir", NULL);
+ REMOVE(dbdirname);
+ myfree(dbdirname);
+ }
+ else {
+ msg_warn("Only type sdbm: supported: %s", dbname);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now open the dictionary. Do it with O_EXCL, so that we only open a
+ * fresh file. If we cannot open it with a fresh file, then we won't
+ * touch it.
+ */
+ retval = dict_open(dbname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL,
+ DICT_FLAG_DUP_REPLACE | DICT_FLAG_LOCK | DICT_FLAG_SYNC_UPDATE);
+ if (!retval)
+ msg_warn("Could not create dictionary %s", dbname);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/* tlsmgr_trigger_event - respond to external trigger(s) */
+
+static void tlsmgr_trigger_event(char *buf, int len,
+ char *unused_service, char **argv)
+{
+ /*
+ * Sanity check. This service takes no command-line arguments.
+ */
+ if (argv[0])
+ msg_fatal("unexpected command-line argument: %s", argv[0]);
+
+}
+
+/* tlsmgr_loop - queue manager main loop */
+
+static int tlsmgr_loop(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
+{
+ /*
+ * This routine runs as part of the event handling loop, after the event
+ * manager has delivered a timer or I/O event (including the completion
+ * of a connection to a delivery process), or after it has waited for a
+ * specified amount of time. The result value of qmgr_loop() specifies
+ * how long the event manager should wait for the next event.
+ */
+#define DONT_WAIT 0
+#define WAIT_FOR_EVENT (-1)
+
+ if (clnt_scache_db_active)
+ clnt_scache_db_active = tlsmgr_do_scache_check(clnt_scache_db,
+ var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout, 0);
+ if (srvr_scache_db_active)
+ srvr_scache_db_active = tlsmgr_do_scache_check(srvr_scache_db,
+ var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout, 0);
+ if (clnt_scache_db_active || srvr_scache_db_active)
+ return (DONT_WAIT);
+ return (WAIT_FOR_EVENT);
+}
+
+/* pre_accept - see if tables have changed */
+
+static void pre_accept(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
+{
+ if (dict_changed()) {
+ msg_info("table has changed -- exiting");
+ exit(0);
+ }
+}
+
+/* tlsmgr_pre_init - pre-jail initialization */
+
+static void tlsmgr_pre_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
+{
+ int rand_bytes;
+ unsigned char buffer[255];
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ /*
+ * Access the external sources for random seed. We may not be able to
+ * access them again if we are sent to chroot jail, so we must leave
+ * dev: and egd: type sources open.
+ */
+ if (*var_tls_rand_source) {
+ if (!strncmp(var_tls_rand_source, "dev:", 4)) {
+ /*
+ * Source is a random device
+ */
+ rand_source_dev_fd = open(var_tls_rand_source + 4, 0, 0);
+ if (rand_source_dev_fd == -1)
+ msg_fatal("Could not open entropy device %s",
+ var_tls_rand_source);
+ if (var_tls_rand_bytes > 255)
+ var_tls_rand_bytes = 255;
+ rand_bytes = read(rand_source_dev_fd, buffer, var_tls_rand_bytes);
+ RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
+ } else if (!strncmp(var_tls_rand_source, "egd:", 4)) {
+ /*
+ * Source is a EGD compatible socket
+ */
+ rand_source_socket_fd = unix_connect(var_tls_rand_source +4,
+ BLOCKING, 10);
+ if (rand_source_socket_fd == -1)
+ msg_fatal("Could not connect to %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+ if (var_tls_rand_bytes > 255)
+ var_tls_rand_bytes = 255;
+ buffer[0] = 1;
+ buffer[1] = var_tls_rand_bytes;
+ if (write(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 2) != 2)
+ msg_fatal("Could not talk to %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+ if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 1) != 1)
+ msg_fatal("Could not read info from %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+ rand_bytes = buffer[0];
+ if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, rand_bytes) != rand_bytes)
+ msg_fatal("Could not read data from %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+ RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
+ } else {
+ rand_bytes = RAND_load_file(var_tls_rand_source,
+ var_tls_rand_bytes);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Now open the PRNG exchange file
+ */
+ if (*var_tls_rand_exch_name) {
+ rand_exch_fd = open(var_tls_rand_exch_name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Finally, open the session cache files. Remove old files, if still there.
+ * If we could not remove the old files, something is pretty wrong and we
+ * won't touch it!!
+ */
+ if (*var_smtp_tls_scache_db)
+ clnt_scache_db = tlsmgr_cache_open(var_smtp_tls_scache_db);
+ if (*var_smtpd_tls_scache_db)
+ srvr_scache_db = tlsmgr_cache_open(var_smtpd_tls_scache_db);
+}
+
+/* qmgr_post_init - post-jail initialization */
+
+static void tlsmgr_post_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
+{
+ unsigned char buffer[1024];
+
+ /*
+ * This routine runs after the skeleton code has entered the chroot jail.
+ * Prevent automatic process suicide after a limited number of client
+ * requests or after a limited amount of idle time.
+ */
+ var_use_limit = 0;
+ var_idle_limit = 0;
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+ /*
+ * Complete thie initialization by reading the additional seed from the
+ * PRNG exchange file. Don't care how many bytes were actually read, just
+ * seed buffer into the PRNG, regardless of its contents.
+ */
+ if (rand_exch_fd >= 0) {
+ if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_SHARED) == -1)
+ msg_fatal("Could not lock random exchange file: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ read(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024);
+ if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) == -1)
+ msg_fatal("Could not unlock random exchange file: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+ RAND_seed(buffer, 1024);
+ tlsmgr_prng_upd_event(0, (char *) 0);
+ tlsmgr_reseed_event(0, (char *) 0);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ clnt_scache_db_active = 0;
+ srvr_scache_db_active = 0;
+ if (clnt_scache_db)
+ tlsmgr_clnt_cache_run_event(0, (char *) 0);
+ if (srvr_scache_db)
+ tlsmgr_srvr_cache_run_event(0, (char *) 0);
+}
+
+/* main - the main program */
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ static CONFIG_STR_TABLE str_table[] = {
+ VAR_TLS_RAND_SOURCE, DEF_TLS_RAND_SOURCE, &var_tls_rand_source, 0, 0,
+ 0,
+ };
+ static CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_table[] = {
+ VAR_TLS_RESEED_PERIOD, DEF_TLS_RESEED_PERIOD, &var_tls_reseed_period, 0, 0,
+ VAR_TLS_PRNG_UPD_PERIOD, DEF_TLS_PRNG_UPD_PERIOD, &var_tls_prng_upd_period, 0, 0,
+ 0,
+ };
+ static CONFIG_INT_TABLE int_table[] = {
+ VAR_TLS_RAND_BYTES, DEF_TLS_RAND_BYTES, &var_tls_rand_bytes, 0, 0,
+ 0,
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Use the trigger service skeleton, because no-one else should be
+ * monitoring our service port while this process runs, and because we do
+ * not talk back to the client.
+ */
+ trigger_server_main(argc, argv, tlsmgr_trigger_event,
+ MAIL_SERVER_TIME_TABLE, time_table,
+ MAIL_SERVER_INT_TABLE, int_table,
+ MAIL_SERVER_STR_TABLE, str_table,
+ MAIL_SERVER_PRE_INIT, tlsmgr_pre_init,
+ MAIL_SERVER_POST_INIT, tlsmgr_post_init,
+ MAIL_SERVER_LOOP, tlsmgr_loop,
+ MAIL_SERVER_PRE_ACCEPT, pre_accept,
+ 0);
+}
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.0/src/util/Makefile.in
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/Makefile.in Tue Jan 15 16:24:58 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/util/Makefile.in Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
unix_connect.c unix_listen.c unix_trigger.c unsafe.c username.c \
valid_hostname.c vbuf.c vbuf_print.c vstream.c vstream_popen.c \
vstring.c vstring_vstream.c watchdog.c writable.c write_buf.c \
- write_wait.c
+ write_wait.c dict_sdbm.c sdbm.c
OBJS = alldig.o argv.o argv_split.o attr_print0.o attr_print64.o \
attr_scan0.o attr_scan64.o base64_code.o basename.o binhash.o \
chroot_uid.o clean_env.o close_on_exec.o concatenate.o ctable.o \
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
unix_connect.o unix_listen.o unix_trigger.o unsafe.o username.o \
valid_hostname.o vbuf.o vbuf_print.o vstream.o vstream_popen.o \
vstring.o vstring_vstream.o watchdog.o writable.o write_buf.o \
- write_wait.o
+ write_wait.o dict_sdbm.o sdbm.o
HDRS = argv.h attr.h base64_code.h binhash.h chroot_uid.h clean_env.h \
connect.h ctable.h dict.h dict_db.h dict_dbm.h dict_env.h \
dict_ht.h dict_ldap.h dict_mysql.h dict_ni.h dict_nis.h \
@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@
scan_dir.h set_eugid.h set_ugid.h sigdelay.h spawn_command.h \
split_at.h stat_as.h stringops.h sys_defs.h timed_connect.h \
timed_wait.h trigger.h username.h valid_hostname.h vbuf.h \
- vbuf_print.h vstream.h vstring.h vstring_vstream.h watchdog.h
+ vbuf_print.h vstream.h vstring.h vstring_vstream.h watchdog.h \
+ dict_sdbm.h sdbm.h
TESTSRC = fifo_open.c fifo_rdwr_bug.c fifo_rdonly_bug.c select_bug.c \
stream_test.c dup2_pass_on_exec.c
WARN = -W -Wformat -Wimplicit -Wmissing-prototypes \
@@ -590,6 +591,7 @@
dict_open.o: dict_unix.h
dict_open.o: dict_tcp.h
dict_open.o: dict_dbm.h
+dict_open.o: dict_sdbm.h
dict_open.o: dict_db.h
dict_open.o: dict_nis.h
dict_open.o: dict_nisplus.h
@@ -1217,3 +1219,9 @@
write_wait.o: sys_defs.h
write_wait.o: msg.h
write_wait.o: iostuff.h
+sdbm.o: sdbm.c
+sdbm.o: sdbm.h
+dict_sdbm.o: sdbm.h
+dict_sdbm.o: dict_sdbm.c
+dict_sdbm.o: dict_sdbm.h
+dict_sdbm.o: sys_defs.h
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/dict_open.c postfix-1.1.0/src/util/dict_open.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/dict_open.c Fri Dec 21 23:18:07 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/util/dict_open.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@
#include <dict_env.h>
#include <dict_unix.h>
#include <dict_tcp.h>
+#include <dict_sdbm.h>
#include <dict_dbm.h>
#include <dict_db.h>
#include <dict_nis.h>
@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@
#if 0
DICT_TYPE_TCP, dict_tcp_open,
#endif
+ "sdbm", dict_sdbm_open,
#ifdef HAS_DBM
DICT_TYPE_DBM, dict_dbm_open,
#endif
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/dict_sdbm.c postfix-1.1.0/src/util/dict_sdbm.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/dict_sdbm.c Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/util/dict_sdbm.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/* dict_sdbm 3
+/* SUMMARY
+/* dictionary manager interface to SDBM files
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/* #include <dict_sdbm.h>
+/*
+/* DICT *dict_sdbm_open(path, open_flags, dict_flags)
+/* const char *name;
+/* const char *path;
+/* int open_flags;
+/* int dict_flags;
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* dict_sdbm_open() opens the named SDBM database and makes it available
+/* via the generic interface described in dict_open(3).
+/* DIAGNOSTICS
+/* Fatal errors: cannot open file, file write error, out of memory.
+/* SEE ALSO
+/* dict(3) generic dictionary manager
+/* sdbm(3) data base subroutines
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/* Wietse Venema
+/* IBM T.J. Watson Research
+/* P.O. Box 704
+/* Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
+/*--*/
+
+#include "sys_defs.h"
+
+/* System library. */
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "mymalloc.h"
+#include "htable.h"
+#include "iostuff.h"
+#include "vstring.h"
+#include "myflock.h"
+#include "stringops.h"
+#include "dict.h"
+#include "dict_sdbm.h"
+#include "sdbm.h"
+
+/* Application-specific. */
+
+typedef struct {
+ DICT dict; /* generic members */
+ SDBM *dbm; /* open database */
+ char *path; /* pathname */
+} DICT_SDBM;
+
+/* dict_sdbm_lookup - find database entry */
+
+static const char *dict_sdbm_lookup(DICT *dict, const char *name)
+{
+ DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
+ datum dbm_key;
+ datum dbm_value;
+ static VSTRING *buf;
+ const char *result = 0;
+
+ dict_errno = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Acquire an exclusive lock.
+ */
+ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+ && myflock(dict->fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_SHARED) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("%s: lock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+ /*
+ * See if this DBM file was written with one null byte appended to key
+ * and value.
+ */
+ if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL) {
+ dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
+ dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name) + 1;
+ dbm_value = sdbm_fetch(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key);
+ if (dbm_value.dptr != 0) {
+ dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL;
+ result = dbm_value.dptr;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * See if this DBM file was written with no null byte appended to key and
+ * value.
+ */
+ if (result == 0 && (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL)) {
+ dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
+ dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name);
+ dbm_value = sdbm_fetch(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key);
+ if (dbm_value.dptr != 0) {
+ if (buf == 0)
+ buf = vstring_alloc(10);
+ vstring_strncpy(buf, dbm_value.dptr, dbm_value.dsize);
+ dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL;
+ result = vstring_str(buf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Release the exclusive lock.
+ */
+ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+ && myflock(dict->fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("%s: unlock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+ return (result);
+}
+
+/* dict_sdbm_update - add or update database entry */
+
+static void dict_sdbm_update(DICT *dict, const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+ DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
+ datum dbm_key;
+ datum dbm_value;
+ int status;
+
+ dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
+ dbm_value.dptr = (void *) value;
+ dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name);
+ dbm_value.dsize = strlen(value);
+
+ /*
+ * If undecided about appending a null byte to key and value, choose a
+ * default depending on the platform.
+ */
+ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL)
+ && (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL)) {
+#ifdef DBM_NO_TRAILING_NULL
+ dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL;
+#else
+ dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Optionally append a null byte to key and value.
+ */
+ if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL) {
+ dbm_key.dsize++;
+ dbm_value.dsize++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Acquire an exclusive lock.
+ */
+ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+ && myflock(dict->fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("%s: lock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+ /*
+ * Do the update.
+ */
+ if ((status = sdbm_store(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key, dbm_value,
+ (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_DUP_REPLACE) ? DBM_REPLACE : DBM_INSERT)) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("error writing SDBM database %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+ if (status) {
+ if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_DUP_IGNORE)
+ /* void */ ;
+ else if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_DUP_WARN)
+ msg_warn("%s: duplicate entry: \"%s\"", dict_sdbm->path, name);
+ else
+ msg_fatal("%s: duplicate entry: \"%s\"", dict_sdbm->path, name);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Release the exclusive lock.
+ */
+ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+ && myflock(dict->fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("%s: unlock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+}
+
+
+/* dict_sdbm_delete - delete one entry from the dictionary */
+
+static int dict_sdbm_delete(DICT *dict, const char *name)
+{
+ DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
+ datum dbm_key;
+ int status = 1;
+ int flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Acquire an exclusive lock.
+ */
+ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+ && myflock(dict->fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("%s: lock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+ /*
+ * See if this DBM file was written with one null byte appended to key
+ * and value.
+ */
+ if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL) {
+ dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
+ dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name) + 1;
+ sdbm_clearerr(dict_sdbm->dbm);
+ if ((status = sdbm_delete(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key)) < 0) {
+ if (sdbm_error(dict_sdbm->dbm) != 0) /* fatal error */
+ msg_fatal("error deleting from %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+ status = 1; /* not found */
+ } else {
+ dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL; /* found */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * See if this DBM file was written with no null byte appended to key and
+ * value.
+ */
+ if (status > 0 && (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL)) {
+ dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
+ dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name);
+ sdbm_clearerr(dict_sdbm->dbm);
+ if ((status = sdbm_delete(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key)) < 0) {
+ if (sdbm_error(dict_sdbm->dbm) != 0) /* fatal error */
+ msg_fatal("error deleting from %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+ status = 1; /* not found */
+ } else {
+ dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL; /* found */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Release the exclusive lock.
+ */
+ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+ && myflock(dict->fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("%s: unlock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+ return (status);
+}
+
+/* traverse the dictionary */
+
+static int dict_sdbm_sequence(DICT *dict, const int function,
+ const char **key, const char **value)
+{
+ char *myname = "dict_sdbm_sequence";
+ DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
+ datum dbm_key;
+ datum dbm_value;
+ int status = 0;
+ static VSTRING *key_buf;
+ static VSTRING *value_buf;
+
+ /*
+ * Acquire an exclusive lock.
+ */
+ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+ && myflock(dict->fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("%s: lock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+ /*
+ * Determine and execute the seek function. It returns the key.
+ */
+ switch (function) {
+ case DICT_SEQ_FUN_FIRST:
+ dbm_key = sdbm_firstkey(dict_sdbm->dbm);
+ break;
+ case DICT_SEQ_FUN_NEXT:
+ dbm_key = sdbm_nextkey(dict_sdbm->dbm);
+ break;
+ default:
+ msg_panic("%s: invalid function: %d", myname, function);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Release the exclusive lock.
+ */
+ if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+ && myflock(dict->fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("%s: unlock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+ if (dbm_key.dptr != 0 && dbm_key.dsize > 0) {
+
+ /*
+ * See if this DB file was written with one null byte appended to key
+ * an d value or not. If necessary, copy the key.
+ */
+ if (((char *) dbm_key.dptr)[dbm_key.dsize - 1] == 0) {
+ *key = dbm_key.dptr;
+ } else {
+ if (key_buf == 0)
+ key_buf = vstring_alloc(10);
+ vstring_strncpy(key_buf, dbm_key.dptr, dbm_key.dsize);
+ *key = vstring_str(key_buf);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Fetch the corresponding value.
+ */
+ dbm_value = sdbm_fetch(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key);
+
+ if (dbm_value.dptr != 0 && dbm_value.dsize > 0) {
+
+ /*
+ * See if this DB file was written with one null byte appended to
+ * key and value or not. If necessary, copy the key.
+ */
+ if (((char *) dbm_value.dptr)[dbm_value.dsize - 1] == 0) {
+ *value = dbm_value.dptr;
+ } else {
+ if (value_buf == 0)
+ value_buf = vstring_alloc(10);
+ vstring_strncpy(value_buf, dbm_value.dptr, dbm_value.dsize);
+ *value = vstring_str(value_buf);
+ }
+ } else {
+
+ /*
+ * Determine if we have hit the last record or an error
+ * condition.
+ */
+ if (sdbm_error(dict_sdbm->dbm))
+ msg_fatal("error seeking %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+ return (1); /* no error: eof/not found
+ * (should not happen!) */
+ }
+ } else {
+
+ /*
+ * Determine if we have hit the last record or an error condition.
+ */
+ if (sdbm_error(dict_sdbm->dbm))
+ msg_fatal("error seeking %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+ return (1); /* no error: eof/not found */
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* dict_sdbm_close - disassociate from data base */
+
+static void dict_sdbm_close(DICT *dict)
+{
+ DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
+
+ sdbm_close(dict_sdbm->dbm);
+ myfree(dict_sdbm->path);
+ myfree((char *) dict_sdbm);
+}
+
+/* dict_sdbm_open - open SDBM data base */
+
+DICT *dict_sdbm_open(const char *path, int open_flags, int dict_flags)
+{
+ DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm;
+ struct stat st;
+ SDBM *dbm;
+ char *dbm_path;
+ int lock_fd;
+
+ if (dict_flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK) {
+ dbm_path = concatenate(path, ".pag", (char *) 0);
+ if ((lock_fd = open(dbm_path, open_flags, 0644)) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("open database %s: %m", dbm_path);
+ if (myflock(lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_SHARED) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("shared-lock database %s for open: %m", dbm_path);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX SunOS 5.x has no const in dbm_open() prototype.
+ */
+ if ((dbm = sdbm_open((char *) path, open_flags, 0644)) == 0)
+ msg_fatal("open database %s.{dir,pag}: %m", path);
+
+ if (dict_flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK) {
+ if (myflock(lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("unlock database %s for open: %m", dbm_path);
+ if (close(lock_fd) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("close database %s: %m", dbm_path);
+ myfree(dbm_path);
+ }
+ dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) mymalloc(sizeof(*dict_sdbm));
+ dict_sdbm->dict.lookup = dict_sdbm_lookup;
+ dict_sdbm->dict.update = dict_sdbm_update;
+ dict_sdbm->dict.delete = dict_sdbm_delete;
+ dict_sdbm->dict.sequence = dict_sdbm_sequence;
+ dict_sdbm->dict.close = dict_sdbm_close;
+ dict_sdbm->dict.fd = sdbm_pagfno(dbm);
+ if (fstat(dict_sdbm->dict.fd, &st) < 0)
+ msg_fatal("dict_sdbm_open: fstat: %m");
+ dict_sdbm->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
+ close_on_exec(sdbm_pagfno(dbm), CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
+ close_on_exec(sdbm_dirfno(dbm), CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
+ dict_sdbm->dict.flags = dict_flags | DICT_FLAG_FIXED;
+ if ((dict_flags & (DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL | DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL)) == 0)
+ dict_sdbm->dict.flags |= (DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL | DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL);
+ dict_sdbm->dbm = dbm;
+ dict_sdbm->path = mystrdup(path);
+
+ return (&dict_sdbm->dict);
+}
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/dict_sdbm.h postfix-1.1.0/src/util/dict_sdbm.h
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/dict_sdbm.h Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/util/dict_sdbm.h Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+#ifndef _DICT_SDBM_H_INCLUDED_
+#define _DICT_SDBM_H_INCLUDED_
+
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/* dict_dbm 3h
+/* SUMMARY
+/* dictionary manager interface to DBM files
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/* #include <dict_dbm.h>
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* .nf
+
+ /*
+ * Utility library.
+ */
+#include <dict.h>
+
+ /*
+ * External interface.
+ */
+extern DICT *dict_sdbm_open(const char *, int, int);
+
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/* Wietse Venema
+/* IBM T.J. Watson Research
+/* P.O. Box 704
+/* Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
+/*--*/
+
+#endif
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/sdbm.c postfix-1.1.0/src/util/sdbm.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/sdbm.c Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/util/sdbm.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,971 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/* sdbm 3h
+/* SUMMARY
+/* SDBM Simple DBM: ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/* include "sdbm.h"
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* This file includes the public domain SDBM (ndbm work-alike hashed
+/* database library), based on Per-Aake Larson's Dynamic Hashing
+/* algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
+/* author: oz@nexus.yorku.ca
+/* status: public domain
+/* The file has been patched following the advice of Uwe Ohse
+/* <uwe@ohse.de>:
+/* --------------------------------------------------------------
+/* this patch fixes a problem with sdbms .dir file, which arrises when
+/* a second .dir block is needed for the first time. read() returns 0
+/* in that case, and the library forgot to initialize that new block.
+/*
+/* A related problem is that the calculation of db->maxbno is wrong.
+/* It just appends 4096*BYTESIZ bits, which is not enough except for
+/* small databases (.dir basically doubles everytime it's too small).
+/* --------------------------------------------------------------
+/* According to Uwe Ohse, the patch has also been submitted to the
+/* author of SDBM. (The 4096*BYTESIZ bits comment may apply with a
+/* different size for Postfix/TLS, as the patch was sent against the
+/* original SDBM distributiona and for Postfix/TLS I have changed the
+/* default sizes.
+/* .nf
+/*--*/
+
+/*
+ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+ * based on Per-Aake Larson's Dynamic Hashing algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
+ * author: oz@nexus.yorku.ca
+ * status: public domain.
+ *
+ * core routines
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef WIN32
+#include <io.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#else
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef __STDC__
+#include <stddef.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <sdbm.h>
+
+/*
+ * useful macros
+ */
+#define bad(x) ((x).dptr == NULL || (x).dsize <= 0)
+#define exhash(item) sdbm_hash((item).dptr, (item).dsize)
+#define ioerr(db) ((db)->flags |= DBM_IOERR)
+
+#define OFF_PAG(off) (long) (off) * PBLKSIZ
+#define OFF_DIR(off) (long) (off) * DBLKSIZ
+
+static long masks[] =
+{
+ 000000000000, 000000000001, 000000000003, 000000000007,
+ 000000000017, 000000000037, 000000000077, 000000000177,
+ 000000000377, 000000000777, 000000001777, 000000003777,
+ 000000007777, 000000017777, 000000037777, 000000077777,
+ 000000177777, 000000377777, 000000777777, 000001777777,
+ 000003777777, 000007777777, 000017777777, 000037777777,
+ 000077777777, 000177777777, 000377777777, 000777777777,
+ 001777777777, 003777777777, 007777777777, 017777777777
+};
+
+datum nullitem =
+{NULL, 0};
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ int dirf; /* directory file descriptor */
+ int pagf; /* page file descriptor */
+ int flags; /* status/error flags, see below */
+ long maxbno; /* size of dirfile in bits */
+ long curbit; /* current bit number */
+ long hmask; /* current hash mask */
+ long blkptr; /* current block for nextkey */
+ int keyptr; /* current key for nextkey */
+ long blkno; /* current page to read/write */
+ long pagbno; /* current page in pagbuf */
+ char *pagbuf; /* page file block buffer */
+ long dirbno; /* current block in dirbuf */
+ char *dirbuf; /* directory file block buffer */
+} DBM;
+
+
+/* ************************* */
+
+/*
+ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+ * based on Per-Aake Larson's Dynamic Hashing algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
+ * author: oz@nexus.yorku.ca
+ * status: public domain. keep it that way.
+ *
+ * hashing routine
+ */
+
+/*
+ * polynomial conversion ignoring overflows
+ * [this seems to work remarkably well, in fact better
+ * then the ndbm hash function. Replace at your own risk]
+ * use: 65599 nice.
+ * 65587 even better.
+ */
+static long sdbm_hash (char *str, int len)
+{
+ unsigned long n = 0;
+
+#ifdef DUFF
+#define HASHC n = *str++ + 65599 * n
+ if (len > 0)
+ {
+ int loop = (len + 8 - 1) >> 3;
+
+ switch (len & (8 - 1))
+ {
+ case 0:
+ do
+ {
+ HASHC;
+ case 7:
+ HASHC;
+ case 6:
+ HASHC;
+ case 5:
+ HASHC;
+ case 4:
+ HASHC;
+ case 3:
+ HASHC;
+ case 2:
+ HASHC;
+ case 1:
+ HASHC;
+ }
+ while (--loop);
+ }
+
+ }
+#else
+ while (len--)
+ n = *str++ + 65599 * n;
+#endif
+ return n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check page sanity:
+ * number of entries should be something
+ * reasonable, and all offsets in the index should be in order.
+ * this could be made more rigorous.
+ */
+static int chkpage (char *pag)
+{
+ int n;
+ int off;
+ short *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+ if ((n = ino[0]) < 0 || n > PBLKSIZ / sizeof (short))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (n > 0)
+ {
+ off = PBLKSIZ;
+ for (ino++; n > 0; ino += 2)
+ {
+ if (ino[0] > off || ino[1] > off ||
+ ino[1] > ino[0])
+ return 0;
+ off = ino[1];
+ n -= 2;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * search for the key in the page.
+ * return offset index in the range 0 < i < n.
+ * return 0 if not found.
+ */
+static int seepair (char *pag, int n, char *key, int siz)
+{
+ int i;
+ int off = PBLKSIZ;
+ short *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < n; i += 2)
+ {
+ if (siz == off - ino[i] &&
+ memcmp (key, pag + ino[i], siz) == 0)
+ return i;
+ off = ino[i + 1];
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SEEDUPS
+static int duppair (char *pag, datum key)
+{
+ short *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+ return ino[0] > 0 && seepair (pag, ino[0], key.dptr, key.dsize) > 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ************************* */
+
+/*
+ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+ * based on Per-Aake Larson's Dynamic Hashing algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
+ * author: oz@nexus.yorku.ca
+ * status: public domain.
+ *
+ * page-level routines
+ */
+
+/*
+ * page format:
+ * +------------------------------+
+ * ino | n | keyoff | datoff | keyoff |
+ * +------------+--------+--------+
+ * | datoff | - - - ----> |
+ * +--------+---------------------+
+ * | F R E E A R E A |
+ * +--------------+---------------+
+ * | <---- - - - | data |
+ * +--------+-----+----+----------+
+ * | key | data | key |
+ * +--------+----------+----------+
+ *
+ * calculating the offsets for free area: if the number
+ * of entries (ino[0]) is zero, the offset to the END of
+ * the free area is the block size. Otherwise, it is the
+ * nth (ino[ino[0]]) entry's offset.
+ */
+
+static int fitpair (char *pag, int need)
+{
+ int n;
+ int off;
+ int avail;
+ short *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+ off = ((n = ino[0]) > 0) ? ino[n] : PBLKSIZ;
+ avail = off - (n + 1) * sizeof (short);
+ need += 2 * sizeof (short);
+
+ return need <= avail;
+}
+
+static void putpair (char *pag, datum key, datum val)
+{
+ int n;
+ int off;
+ short *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+ off = ((n = ino[0]) > 0) ? ino[n] : PBLKSIZ;
+/*
+ * enter the key first
+ */
+ off -= key.dsize;
+ (void) memcpy (pag + off, key.dptr, key.dsize);
+ ino[n + 1] = off;
+/*
+ * now the data
+ */
+ off -= val.dsize;
+ (void) memcpy (pag + off, val.dptr, val.dsize);
+ ino[n + 2] = off;
+/*
+ * adjust item count
+ */
+ ino[0] += 2;
+}
+
+static datum getpair (char *pag, datum key)
+{
+ int i;
+ int n;
+ datum val;
+ short *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+ if ((n = ino[0]) == 0)
+ return nullitem;
+
+ if ((i = seepair (pag, n, key.dptr, key.dsize)) == 0)
+ return nullitem;
+
+ val.dptr = pag + ino[i + 1];
+ val.dsize = ino[i] - ino[i + 1];
+ return val;
+}
+
+static datum getnkey (char *pag, int num)
+{
+ datum key;
+ int off;
+ short *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+ num = num * 2 - 1;
+ if (ino[0] == 0 || num > ino[0])
+ return nullitem;
+
+ off = (num > 1) ? ino[num - 1] : PBLKSIZ;
+
+ key.dptr = pag + ino[num];
+ key.dsize = off - ino[num];
+
+ return key;
+}
+
+static int delpair (char *pag, datum key)
+{
+ int n;
+ int i;
+ short *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+ if ((n = ino[0]) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((i = seepair (pag, n, key.dptr, key.dsize)) == 0)
+ return 0;
+/*
+ * found the key. if it is the last entry
+ * [i.e. i == n - 1] we just adjust the entry count.
+ * hard case: move all data down onto the deleted pair,
+ * shift offsets onto deleted offsets, and adjust them.
+ * [note: 0 < i < n]
+ */
+ if (i < n - 1)
+ {
+ int m;
+ char *dst = pag + (i == 1 ? PBLKSIZ : ino[i - 1]);
+ char *src = pag + ino[i + 1];
+ int zoo = dst - src;
+
+/*
+ * shift data/keys down
+ */
+ m = ino[i + 1] - ino[n];
+#ifdef DUFF
+#define MOVB *--dst = *--src
+ if (m > 0)
+ {
+ int loop = (m + 8 - 1) >> 3;
+
+ switch (m & (8 - 1))
+ {
+ case 0:
+ do
+ {
+ MOVB;
+ case 7:
+ MOVB;
+ case 6:
+ MOVB;
+ case 5:
+ MOVB;
+ case 4:
+ MOVB;
+ case 3:
+ MOVB;
+ case 2:
+ MOVB;
+ case 1:
+ MOVB;
+ }
+ while (--loop);
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ dst -= m;
+ src -= m;
+ memmove (dst, src, m);
+#endif
+/*
+ * adjust offset index up
+ */
+ while (i < n - 1)
+ {
+ ino[i] = ino[i + 2] + zoo;
+ i++;
+ }
+ }
+ ino[0] -= 2;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void splpage (char *pag, char *new, long sbit)
+{
+ datum key;
+ datum val;
+
+ int n;
+ int off = PBLKSIZ;
+ char cur[PBLKSIZ];
+ short *ino = (short *) cur;
+
+ (void) memcpy (cur, pag, PBLKSIZ);
+ (void) memset (pag, 0, PBLKSIZ);
+ (void) memset (new, 0, PBLKSIZ);
+
+ n = ino[0];
+ for (ino++; n > 0; ino += 2)
+ {
+ key.dptr = cur + ino[0];
+ key.dsize = off - ino[0];
+ val.dptr = cur + ino[1];
+ val.dsize = ino[0] - ino[1];
+/*
+ * select the page pointer (by looking at sbit) and insert
+ */
+ (void) putpair ((exhash (key) & sbit) ? new : pag, key, val);
+
+ off = ino[1];
+ n -= 2;
+ }
+}
+
+static int getdbit (DBM * db, long dbit)
+{
+ long c;
+ long dirb;
+
+ c = dbit / BYTESIZ;
+ dirb = c / DBLKSIZ;
+
+ if (dirb != db->dirbno)
+ {
+ int got;
+ if (lseek (db->dirf, OFF_DIR (dirb), SEEK_SET) < 0
+ || (got = read(db->dirf, db->dirbuf, DBLKSIZ)) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (got==0)
+ memset(db->dirbuf,0,DBLKSIZ);
+ db->dirbno = dirb;
+ }
+
+ return db->dirbuf[c % DBLKSIZ] & (1 << dbit % BYTESIZ);
+}
+
+static int setdbit (DBM * db, long dbit)
+{
+ long c;
+ long dirb;
+
+ c = dbit / BYTESIZ;
+ dirb = c / DBLKSIZ;
+
+ if (dirb != db->dirbno)
+ {
+ int got;
+ if (lseek (db->dirf, OFF_DIR (dirb), SEEK_SET) < 0
+ || (got = read(db->dirf, db->dirbuf, DBLKSIZ)) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (got==0)
+ memset(db->dirbuf,0,DBLKSIZ);
+ db->dirbno = dirb;
+ }
+
+ db->dirbuf[c % DBLKSIZ] |= (1 << dbit % BYTESIZ);
+
+#if 0
+ if (dbit >= db->maxbno)
+ db->maxbno += DBLKSIZ * BYTESIZ;
+#else
+ if (OFF_DIR((dirb+1))*BYTESIZ > db->maxbno)
+ db->maxbno=OFF_DIR((dirb+1))*BYTESIZ;
+#endif
+
+ if (lseek (db->dirf, OFF_DIR (dirb), SEEK_SET) < 0
+ || write (db->dirf, db->dirbuf, DBLKSIZ) < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * getnext - get the next key in the page, and if done with
+ * the page, try the next page in sequence
+ */
+static datum getnext (DBM * db)
+{
+ datum key;
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ db->keyptr++;
+ key = getnkey (db->pagbuf, db->keyptr);
+ if (key.dptr != NULL)
+ return key;
+/*
+ * we either run out, or there is nothing on this page..
+ * try the next one... If we lost our position on the
+ * file, we will have to seek.
+ */
+ db->keyptr = 0;
+ if (db->pagbno != db->blkptr++)
+ if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->blkptr), SEEK_SET) < 0)
+ break;
+ db->pagbno = db->blkptr;
+ if (read (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) <= 0)
+ break;
+ if (!chkpage (db->pagbuf))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ioerr (db), nullitem;
+}
+
+/*
+ * all important binary trie traversal
+ */
+static int getpage (DBM * db, long hash)
+{
+ int hbit;
+ long dbit;
+ long pagb;
+
+ dbit = 0;
+ hbit = 0;
+ while (dbit < db->maxbno && getdbit (db, dbit))
+ dbit = 2 * dbit + ((hash & (1 << hbit++)) ? 2 : 1);
+
+ db->curbit = dbit;
+ db->hmask = masks[hbit];
+
+ pagb = hash & db->hmask;
+/*
+ * see if the block we need is already in memory.
+ * note: this lookaside cache has about 10% hit rate.
+ */
+ if (pagb != db->pagbno)
+ {
+/*
+ * note: here, we assume a "hole" is read as 0s.
+ * if not, must zero pagbuf first.
+ */
+ if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (pagb), SEEK_SET) < 0
+ || read (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (!chkpage (db->pagbuf))
+ return 0;
+ db->pagbno = pagb;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * makroom - make room by splitting the overfull page
+ * this routine will attempt to make room for SPLTMAX times before
+ * giving up.
+ */
+static int makroom (DBM * db, long hash, int need)
+{
+ long newp;
+ char twin[PBLKSIZ];
+ char *pag = db->pagbuf;
+ char *new = twin;
+ int smax = SPLTMAX;
+
+ do
+ {
+/*
+ * split the current page
+ */
+ (void) splpage (pag, new, db->hmask + 1);
+/*
+ * address of the new page
+ */
+ newp = (hash & db->hmask) | (db->hmask + 1);
+
+/*
+ * write delay, read avoidence/cache shuffle:
+ * select the page for incoming pair: if key is to go to the new page,
+ * write out the previous one, and copy the new one over, thus making
+ * it the current page. If not, simply write the new page, and we are
+ * still looking at the page of interest. current page is not updated
+ * here, as sdbm_store will do so, after it inserts the incoming pair.
+ */
+ if (hash & (db->hmask + 1))
+ {
+ if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->pagbno), SEEK_SET) < 0
+ || write (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ db->pagbno = newp;
+ (void) memcpy (pag, new, PBLKSIZ);
+ }
+ else if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (newp), SEEK_SET) < 0
+ || write (db->pagf, new, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!setdbit (db, db->curbit))
+ return 0;
+/*
+ * see if we have enough room now
+ */
+ if (fitpair (pag, need))
+ return 1;
+/*
+ * try again... update curbit and hmask as getpage would have
+ * done. because of our update of the current page, we do not
+ * need to read in anything. BUT we have to write the current
+ * [deferred] page out, as the window of failure is too great.
+ */
+ db->curbit = 2 * db->curbit +
+ ((hash & (db->hmask + 1)) ? 2 : 1);
+ db->hmask |= db->hmask + 1;
+
+ if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->pagbno), SEEK_SET) < 0
+ || write (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ }
+ while (--smax);
+/*
+ * if we are here, this is real bad news. After SPLTMAX splits,
+ * we still cannot fit the key. say goodnight.
+ */
+#ifdef BADMESS
+ (void) write (2, "sdbm: cannot insert after SPLTMAX attempts.\n", 44);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+static SDBM *sdbm_prep (char *dirname, char *pagname, int flags, int mode)
+{
+ SDBM *db;
+ struct stat dstat;
+
+ if ((db = (SDBM *) mymalloc (sizeof (SDBM))) == NULL)
+ return errno = ENOMEM, (SDBM *) NULL;
+
+ db->flags = 0;
+ db->blkptr = 0;
+ db->keyptr = 0;
+/*
+ * adjust user flags so that WRONLY becomes RDWR,
+ * as required by this package. Also set our internal
+ * flag for RDONLY if needed.
+ */
+ if (flags & O_WRONLY)
+ flags = (flags & ~O_WRONLY) | O_RDWR;
+ else if ((flags & 03) == O_RDONLY)
+ db->flags = DBM_RDONLY;
+#if defined(OS2) || defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32)
+ flags |= O_BINARY;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Make sure to ignore the O_EXCL option, as the file might exist due
+ * to the locking.
+ */
+ flags &= ~O_EXCL;
+
+/*
+ * open the files in sequence, and stat the dirfile.
+ * If we fail anywhere, undo everything, return NULL.
+ */
+
+ if ((db->pagf = open (pagname, flags, mode)) > -1)
+ {
+ if ((db->dirf = open (dirname, flags, mode)) > -1)
+ {
+/*
+ * need the dirfile size to establish max bit number.
+ */
+ if (fstat (db->dirf, &dstat) == 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * success
+ */
+ return db;
+ }
+ msg_info ("closing dirf");
+ (void) close (db->dirf);
+ }
+ msg_info ("closing pagf");
+ (void) close (db->pagf);
+ }
+ myfree ((char *) db);
+ return (SDBM *) NULL;
+}
+
+static DBM *sdbm_internal_open (SDBM * sdbm)
+{
+ DBM *db;
+ struct stat dstat;
+
+ if ((db = (DBM *) mymalloc (sizeof (DBM))) == NULL)
+ return errno = ENOMEM, (DBM *) NULL;
+
+ db->flags = sdbm->flags;
+ db->hmask = 0;
+ db->blkptr = sdbm->blkptr;
+ db->keyptr = sdbm->keyptr;
+ db->pagf = sdbm->pagf;
+ db->dirf = sdbm->dirf;
+ db->pagbuf = sdbm->pagbuf;
+ db->dirbuf = sdbm->dirbuf;
+
+/*
+ * need the dirfile size to establish max bit number.
+ */
+ if (fstat (db->dirf, &dstat) == 0)
+ {
+/*
+ * zero size: either a fresh database, or one with a single,
+ * unsplit data page: dirpage is all zeros.
+ */
+ db->dirbno = (!dstat.st_size) ? 0 : -1;
+ db->pagbno = -1;
+ db->maxbno = dstat.st_size * BYTESIZ;
+
+ (void) memset (db->pagbuf, 0, PBLKSIZ);
+ (void) memset (db->dirbuf, 0, DBLKSIZ);
+ return db;
+ }
+ myfree ((char *) db);
+ return (DBM *) NULL;
+}
+
+static void sdbm_internal_close (DBM * db)
+{
+ if (db == NULL)
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ else
+ {
+ myfree ((char *) db);
+ }
+}
+
+datum sdbm_fetch (SDBM * sdb, datum key)
+{
+ datum retval;
+ DBM *db;
+
+ if (sdb == NULL || bad (key))
+ return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
+
+ if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
+ return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
+
+ if (getpage (db, exhash (key)))
+ {
+ retval = getpair (db->pagbuf, key);
+ sdbm_internal_close (db);
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ sdbm_internal_close (db);
+
+ return ioerr (sdb), nullitem;
+}
+
+int sdbm_delete (SDBM * sdb, datum key)
+{
+ int retval;
+ DBM *db;
+
+ if (sdb == NULL || bad (key))
+ return errno = EINVAL, -1;
+ if (sdbm_rdonly (sdb))
+ return errno = EPERM, -1;
+
+ if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
+ return errno = EINVAL, -1;
+
+ if (getpage (db, exhash (key)))
+ {
+ if (!delpair (db->pagbuf, key))
+ retval = -1;
+/*
+ * update the page file
+ */
+ else if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->pagbno), SEEK_SET) < 0
+ || write (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+ retval = ioerr (sdb), -1;
+ else
+ retval = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ retval = ioerr (sdb), -1;
+
+ sdbm_internal_close (db);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+int sdbm_store (SDBM * sdb, datum key, datum val, int flags)
+{
+ int need;
+ int retval;
+ long hash;
+ DBM *db;
+
+ if (sdb == NULL || bad (key))
+ return errno = EINVAL, -1;
+ if (sdbm_rdonly (sdb))
+ return errno = EPERM, -1;
+
+ need = key.dsize + val.dsize;
+/*
+ * is the pair too big (or too small) for this database ??
+ */
+ if (need < 0 || need > PAIRMAX)
+ return errno = EINVAL, -1;
+
+ if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
+ return errno = EINVAL, -1;
+
+ if (getpage (db, (hash = exhash (key))))
+ {
+/*
+ * if we need to replace, delete the key/data pair
+ * first. If it is not there, ignore.
+ */
+ if (flags == DBM_REPLACE)
+ (void) delpair (db->pagbuf, key);
+#ifdef SEEDUPS
+ else if (duppair (db->pagbuf, key))
+ {
+ sdbm_internal_close (db);
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
+/*
+ * if we do not have enough room, we have to split.
+ */
+ if (!fitpair (db->pagbuf, need))
+ if (!makroom (db, hash, need))
+ {
+ sdbm_internal_close (db);
+ return ioerr (db), -1;
+ }
+/*
+ * we have enough room or split is successful. insert the key,
+ * and update the page file.
+ */
+ (void) putpair (db->pagbuf, key, val);
+
+ if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->pagbno), SEEK_SET) < 0
+ || write (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+ {
+ sdbm_internal_close (db);
+ return ioerr (db), -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * success
+ */
+ sdbm_internal_close (db);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sdbm_internal_close (db);
+ return ioerr (sdb), -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * the following two routines will break if
+ * deletions aren't taken into account. (ndbm bug)
+ */
+datum sdbm_firstkey (SDBM * sdb)
+{
+ datum retval;
+ DBM *db;
+
+ if (sdb == NULL)
+ return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
+
+ if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
+ return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
+
+/*
+ * start at page 0
+ */
+ if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (0), SEEK_SET) < 0
+ || read (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+ {
+ sdbm_internal_close (db);
+ return ioerr (sdb), nullitem;
+ }
+ db->pagbno = 0;
+ db->blkptr = 0;
+ db->keyptr = 0;
+
+ retval = getnext (db);
+ sdb->blkptr = db->blkptr;
+ sdb->keyptr = db->keyptr;
+ sdbm_internal_close (db);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+datum sdbm_nextkey (SDBM * sdb)
+{
+ datum retval;
+ DBM *db;
+
+ if (sdb == NULL)
+ return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
+
+ if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
+ return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
+
+ retval = getnext (db);
+ sdb->blkptr = db->blkptr;
+ sdb->keyptr = db->keyptr;
+ sdbm_internal_close (db);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+void sdbm_close (SDBM * db)
+{
+ if (db == NULL)
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ else
+ {
+ (void) close (db->dirf);
+ (void) close (db->pagf);
+ myfree ((char *) db);
+ }
+}
+
+SDBM *sdbm_open (char *file, int flags, int mode)
+{
+ SDBM *db;
+ char *dirname;
+ char *pagname;
+ int n;
+
+ if (file == NULL || !*file)
+ return errno = EINVAL, (SDBM *) NULL;
+/*
+ * need space for two seperate filenames
+ */
+ n = strlen (file) * 2 + strlen (DIRFEXT) + strlen (PAGFEXT) + 2;
+
+ if ((dirname = (char *) mymalloc ((unsigned) n)) == NULL)
+ return errno = ENOMEM, (SDBM *) NULL;
+/*
+ * build the file names
+ */
+ dirname = strcat (strcpy (dirname, file), DIRFEXT);
+ pagname = strcpy (dirname + strlen (dirname) + 1, file);
+ pagname = strcat (pagname, PAGFEXT);
+
+ db = sdbm_prep (dirname, pagname, flags, mode);
+ myfree ((char *) dirname);
+ return db;
+}
+
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/sdbm.h postfix-1.1.0/src/util/sdbm.h
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/sdbm.h Thu Jan 1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/util/sdbm.h Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/* sdbm 3h
+/* SUMMARY
+/* SDBM Simple DBM: ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/* include "sdbm.h"
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* .nf
+/*--*/
+
+#ifndef UTIL_SDBM_H
+#define UTIL_SDBM_H
+
+/*
+ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+ * based on Per-Ake Larson's Dynamic Hashing algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
+ * author: oz@nexus.yorku.ca
+ * status: public domain.
+ */
+
+#define DUFF /* go ahead and use the loop-unrolled version */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#define DBLKSIZ 16384 /* SSL cert chains require more */
+#define PBLKSIZ 8192 /* SSL cert chains require more */
+#define PAIRMAX 8008 /* arbitrary on PBLKSIZ-N */
+#define SPLTMAX 10 /* maximum allowed splits */
+ /* for a single insertion */
+#define DIRFEXT ".dir"
+#define PAGFEXT ".pag"
+
+typedef struct {
+ int dirf; /* directory file descriptor */
+ int pagf; /* page file descriptor */
+ int flags; /* status/error flags, see below */
+ long blkptr; /* current block for nextkey */
+ int keyptr; /* current key for nextkey */
+ char pagbuf[PBLKSIZ]; /* page file block buffer */
+ char dirbuf[DBLKSIZ]; /* directory file block buffer */
+} SDBM;
+
+#define DBM_RDONLY 0x1 /* data base open read-only */
+#define DBM_IOERR 0x2 /* data base I/O error */
+
+/*
+ * utility macros
+ */
+#define sdbm_rdonly(db) ((db)->flags & DBM_RDONLY)
+#define sdbm_error(db) ((db)->flags & DBM_IOERR)
+
+#define sdbm_clearerr(db) ((db)->flags &= ~DBM_IOERR) /* ouch */
+
+#define sdbm_dirfno(db) ((db)->dirf)
+#define sdbm_pagfno(db) ((db)->pagf)
+
+typedef struct {
+ char *dptr;
+ int dsize;
+} datum;
+
+extern datum nullitem;
+
+/*
+ * flags to sdbm_store
+ */
+#define DBM_INSERT 0
+#define DBM_REPLACE 1
+
+/*
+ * ndbm interface
+ */
+extern SDBM *sdbm_open(char *, int, int);
+extern void sdbm_close(SDBM *);
+extern datum sdbm_fetch(SDBM *, datum);
+extern int sdbm_delete(SDBM *, datum);
+extern int sdbm_store(SDBM *, datum, datum, int);
+extern datum sdbm_firstkey(SDBM *);
+extern datum sdbm_nextkey(SDBM *);
+
+/*
+ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+ * tuning and portability constructs [not nearly enough]
+ * author: oz@nexus.yorku.ca
+ */
+
+#define BYTESIZ 8
+
+/*
+ * important tuning parms (hah)
+ */
+
+#define SEEDUPS /* always detect duplicates */
+#define BADMESS /* generate a message for worst case:
+ cannot make room after SPLTMAX splits */
+#endif /* UTIL_SDBM_H */
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/vstream.c postfix-1.1.0/src/util/vstream.c
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/vstream.c Mon Sep 10 02:39:23 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/util/vstream.c Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
/* int vstream_fileno(stream)
/* VSTREAM *stream;
/*
+/* void *vstream_context(stream)
+/* VSTREAM *stream;
+/*
/* int vstream_ferror(stream)
/* VSTREAM *stream;
/*
@@ -249,6 +252,9 @@
/* vstream_fileno() gives access to the file handle associated with
/* a buffered stream. With streams that have separate read/write
/* file descriptors, the result is the current descriptor.
+/*
+/* vstream_context() returns the application context that is passed on to
+/* the application-specified read/write routines.
/*
/* VSTREAM_PATH() is an unsafe macro that returns the name stored
/* with vstream_fopen() or with vstream_control(). The macro is
diff -r -u --new-file postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/vstream.h postfix-1.1.0/src/util/vstream.h
--- postfix-1.1.0-vanilla/src/util/vstream.h Sat Dec 9 01:06:10 2000
+++ postfix-1.1.0/src/util/vstream.h Thu Jan 17 21:30:51 2002
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
#define VSTREAM_GETCHAR() VSTREAM_GETC(VSTREAM_IN)
#define vstream_fileno(vp) ((vp)->fd)
+#define vstream_context(vp) ((vp)->context)
#define vstream_ferror(vp) vbuf_error(&(vp)->buf)
#define vstream_feof(vp) vbuf_eof(&(vp)->buf)
#define vstream_ftimeout(vp) vbuf_timeout(&(vp)->buf)
|