1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
|
<!-- $Id: mod_cap.html,v 1.1 2004/04/16 00:36:57 castaglia Exp $ -->
<!-- $Source: /cvsroot/proftp/proftpd/doc/modules/mod_cap.html,v $ -->
<html>
<head>
<title>ProFTPD module mod_cap</title>
</head>
<body bgcolor=white>
<hr>
<center>
<h2><b>ProFTPD module <code>mod_cap</code></b></h2>
</center>
<hr><br>
<p>
Linux capabilities is a project aimed at providing the POSIX.1e security
model under Linux. Documentation for this project can be found here:
<pre>
<a href="ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs">ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs</a>
</pre>
Without going into gory detail, POSIX.1e basically specifies an interface to
such goodies as capabilities, capability sets, access control lists, mandatory
access control and much, much more. The end result of this security model
allows compliant systems and daemons to have <b>very</b> fine-grained control
over what operations are allowed by which services on the system.
<p>
The best part of the whole story is that Linux kernels (since 2.1)
already have two important facets of the security model in place, namely
capabilities and capability sets. Using these features allows a userland
program to specifically drop capabilities (which can be thought of as
"privileges") which it does not need. Once such capabilities are
completely dropped, neither the userland program <b>nor</b> any binary it
should spawn will be allowed to perform privileged operations, <i>regardless</i>
of whether the program is running as root or not. Essentially, this limits
the power of root to only those specific functions that are necessary, with
the end effect of making the program much more secure.
<p>
A contributed module has been added in the <code>proftpd</code> distribution,
named <code>mod_cap</code>. It can be found in the <code>modules/</code>
directory.
<p>
The <code>libcap</code> library provides the interface between
<code>mod_cap</code> and the capability syscalls present in Linux kernels.
(Note that this library can be found at
<a href="http://www.kernel.org">www.kernel.org</a> or <a href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-privs">sourceforge.net/projects/linux-privs</a>).
<p>
When <code>proftpd</code> runs with <code>mod_cap</code> installed, its
operation changes slightly:
<ul>
<li>The master <code>proftpd</code> process runs as normal, with full
capabilities.
</li>
<p>
<li>
The child <code>proftpd</code> processes, the ones that handle FTP sessions,
drop <b>all</b> capabilities-except for <code>CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE</code>
(which allows a process to bind to port less than 1024) and
<code>CAP_CHOWN</code> (which allows a process to change a file's
ownership)-<i>immediately</i> after a client has authenticated.
<p>
Additionally, switching back and forth between root privileges and the
authenticated user's privileges is no longer possible.
</li>
</ul>
Installation instructions for <code>mod_cap</code> can be found
<a href="#Installation">here</a>.
<p>
The most current version of <code>mod_cap</code> can be found in the
ProFTPD source distribution:
<pre>
<a href="http://www.proftpd.org/">http://www.proftpd.org/</a>
</pre>
<h2>Directives</h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="#CapabilitiesEngine">CapabilitiesEngine</a>
<li><a href="#CapabilitiesSet">CapabilitiesSet</a>
</ul>
<hr>
<h2><a name="CapabilitiesEngine">CapabilitiesEngine</a></h2>
<strong>Syntax:</strong> CapabilitiesEngine <em>on|off</em><br>
<strong>Default:</strong> on<br>
<strong>Context:</strong> server config, <code><VirtualHost></code>, <code><Global></code><br>
<strong>Module:</strong> mod_cap<br>
<strong>Compatibility:</strong> 1.2.8rc2 and later
<p>
The <code>CapabilitesEngine</code> directive enables or disables the module's
runtime capabilities engine. If it is set to <em>off</em> this module does no
runtime capabilities processing at all. Use this directive to disable the
module.
<p>
<hr>
<h2><a name="CapabilitiesSet">CapabilitiesSet</a></h2>
<strong>Syntax:</strong> CapabilitiesSet <em>[+|- cap] ...</em><br>
<strong>Default:</strong> None<br>
<strong>Context:</strong> server config, <code><VirtualHost></code>, <code><Global></code><br>
<strong>Module:</strong> mod_cap<br>
<strong>Compatibility:</strong> 1.2.8rc2 and later
<p>
The <code>CapabilitiesSet</code> directive is used to manipulate the set of
capabilities that <code>mod_cap</code> grants.
<p>
By default, <code>mod_cap</code> removes all but two capabilities
from the session-handling process: <code>CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE</code>, for
binding to ports lower than 1024 (required for active data transfers), and
<code>CAP_CHOWN</code>, for allowing a process to change a file's ownership
to a different user. The <code>CAP_CHOWN</code> capability is only strictly
necessary if the <code>UserOwner</code> configuration directive is in use; if
not being used, the <code>CAP_CHOWN</code> capability is best removed.
<p>
To remove a capability, prefix the name with a '-'; to enable a capability,
use '+'. This directive only supports the following capabilities:
<code>CAP_CHOWN</code>, <code>CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE</code> (override all directory
access controls), and <code>CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH</code> (allow read and search
directory access).
<p>
Example:
<pre>
<IfModule mod_cap.c>
CapabilitiesEngine on
CapabilitiesSet -CAP_CHOWN +CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
</IfModule>
</pre>
<p>
<hr>
<h2><a name="Installation">Installation</a></h2>
<code>mod_cap</code> is automatically included when <code>proftpd</code> is
built on a Linux system that supports capabilities; to disable this automatic
inclusion, use the <code>--disable-cap</code> configure option.
<p>
<hr><br>
Author: <i>$Author: castaglia $</i><br>
Last Updated: <i>$Date: 2004/04/16 00:36:57 $</i><br>
<br><hr>
<font size=2><b><i>
© Copyright 2000-2002 TJ Saunders<br>
All Rights Reserved<br>
</i></b></font>
<hr><br>
</body>
</html>
|
