1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
/* Copyright 2013-2019 IBM Corp. */
#ifndef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "STB: " fmt
#endif
#include <skiboot.h>
#include <device.h>
#include <nvram.h>
#include <opal-api.h>
#include "secureboot.h"
#include "trustedboot.h"
#include "tpm_chip.h"
#include "ibmtss/TPM_Types.h"
/* For debugging only */
//#define STB_DEBUG
static bool trusted_mode = false;
static bool trusted_init = false;
static bool boot_services_exited = false;
/*
* Partitions retrieved from PNOR must be extended to the proper PCR and
* recorded in the event log. Later, customers may use: the PCR values to attest
* the boot security, and the event log to inspect what measurements were
* extended to the PCRs.
*
* The list below should map every skiboot event (or resource) to a PCR
* following the TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile specification,
* Family 2.0, Level 00, Revision 1.03 v51.
*
* Convention for skiboot events:
* - Events that represents data should be extended to PCR 4.
* - Events that represents config should be extended to PCR 5.
* - For the lack of an event type that fits the specific purpose,
* both data and config events should be logged as EV_COMPACT_HASH.
*/
static struct {
enum resource_id id;
TPMI_DH_PCR pcr;
} resources[] = {
{ RESOURCE_ID_IMA_CATALOG, PCR_4},
{ RESOURCE_ID_KERNEL, PCR_4},
{ RESOURCE_ID_CAPP, PCR_4},
{ RESOURCE_ID_VERSION, PCR_4}, /* Also data for Hostboot */
};
/*
* Event Separator - digest of 0xFFFFFFFF
*/
static struct {
const unsigned char *event;
const unsigned char *sha1;
const unsigned char *sha256;
} ev_separator = {
.event = "\xff\xff\xff\xff",
.sha1 = "\xd9\xbe\x65\x24\xa5\xf5\x04\x7d\xb5\x86"
"\x68\x13\xac\xf3\x27\x78\x92\xa7\xa3\x0a",
.sha256 = "\xad\x95\x13\x1b\xc0\xb7\x99\xc0\xb1\xaf"
"\x47\x7f\xb1\x4f\xcf\x26\xa6\xa9\xf7\x60"
"\x79\xe4\x8b\xf0\x90\xac\xb7\xe8\x36\x7b"
"\xfd\x0e"
};
static TPM_Pcr map_pcr(enum resource_id id)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(resources); i++) {
if (resources[i].id == id)
return resources[i].pcr;
}
return -1;
}
void trustedboot_init(void)
{
struct dt_node *node;
node = dt_find_by_path(dt_root, "/ibm,secureboot");
if (!node) {
prlog(PR_NOTICE, "trusted boot not supported\n");
return;
}
if (!secureboot_is_compatible(node, NULL, NULL)) {
/**
* @fwts-label TrustedBootNotCompatible
* @fwts-advice Compatible trustedboot driver not found. Probably,
* hostboot/mambo/skiboot has updated the
* /ibm,secureboot/compatible without adding a driver that
* supports it.
*/
prlog(PR_ERR, "trustedboot init FAILED, '%s' node not "
"compatible.\n", node->name);
return;
}
if (nvram_query_eq_dangerous("force-trusted-mode", "true")) {
trusted_mode = true;
prlog(PR_NOTICE, "trusted mode on (FORCED by nvram)\n");
} else {
trusted_mode = dt_has_node_property(node, "trusted-enabled", NULL);
prlog(PR_INFO, "trusted mode %s\n",
trusted_mode ? "on" : "off");
}
if (!trusted_mode)
return;
cvc_init();
tpm_init();
trusted_init = true;
boot_services_exited = false;
}
int trustedboot_exit_boot_services(void)
{
uint32_t pcr;
int rc = 0;
bool failed = false;
if (!trusted_mode)
goto out_free;
if (boot_services_exited) {
prlog(PR_WARNING, "Trusted boot services exited before.\n");
goto out_free;
}
boot_services_exited = true;
#ifdef STB_DEBUG
prlog(PR_NOTICE, "ev_separator.event: %s\n", ev_separator.event);
prlog(PR_NOTICE, "ev_separator.sha1:\n");
stb_print_data((uint8_t*) ev_separator.sha1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
prlog(PR_NOTICE, "ev_separator.sha256:\n");
stb_print_data((uint8_t*) ev_separator.sha256, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
#endif
/*
* Extend the digest of 0xFFFFFFFF to PCR[0-7] and record it as
* EV_SEPARATOR
*/
for (pcr = 0; pcr < 8; pcr++) {
rc = tpm_extendl(pcr,
TPM_ALG_SHA256, (uint8_t*) ev_separator.sha256,
TPM_ALG_SHA1, (uint8_t*) ev_separator.sha1,
EV_SEPARATOR, ev_separator.event,
strlen(ev_separator.event));
if (rc)
failed = true;
}
tpm_add_status_property();
tss_set_platform_auth();
out_free:
tpm_cleanup();
return (failed) ? -1 : 0;
}
int trustedboot_measure(enum resource_id id, void *buf, size_t len)
{
uint8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
void *buf_aux;
size_t len_aux;
const char *name;
TPMI_DH_PCR pcr;
int rc = -1;
if (!trusted_mode)
return 1;
name = flash_map_resource_name(id);
if (!name) {
/**
* @fwts-label ResourceNotMeasuredUnknown
* @fwts-advice This is a bug in the trustedboot_measure()
* caller, which is passing an unknown resource_id.
*/
prlog(PR_ERR, "resource NOT MEASURED, resource_id=%d unknown\n", id);
return -1;
}
if (!trusted_init) {
prlog(PR_ERR, "resource NOT MEASURED, resource_id=%d "
"trustedboot not yet initialized\n", id);
return -1;
}
if (boot_services_exited) {
prlog(PR_ERR, "%s NOT MEASURED. Already exited from boot "
"services\n", name);
return -1;
}
pcr = map_pcr(id);
if (pcr == -1) {
/**
* @fwts-label ResourceNotMappedToPCR
* @fwts-advice This is a bug. The resource cannot be measured
* because it is not mapped to a PCR in the resources[] array.
*/
prlog(PR_ERR, "%s NOT MEASURED, it's not mapped to a PCR\n", name);
return -1;
}
if (!buf) {
/**
* @fwts-label ResourceNotMeasuredNull
* @fwts-advice This is a bug. The trustedboot_measure() caller
* provided a NULL container.
*/
prlog(PR_ERR, "%s NOT MEASURED, it's null\n", name);
return -1;
}
if (stb_is_container(buf, len)) {
buf_aux = buf + SECURE_BOOT_HEADERS_SIZE;
len_aux = len - SECURE_BOOT_HEADERS_SIZE;
} else {
buf_aux = buf;
len_aux = len;
}
rc = call_cvc_sha512(buf_aux, len_aux, digest, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (rc == OPAL_SUCCESS) {
prlog(PR_NOTICE, "%s hash calculated\n", name);
} else if (rc == OPAL_PARAMETER) {
prlog(PR_ERR, "%s NOT MEASURED, invalid param. buf=%p, "
"len=%zd, digest=%p\n", name, buf_aux,
len_aux, digest);
return -1;
} else if (rc == OPAL_UNSUPPORTED) {
prlog(PR_ERR, "%s NOT MEASURED, CVC-sha512 service not "
"supported\n", name);
return -1;
} else {
prlog(PR_ERR, "%s NOT MEASURED, unknown CVC-sha512 error. "
"rc=%d\n", name, rc);
return -1;
}
#ifdef STB_DEBUG
stb_print_data(digest, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
#endif
/*
* Extend the given PCR number in both sha256 and sha1 banks with the
* sha512 hash calculated. The hash is truncated accordingly to fit the
* PCR.
*/
return tpm_extendl(pcr, TPM_ALG_SHA256, (uint8_t*) digest,
TPM_ALG_SHA1, (uint8_t*) digest,
EV_COMPACT_HASH, name, strlen(name));
}
|