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/*
* Copyright (C) 2011 Adam Barth. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2011 Daniel Bates (dbates@intudata.com).
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE INC. ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE INC. OR
* CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
* PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
* PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY
* OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "config.h"
#include "XSSAuditor.h"
#include "ContentSecurityPolicy.h"
#include "DecodeEscapeSequences.h"
#include "Document.h"
#include "DocumentLoader.h"
#include "FormData.h"
#include "Frame.h"
#include "HTMLDocumentParser.h"
#include "HTMLNames.h"
#include "HTMLParamElement.h"
#include "HTMLParserIdioms.h"
#include "InspectorValues.h"
#include "KURL.h"
#include "Settings.h"
#include "TextEncoding.h"
#include "TextResourceDecoder.h"
#include "XLinkNames.h"
#include "XSSAuditorDelegate.h"
#if ENABLE(SVG)
#include "SVGNames.h"
#endif
#include <wtf/MainThread.h>
namespace WebCore {
using namespace HTMLNames;
static bool isNonCanonicalCharacter(UChar c)
{
// We remove all non-ASCII characters, including non-printable ASCII characters.
//
// Note, we don't remove backslashes like PHP stripslashes(), which among other things converts "\\0" to the \0 character.
// Instead, we remove backslashes and zeros (since the string "\\0" =(remove backslashes)=> "0"). However, this has the
// adverse effect that we remove any legitimate zeros from a string.
//
// For instance: new String("http://localhost:8000") => new String("http://localhost:8").
return (c == '\\' || c == '0' || c == '\0' || c >= 127);
}
static String canonicalize(const String& string)
{
return string.removeCharacters(&isNonCanonicalCharacter);
}
static bool isRequiredForInjection(UChar c)
{
return (c == '\'' || c == '"' || c == '<' || c == '>');
}
static bool isTerminatingCharacter(UChar c)
{
return (c == '&' || c == '/' || c == '"' || c == '\'' || c == '<' || c == '>' || c == ',');
}
static bool isHTMLQuote(UChar c)
{
return (c == '"' || c == '\'');
}
static bool isJSNewline(UChar c)
{
// Per ecma-262 section 7.3 Line Terminators.
return (c == '\n' || c == '\r' || c == 0x2028 || c == 0x2029);
}
static bool startsHTMLCommentAt(const String& string, size_t start)
{
return (start + 3 < string.length() && string[start] == '<' && string[start+1] == '!' && string[start+2] == '-' && string[start+3] == '-');
}
static bool startsSingleLineCommentAt(const String& string, size_t start)
{
return (start + 1 < string.length() && string[start] == '/' && string[start+1] == '/');
}
static bool startsMultiLineCommentAt(const String& string, size_t start)
{
return (start + 1 < string.length() && string[start] == '/' && string[start+1] == '*');
}
// If other files need this, we should move this to HTMLParserIdioms.h
template<size_t inlineCapacity>
bool threadSafeMatch(const Vector<UChar, inlineCapacity>& vector, const QualifiedName& qname)
{
return equalIgnoringNullity(vector, qname.localName().impl());
}
static bool hasName(const HTMLToken& token, const QualifiedName& name)
{
return threadSafeMatch(token.name(), name);
}
static bool findAttributeWithName(const HTMLToken& token, const QualifiedName& name, size_t& indexOfMatchingAttribute)
{
// Notice that we're careful not to ref the StringImpl here because we might be on a background thread.
const String& attrName = name.namespaceURI() == XLinkNames::xlinkNamespaceURI ? "xlink:" + name.localName().string() : name.localName().string();
for (size_t i = 0; i < token.attributes().size(); ++i) {
if (equalIgnoringNullity(token.attributes().at(i).name, attrName)) {
indexOfMatchingAttribute = i;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
static bool isNameOfInlineEventHandler(const Vector<UChar, 32>& name)
{
const size_t lengthOfShortestInlineEventHandlerName = 5; // To wit: oncut.
if (name.size() < lengthOfShortestInlineEventHandlerName)
return false;
return name[0] == 'o' && name[1] == 'n';
}
static bool isDangerousHTTPEquiv(const String& value)
{
String equiv = value.stripWhiteSpace();
return equalIgnoringCase(equiv, "refresh") || equalIgnoringCase(equiv, "set-cookie");
}
static inline String decode16BitUnicodeEscapeSequences(const String& string)
{
// Note, the encoding is ignored since each %u-escape sequence represents a UTF-16 code unit.
return decodeEscapeSequences<Unicode16BitEscapeSequence>(string, UTF8Encoding());
}
static inline String decodeStandardURLEscapeSequences(const String& string, const TextEncoding& encoding)
{
// We use decodeEscapeSequences() instead of decodeURLEscapeSequences() (declared in KURL.h) to
// avoid platform-specific URL decoding differences (e.g. KURLGoogle).
return decodeEscapeSequences<URLEscapeSequence>(string, encoding);
}
static String fullyDecodeString(const String& string, const TextEncoding& encoding)
{
size_t oldWorkingStringLength;
String workingString = string;
do {
oldWorkingStringLength = workingString.length();
workingString = decode16BitUnicodeEscapeSequences(decodeStandardURLEscapeSequences(workingString, encoding));
} while (workingString.length() < oldWorkingStringLength);
workingString.replace('+', ' ');
workingString = canonicalize(workingString);
return workingString;
}
static ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSDisposition combineXSSProtectionHeaderAndCSP(ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSDisposition xssProtection, ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSDisposition reflectedXSS)
{
ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSDisposition result = std::max(xssProtection, reflectedXSS);
if (result == ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSInvalid || result == ContentSecurityPolicy::FilterReflectedXSS || result == ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSUnset)
return ContentSecurityPolicy::FilterReflectedXSS;
return result;
}
static bool isSemicolonSeparatedAttribute(const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute)
{
#if ENABLE(SVG)
return threadSafeMatch(attribute.name, SVGNames::valuesAttr);
#else
return false;
#endif
}
static bool semicolonSeparatedValueContainsJavaScriptURL(const String& value)
{
Vector<String> valueList;
value.split(';', valueList);
for (size_t i = 0; i < valueList.size(); ++i) {
if (protocolIsJavaScript(valueList[i]))
return true;
}
return false;
}
XSSAuditor::XSSAuditor()
: m_isEnabled(false)
, m_xssProtection(ContentSecurityPolicy::FilterReflectedXSS)
, m_didSendValidCSPHeader(false)
, m_didSendValidXSSProtectionHeader(false)
, m_state(Uninitialized)
, m_scriptTagNestingLevel(0)
, m_encoding(UTF8Encoding())
{
// Although tempting to call init() at this point, the various objects
// we want to reference might not all have been constructed yet.
}
void XSSAuditor::initForFragment()
{
ASSERT(isMainThread());
ASSERT(m_state == Uninitialized);
m_state = Initialized;
// When parsing a fragment, we don't enable the XSS auditor because it's
// too much overhead.
ASSERT(!m_isEnabled);
}
void XSSAuditor::init(Document* document, XSSAuditorDelegate* auditorDelegate)
{
const size_t miniumLengthForSuffixTree = 512; // FIXME: Tune this parameter.
const int suffixTreeDepth = 5;
ASSERT(isMainThread());
if (m_state == Initialized)
return;
ASSERT(m_state == Uninitialized);
m_state = Initialized;
if (Frame* frame = document->frame())
if (Settings* settings = frame->settings())
m_isEnabled = settings->xssAuditorEnabled();
if (!m_isEnabled)
return;
m_documentURL = document->url().copy();
// In theory, the Document could have detached from the Frame after the
// XSSAuditor was constructed.
if (!document->frame()) {
m_isEnabled = false;
return;
}
if (m_documentURL.isEmpty()) {
// The URL can be empty when opening a new browser window or calling window.open("").
m_isEnabled = false;
return;
}
if (m_documentURL.protocolIsData()) {
m_isEnabled = false;
return;
}
if (document->decoder())
m_encoding = document->decoder()->encoding();
m_decodedURL = fullyDecodeString(m_documentURL.string(), m_encoding);
if (m_decodedURL.find(isRequiredForInjection) == notFound)
m_decodedURL = String();
String httpBodyAsString;
if (DocumentLoader* documentLoader = document->frame()->loader()->documentLoader()) {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(String, XSSProtectionHeader, (ASCIILiteral("X-XSS-Protection")));
String headerValue = documentLoader->response().httpHeaderField(XSSProtectionHeader);
String errorDetails;
unsigned errorPosition = 0;
String reportURL;
KURL xssProtectionReportURL;
// Process the X-XSS-Protection header, then mix in the CSP header's value.
ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSDisposition xssProtectionHeader = parseXSSProtectionHeader(headerValue, errorDetails, errorPosition, reportURL);
m_didSendValidXSSProtectionHeader = xssProtectionHeader != ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSUnset && xssProtectionHeader != ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSInvalid;
if ((xssProtectionHeader == ContentSecurityPolicy::FilterReflectedXSS || xssProtectionHeader == ContentSecurityPolicy::BlockReflectedXSS) && !reportURL.isEmpty()) {
xssProtectionReportURL = document->completeURL(reportURL);
if (MixedContentChecker::isMixedContent(document->securityOrigin(), xssProtectionReportURL)) {
errorDetails = "insecure reporting URL for secure page";
xssProtectionHeader = ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSInvalid;
xssProtectionReportURL = KURL();
}
}
if (xssProtectionHeader == ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSInvalid)
document->addConsoleMessage(SecurityMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel, "Error parsing header X-XSS-Protection: " + headerValue + ": " + errorDetails + " at character position " + String::format("%u", errorPosition) + ". The default protections will be applied.");
ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSDisposition cspHeader = document->contentSecurityPolicy()->reflectedXSSDisposition();
m_didSendValidCSPHeader = cspHeader != ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSUnset && cspHeader != ContentSecurityPolicy::ReflectedXSSInvalid;
m_xssProtection = combineXSSProtectionHeaderAndCSP(xssProtectionHeader, cspHeader);
// FIXME: Combine the two report URLs in some reasonable way.
if (auditorDelegate)
auditorDelegate->setReportURL(xssProtectionReportURL.copy());
FormData* httpBody = documentLoader->originalRequest().httpBody();
if (httpBody && !httpBody->isEmpty()) {
httpBodyAsString = httpBody->flattenToString();
if (!httpBodyAsString.isEmpty()) {
m_decodedHTTPBody = fullyDecodeString(httpBodyAsString, m_encoding);
if (m_decodedHTTPBody.find(isRequiredForInjection) == notFound)
m_decodedHTTPBody = String();
if (m_decodedHTTPBody.length() >= miniumLengthForSuffixTree)
m_decodedHTTPBodySuffixTree = adoptPtr(new SuffixTree<ASCIICodebook>(m_decodedHTTPBody, suffixTreeDepth));
}
}
}
if (m_decodedURL.isEmpty() && m_decodedHTTPBody.isEmpty()) {
m_isEnabled = false;
return;
}
}
PassOwnPtr<XSSInfo> XSSAuditor::filterToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(m_state == Initialized);
if (!m_isEnabled || m_xssProtection == ContentSecurityPolicy::AllowReflectedXSS)
return nullptr;
bool didBlockScript = false;
if (request.token.type() == HTMLToken::StartTag)
didBlockScript = filterStartToken(request);
else if (m_scriptTagNestingLevel) {
if (request.token.type() == HTMLToken::Character)
didBlockScript = filterCharacterToken(request);
else if (request.token.type() == HTMLToken::EndTag)
filterEndToken(request);
}
if (didBlockScript) {
bool didBlockEntirePage = (m_xssProtection == ContentSecurityPolicy::BlockReflectedXSS);
OwnPtr<XSSInfo> xssInfo = XSSInfo::create(didBlockEntirePage, m_didSendValidXSSProtectionHeader, m_didSendValidCSPHeader);
return xssInfo.release();
}
return nullptr;
}
bool XSSAuditor::filterStartToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
bool didBlockScript = eraseDangerousAttributesIfInjected(request);
if (hasName(request.token, scriptTag)) {
didBlockScript |= filterScriptToken(request);
ASSERT(request.shouldAllowCDATA || !m_scriptTagNestingLevel);
m_scriptTagNestingLevel++;
} else if (hasName(request.token, objectTag))
didBlockScript |= filterObjectToken(request);
else if (hasName(request.token, paramTag))
didBlockScript |= filterParamToken(request);
else if (hasName(request.token, embedTag))
didBlockScript |= filterEmbedToken(request);
else if (hasName(request.token, appletTag))
didBlockScript |= filterAppletToken(request);
else if (hasName(request.token, iframeTag))
didBlockScript |= filterIframeToken(request);
else if (hasName(request.token, metaTag))
didBlockScript |= filterMetaToken(request);
else if (hasName(request.token, baseTag))
didBlockScript |= filterBaseToken(request);
else if (hasName(request.token, formTag))
didBlockScript |= filterFormToken(request);
else if (hasName(request.token, inputTag))
didBlockScript |= filterInputToken(request);
else if (hasName(request.token, buttonTag))
didBlockScript |= filterButtonToken(request);
return didBlockScript;
}
void XSSAuditor::filterEndToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(m_scriptTagNestingLevel);
if (hasName(request.token, scriptTag)) {
m_scriptTagNestingLevel--;
ASSERT(request.shouldAllowCDATA || !m_scriptTagNestingLevel);
}
}
bool XSSAuditor::filterCharacterToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(m_scriptTagNestingLevel);
if (isContainedInRequest(m_cachedDecodedSnippet) && isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippetForJavaScript(request))) {
request.token.eraseCharacters();
request.token.appendToCharacter(' '); // Technically, character tokens can't be empty.
return true;
}
return false;
}
bool XSSAuditor::filterScriptToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(request.token.type() == HTMLToken::StartTag);
ASSERT(hasName(request.token, scriptTag));
m_cachedDecodedSnippet = decodedSnippetForName(request);
bool didBlockScript = false;
if (isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippetForName(request))) {
didBlockScript |= eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, srcAttr, blankURL().string(), SrcLikeAttribute);
didBlockScript |= eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, XLinkNames::hrefAttr, blankURL().string(), SrcLikeAttribute);
}
return didBlockScript;
}
bool XSSAuditor::filterObjectToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(request.token.type() == HTMLToken::StartTag);
ASSERT(hasName(request.token, objectTag));
bool didBlockScript = false;
if (isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippetForName(request))) {
didBlockScript |= eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, dataAttr, blankURL().string(), SrcLikeAttribute);
didBlockScript |= eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, typeAttr);
didBlockScript |= eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, classidAttr);
}
return didBlockScript;
}
bool XSSAuditor::filterParamToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(request.token.type() == HTMLToken::StartTag);
ASSERT(hasName(request.token, paramTag));
size_t indexOfNameAttribute;
if (!findAttributeWithName(request.token, nameAttr, indexOfNameAttribute))
return false;
const HTMLToken::Attribute& nameAttribute = request.token.attributes().at(indexOfNameAttribute);
if (!HTMLParamElement::isURLParameter(String(nameAttribute.value)))
return false;
return eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, valueAttr, blankURL().string(), SrcLikeAttribute);
}
bool XSSAuditor::filterEmbedToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(request.token.type() == HTMLToken::StartTag);
ASSERT(hasName(request.token, embedTag));
bool didBlockScript = false;
if (isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippetForName(request))) {
didBlockScript |= eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, codeAttr, String(), SrcLikeAttribute);
didBlockScript |= eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, srcAttr, blankURL().string(), SrcLikeAttribute);
didBlockScript |= eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, typeAttr);
}
return didBlockScript;
}
bool XSSAuditor::filterAppletToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(request.token.type() == HTMLToken::StartTag);
ASSERT(hasName(request.token, appletTag));
bool didBlockScript = false;
if (isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippetForName(request))) {
didBlockScript |= eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, codeAttr, String(), SrcLikeAttribute);
didBlockScript |= eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, objectAttr);
}
return didBlockScript;
}
bool XSSAuditor::filterIframeToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(request.token.type() == HTMLToken::StartTag);
ASSERT(hasName(request.token, iframeTag));
bool didBlockScript = false;
if (isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippetForName(request))) {
didBlockScript |= eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, srcAttr, String(), SrcLikeAttribute);
didBlockScript |= eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, srcdocAttr, String(), ScriptLikeAttribute);
}
return didBlockScript;
}
bool XSSAuditor::filterMetaToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(request.token.type() == HTMLToken::StartTag);
ASSERT(hasName(request.token, metaTag));
return eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, http_equivAttr);
}
bool XSSAuditor::filterBaseToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(request.token.type() == HTMLToken::StartTag);
ASSERT(hasName(request.token, baseTag));
return eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, hrefAttr);
}
bool XSSAuditor::filterFormToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(request.token.type() == HTMLToken::StartTag);
ASSERT(hasName(request.token, formTag));
return eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, actionAttr, blankURL().string());
}
bool XSSAuditor::filterInputToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(request.token.type() == HTMLToken::StartTag);
ASSERT(hasName(request.token, inputTag));
return eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, formactionAttr, blankURL().string(), SrcLikeAttribute);
}
bool XSSAuditor::filterButtonToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
ASSERT(request.token.type() == HTMLToken::StartTag);
ASSERT(hasName(request.token, buttonTag));
return eraseAttributeIfInjected(request, formactionAttr, blankURL().string(), SrcLikeAttribute);
}
bool XSSAuditor::eraseDangerousAttributesIfInjected(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(String, safeJavaScriptURL, (ASCIILiteral("javascript:void(0)")));
bool didBlockScript = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < request.token.attributes().size(); ++i) {
const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute = request.token.attributes().at(i);
bool isInlineEventHandler = isNameOfInlineEventHandler(attribute.name);
// FIXME: It would be better if we didn't create a new String for every attribute in the document.
String strippedValue = stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(String(attribute.value));
bool valueContainsJavaScriptURL = (!isInlineEventHandler && protocolIsJavaScript(strippedValue)) || (isSemicolonSeparatedAttribute(attribute) && semicolonSeparatedValueContainsJavaScriptURL(strippedValue));
if (!isInlineEventHandler && !valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
continue;
if (!isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippetForAttribute(request, attribute, ScriptLikeAttribute)))
continue;
request.token.eraseValueOfAttribute(i);
if (valueContainsJavaScriptURL)
request.token.appendToAttributeValue(i, safeJavaScriptURL);
didBlockScript = true;
}
return didBlockScript;
}
bool XSSAuditor::eraseAttributeIfInjected(const FilterTokenRequest& request, const QualifiedName& attributeName, const String& replacementValue, AttributeKind treatment)
{
size_t indexOfAttribute = 0;
if (findAttributeWithName(request.token, attributeName, indexOfAttribute)) {
const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute = request.token.attributes().at(indexOfAttribute);
if (isContainedInRequest(decodedSnippetForAttribute(request, attribute, treatment))) {
if (threadSafeMatch(attributeName, srcAttr) && isLikelySafeResource(String(attribute.value)))
return false;
if (threadSafeMatch(attributeName, http_equivAttr) && !isDangerousHTTPEquiv(String(attribute.value)))
return false;
request.token.eraseValueOfAttribute(indexOfAttribute);
if (!replacementValue.isEmpty())
request.token.appendToAttributeValue(indexOfAttribute, replacementValue);
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
String XSSAuditor::decodedSnippetForName(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
// Grab a fixed number of characters equal to the length of the token's name plus one (to account for the "<").
return fullyDecodeString(request.sourceTracker.sourceForToken(request.token), m_encoding).substring(0, request.token.name().size() + 1);
}
String XSSAuditor::decodedSnippetForAttribute(const FilterTokenRequest& request, const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute, AttributeKind treatment)
{
// The range doesn't inlcude the character which terminates the value. So,
// for an input of |name="value"|, the snippet is |name="value|. For an
// unquoted input of |name=value |, the snippet is |name=value|.
// FIXME: We should grab one character before the name also.
int start = attribute.nameRange.start - request.token.startIndex();
int end = attribute.valueRange.end - request.token.startIndex();
String decodedSnippet = fullyDecodeString(request.sourceTracker.sourceForToken(request.token).substring(start, end - start), m_encoding);
decodedSnippet.truncate(kMaximumFragmentLengthTarget);
if (treatment == SrcLikeAttribute) {
int slashCount = 0;
bool commaSeen = false;
// In HTTP URLs, characters following the first ?, #, or third slash may come from
// the page itself and can be merely ignored by an attacker's server when a remote
// script or script-like resource is requested. In DATA URLS, the payload starts at
// the first comma, and the the first /*, //, or <!-- may introduce a comment. Characters
// following this may come from the page itself and may be ignored when the script is
// executed. For simplicity, we don't differentiate based on URL scheme, and stop at
// the first # or ?, the third slash, or the first slash or < once a comma is seen.
for (size_t currentLength = 0; currentLength < decodedSnippet.length(); ++currentLength) {
UChar currentChar = decodedSnippet[currentLength];
if (currentChar == '?'
|| currentChar == '#'
|| ((currentChar == '/' || currentChar == '\\') && (commaSeen || ++slashCount > 2))
|| (currentChar == '<' && commaSeen)) {
decodedSnippet.truncate(currentLength);
break;
}
if (currentChar == ',')
commaSeen = true;
}
} else if (treatment == ScriptLikeAttribute) {
// Beware of trailing characters which came from the page itself, not the
// injected vector. Excluding the terminating character covers common cases
// where the page immediately ends the attribute, but doesn't cover more
// complex cases where there is other page data following the injection.
// Generally, these won't parse as javascript, so the injected vector
// typically excludes them from consideration via a single-line comment or
// by enclosing them in a string literal terminated later by the page's own
// closing punctuation. Since the snippet has not been parsed, the vector
// may also try to introduce these via entities. As a result, we'd like to
// stop before the first "//", the first <!--, the first entity, or the first
// quote not immediately following the first equals sign (taking whitespace
// into consideration). To keep things simpler, we don't try to distinguish
// between entity-introducing amperands vs. other uses, nor do we bother to
// check for a second slash for a comment, nor do we bother to check for
// !-- following a less-than sign. We stop instead on any ampersand
// slash, or less-than sign.
size_t position = 0;
if ((position = decodedSnippet.find("=")) != notFound
&& (position = decodedSnippet.find(isNotHTMLSpace, position + 1)) != notFound
&& (position = decodedSnippet.find(isTerminatingCharacter, isHTMLQuote(decodedSnippet[position]) ? position + 1 : position)) != notFound) {
decodedSnippet.truncate(position);
}
}
return decodedSnippet;
}
String XSSAuditor::decodedSnippetForJavaScript(const FilterTokenRequest& request)
{
String string = request.sourceTracker.sourceForToken(request.token);
size_t startPosition = 0;
size_t endPosition = string.length();
size_t foundPosition = notFound;
// Skip over initial comments to find start of code.
while (startPosition < endPosition) {
while (startPosition < endPosition && isHTMLSpace(string[startPosition]))
startPosition++;
// Under SVG/XML rules, only HTML comment syntax matters and the parser returns
// these as a separate comment tokens. Having consumed whitespace, we need not look
// further for these.
if (request.shouldAllowCDATA)
break;
// Under HTML rules, both the HTML and JS comment synatx matters, and the HTML
// comment ends at the end of the line, not with -->.
if (startsHTMLCommentAt(string, startPosition) || startsSingleLineCommentAt(string, startPosition)) {
while (startPosition < endPosition && !isJSNewline(string[startPosition]))
startPosition++;
} else if (startsMultiLineCommentAt(string, startPosition)) {
if (startPosition + 2 < endPosition && (foundPosition = string.find("*/", startPosition + 2)) != notFound)
startPosition = foundPosition + 2;
else
startPosition = endPosition;
} else
break;
}
String result;
while (startPosition < endPosition && !result.length()) {
// Stop at next comment (using the same rules as above for SVG/XML vs HTML), when we
// encounter a comma, or when we exceed the maximum length target. The comma rule
// covers a common parameter concatenation case performed by some webservers.
// After hitting the length target, we can only stop at a point where we know we are
// not in the middle of a %-escape sequence. For the sake of simplicity, approximate
// not stopping inside a (possibly multiply encoded) %-esacpe sequence by breaking on
// whitespace only. We should have enough text in these cases to avoid false positives.
for (foundPosition = startPosition; foundPosition < endPosition; foundPosition++) {
if (!request.shouldAllowCDATA) {
if (startsSingleLineCommentAt(string, foundPosition) || startsMultiLineCommentAt(string, foundPosition)) {
foundPosition += 2;
break;
}
if (startsHTMLCommentAt(string, foundPosition)) {
foundPosition += 4;
break;
}
}
if (string[foundPosition] == ',' || (foundPosition > startPosition + kMaximumFragmentLengthTarget && isHTMLSpace(string[foundPosition]))) {
break;
}
}
result = fullyDecodeString(string.substring(startPosition, foundPosition - startPosition), m_encoding);
startPosition = foundPosition + 1;
}
return result;
}
bool XSSAuditor::isContainedInRequest(const String& decodedSnippet)
{
if (decodedSnippet.isEmpty())
return false;
if (m_decodedURL.find(decodedSnippet, 0, false) != notFound)
return true;
if (m_decodedHTTPBodySuffixTree && !m_decodedHTTPBodySuffixTree->mightContain(decodedSnippet))
return false;
return m_decodedHTTPBody.find(decodedSnippet, 0, false) != notFound;
}
bool XSSAuditor::isLikelySafeResource(const String& url)
{
// Give empty URLs and about:blank a pass. Making a resourceURL from an
// empty string below will likely later fail the "no query args test" as
// it inherits the document's query args.
if (url.isEmpty() || url == blankURL().string())
return true;
// If the resource is loaded from the same host as the enclosing page, it's
// probably not an XSS attack, so we reduce false positives by allowing the
// request, ignoring scheme and port considerations. If the resource has a
// query string, we're more suspicious, however, because that's pretty rare
// and the attacker might be able to trick a server-side script into doing
// something dangerous with the query string.
if (m_documentURL.host().isEmpty())
return false;
KURL resourceURL(m_documentURL, url);
return (m_documentURL.host() == resourceURL.host() && resourceURL.query().isEmpty());
}
bool XSSAuditor::isSafeToSendToAnotherThread() const
{
return m_documentURL.isSafeToSendToAnotherThread()
&& m_decodedURL.isSafeToSendToAnotherThread()
&& m_decodedHTTPBody.isSafeToSendToAnotherThread()
&& m_cachedDecodedSnippet.isSafeToSendToAnotherThread();
}
} // namespace WebCore
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