File: README.source

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Explanation for binary files inside source package according to
  http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2013/09/msg00332.html

This package contains a number of example data sets

Files: data/ks2013.3.rda
Documentation: man/ks2013.3.Rd
  Example data set:
  Data from Klauer & Singmann (2013, Experiment 3)
  Klauer and Singmann (2013) attempted to replicate a hypothesis of Morsanyi
  and Handley (2012) according to which individuals have an intuitive sense of
  logicality. Specifically, Morsanyi and Handley apparently provided evidence
  that the logical status of syllogisms (i.e., valid or invalid) affects
  participants liking ratings of the conclusion of syllogisms. Conclusions
  from valid syllogisms (e.g., Some snakes are poisonous. No poisonous animals
  are obbs. Some snakes are not obbs.) received higher liking ratings than
  conclusions from invalid syllogisms (e.g.,  No ice creams are vons. Some
  vons are hot. Some ice creams are not hot.). It is important to noted that
  in the experiments participants were simply shown the premises and
  conclusion in succession, they were not asked whether or not the conclusion
  follows or to generate their own conclusion. Their task was simply to judge
  how much they liked the "final" statement (i.e., the conclusion).

Files: data/md_12.1.rda
Documentation: man/md_12.1.Rd
  Example data set:
  Data 12.1 from Maxwell & Delaney
  Hypothetical Reaction Time Data for 2 x 3 Perceptual Experiment: Example
  data for chapter 12 of Maaxwell and Delaney (2004, Table 12.1, p. 574) in
  long format. Has two within.subjects factors: angle and noise.

Files: data/md_15.1.rda
Documentation: man/md_15.1.Rd
  Example data set:
  Data 15.1 / 11.5 from Maxwell & Delaney
  Hypothetical IQ Data from 12 children at 4 time points: Example data for
  chapter 11/15 of Maxwell and Delaney (2004, Table 15.1, p. 766) in long
  format. Has two one within-subjects factor: time.

Files: data/md_16.1.rda
Documentation: man/md_16.1.Rd
  Example data set:
  Hypothetical Reaction Time Data for 2 x 3 Perceptual Experiment: Example
  data for chapter 12 of Maaxwell and Delaney (2004, Table 12.1, p. 574) in
  long format. Has two within subjects factors: angle and noise.

Files: data/md_16.4.rda
Documentation: man/md_16.4.Rd
  Example data set:
  Data 16.1 / 10.9 from Maxwell & Delaney
  Hypothetical data collected from 29 children who participated in the study
  assessing the effectiveness of the intervention to increase inductive
  reasoning skills.

Files: data/obk.long.rda
Documentation: man/obk.long.Rd
  Example data set:
  O'Brien Kaiser's Repeated-Measures Dataset with Covariate
  This is the long version of the OBrienKaiser dataset from the car package
  adding a random covariate age. Originally the dataset ist taken from O'Brien
  and Kaiser (1985).

Files: data/sk2011.1.rda
Documentation: man/sk2011.1.Rd
  Example data set:
  Data from Singmann & Klauer (2011, Experiment 1)
  Singmann and Klauer (2011) were interested in whether or not conditional
  reasoning can be explained by a single process or whether multiple processes
  are necessary to explain it. To provide evidence for multiple processes we
  aimed to establish a double dissociation of two variables: instruction type
  and problem type. Instruction type was manipulated between-subjects, one
  group of participants received  deductive instructions (i.e., to treat the
  premises as given and only draw necessary conclusions) and a second group of
  participants received probabilistic instructions (i.e., to reason as in an
  everyday situation; we called this "inductive instruction" in the
  manuscript). Problem type consisted of two different orthogonally crossed
  variables that were manipulated within-subjects, validity of the problem
  (formally valid or formally invalid) and plausibility of the problem
  (inferences which were consisted with the background knowledge versus
  problems that were inconsistent with the background knowledge). The critical
  comparison across the two conditions was among problems which were valid and
  implausible with problems that were invalid and plausible.

Files: data/sk2011.2.rda
Documentation: man/sk2011.2.Rd
  Example data set:
  Data from Singmann & Klauer (2011, Experiment 2)
  Singmann and Klauer (2011) were interested in whether or not conditional
  reasoning can be explained by a single process or whether multiple processes
  are necessary to explain it. To provide evidence for multiple processes we
  aimed to establish a double dissociation of two variables: instruction type
  and problem type. Instruction type was manipulated between-subjects, one
  group of participants received  deductive instructions (i.e., to treat the
  premises as given and only draw necessary conclusions) and a second group of
  participants received probabilistic instructions (i.e., to reason as in an
  everyday situation; we called this "inductive instruction" in the
  manuscript). Problem type consisted of two different orthogonally crossed
  variables that were manipulated within-subjects, validity of the problem
  (formally valid or formally invalid) and type of the problem. Problem type
  consistent of three levels: prological problems (i.e., problems in which
  background knowledge suggested to accept valid but reject invalid
  conclusions), neutral problems (i.e., in which background knowledge
  suggested to reject all problems), and counterlogical problems (i.e.,
  problems in which background knowledge suggested to reject valid but accept
  invalid conclusions).