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// Copyright (c) 2019-2023, Sylabs Inc. All rights reserved.
// Copyright (c) Contributors to the Apptainer project, established as
// Apptainer a Series of LF Projects LLC.
// This software is licensed under a 3-clause BSD license. Please consult the
// LICENSE.md file distributed with the sources of this project regarding your
// rights to use or distribute this software.
package fakeroot
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net"
"os"
"syscall"
specs "github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/specs-go"
"github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/internal/pkg/buildcfg"
fakerootutil "github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/internal/pkg/fakeroot"
"github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/internal/pkg/plugin"
"github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/internal/pkg/runtime/engine"
"github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/internal/pkg/runtime/engine/config/oci/generate"
"github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/internal/pkg/runtime/engine/config/starter"
fakerootConfig "github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/internal/pkg/runtime/engine/fakeroot/config"
"github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/internal/pkg/security/seccomp"
"github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/internal/pkg/util/fs"
fakerootcallback "github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/pkg/plugin/callback/runtime/fakeroot"
"github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/pkg/runtime/engine/config"
"github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/pkg/sylog"
"github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/pkg/util/capabilities"
"github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/pkg/util/fs/proc"
"github.com/sylabs/singularity/v4/pkg/util/singularityconf"
)
// EngineOperations is a Singularity fakeroot runtime engine that implements engine.Operations.
type EngineOperations struct {
CommonConfig *config.Common `json:"-"`
EngineConfig *fakerootConfig.EngineConfig `json:"engineConfig"`
}
// InitConfig stores the parsed config.Common inside the engine.
//
// Since this method simply stores config.Common, it does not matter
// whether or not there are any elevated privileges during this call.
func (e *EngineOperations) InitConfig(cfg *config.Common) {
e.CommonConfig = cfg
}
// Config returns a pointer to a fakerootConfig.EngineConfig
// literal as a config.EngineConfig interface. This pointer
// gets stored in the engine.Engine.Common field.
//
// Since this method simply returns a zero value of the concrete
// EngineConfig, it does not matter whether or not there are any elevated
// privileges during this call.
func (e *EngineOperations) Config() config.EngineConfig {
return e.EngineConfig
}
// PrepareConfig is called during stage1 to validate and prepare
// container configuration. It is responsible for singularity
// configuration file parsing, reading capabilities, configuring
// UID/GID mappings, etc.
//
// No additional privileges can be gained as any of them are already
// dropped by the time PrepareConfig is called.
func (e *EngineOperations) PrepareConfig(starterConfig *starter.Config) error {
g := generate.New(nil)
configurationFile := buildcfg.SINGULARITY_CONF_FILE
// check for ownership of singularity.conf
if starterConfig.GetIsSUID() && !fs.IsOwner(configurationFile, 0) {
return fmt.Errorf("%s must be owned by root", configurationFile)
}
fileConfig, err := singularityconf.Parse(configurationFile)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to parse singularity.conf file: %s", err)
}
if starterConfig.GetIsSUID() {
if !fileConfig.AllowSetuid {
return fmt.Errorf("fakeroot requires to set 'allow setuid = yes' in %s", configurationFile)
}
} else {
sylog.Verbosef("Fakeroot requested with unprivileged workflow, fallback to newuidmap/newgidmap")
sylog.Debugf("Search for newuidmap binary")
if err := starterConfig.SetNewUIDMapPath(); err != nil {
return err
}
sylog.Debugf("Search for newgidmap binary")
if err := starterConfig.SetNewGIDMapPath(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
g.AddOrReplaceLinuxNamespace(specs.UserNamespace, "")
g.AddOrReplaceLinuxNamespace(specs.MountNamespace, "")
// If we enter a PID NS in the --oci action -> oci run flow, then crun / runc will fail.
if !e.EngineConfig.NoPIDNS {
g.AddOrReplaceLinuxNamespace(specs.PIDNamespace, "")
}
uid := uint32(os.Getuid())
gid := uint32(os.Getgid())
getIDRange := fakerootutil.GetIDRange
callbackType := (fakerootcallback.UserMapping)(nil)
callbacks, err := plugin.LoadCallbacks(callbackType)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("while loading plugins callbacks '%T': %s", callbackType, err)
}
if len(callbacks) > 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("multiple plugins have registered hook callback for fakeroot")
} else if len(callbacks) == 1 {
//nolint:forcetypeassert
getIDRange = callbacks[0].(fakerootcallback.UserMapping)
}
g.AddLinuxUIDMapping(uid, 0, 1)
idRange, err := getIDRange(fakerootutil.SubUIDFile, uid)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not use fakeroot: %s", err)
}
g.AddLinuxUIDMapping(idRange.HostID, idRange.ContainerID, idRange.Size)
starterConfig.AddUIDMappings(g.Config.Linux.UIDMappings)
g.AddLinuxGIDMapping(gid, 0, 1)
idRange, err = getIDRange(fakerootutil.SubGIDFile, uid)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not use fakeroot: %s", err)
}
g.AddLinuxGIDMapping(idRange.HostID, idRange.ContainerID, idRange.Size)
starterConfig.AddGIDMappings(g.Config.Linux.GIDMappings)
starterConfig.SetHybridWorkflow(true)
starterConfig.SetAllowSetgroups(true)
starterConfig.SetNoSetgroups(e.EngineConfig.NoSetgroups)
starterConfig.SetTargetUID(0)
starterConfig.SetTargetGID([]int{0})
if g.Config.Linux != nil {
starterConfig.SetNsFlagsFromSpec(g.Config.Linux.Namespaces)
}
g.SetupPrivileged(true)
starterConfig.SetCapabilities(capabilities.Permitted, g.Config.Process.Capabilities.Permitted)
starterConfig.SetCapabilities(capabilities.Effective, g.Config.Process.Capabilities.Effective)
starterConfig.SetCapabilities(capabilities.Inheritable, g.Config.Process.Capabilities.Inheritable)
starterConfig.SetCapabilities(capabilities.Bounding, g.Config.Process.Capabilities.Bounding)
starterConfig.SetCapabilities(capabilities.Ambient, g.Config.Process.Capabilities.Ambient)
return nil
}
// CreateContainer does nothing for the fakeroot engine.
func (e *EngineOperations) CreateContainer(context.Context, int, net.Conn) error {
return nil
}
// fakerootSeccompProfile returns a seccomp filter allowing to
// set the return value to 0 for mknod and mknodat syscalls. It
// allows build bootstrap like yum to work with fakeroot.
func fakerootSeccompProfile() *specs.LinuxSeccomp {
// sets filters allowing to create file/pipe/socket
// and turns mknod/mknodat as no-op syscalls for block
// devices and character devices having a device number
// greater than 0
zero := uint(0)
syscalls := []specs.LinuxSyscall{
{
Names: []string{"mknod"},
Action: specs.ActErrno,
ErrnoRet: &zero,
Args: []specs.LinuxSeccompArg{
{
Index: 1,
Value: syscall.S_IFBLK,
ValueTwo: syscall.S_IFBLK,
Op: specs.OpMaskedEqual,
},
},
},
{
Names: []string{"mknod"},
Action: specs.ActErrno,
ErrnoRet: &zero,
Args: []specs.LinuxSeccompArg{
{
Index: 1,
Value: syscall.S_IFCHR,
ValueTwo: syscall.S_IFCHR,
Op: specs.OpMaskedEqual,
},
{
Index: 2,
Value: 0,
ValueTwo: 0,
Op: specs.OpNotEqual,
},
},
},
{
Names: []string{"mknodat"},
Action: specs.ActErrno,
ErrnoRet: &zero,
Args: []specs.LinuxSeccompArg{
{
Index: 2,
Value: syscall.S_IFBLK,
ValueTwo: syscall.S_IFBLK,
Op: specs.OpMaskedEqual,
},
},
},
{
Names: []string{"mknodat"},
Action: specs.ActErrno,
ErrnoRet: &zero,
Args: []specs.LinuxSeccompArg{
{
Index: 2,
Value: syscall.S_IFCHR,
ValueTwo: syscall.S_IFCHR,
Op: specs.OpMaskedEqual,
},
{
Index: 3,
Value: 0,
ValueTwo: 0,
Op: specs.OpNotEqual,
},
},
},
}
return &specs.LinuxSeccomp{
DefaultAction: specs.ActAllow,
Syscalls: syscalls,
}
}
// StartProcess is called during stage2 after RPC server finished
// environment preparation. This is the container process itself.
// It will execute command in the fakeroot context.
//
// This will be executed as a fake root user in a new user
// namespace (PrepareConfig will set both).
func (e *EngineOperations) StartProcess(_ net.Conn) error {
const (
mountInfo = "/proc/self/mountinfo"
selinuxMount = "/sys/fs/selinux"
)
if e.EngineConfig == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("bad fakeroot engine configuration provided")
}
args := e.EngineConfig.Args
if len(args) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("no command to execute provided")
}
env := e.EngineConfig.Envs
// simple command execution
if !e.EngineConfig.BuildEnv {
return syscall.Exec(args[0], args, env)
}
// prepare fakeroot build environment
if e.EngineConfig.Home == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("a user home directory is required to bind it on top of /root directory")
}
// simple trick to bind user home directory on top of /root
err := syscall.Mount(e.EngineConfig.Home, "/root", "", syscall.MS_BIND|syscall.MS_REC, "")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to mount %s to /root: %s", e.EngineConfig.Home, err)
}
err = syscall.Mount("proc", "/proc", "proc", syscall.MS_NOSUID|syscall.MS_NOEXEC|syscall.MS_NODEV, "")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to mount proc filesystem: %s", err)
}
// fix potential issue with SELinux (https://github.com/sylabs/singularity/issues/4038)
mounts, err := proc.GetMountPointMap(mountInfo)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("while parsing %s: %s", mountInfo, err)
}
for _, m := range mounts["/sys"] {
// In Linux <5.9 this is required so that in the chroot, selinux is seen as ro, i.e.
// disabled, and errors getting security labels do not occur.
// In 5.9 the remount will now fail, but it is not needed due to changes in label handling.
if m == selinuxMount {
flags := uintptr(syscall.MS_BIND | syscall.MS_REMOUNT | syscall.MS_RDONLY)
err = syscall.Mount("", selinuxMount, "", flags, "")
if err != nil {
sylog.Debugf("while remount %s read-only: %s", selinuxMount, err)
sylog.Debugf("note %s remount failure is expected on kernel 5.9+", selinuxMount)
}
break
}
}
if seccomp.Enabled() {
if err := seccomp.LoadSeccompConfig(fakerootSeccompProfile(), false); err != nil {
sylog.Warningf("Could not apply seccomp filter, some bootstrap may not work correctly")
}
} else {
sylog.Warningf("Not compiled with seccomp, fakeroot may not work correctly, " +
"if you get permission denied error during creation of pseudo devices, " +
"you should install seccomp library and recompile Singularity")
}
return syscall.Exec(args[0], args, env)
}
// MonitorContainer is called from master once the container has
// been spawned. It will block until the container exists.
//
// Additional privileges may be gained when running hybrid flow.
//
// Particularly here no additional privileges are gained as monitor does
// not need them for wait4 and kill syscalls.
func (e *EngineOperations) MonitorContainer(pid int, signals chan os.Signal) (syscall.WaitStatus, error) {
var status syscall.WaitStatus
waitStatus := make(chan syscall.WaitStatus, 1)
waitError := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
sylog.Debugf("Waiting for container process %d", pid)
_, err := syscall.Wait4(pid, &status, 0, nil)
sylog.Debugf("Wait for process %d complete with status %v, error %v", pid, status, err)
waitStatus <- status
waitError <- err
}()
for {
//nolint:forcetypeassert
select {
case s := <-signals:
// Signal received
switch s {
case syscall.SIGCHLD:
// Our go routine waiting for the container pid will handle container exit.
break
case syscall.SIGURG:
// Ignore SIGURG, which is used for non-cooperative goroutine
// preemption starting with Go 1.14. For more information, see
// https://github.com/golang/go/issues/24543.
break
default:
//nolint:forcetypeassert
if err := syscall.Kill(pid, s.(syscall.Signal)); err != nil {
return status, fmt.Errorf("interrupted by signal %s", s.String())
}
}
case ws := <-waitStatus:
// Container process exited
we := <-waitError
if we != nil {
return ws, fmt.Errorf("error while waiting for child: %w", we)
}
return ws, we
}
}
}
// CleanupContainer does nothing for the fakeroot engine.
func (e *EngineOperations) CleanupContainer(context.Context, error, syscall.WaitStatus) error {
return nil
}
// PostStartProcess does nothing for the fakeroot engine.
func (e *EngineOperations) PostStartProcess(context.Context, int) error {
return nil
}
// PostStartHost does nothing for the fakeroot engine.
func (e *EngineOperations) PostStartHost(context.Context) error {
return nil
}
// CleanupHost does nothing for the fakeroot engine.
func (e *EngineOperations) CleanupHost(context.Context) error {
return nil
}
func init() {
engine.RegisterOperations(
fakerootConfig.Name,
&EngineOperations{
EngineConfig: &fakerootConfig.EngineConfig{},
},
)
}
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