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Rule:
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Sid:
230
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Summary:
This event is generated when a DDoS Shaft client communicates with a Shaft handler. It is also possible that this event may be generated when any host attempts to discover or detect a Shaft handler.
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Impact:
Attempted DDoS. If the listed source IP is in your network, it may be a Shaft client or a host attempting to discover Shaft handlers. If the listed destination IP is in your network, it may be a Shaft handler.
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Detailed Information:
The Shaft DDoS uses a tiered structure of compromised hosts to coordinate and participate in a distributed denial of service attack. At the highest level, clients communicate with handlers to direct them to launch attacks. A client may communicate with a handler via TCP destination port 20432.
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Affected Systems:
Any Shaft compromised host.
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Attack Scenarios:
A Shaft client needs to communicate with handlers to direct attacks.
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Ease of Attack:
Simple. Shaft code is freely available.
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False Positives:
A legitimate server port of 20432 will cause this rule to fire. It may also create a false positive if port 20432 is selected as an FTP data port.
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False Negatives:
None Known.
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Corrective Action:
Perform proper forensic analysis on the suspected compromised host to discover the means of compromise.
Rebuild a confirmed compromised host.
Use a packet-filtering firewall to block inappropriate traffic to the network to prevent hosts from being compromised.
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Contributors:
Original rule written by Max Vision <vision@whitehats.com>
Sourcefire Research Team
Judy Novak <judy.novak@sourcefire.com>
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Additional References:
Arachnids:
http://www.whitehats.com/info/IDS254
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