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Rule:
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Sid:
1886
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Summary:
This rule has been placed in deleted.rules
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Impact:
attacker might have gained an ability to execute commands remotely on the system.
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Detailed Information:
This signature triggers when a UNIX "id" command is used to confirm
the user name of the currently logged in user over any unencrypted
connection. Such connection can be either a legitimate telnet
connection or a result of spawning a shell on FTP, POP3, SMTP or other
port as a consequence of network exploit. The string "uid=" and
"(apache)" is an output of an "id" command indicating that the user
has "apache" account privileges, typically used by the web server
process. Seeing such a response indicates that some user connected
over the network to a target web server and likely exploited the web
server to launch a shell.
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Attack Scenarios:
a buffer overflow exploit against the WWW server
results in "/bin/sh" being executed. An automated script performing an
attack, checks for the success of the exploit via an "id" command.
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Ease of Attack:
this post-attack behavior can accompany different attacks
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False Positives:
the signature will trigger if a legitimate system administrator executes the "id" command over the telnet connection which uses one of the web ports, as defined in snort.conf
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False Negatives:
not known
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Corrective Action:
investigate the server for signs of compromise, run
the integrity checking software, look for other IDS alerts involving
the same IP addresses.
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Contributors:
Anton Chuvakin <anton@chuvakin.org>
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Additional References:
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