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begin
require 'gpgme'
rescue LoadError
end
module Redwood
class CryptoManager
include Redwood::Singleton
class Error < StandardError; end
OUTGOING_MESSAGE_OPERATIONS = {
sign: "Sign",
sign_and_encrypt: "Sign and encrypt",
encrypt: "Encrypt only"
}
KEY_PATTERN = /(-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK.*-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK)/m
KEYSERVER_URL = "http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup"
HookManager.register "gpg-options", <<EOS
Runs before gpg is called, allowing you to modify the options (most
likely you would want to add something to certain commands, like
{:always_trust => true} to encrypting a message, but who knows).
Variables:
operation: what operation will be done ("sign", "encrypt", "decrypt" or "verify")
options: a dictionary of values to be passed to GPGME
Return value: a dictionary to be passed to GPGME
EOS
HookManager.register "sig-output", <<EOS
Runs when the signature output is being generated, allowing you to
add extra information to your signatures if you want.
Variables:
signature: the signature object (class is GPGME::Signature)
from_key: the key that generated the signature (class is GPGME::Key)
Return value: an array of lines of output
EOS
HookManager.register "gpg-expand-keys", <<EOS
Runs when the list of encryption recipients is created, allowing you to
replace a recipient with one or more GPGME recipients. For example, you could
replace the email address of a mailing list with the key IDs that belong to
the recipients of that list. This is essentially what GPG groups do, which
are not supported by GPGME.
Variables:
recipients: an array of recipients of the current email
Return value: an array of recipients (email address or GPG key ID) to encrypt
the email for
EOS
def initialize
@mutex = Mutex.new
@not_working_reason = nil
# test if the gpgme gem is available
@gpgme_present =
begin
begin
begin
GPGME.check_version({:protocol => GPGME::PROTOCOL_OpenPGP})
rescue TypeError
GPGME.check_version(nil)
end
true
rescue GPGME::Error
false
rescue ArgumentError
# gpgme 2.0.0 raises this due to the hash->string conversion
false
end
rescue NameError
false
end
unless @gpgme_present
@not_working_reason = ['gpgme gem not present',
'Install the gpgme gem in order to use signed and encrypted emails']
return
end
# if gpg2 is available, it will start gpg-agent if required
if (bin = `which gpg2`.chomp) =~ /\S/
if GPGME.respond_to?('set_engine_info')
GPGME.set_engine_info GPGME::PROTOCOL_OpenPGP, bin, nil
else
GPGME.gpgme_set_engine_info GPGME::PROTOCOL_OpenPGP, bin, nil
end
else
# check if the gpg-options hook uses the passphrase_callback
# if it doesn't then check if gpg agent is present
gpg_opts = HookManager.run("gpg-options",
{:operation => "sign", :options => {}}) || {}
if gpg_opts[:passphrase_callback].nil?
if ENV['GPG_AGENT_INFO'].nil?
@not_working_reason = ["Environment variable 'GPG_AGENT_INFO' not set, is gpg-agent running?",
"If gpg-agent is running, try $ export `cat ~/.gpg-agent-info`"]
return
end
gpg_agent_socket_file = ENV['GPG_AGENT_INFO'].split(':')[0]
unless File.exist?(gpg_agent_socket_file)
@not_working_reason = ["gpg-agent socket file #{gpg_agent_socket_file} does not exist"]
return
end
s = File.stat(gpg_agent_socket_file)
unless s.socket?
@not_working_reason = ["gpg-agent socket file #{gpg_agent_socket_file} is not a socket"]
return
end
end
end
end
def have_crypto?; @not_working_reason.nil? end
def not_working_reason; @not_working_reason end
def sign from, to, payload
return unknown_status(@not_working_reason) unless @not_working_reason.nil?
# We grab this from the GPG::Ctx below after signing, so that we can set
# micalg in Content-Type to match the hash algorithm GPG decided to use.
hash_algo = nil
gpg_opts = {:protocol => GPGME::PROTOCOL_OpenPGP, :armor => true, :textmode => true}
gpg_opts.merge!(gen_sign_user_opts(from))
gpg_opts = HookManager.run("gpg-options",
{:operation => "sign", :options => gpg_opts}) || gpg_opts
begin
input = GPGME::Data.new(format_payload(payload))
output = GPGME::Data.new()
GPGME::Ctx.new(gpg_opts) do |ctx|
if gpg_opts[:signer]
signers = GPGME::Key.find(:secret, gpg_opts[:signer], :sign)
ctx.add_signer(*signers)
end
ctx.sign(input, output, GPGME::SIG_MODE_DETACH)
hash_algo = GPGME::hash_algo_name(ctx.sign_result.signatures[0].hash_algo)
end
output.seek(0)
sig = output.read
rescue GPGME::Error => exc
raise Error, gpgme_exc_msg(exc.message)
end
# if the key (or gpg-agent) is not available GPGME does not complain
# but just returns a zero length string. Let's catch that
if sig.length == 0
raise Error, gpgme_exc_msg("GPG failed to generate signature: check that gpg-agent is running and your key is available.")
end
envelope = RMail::Message.new
envelope.header["Content-Type"] = "multipart/signed; protocol=application/pgp-signature; micalg=pgp-#{hash_algo.downcase}"
envelope.add_part payload
signature = RMail::Message.make_attachment sig, "application/pgp-signature", nil, "signature.asc"
envelope.add_part signature
envelope
end
def encrypt from, to, payload, sign=false
return unknown_status(@not_working_reason) unless @not_working_reason.nil?
gpg_opts = {:protocol => GPGME::PROTOCOL_OpenPGP, :armor => true, :textmode => true}
if sign
gpg_opts.merge!(gen_sign_user_opts(from))
gpg_opts.merge!({:sign => true})
end
gpg_opts = HookManager.run("gpg-options",
{:operation => "encrypt", :options => gpg_opts}) || gpg_opts
## On the sup side we use :signer for backwards compatibility, but GPGME wants :signers.
gpg_opts[:signers] = gpg_opts[:signer]
recipients = to + [from]
recipients = HookManager.run("gpg-expand-keys", { :recipients => recipients }) || recipients
begin
if GPGME.respond_to?('encrypt')
cipher = GPGME.encrypt(recipients, format_payload(payload), gpg_opts)
else
crypto = GPGME::Crypto.new
gpg_opts[:recipients] = recipients
cipher = crypto.encrypt(format_payload(payload), gpg_opts).read
end
rescue GPGME::Error => exc
raise Error, gpgme_exc_msg(exc.message)
end
# if the key (or gpg-agent) is not available GPGME does not complain
# but just returns a zero length string. Let's catch that
if cipher.length == 0
raise Error, gpgme_exc_msg("GPG failed to generate cipher text: check that gpg-agent is running and your key is available.")
end
encrypted_payload = RMail::Message.new
encrypted_payload.header["Content-Type"] = +"application/octet-stream"
encrypted_payload.header["Content-Disposition"] = +'inline; filename="msg.asc"'
encrypted_payload.body = cipher
control = RMail::Message.new
control.header["Content-Type"] = +"application/pgp-encrypted"
control.header["Content-Disposition"] = +"attachment"
control.body = "Version: 1\n"
envelope = RMail::Message.new
envelope.header["Content-Type"] = +"multipart/encrypted; protocol=application/pgp-encrypted"
envelope.add_part control
envelope.add_part encrypted_payload
envelope
end
def sign_and_encrypt from, to, payload
encrypt from, to, payload, true
end
def verified_ok? verify_result
valid = true
unknown = false
all_output_lines = []
all_trusted = true
unknown_fingerprint = nil
verify_result.signatures.each do |signature|
output_lines, trusted, unknown_fingerprint = sig_output_lines signature
all_output_lines << output_lines
all_output_lines.flatten!
all_trusted &&= trusted
err_code = GPGME::gpgme_err_code(signature.status)
if err_code == GPGME::GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
valid = false
elsif err_code != GPGME::GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR
valid = false
unknown = true
end
end
if valid || !unknown
summary_line = simplify_sig_line(verify_result.signatures[0].to_s.dup, all_trusted)
end
if all_output_lines.length == 0
Chunk::CryptoNotice.new :valid, "Encrypted message wasn't signed", all_output_lines
elsif valid
if all_trusted
Chunk::CryptoNotice.new(:valid, summary_line, all_output_lines)
else
Chunk::CryptoNotice.new(:valid_untrusted, summary_line, all_output_lines)
end
elsif !unknown
Chunk::CryptoNotice.new(:invalid, summary_line, all_output_lines)
elsif unknown_fingerprint
Chunk::CryptoNotice.new(:unknown_key, "Unable to determine validity of cryptographic signature", all_output_lines, unknown_fingerprint)
else
unknown_status all_output_lines
end
end
def verify payload, signature, detached=true # both RubyMail::Message objects
return unknown_status(@not_working_reason) unless @not_working_reason.nil?
gpg_opts = {:protocol => GPGME::PROTOCOL_OpenPGP}
gpg_opts = HookManager.run("gpg-options",
{:operation => "verify", :options => gpg_opts}) || gpg_opts
ctx = GPGME::Ctx.new(gpg_opts)
sig_data = GPGME::Data.from_str signature.decode
if detached
signed_text_data = GPGME::Data.from_str(format_payload(payload))
plain_data = nil
else
signed_text_data = nil
if GPGME::Data.respond_to?('empty')
plain_data = GPGME::Data.empty
else
plain_data = GPGME::Data.empty!
end
end
begin
ctx.verify(sig_data, signed_text_data, plain_data)
rescue GPGME::Error => exc
return unknown_status [gpgme_exc_msg(exc.message)]
end
begin
self.verified_ok? ctx.verify_result
rescue ArgumentError => exc
return unknown_status [gpgme_exc_msg(exc.message)]
end
end
## returns decrypted_message, status, desc, lines
def decrypt payload, armor=false # a RubyMail::Message object
return unknown_status(@not_working_reason) unless @not_working_reason.nil?
gpg_opts = {:protocol => GPGME::PROTOCOL_OpenPGP}
gpg_opts = HookManager.run("gpg-options",
{:operation => "decrypt", :options => gpg_opts}) || gpg_opts
ctx = GPGME::Ctx.new(gpg_opts)
cipher_data = GPGME::Data.from_str(format_payload(payload))
if GPGME::Data.respond_to?('empty')
plain_data = GPGME::Data.empty
else
plain_data = GPGME::Data.empty!
end
begin
ctx.decrypt_verify(cipher_data, plain_data)
rescue GPGME::Error => exc
return Chunk::CryptoNotice.new(:invalid, "This message could not be decrypted", gpgme_exc_msg(exc.message))
end
begin
sig = self.verified_ok? ctx.verify_result
rescue ArgumentError => exc
sig = unknown_status [gpgme_exc_msg(exc.message)]
end
plain_data.seek(0, IO::SEEK_SET)
output = plain_data.read
output.transcode(Encoding::ASCII_8BIT, output.encoding)
## TODO: test to see if it is still necessary to do a 2nd run if verify
## fails.
#
## check for a valid signature in an extra run because gpg aborts if the
## signature cannot be verified (but it is still able to decrypt)
#sigoutput = run_gpg "#{payload_fn.path}"
#sig = self.old_verified_ok? sigoutput, $?
if armor
msg = RMail::Message.new
# Look for Charset, they are put before the base64 crypted part
charsets = payload.body.split("\n").grep(/^Charset:/)
if !charsets.empty? and charsets[0] =~ /^Charset: (.+)$/
output.transcode($encoding, $1)
end
msg.body = output
else
# It appears that some clients use Windows new lines - CRLF - but RMail
# splits the body and header on "\n\n". So to allow the parse below to
# succeed, we will convert the newlines to what RMail expects
output = output.gsub(/\r\n/, "\n")
# This is gross. This decrypted payload could very well be a multipart
# element itself, as opposed to a simple payload. For example, a
# multipart/signed element, like those generated by Mutt when encrypting
# and signing a message (instead of just clearsigning the body).
# Supposedly, decrypted_payload being a multipart element ought to work
# out nicely because Message::multipart_encrypted_to_chunks() runs the
# decrypted message through message_to_chunks() again to get any
# children. However, it does not work as intended because these inner
# payloads need not carry a MIME-Version header, yet they are fed to
# RMail as a top-level message, for which the MIME-Version header is
# required. This causes for the part not to be detected as multipart,
# hence being shown as an attachment. If we detect this is happening,
# we force the decrypted payload to be interpreted as MIME.
msg = RMail::Parser.read output
if msg.header.content_type =~ %r{^multipart/} && !msg.multipart?
output = "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" + output
output.fix_encoding!
msg = RMail::Parser.read output
end
end
notice = Chunk::CryptoNotice.new :valid, "This message has been decrypted for display"
[notice, sig, msg]
end
def retrieve fingerprint
require 'net/http'
uri = URI($config[:keyserver_url] || KEYSERVER_URL)
unless uri.scheme == "http" and not uri.host.nil? and not uri.host.empty?
return "Invalid url: #{uri}"
end
fingerprint = "0x" + fingerprint unless fingerprint[0..1] == "0x"
params = {op: "get", search: fingerprint}
uri.query = URI.encode_www_form(params)
begin
res = Net::HTTP.get_response(uri)
rescue SocketError # Host doesn't exist or we couldn't connect
end
return "Couldn't get key from keyserver at this address: #{uri}" unless res.is_a?(Net::HTTPSuccess)
match = KEY_PATTERN.match(res.body)
return "No key found" unless match && match.length > 0
GPGME::Key.import(match[0])
return nil
end
private
def unknown_status lines=[]
Chunk::CryptoNotice.new :unknown, "Unable to determine validity of cryptographic signature", lines
end
def gpgme_exc_msg msg
err_msg = "Exception in GPGME call: #{msg}"
#info err_msg
err_msg
end
## here's where we munge rmail output into the format that signed/encrypted
## PGP/GPG messages should be
def format_payload payload
payload.to_s.gsub(/(^|[^\r])\n/, "\\1\r\n")
end
# remove the hex key_id and info in ()
def simplify_sig_line sig_line, trusted
sig_line.sub!(/from [0-9A-F]{16} /, "from ")
if !trusted
sig_line.sub!(/Good signature/, "Good (untrusted) signature")
end
sig_line
end
def sig_output_lines signature
# It appears that the signature.to_s call can lead to a EOFError if
# the key is not found. So start by looking for the key.
ctx = GPGME::Ctx.new
begin
from_key = ctx.get_key(signature.fingerprint)
if GPGME::gpgme_err_code(signature.status) == GPGME::GPG_ERR_GENERAL
first_sig = "General error on signature verification for #{signature.fingerprint}"
elsif signature.to_s
first_sig = signature.to_s.sub(/from [0-9A-F]{16} /, 'from "') + '"'
else
first_sig = "Unknown error or empty signature"
end
rescue EOFError
from_key = nil
first_sig = "No public key available for #{signature.fingerprint}"
unknown_fpr = signature.fingerprint
end
time_line = "Signature made " + signature.timestamp.strftime("%a %d %b %Y %H:%M:%S %Z") +
" using " + key_type(from_key, signature.fingerprint) +
"key ID " + signature.fingerprint[-8..-1]
output_lines = [time_line, first_sig]
trusted = false
if from_key
# first list all the uids
if from_key.uids.length > 1
aka_list = from_key.uids[1..-1]
aka_list.each { |aka| output_lines << ' aka "' + aka.uid + '"' }
end
# now we want to look at the trust of that key
if signature.validity != GPGME::GPGME_VALIDITY_FULL && signature.validity != GPGME::GPGME_VALIDITY_MARGINAL
output_lines << "WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!"
output_lines << "There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner"
output_lines << "Full fingerprint is: " + (0..9).map {|i| signature.fpr[(i*4),4]}.join(":")
else
trusted = true
end
# finally, run the hook
output_lines << HookManager.run("sig-output",
{:signature => signature, :from_key => from_key})
end
return output_lines, trusted, unknown_fpr
end
def key_type key, fpr
return "" if key.nil?
subkey = key.subkeys.find {|subkey| subkey.fpr == fpr || subkey.keyid == fpr }
return "" if subkey.nil?
case subkey.pubkey_algo
when GPGME::PK_RSA then "RSA "
when GPGME::PK_DSA then "DSA "
when GPGME::PK_ELG then "ElGamel "
when GPGME::PK_ELG_E then "ElGamel "
else "unknown key type (#{subkey.pubkey_algo}) "
end
end
# logic is:
# if gpgkey set for this account, then use that
# elsif only one account, then leave blank so gpg default will be user
# else set --local-user from_email_address
# NOTE: multiple signers doesn't seem to work with gpgme (2.0.2, 1.0.8)
#
def gen_sign_user_opts from
account = AccountManager.account_for from
account ||= AccountManager.default_account
if !account.gpgkey.nil?
opts = {:signer => account.gpgkey}
elsif AccountManager.user_emails.length == 1
# only one account
opts = {}
else
opts = {:signer => from}
end
opts
end
end
end
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