--- linux/fs/Config.in	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/fs/Config.in	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@
 
 bool	 'Quota support' CONFIG_QUOTA
 tristate 'Kernel automounter support' CONFIG_AUTOFS_FS
-
+if [ "$CONFIG_EXPERIMENTAL" = "y" ]; then
+  bool ' Linux trustees (ACL) support  (EXPERIMENTAL)' CONFIG_TRUSTEES
+fi
 
 if [ "$CONFIG_EXPERIMENTAL" = "y" ]; then
   tristate 'ADFS filesystem support (read only) (EXPERIMENTAL)' CONFIG_ADFS_FS
--- linux/include/linux/fs.h	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/include/linux/fs.h	Thu Jan  3 14:22:11 2002
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@
 	short int		s_ibasket_count;
 	short int		s_ibasket_max;
 	struct list_head	s_dirty;	/* dirty inodes */
-
+        struct vfsmount         * mnt;
 	union {
 		struct minix_sb_info	minix_sb;
 		struct ext2_sb_info	ext2_sb;
@@ -839,6 +839,11 @@
 extern int notify_change(struct dentry *, struct iattr *);
 extern int vfs_permission(struct inode * inode,int mask);
 extern int permission(struct inode * inode,int mask);
+#ifdef  CONFIG_TRUSTEES
+extern int permission_dentry(struct dentry * dentry,int mask);
+#else
+#define permission_dentry(DENTRY,MASK) permission(DENTRY->d_inode,MASK)
+#endif
 extern int get_write_access(struct inode *inode);
 extern void put_write_access(struct inode *inode);
 extern struct dentry * open_namei(const char * pathname, int flag, int mode);
--- linux/fs/namei.c	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/fs/namei.c	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 
 /* [Feb 1997 T. Schoebel-Theuer] Complete rewrite of the pathname
  * lookup logic.
+ *  Linux Trustees support added (c) 1999-2000 Vyacheslav Zavadsky
  */
 
 #include <linux/mm.h>
@@ -24,7 +25,9 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
 #include <asm/namei.h>
-
+#ifdef  CONFIG_TRUSTEES
+#include <linux/trustee.h>
+#endif
 /* This can be removed after the beta phase. */
 #define CACHE_SUPERVISE	/* debug the correctness of dcache entries */
 #undef DEBUG		/* some other debugging */
@@ -365,7 +368,7 @@
 		unsigned int flags;
 		unsigned int c;
 
-		err = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+		err = permission_dentry(base, MAY_EXEC);
 		dentry = ERR_PTR(err);
  		if (err)
 			break;
@@ -531,7 +534,7 @@
 	int error;
 	if (!victim->d_inode || victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir)
 		return -ENOENT;
-	error = permission(dir,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
+	error = permission_dentry(victim->d_parent,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	if (IS_APPEND(dir))
@@ -562,7 +565,7 @@
 static inline int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *child) {
 	if (child->d_inode)
 		return -EEXIST;
-	return permission(dir,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
+	return permission_dentry(child->d_parent,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
 }
 
 static inline struct dentry *get_parent(struct dentry *dentry)
@@ -756,7 +759,7 @@
 	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && (flag & FMODE_WRITE))
 		goto exit;
 
-	error = permission(inode,acc_mode);
+	error = permission_dentry(dentry,acc_mode);
 	if (error)
 		goto exit;
 
@@ -1274,7 +1277,7 @@
 	 * we'll need to flip '..'.
 	 */
 	if (new_dir != old_dir) {
-		error = permission(old_dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE);
+		error = permission_dentry(old_dentry, MAY_WRITE);
 	}
 	if (error)
 		return error;
@@ -1413,3 +1416,102 @@
 	unlock_kernel();
 	return error;
 }
+
+
+/* Begin Trustees code */
+ #ifdef  CONFIG_TRUSTEES
+ static int inline trustee_mask_to_normal_mask(int mask, int isdir) {
+ 	int r=0;
+         if ((mask & TRUSTEE_READ_MASK)  && !isdir) r |= S_IROTH;
+ 	if ((mask & TRUSTEE_READ_DIR_MASK)  && isdir) r |= S_IROTH;
+         if (mask & TRUSTEE_WRITE_MASK) r |= S_IWOTH;
+ 	if ((mask & TRUSTEE_BROWSE_MASK) && isdir) r |= S_IXOTH;
+ 	if ((mask & TRUSTEE_EXECUTE_MASK) && !isdir) r |= S_IXOTH;
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ int permission_dentry(struct dentry * dentry,int mask)
+ {
+         int p=permission(dentry->d_inode,mask);
+         int trusteemask,isdir;
+         int mode = dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
+        struct inode * inode=dentry->d_inode;
+	 int res= -EACCES;
+	
+ 	#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+ 	if (current->fsuid != TRUSTEE_DEBUG_USER) {  return p; }
+ 	#endif
+ 
+ 	if ((mask & S_IWOTH) && IS_RDONLY(inode) &&
+ 		 (S_ISREG(mode) || S_ISDIR(mode) || S_ISLNK(mode)))
+ 		{ res= -EROFS; /* Nobody gets write access to a read-only fs */
+		goto out;
+		}
+	else if ((mask & S_IWOTH) && IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
+ 		{res= -EACCES; /* Nobody gets write access to an immutable file */
+		goto out;
+		}
+ 	isdir=S_ISDIR(mode);
+         trusteemask=get_trustee_mask_for_dentry(dentry,current->fsuid);
+ 	#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+ 	printk("dentry_permission is called , trusteemask is %x, unix permission is %d, mask is %x, mode is %x\n", trusteemask,p,mask,mode);
+         #endif
+         /* grant superuser priveleges */
+ 	if ( capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+ 		{       
+ #ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+ 			printk("Superuser write permission granted");
+ #endif
+			res=0;
+			goto out;
+ 		}
+         if ((mask == S_IROTH) ||
+ 	    (S_ISDIR(mode)  && !(mask & ~(S_IROTH | S_IXOTH))))
+ 		if (capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ 			{       
+ 				#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+ 				printk("Superuser read permission granted");
+ 				#endif
+ 				res=0;
+				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 	if (trustee_mask_to_normal_mask(trusteemask >>  TRUSTEE_NUM_ACL_BITS,isdir) &  mask & S_IRWXO) { 
+ #ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+ 		printk(" trustee access denied ");
+ #endif
+ 		return -EACCES;} /* no permission if denied */
+         if ((!((trusteemask >>  TRUSTEE_NUM_ACL_BITS) & TRUSTEE_USE_UNIX_MASK)) && (trusteemask & TRUSTEE_USE_UNIX_MASK) && (!p)) {   
+ 		#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+ 		printk("unix access granted");
+ 		#endif
+		res=0;
+ 		 goto out;
+ 	} /* grant ordinary unix permission */
+         if (!(mode & S_IXOTH)  && !((mode >> 3) & S_IXOTH) && !((mode >> 6) & S_IXOTH) && (!isdir) && (mask & S_IXOTH)) return -EACCES;  /* execute  permission for  non-executable file can not be granted */  
+ 	if (((trustee_mask_to_normal_mask(trusteemask,isdir) & mask & S_IRWXO) == mask))
+ 		{ 
+ 			#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+ 			printk("trustee permission granted");
+			#endif
+ 			res= 0;
+			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 	
+ out:
+	
+ 	return res;	 
+ }
+ #else /* dummy code for sys_set_trustee */
+ asmlinkage int sys_set_trustee(const char * name, struct trustee_permission * permission,int command) {
+ 	return -ENOSYS;
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* end trustees code */
+ 
+ 
+
+
+
+
+
+
--- linux/fs/open.c	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/fs/open.c	Thu Jan  3 14:18:22 2002
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
  *  linux/fs/open.c
  *
  *  Copyright (C) 1991, 1992  Linus Torvalds
+ *  Linux Trustees support added (c) 1999 Vyacheslav Zavadsky
  */
 
 #include <linux/mm.h>
@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@
 	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
-	error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE);
+	error = permission_dentry(dentry,MAY_WRITE);
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
@@ -215,7 +216,7 @@
 		newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET;
 	} else {
 		if (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid &&
-		    (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE)) != 0)
+		    (error = permission_dentry(dentry,MAY_WRITE)) != 0)
 			goto dput_and_out;
 	}
 	error = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
@@ -262,7 +263,7 @@
 		newattrs.ia_mtime = times[1].tv_sec;
 		newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET;
 	} else {
-		if ((error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE)) != 0)
+		if ((error = permission_dentry(dentry,MAY_WRITE)) != 0)
 			goto dput_and_out;
 	}
 	error = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
@@ -278,12 +279,19 @@
  * We do this by temporarily clearing all FS-related capabilities and
  * switching the fsuid/fsgid around to the real ones.
  */
-asmlinkage int sys_access(const char * filename, int mode)
+
+asmlinkage int sys_access_uid(const char * filename, int mode,uid_t uid,gid_t gid)
 {
 	struct dentry * dentry;
 	int old_fsuid, old_fsgid;
 	kernel_cap_t old_cap;
+	int group_ok=0;
 	int res = -EINVAL;
+	group_ok=capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) || in_group_p(gid);
+        if (capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) goto can_do;
+	if ((uid==current->uid) || (uid==current->fsuid)) goto can_do;
+	return res;
+ can_do:
 
 	lock_kernel();
 	if (mode != (mode & S_IRWXO))	/* where's F_OK, X_OK, W_OK, R_OK? */
@@ -292,11 +300,12 @@
 	old_fsgid = current->fsgid;
 	old_cap = current->cap_effective;
 
-	current->fsuid = current->uid;
-	current->fsgid = current->gid;
+	current->fsuid = uid;
+        if ((gid!=current->gid) && !capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) && !in_group_p(gid) && !group_ok) goto out; 
+	current->fsgid = gid;
 
 	/* Clear the capabilities if we switch to a non-root user */
-	if (current->uid)
+	if (uid)
 		cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
 	else
 		current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
@@ -304,7 +313,7 @@
 	dentry = namei(filename);
 	res = PTR_ERR(dentry);
 	if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
-		res = permission(dentry->d_inode, mode);
+		res = permission_dentry(dentry, mode);
 
 		/* SUSv2 says to return EROFS for open() and access()
 		   for files on a read-only filesystem, when writing
@@ -325,6 +334,11 @@
 	return res;
 }
 
+asmlinkage int sys_access(const char * filename, int mode) {
+	return sys_access_uid(filename,mode,current->uid,current->gid);
+}
+
+
 asmlinkage int sys_chdir(const char * filename)
 {
 	int error;
@@ -344,7 +358,7 @@
 	if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
-	error = permission(inode,MAY_EXEC);
+	error = permission_dentry(dentry,MAY_EXEC);
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
@@ -384,7 +398,7 @@
 	if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
 		goto out_putf;
 
-	error = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+	error = permission_dentry(dentry, MAY_EXEC);
 	if (!error) {
 		struct dentry *tmp = current->fs->pwd;
 		current->fs->pwd = dget(dentry);
@@ -416,7 +430,7 @@
 	if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
-	error = permission(inode,MAY_EXEC);
+	error = permission_dentry(dentry,MAY_EXEC);
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
--- linux/include/linux/trustee.h	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/include/linux/trustee.h	Thu Jan  3 14:23:57 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/* 
+ *  (c) 1999-2000 Vyacheslav Zavadsky
+ *  GPLed
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_TRUSTEE_H
+#define _LINUX_TRUSTEE_H
+#include <linux/config.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/trustee_struct.h>
+#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+/* this function evaluates the trustee mask applicable to given name for given user. it is does not checks the trustees for parent and higher levels 
+
+result & TRUSTEE_ACL_MASK - allow mask
+(result >> TRUSTEE_NUM_ACL_BITS) & TRUSTEE_ACL_MASK - deny mask
+old_mask - the same mask for higher level
+*/
+#define TRUSTEE_DEFAULT_MASK TRUSTEE_USE_UNIX_MASK
+
+
+struct trustee_name {
+  kdev_t dev;
+  char * filename;
+  char * devname; /* ONLY if MAJOR(dev)==0 */
+      
+
+
+};
+
+
+extern int  get_trustee_mask_for_name(const struct trustee_name * name,uid_t user,int oldmask,int height); 
+
+extern int get_trustee_mask_for_dentry(struct dentry * dentry,uid_t user);
+
+#define TRUSTEE_INITIAL_HASH_SIZE 4
+#define TRUSTEE_INITIAL_NAME_BUFFER 256
+
+
+/* name & permission are ignored if command=TRUSTEE_COMMAND_REMOVE_ALL */ 
+/*  permission is ignored if command=TRUSTEE_COMMAND_REMOVE */ 
+
+
+
+extern int sys_set_trustee(const struct trustee_command * c); 
+
+/*#define TRUSTEE_DEBUG 1*/
+#define TRUSTEE_DEBUG_USER 500
+extern __initfunc(void proc_trustee_init(void));
+#endif
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
--- linux/fs/trustee.c	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/fs/trustee.c	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,474 @@
+/* 
+ *  (c) 1999-2000 Vyacheslav Zavadsky
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/trustee.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/malloc.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+#include <linux/poll.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+typedef struct permission_capsule * Ppermission_capsule;
+struct permission_capsule {
+        Ppermission_capsule  next;
+	struct trustee_permission permission;
+};
+
+
+struct trustee_hash_element {
+	int usage; /* 0 -unused, 1- deleted, 2 - used */
+	struct trustee_name  name;
+	Ppermission_capsule list;
+
+};
+static struct trustee_hash_element * trustee_hash=NULL;
+static int trustee_hash_size=0, trustee_hash_used=0, trustee_hash_deleted=0;
+
+
+static inline void free_hash_element_list(struct trustee_hash_element  e) {
+	struct permission_capsule * l1, *l2;
+	l1=e.list;
+	while (l1!=NULL) {
+		l2=l1;
+		l1=(struct permission_capsule *)l1->next;
+		kfree(l2);
+	}
+	e.list=NULL;
+       
+}
+
+
+static inline void free_trustee_name(struct trustee_name * name) {
+        kfree(name->filename);
+	if (TRUSTEE_HASDEVNAME(*name)) {
+	  kfree(name->devname);
+	}
+
+} 
+
+
+
+static inline void free_hash_element(struct trustee_hash_element  e) {
+	e.usage=1;
+	free_hash_element_list(e);
+	free_trustee_name(&e.name);
+	
+       
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int hash_string(const char * s) {
+	unsigned int v=1;
+        while (*s) {
+ 
+		v = (v << 2) | (v >> (4*sizeof(v)-2));
+		v = (v+(*s))^(*s);
+		s++;
+	}
+	return v;
+
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int hash(const struct trustee_name * name ) {
+         unsigned int v=hash_string(name->filename);
+	 if (TRUSTEE_HASDEVNAME(*name)) {
+  	       v^=hash_string(name->devname);
+	 } else {
+	   v^=name->dev;
+	 }
+
+	 return v;
+} 
+
+static inline int trustee_name_cmp(const struct  trustee_name * n1, const struct  trustee_name * n2) {
+       if (TRUSTEE_HASDEVNAME(*n1) && TRUSTEE_HASDEVNAME(*n2)) 
+	 return (strcmp(n1->devname,n2->devname)==0) &&  (strcmp(n1->filename,n2->filename)==0);
+       else  if ((!TRUSTEE_HASDEVNAME(*n1)) && (!TRUSTEE_HASDEVNAME(*n2))) 
+	 return ((n1->dev==n2->dev) && (strcmp(n1->filename,n2->filename)==0));
+       return 0;
+
+}
+
+
+static struct trustee_hash_element  * get_trustee_for_name(const struct trustee_name  * name) {
+	unsigned int i;
+	if (trustee_hash==NULL) return NULL;
+	for (i=hash(name)%trustee_hash_size;trustee_hash[i].usage;i=(i+1)%trustee_hash_size) {
+		if (trustee_hash[i].usage==1) continue;
+		#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+		printk("Comparing in  get_trustee_for_name %s, dev %x i is %d", name->filename,(int)name->dev,i);
+		printk(" to %s\n",trustee_hash[i].name.filename);
+		#endif
+		if (trustee_name_cmp(&trustee_hash[i].name,name)) return trustee_hash+i;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+
+}
+
+/* This function does not allocate memory for filename and devname. It should be allocated at calling level */
+static struct trustee_hash_element  * getallocate_trustee_for_name(const struct trustee_name  * name, int * should_free) {
+
+	struct trustee_hash_element  * r,*n;
+	unsigned int i,j,newsize;
+	
+
+	lock_kernel();
+	*should_free=1;
+	r=get_trustee_for_name(name);
+	if (r!=NULL) goto unlock_exit;
+
+	if (trustee_hash==NULL){
+#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+		printk("Building new trustee hash\n");
+#endif
+		trustee_hash=kmalloc(sizeof(struct trustee_hash_element)*TRUSTEE_INITIAL_HASH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (trustee_hash==NULL) {
+#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+			printk("Can not allocate memory for trustee hash\n");
+#endif
+			goto unlock_exit;
+		}
+		trustee_hash_size=TRUSTEE_INITIAL_HASH_SIZE;
+		trustee_hash_used=0;
+		trustee_hash_deleted=0;
+		for (i=0;i<trustee_hash_size;i++) trustee_hash[i].usage=0;
+	}
+	
+	if ((trustee_hash_size*3/4<trustee_hash_used) || (trustee_hash_size-2<trustee_hash_used)) { /*hash needed to be rebuilt, rebuilding hash */
+		newsize=(trustee_hash_deleted*3)>trustee_hash_size?trustee_hash_size:trustee_hash_size*2;
+#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+		printk("Rebuilding trustee hash, oldsize: %d, newsize %d, deleted %d\n",trustee_hash_size,newsize, trustee_hash_deleted);
+#endif
+		n=kmalloc(sizeof(struct trustee_hash_element)*newsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (n==NULL) {
+#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+			printk("Can not allocate memory for trustee hash\n");
+#endif
+			goto unlock_exit;
+		}
+		for (i=0;i<newsize;i++) n[i].usage=0;
+		trustee_hash_used=0;
+		for (i=0;i<trustee_hash_size;i++) {
+			if (trustee_hash[i].usage==2) {
+				for (j=hash(&trustee_hash[i].name)%newsize;n[j].usage;j=(j+1)%newsize);
+				n[j]=trustee_hash[i];
+				trustee_hash_used++;
+			}
+		}
+		kfree(trustee_hash);
+                trustee_hash=n;
+                trustee_hash_size=newsize;
+		trustee_hash_deleted=0;
+				
+		
+			
+	}
+	for (j=hash(name)%trustee_hash_size;trustee_hash[j].usage==2;j=(j+1)%trustee_hash_size);
+	trustee_hash[j].name=*name;
+	*should_free=0;
+	r=trustee_hash+j;
+	r->list=NULL;
+	r->usage=2;
+#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+	printk("Added element to trustee hash: j %d, name : %s\n",j,r->name.filename);
+#endif
+	trustee_hash_used++;
+	
+	
+ unlock_exit:
+	unlock_kernel();
+	return r;
+	
+
+}
+
+int  get_trustee_mask_for_name( const struct trustee_name * name,uid_t user,int oldmask,int height)
+{
+	struct trustee_hash_element * e;
+	int m;
+	struct permission_capsule * l;
+	int appl;
+#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+	printk("getting trustee mask for %s ", name->filename);
+#endif
+	e=get_trustee_for_name(name);
+	if (e==NULL) {
+#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+		printk("Not found, returning old trustee, %x\n",oldmask);
+#endif
+		return oldmask;
+	}
+	for (l=(struct permission_capsule *)e->list;l!=NULL;l=(struct permission_capsule *)l->next) {
+		if ((height<0) && (l->permission.mask & TRUSTEE_ONE_LEVEL_MASK)) continue;
+		appl=((!(l->permission.mask & TRUSTEE_IS_GROUP_MASK)) && (current->fsuid==l->permission.u.uid)) 
+		    ||
+		    (((l->permission.mask & TRUSTEE_IS_GROUP_MASK)) && (in_group_p(l->permission.u.gid)))
+		    ||
+		    (l->permission.mask & TRUSTEE_ALL_MASK);
+		if (l->permission.mask & TRUSTEE_NOT_MASK) appl=!appl;
+		if (!appl) continue;
+		m=l->permission.mask & TRUSTEE_ACL_MASK;
+#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+		printk("Found a suitable trustee, mask %x",l->permission.mask);
+#endif
+		if (l->permission.mask & TRUSTEE_ALLOW_DENY_MASK) m <<= TRUSTEE_NUM_ACL_BITS;
+		oldmask=l->permission.mask & TRUSTEE_CLEAR_SET_MASK? oldmask & (~m):oldmask | m;
+
+	}
+#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+	printk("The new trustee mask is %x\n",oldmask);
+#endif
+	return oldmask;
+	
+}
+
+int get_trustee_mask_for_dentry(struct dentry * dentry,uid_t user) {
+        int oldmask=trustee_default_acl;
+	char * namebuffer, * buf2;
+	int i,j,k;
+	char c;
+	int   bufsize;
+        int   slashes=1;
+	int   slash=1;
+	struct trustee_name name;
+	struct super_block * d_sb;
+	int isdir=S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
+	#ifdef  TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+	if (user!= TRUSTEE_DEBUG_USER) return trustee_default_acl;
+	printk("Entering get_trustee_mask_for_dentry\n");
+	#endif
+	/* debug */ if (dentry->d_parent==NULL) {
+#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+		printk("d_parent  is null");
+#endif
+		return trustee_default_acl;
+	}
+	/* debug */ if (dentry->d_name.name==NULL) {
+#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+		printk("name is null");
+#endif
+		return trustee_default_acl;
+	}
+	d_sb=dentry->d_sb;
+	if (!d_sb) return trustee_default_acl;
+	namebuffer=kmalloc(TRUSTEE_INITIAL_NAME_BUFFER,GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!namebuffer) return trustee_default_acl;
+	bufsize=TRUSTEE_INITIAL_NAME_BUFFER;
+	*namebuffer='/';
+	namebuffer[1]=0;
+	i=1;
+	for (;;) {
+	    	#ifdef  TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+	    printk("cycle get_trustee_mask_for_dentry, %d\n",i);
+	    #endif
+
+	   if (IS_ROOT(dentry)) break;
+	  j=i+strlen(dentry->d_name.name);
+	  #ifdef  TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+	  printk("j get_trustee_mask_for_dentry %d\n",j);
+	 #endif
+
+	  if (j+1>=bufsize) {
+	    while  (j+1>=bufsize) bufsize*=2;
+	    buf2=kmalloc(bufsize,GFP_KERNEL);
+            if (!buf2) {
+	      kfree(namebuffer);
+	      return trustee_default_acl;
+	    }
+	    strcpy(buf2,namebuffer);
+	    kfree(namebuffer);
+	    namebuffer=buf2;
+	
+	  }
+	  for (k=0;dentry->d_name.name[k];k++) namebuffer[j-1-k]=dentry->d_name.name[k];
+	  i=j;
+	  namebuffer[i++]='/';
+	  slashes++;
+	  dentry=dentry->d_parent;
+	}
+	namebuffer[i]=0;
+	for (j=0;j<i/2;j++) {
+	  c=namebuffer[j];
+	  namebuffer[j]=namebuffer[i-j-1];
+	  namebuffer[i-j-1]=c;
+	}
+	#ifdef  TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+	printk("namebuffer is get_trustee_mask_for_dentry %s, i is %d\n", namebuffer,i);
+	#endif
+
+	name.filename=namebuffer;
+        #ifdef  TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+	printk("dentry is get_trustee_mask_for_dentry %x, sb is %x", dentry,d_sb);
+	#endif
+	
+	name.dev=d_sb->s_dev;
+	name.devname=NULL;
+	j=1;
+	for (;;) {
+	  c=namebuffer[j];
+	  namebuffer[j]=0;
+	  #ifdef  TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+	  printk("checking in get_trustee_mask_for_dentry %s, j is %d\n", namebuffer,j);
+	  #endif
+
+          if (TRUSTEE_HASDEVNAME(name)) {
+	      #ifdef  TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+	      printk("has dev name get_trustee_mask_for_dentry\n");
+	      #endif
+
+	   if (d_sb->mnt && d_sb->mnt->mnt_devname){
+		name.devname=d_sb->mnt->mnt_devname;
+		oldmask=get_trustee_mask_for_name(&name,user,oldmask,slash-slashes+!isdir);
+	      }
+	    
+	  } else oldmask=get_trustee_mask_for_name(&name,user,oldmask,slash-slashes+!isdir);
+	  slash++;
+	  namebuffer[j]=c;
+	  for (j++;(j<i) && (namebuffer[j]!='/');j++) ;
+	  if (j>=i) break;
+	}
+	kfree(namebuffer);   
+	#ifdef  TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+	printk("Exiting get_trustee_mask_for_dentry\n");
+	#endif
+
+	return oldmask;
+	  
+      
+
+}
+
+
+				 
+
+static int prepare_trustee_name(const struct trustee_command * c, struct trustee_name * name) {
+         name->dev=to_kdev_t(c->dev);
+	 name->filename=kmalloc((strlen(c->filename)+1)*sizeof(char),GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!name->filename) {
+			printk("No memory to allocate for temporary name buffer");
+			return 0;
+		}
+	 copy_from_user(name->filename,c->filename,(strlen(c->filename)+1)*sizeof(char));
+		
+	 if (TRUSTEE_HASDEVNAME(*name)) {
+	         name->devname=kmalloc((strlen(c->devname)+1)*sizeof(char),GFP_KERNEL);
+                 if (!name->devname) {
+			printk("No memory to allocate for temporary device buffer");
+			kfree(name->filename);
+
+			return 0;
+		}
+		copy_from_user(name->devname,c->devname,(strlen(c->devname)+1)*sizeof(char)); 
+	 }
+	 return 1;
+}
+asmlinkage int sys_set_trustee(const struct trustee_command * command) {
+	int r=-ENOSYS, i;
+	struct trustee_name name;
+	struct trustee_hash_element * e;
+	struct permission_capsule * capsule;
+	int should_free;
+        struct trustee_command c;
+	copy_from_user(&c,command,sizeof(c));
+#ifdef TRUSTEE_DEBUG
+	printk("set trustee called, command %d", c.command);
+#endif
+	if ((current->euid!=0) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EACCES;
+	lock_kernel();
+	switch (c.command) {
+	case TRUSTEE_COMMAND_REMOVE_ALL :
+		r=0;
+		if (trustee_hash==NULL) goto unlk;
+		for (i=0;i<trustee_hash_size;i++) {
+			if (trustee_hash[i].usage==2) free_hash_element(trustee_hash[i]);
+		}
+		kfree(trustee_hash);
+		trustee_hash=NULL;
+		goto unlk;
+	case TRUSTEE_COMMAND_REMOVE:
+	        if (!prepare_trustee_name(&c,&name)) {
+		  r=-ENOMEM;
+		  goto unlk;
+		}
+		e=get_trustee_for_name(&name);
+		if (e==NULL) {
+			r=-ENOENT;
+			free_trustee_name(&name);
+			goto unlk;
+		}
+		free_hash_element(*e);
+		trustee_hash_deleted++;
+		free_trustee_name(&name);
+		r=0;
+		goto unlk;
+	case TRUSTEE_COMMAND_REPLACE:
+		if (!prepare_trustee_name(&c,&name)) {
+		  r=-ENOMEM;
+		  goto unlk;
+		}
+			
+                e=getallocate_trustee_for_name(&name,&should_free);
+		if (e==NULL) {
+			r=-ENOMEM;
+			if (should_free) free_trustee_name(&name);
+		        goto unlk;
+		}
+		free_hash_element_list(*e);
+		capsule=(struct permission_capsule *)kmalloc(sizeof(struct permission_capsule),GFP_KERNEL);
+		capsule->permission=c.permission;
+		capsule->next=(Ppermission_capsule) e->list;
+		e->list=(struct permission_capsule *)capsule;
+		r=0;
+		if (should_free) free_trustee_name(&name);
+		     
+		goto unlk;
+		
+	case TRUSTEE_COMMAND_ADD:
+		if (!prepare_trustee_name(&c,&name)) {
+		  r=-ENOMEM;
+		  goto unlk;
+		}
+		e=getallocate_trustee_for_name(&name,&should_free);
+		if (e==NULL) {
+			r=-ENOMEM;
+			if (should_free) free_trustee_name(&name);
+			goto unlk;
+		}
+		
+		capsule=(struct permission_capsule *)kmalloc(sizeof(struct permission_capsule),GFP_KERNEL);
+		capsule->permission=c.permission;
+		capsule->next=(Ppermission_capsule)e->list;
+		e->list=(struct permission_capsule *)capsule;
+		r=0;
+		if (should_free) free_trustee_name(&name);
+		goto unlk;
+		
+		
+	}	
+ unlk:
+	unlock_kernel();
+	return r;
+}
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
--- linux/fs/Makefile	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/fs/Makefile	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
 else
 O_OBJS += noquot.o
 endif
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_TRUSTEES),y)
+O_OBJS += trustee.o
+endif
 
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_CODA_FS),y)
 SUB_DIRS += coda
--- linux/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -567,13 +567,49 @@
 	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* streams1 */
 	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* streams2 */
 	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_vfork)            /* 190 */
-
+        .long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)	/*195*/	/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)	/*200*/	/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)	/*205*/	/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)	/*210*/	/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)	/*215*/	/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)	/*220*/	/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)	/*225*/	/* reserved */
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_set_trustee)
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_access_uid)
 	/*
 	 * NOTE!! This doesn't have to be exact - we just have
 	 * to make sure we have _enough_ of the "sys_ni_syscall"
 	 * entries. Don't panic if you notice that this hasn't
 	 * been shrunk every time we add a new system call.
 	 */
-	.rept NR_syscalls-190
+	.rept NR_syscalls-227
 		.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)
 	.endr
--- linux/include/asm-i386/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/include/asm-i386/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -195,6 +195,9 @@
 #define __NR_getpmsg		188	/* some people actually want streams */
 #define __NR_putpmsg		189	/* some people actually want streams */
 #define __NR_vfork		190
+#define __NR_set_trustee        226
+#define __NR_access_uid         227
+
 
 /* user-visible error numbers are in the range -1 - -122: see <asm-i386/errno.h> */
 
--- linux/include/linux/trustee_struct.h	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/include/linux/trustee_struct.h	Thu Jan  3 14:23:57 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/* 
+ *  (c) 1999-2000 Vyacheslav Zavadsky
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_TRUSTEE_STRUCT_H
+
+#define _LINUX_TRUSTEE_STRUCT_H
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+
+
+#define TRUSTEE_EXECUTE_BIT 0
+#define TRUSTEE_READ_BIT 1
+#define TRUSTEE_WRITE_BIT 2
+#define TRUSTEE_BROWSE_BIT 3
+#define TRUSTEE_READ_DIR_BIT 4
+#define TRUSTEE_USE_UNIX_BIT 5
+#define TRUSTEE_NUM_ACL_BITS (TRUSTEE_USE_UNIX_BIT+1)
+#define TRUSTEE_EXECUTE_MASK (1 <<  TRUSTEE_EXECUTE_BIT)
+#define TRUSTEE_READ_MASK (1 <<  TRUSTEE_READ_BIT)
+#define TRUSTEE_WRITE_MASK (1 <<  TRUSTEE_WRITE_BIT)
+#define TRUSTEE_BROWSE_MASK (1 <<  TRUSTEE_BROWSE_BIT)
+#define TRUSTEE_READ_DIR_MASK (1 <<  TRUSTEE_READ_DIR_BIT)
+#define TRUSTEE_USE_UNIX_MASK (1 <<  TRUSTEE_USE_UNIX_BIT)
+#define TRUSTEE_ACL_MASK ((1 << TRUSTEE_NUM_ACL_BITS)-1)
+
+#define TRUSTEE_ALLOW_DENY_BIT 7
+#define TRUSTEE_IS_GROUP_BIT 6
+#define TRUSTEE_CLEAR_SET_BIT 8
+#define TRUSTEE_ONE_LEVEL_BIT 9
+#define TRUSTEE_NOT_BIT 10
+#define TRUSTEE_ALL_BIT 11
+#define TRUSTEE_ALLOW_DENY_MASK (1 <<  TRUSTEE_ALLOW_DENY_BIT) /* set if deny */
+#define TRUSTEE_IS_GROUP_MASK (1 <<  TRUSTEE_IS_GROUP_BIT)
+#define TRUSTEE_CLEAR_SET_MASK (1 <<  TRUSTEE_CLEAR_SET_BIT) /* set if clear */
+#define TRUSTEE_ONE_LEVEL_MASK (1 <<  TRUSTEE_ONE_LEVEL_BIT) 
+#define TRUSTEE_NOT_MASK (1 <<  TRUSTEE_NOT_BIT)
+#define TRUSTEE_ALL_MASK (1 <<  TRUSTEE_ALL_BIT)
+
+#define trustee_acl __u16
+#define trustee_default_acl TRUSTEE_USE_UNIX_MASK 
+
+
+
+
+struct trustee_permission {
+  	trustee_acl mask;
+	union {
+		__kernel_uid_t uid;
+		__kernel_gid_t gid;
+	}  u;
+};
+
+
+
+struct trustee_command {
+  int command;
+  struct trustee_permission  permission;
+  int dev;
+  char * filename;
+  char * devname;
+};
+
+
+
+#define TRUSTEE_HASDEVNAME(TNAME)  (MAJOR((TNAME).dev)==0)
+
+#define TRUSTEE_COMMAND_ADD 1
+#define TRUSTEE_COMMAND_REPLACE 2
+#define TRUSTEE_COMMAND_REMOVE_ALL 3
+#define TRUSTEE_COMMAND_REMOVE 4
+
+#endif
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
--- linux/Documentation/Configure.help	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/Documentation/Configure.help	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -14423,6 +14423,10 @@
 
   Saying M will compile this driver as a module (planb.o).
 
+Linux trustees (ACL) support
+CONFIG_TRUSTEES 
+ This code allow to use special objects "trustees" to manage rights to files and directories. See http://www.braysystems.com/linux/trustees.html
+
 #
 # ARM options
 #
--- linux/arch/alpha/kernel/entry.S	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/arch/alpha/kernel/entry.S	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -1154,3 +1154,6 @@
 	.quad sys_ni_syscall
 	.quad sys_ni_syscall			/* 375 */
 	.quad sys_pciconfig_iobase
+	.quad sys_set_trustee
+ 	.quad sys_access_uid
+ 	
\ No newline at end of file
--- linux/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -200,8 +200,10 @@
 		.long	SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)
 		.long	SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)
 /* 190 */	.long	SYMBOL_NAME(sys_vfork_wrapper)
+ 		.long   SYMBOL_NAME(sys_set_trustee)
+   	        .long   SYMBOL_NAME(sys_access_uid)
 
-		.rept	NR_syscalls-186
+		.rept	NR_syscalls-192
 			.long	SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)
 		.endr
 #endif
--- linux/include/asm-arm/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/include/asm-arm/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -195,9 +195,10 @@
 #define __NR_capset			(__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+185)
 #define __NR_sigaltstack		(__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+186)
 #define __NR_sendfile			(__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+187)
-					/* 188 reserved */
-					/* 189 reserved */
+
 #define __NR_vfork			(__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+190)
+#define __NR_set_trustee                (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+191)
+#define __NR_access_uid                 (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+192)
 
 #define __sys2(x) #x
 #define __sys1(x) __sys2(x)
--- linux/arch/m68k/kernel/entry.S	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/arch/m68k/kernel/entry.S	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -631,7 +631,9 @@
 	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* streams1 */
 	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)		/* streams2 */
 	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_vfork)            /* 190 */
+        .long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_set_trustee)
+	.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_access_uid)
 
 	.rept NR_syscalls-(.-SYMBOL_NAME(sys_call_table))/4
-		.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall)
+		.long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_access_uid)
 	.endr
--- linux/include/asm-m68k/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/include/asm-m68k/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -194,6 +194,9 @@
 #define __NR_getpmsg		188	/* some people actually want streams */
 #define __NR_putpmsg		189	/* some people actually want streams */
 #define __NR_vfork		190
+#define __NR_set_trustee        191
+#define __NR_access_uid         192
+
 
 /* user-visible error numbers are in the range -1 - -122: see
    <asm-m68k/errno.h> */
--- linux/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls.h	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls.h	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -225,3 +225,5 @@
 SYS(sys_sendfile, 3)
 SYS(sys_ni_syscall, 0)
 SYS(sys_ni_syscall, 0)
+SYS(sys_set_trustee,1)           /* 4210 */
+SYS(sys_access_uid,4)
--- linux/include/asm-mips/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/include/asm-mips/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -263,6 +263,8 @@
 #define __NR_SVR4_CDC_reserved18	(__NR_SVR4 + 238)
 #define __NR_SVR4_CDC_reserved19	(__NR_SVR4 + 239)
 #define __NR_SVR4_CDC_reserved20	(__NR_SVR4 + 240)
+#define __NR_SVR4_set_trustee           (__NR_SVR4 + 210)
+#define __NR_SVR4_access_uid            (__NR_SVR4 + 211)
 
 /*
  * SYS V syscalls are in the range from 1000 to 1999
--- linux/arch/ppc/kernel/misc.S	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/arch/ppc/kernel/misc.S	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -1070,6 +1070,9 @@
 	.long sys_pciconfig_write 	/* 199 */
 	.long sys_pciconfig_iobase 	/* 200 */
 	.long sys_ni_syscall		/* 201 - reserved - MacOnLinux - new */
-	.rept NR_syscalls-201
+	 .long sys_set_trustee /* 202 */
+ 	.long  sys_access_uid /*203*/
+ 
+	.rept NR_syscalls-203
 		.long sys_ni_syscall
 	.endr
--- linux/include/asm-ppc/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/include/asm-ppc/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -199,6 +199,8 @@
 #define __NR_pciconfig_write    199
 #define __NR_pciconfig_iobase   200
 #define __NR_multiplexer        201
+#define __NR_set_trustee        202
+#define __NR_access_uid         203
 
 #define __NR(n)	#n
 
--- linux/arch/sparc/kernel/systbls.S	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/arch/sparc/kernel/systbls.S	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
 /*240*/	.long sys_munlockall, sys_sched_setparam, sys_sched_getparam, sys_sched_setscheduler, sys_sched_getscheduler
 /*245*/	.long sys_sched_yield, sys_sched_get_priority_max, sys_sched_get_priority_min, sys_sched_rr_get_interval, sys_nanosleep
 /*250*/	.long sys_mremap, sys_sysctl, sys_getsid, sys_fdatasync, sys_nfsservctl
-/*255*/	.long sys_aplib, sys_nis_syscall
+/*255*/	.long sys_aplib, sys_nis_syscall, sys_set_trustee, sys_access_uid
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SUNOS_EMUL
 	/* Now the SunOS syscall table. */
--- linux/include/asm-sparc/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/include/asm-sparc/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -271,6 +271,8 @@
 #define __NR_fdatasync          253
 #define __NR_nfsservctl         254
 #define __NR_aplib              255
+#define __NR_set_trustee        257
+#define __NR_access_uid         258
 
 #define _syscall0(type,name) \
 type name(void) \
--- linux/arch/sparc64/kernel/systbls.S	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/arch/sparc64/kernel/systbls.S	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@
 /*240*/	.word sys_munlockall, sys_sched_setparam, sys_sched_getparam, sys_sched_setscheduler, sys_sched_getscheduler
 	.word sys_sched_yield, sys_sched_get_priority_max, sys_sched_get_priority_min, sys_sched_rr_get_interval, sys_nanosleep
 /*250*/	.word sys_mremap, sys_sysctl, sys_getsid, sys_fdatasync, sys_nfsservctl
-	.word sys_aplib
+	.word sys_aplib, sys_set_trustee, sys_access_uid
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_SUNOS_EMUL) || defined(CONFIG_SOLARIS_EMUL) || \
     defined(CONFIG_SOLARIS_EMUL_MODULE)
--- linux/include/asm-sparc64/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/include/asm-sparc64/unistd.h	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -271,6 +271,8 @@
 #define __NR_fdatasync          253
 #define __NR_nfsservctl         254
 #define __NR_aplib              255
+#define __NR_set_trustee        256
+#define __NR_access_uid         257
 
 #define _syscall0(type,name) \
 type name(void) \
--- linux/CREDITS	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/CREDITS	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -2478,6 +2478,15 @@
 S: Tokyo 153
 S: Japan
 
+N: Vyacheslav Zavadsky
+E: zavadsky@braysystems.com
+D: Linux trustees code
+S: Vasnetcova 11-43
+S: Minsk, 220107
+S: BELARUS
+
+
+
 N: Orest Zborowski
 E: orestz@eskimo.com
 D: XFree86 and kernel development
--- linux/fs/exec.c	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/fs/exec.c	Thu Jan  3 14:19:14 2002
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@
 	flush_thread();
 
 	if (bprm->e_uid != current->euid || bprm->e_gid != current->egid ||
-	    permission(bprm->dentry->d_inode, MAY_READ)) {
+	    permission_dentry(bprm->dentry, MAY_READ)) {
 		bprm->dumpable = 0;
 		current->dumpable = 0;
 	}
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@
 		return -EACCES;
 	if (!inode->i_sb)
 		return -EACCES;
-	if ((retval = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC)) != 0)
+	if ((retval = permission_dentry( bprm->dentry, MAY_EXEC)) != 0)
 		return retval;
 	/* better not execute files which are being written to */
 	if (inode->i_writecount > 0)
--- linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/fs/nfsd/vfs.c	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -1751,11 +1751,11 @@
 		cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
 	}
 
-	err = permission(inode, acc & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC));
+	err = permission_dentry(dentry, acc & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC));
 
 	/* Allow read access to binaries even when mode 111 */
 	if (err == -EACCES && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && acc == MAY_READ)
-		err = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+		err = permission_dentry(dentry, MAY_EXEC);
 
 	if (current->fsuid != 0)
 		current->cap_effective = saved_cap;
--- linux/fs/super.c	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/fs/super.c	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
 	sema_init(&lptr->mnt_dquot.dqio_sem, 1);
 	sema_init(&lptr->mnt_dquot.dqoff_sem, 1);
 	lptr->mnt_dquot.flags = 0;
-
+	sb->mnt=lptr;
 	/* N.B. Is it really OK to have a vfsmount without names? */
 	if (dev_name && !IS_ERR(tmp = getname(dev_name))) {
 		name = (char *) kmalloc(strlen(tmp)+1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@
 		if (vfsmnttail->mnt_dev == dev)
 			vfsmnttail = lptr;
 	}
+	tofree->mnt_sb->mnt=NULL;
 	if (tofree == mru_vfsmnt)
 		mru_vfsmnt = NULL;
 	kfree(tofree->mnt_devname);
--- linux/fs/proc/link.c	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/fs/proc/link.c	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
 	/* We don't need a base pointer in the /proc filesystem */
 	dput(base);
 
-	error = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+	error = permission_dentry(dentry, MAY_EXEC);
 	result = ERR_PTR(error);
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
--- linux/fs/binfmt_elf.c	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/fs/binfmt_elf.c	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@
 			retval = PTR_ERR(interpreter_dentry);
 			if (IS_ERR(interpreter_dentry))
 				goto out_free_interp;
-			retval = permission(interpreter_dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC);
+			retval = permission_dentry(interpreter_dentry, MAY_EXEC);
 			if (retval < 0)
 				goto out_free_dentry;
 			retval = read_exec(interpreter_dentry, 0, bprm->buf, 128, 1);
--- linux/kernel/ksyms.c	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/kernel/ksyms.c	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
 #include <linux/poll.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
-
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #if defined(CONFIG_PROC_FS)
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #endif
@@ -446,5 +446,7 @@
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(_stext);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(_etext); 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(module_list); 
-
+#ifdef  CONFIG_TRUSTEES
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(permission_dentry);
+#endif 
 
--- linux/fs/proc/root.c	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/fs/proc/root.c	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_ZORRO
 #include <linux/zorro.h>
 #endif
-
+#ifdef  CONFIG_TRUSTEES
+#include <linux/trustee.h>
+#endif
 /*
  * Offset of the first process in the /proc root directory..
  */
@@ -750,7 +752,9 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_DEVICETREE
 	proc_device_tree_init();
 #endif
-
+#ifdef  CONFIG_TRUSTEES
+ 	proc_trustee_init();
+#endif
 	proc_bus = create_proc_entry("bus", S_IFDIR, 0);
 }
 
--- linux/fs/proc/trustee.c	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/fs/proc/trustee.c	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <asm/bitops.h>
+
+/*
+   Daniel Podlejski <underley@debian.pl>, 2001.03.06
+   trustee syscall number is now avaliable
+   in /proc/trustee/syscall
+*/
+
+/*
+ * The /proc/trustee directory inodes...
+ */
+
+static struct proc_dir_entry *proc_trustee_syscall;
+
+/*
+ * This is the handler for /proc/trustee/syscall
+ */
+
+static int trustee_syscall_read_proc(char *page, char **start, off_t off,
+					int count, int *eof, void *data)
+{
+	int	len = 0;
+	off_t	begin = 0;
+
+	len += sprintf(page + len, "%d\n", __NR_set_trustee);
+
+	if (off >= len+begin) return 0;
+
+	*start = page + (off - begin);
+
+	return ((count < begin + len - off) ? count : begin + len - off);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called by proc_root_init() to initialize the /proc/trustee subtree
+ */
+
+__initfunc(void proc_trustee_init(void))
+{
+	struct proc_dir_entry *ent;
+	
+	ent = create_proc_entry("trustee", S_IFDIR, 0);
+	if (!ent) return;
+
+	ent = create_proc_entry("trustee/syscall", 0, 0);
+	ent->read_proc = trustee_syscall_read_proc;
+}
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
--- linux/fs/proc/Makefile	Thu Jan  3 14:16:35 2002
+++ linux/fs/proc/Makefile	Thu Jan  3 14:17:07 2002
@@ -27,5 +27,8 @@
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_PROC_DEVICETREE),y)
 O_OBJS += proc_devtree.o
 endif
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_TRUSTEES),y)
+O_OBJS += trustee.o
+endif
 
 include $(TOPDIR)/Rules.make