File: AuthenticatorCoordinator.cpp

package info (click to toggle)
webkit2gtk 2.42.2-1~deb12u1
  • links: PTS, VCS
  • area: main
  • in suites: bookworm
  • size: 362,452 kB
  • sloc: cpp: 2,881,971; javascript: 282,447; ansic: 134,088; python: 43,789; ruby: 18,308; perl: 15,872; asm: 14,389; xml: 4,395; yacc: 2,350; sh: 2,074; java: 1,734; lex: 1,323; makefile: 288; pascal: 60
file content (322 lines) | stat: -rw-r--r-- 14,613 bytes parent folder | download | duplicates (2)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
/*
 * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE INC. AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS''
 * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
 * THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE INC. OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS
 * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
 * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
 * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF
 * THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include "config.h"
#include "AuthenticatorCoordinator.h"

#if ENABLE(WEB_AUTHN)

#include "AbortSignal.h"
#include "AuthenticatorAssertionResponse.h"
#include "AuthenticatorAttestationResponse.h"
#include "AuthenticatorCoordinatorClient.h"
#include "AuthenticatorResponseData.h"
#include "Document.h"
#include "FeaturePolicy.h"
#include "FrameDestructionObserverInlines.h"
#include "JSBasicCredential.h"
#include "JSCredentialRequestOptions.h"
#include "JSDOMPromiseDeferred.h"
#include "PublicKeyCredential.h"
#include "PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions.h"
#include "PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions.h"
#include "RegistrableDomain.h"
#include "LegacySchemeRegistry.h"
#include "WebAuthenticationConstants.h"
#include "WebAuthenticationUtils.h"
#include <pal/crypto/CryptoDigest.h>
#include <wtf/NeverDestroyed.h>

namespace WebCore {

namespace AuthenticatorCoordinatorInternal {

static bool needsAppIdQuirks(const String& host, const String& appId)
{
    // FIXME(197524): Remove this quirk in 2023. As an early adopter of U2F features, Google has a large number of
    // existing device registrations that authenticate 'google.com' against 'gstatic.com'. Firefox and other browsers
    // have agreed to grant an exception to the AppId rules for a limited time period (5 years from January, 2018) to
    // allow existing Google users to seamlessly transition to proper WebAuthN behavior.
    if (equalLettersIgnoringASCIICase(host, "google.com"_s) || host.endsWithIgnoringASCIICase(".google.com"_s))
        return (appId == "https://www.gstatic.com/securitykey/origins.json"_s) || (appId == "https://www.gstatic.com/securitykey/a/google.com/origins.json"_s);
    return false;
}

// The following roughly implements Step 1-3 of the spec to avoid the complexity of making unnecessary network requests:
// https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-appid-and-facets-v2.0-id-20180227.html#determining-if-a-caller-s-facetid-is-authorized-for-an-appid
// It follows what Chrome and Firefox do, see:
// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1244959#c8
// https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=818303
static String processAppIdExtension(const SecurityOrigin& facetId, const String& appId)
{
    // Step 1. Skipped since facetId should always be secure origins.
    ASSERT(LegacySchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsSecure(facetId.protocol()));

    // Step 2. Follow Chrome and Firefox to use the origin directly without adding a trailing slash.
    if (appId.isEmpty())
        return facetId.toString();

    // Step 3. Relax the comparison to same site.
    URL appIdURL { appId };
    if (!appIdURL.isValid() || facetId.protocol() != appIdURL.protocol() || (RegistrableDomain(appIdURL) != RegistrableDomain::uncheckedCreateFromHost(facetId.host()) && !needsAppIdQuirks(facetId.host(), appId)))
        return String();
    return appId;
}

} // namespace AuthenticatorCoordinatorInternal

AuthenticatorCoordinator::AuthenticatorCoordinator(std::unique_ptr<AuthenticatorCoordinatorClient>&& client)
    : m_client(WTFMove(client))
{
}

void AuthenticatorCoordinator::setClient(std::unique_ptr<AuthenticatorCoordinatorClient>&& client)
{
    m_client = WTFMove(client);
}

void AuthenticatorCoordinator::create(const Document& document, const PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions& options, WebAuthn::Scope scope, RefPtr<AbortSignal>&& abortSignal, CredentialPromise&& promise)
{
    using namespace AuthenticatorCoordinatorInternal;

    const auto& callerOrigin = document.securityOrigin();
    auto* frame = document.frame();
    ASSERT(frame);
    // The following implements https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#createCredential as of 28 June 2022.
    // Step 1, 3, 16 are handled by the caller.
    // Step 2.
    if (scope != WebAuthn::Scope::SameOrigin) {
        promise.reject(Exception { NotAllowedError, "The origin of the document is not the same as its ancestors."_s });
        return;
    }

    // Step 5.
    if (options.user.id.length() < 1 || options.user.id.length() > 64) {
        promise.reject(Exception { TypeError, "The length options.user.id must be between 1-64 bytes."_s });
        return;
    }

    // Step 6. Skipped since SecurityOrigin doesn't have the concept of "opaque origin".
    // Step 7. The effective domain may be represented in various manners, such as a domain or an ip address.
    // Only the domain format of host is permitted in WebAuthN.
    if (URL::hostIsIPAddress(callerOrigin.domain())) {
        promise.reject(Exception { SecurityError, "The effective domain of the document is not a valid domain."_s });
        return;
    }

    // Step 8.
    if (!options.rp.id)
        options.rp.id = callerOrigin.domain();
    else if (!callerOrigin.isMatchingRegistrableDomainSuffix(*options.rp.id)) {
        promise.reject(Exception { SecurityError, "The provided RP ID is not a registrable domain suffix of the effective domain of the document."_s });
        return;
    }

    // Step 9-11.
    // Most of the jobs are done by bindings.
    if (options.pubKeyCredParams.isEmpty()) {
        options.pubKeyCredParams.append({ PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey, COSE::ES256 });
        options.pubKeyCredParams.append({ PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey, COSE::RS256 });
    } else {
        if (notFound != options.pubKeyCredParams.findIf([] (auto& pubKeyCredParam) {
            return pubKeyCredParam.type != PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey;
        })) {
            
            promise.reject(Exception { NotSupportedError, "options.pubKeyCredParams contains unsupported PublicKeyCredentialType value."_s });
            return;
        }
    }

    // Step 12-13.
    ASSERT(options.rp.id);

    AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs extensionInputs = {
        String(),
        false,
        std::nullopt
    };

    if (auto extensions = options.extensions) {
        extensionInputs.credProps = extensions->credProps;
        extensionInputs.largeBlob = extensions->largeBlob;
    }

    options.extensions = extensionInputs;

    // Step 14-16.
    auto clientDataJson = buildClientDataJson(ClientDataType::Create, options.challenge, callerOrigin, scope);
    auto clientDataJsonHash = buildClientDataJsonHash(clientDataJson);

    // Step 4, 18-22.
    if (!m_client) {
        promise.reject(Exception { UnknownError, "Unknown internal error."_s });
        return;
    }

    auto callback = [weakThis = WeakPtr { *this }, clientDataJson = WTFMove(clientDataJson), promise = WTFMove(promise), abortSignal = WTFMove(abortSignal)] (AuthenticatorResponseData&& data, AuthenticatorAttachment attachment, ExceptionData&& exception) mutable {
        if (abortSignal && abortSignal->aborted()) {
            promise.reject(Exception { AbortError, "Aborted by AbortSignal."_s });
            return;
        }

        if (auto response = AuthenticatorResponse::tryCreate(WTFMove(data), attachment)) {
            if (weakThis)
                weakThis->resetUserGestureRequirement();
            response->setClientDataJSON(WTFMove(clientDataJson));
            promise.resolve(PublicKeyCredential::create(response.releaseNonNull()).ptr());
            return;
        }
        ASSERT(!exception.message.isNull());
        promise.reject(exception.toException());
    };
    // Async operations are dispatched and handled in the messenger.
    m_client->makeCredential(*frame, callerOrigin, clientDataJsonHash, options, WTFMove(callback));
}

void AuthenticatorCoordinator::discoverFromExternalSource(const Document& document, CredentialRequestOptions&& requestOptions, const ScopeAndCrossOriginParent& scopeAndCrossOriginParent, CredentialPromise&& promise)
{
    using namespace AuthenticatorCoordinatorInternal;

    auto& callerOrigin = document.securityOrigin();
    auto* frame = document.frame();
    const auto& options = requestOptions.publicKey.value();
    ASSERT(frame);
    // The following implements https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#createCredential as of 5 December 2017.
    // Step 1, 3, 13 are handled by the caller.
    // Step 2.
    // This implements https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#sctn-permissions-policy
    if (scopeAndCrossOriginParent.first != WebAuthn::Scope::SameOrigin && !isFeaturePolicyAllowedByDocumentAndAllOwners(FeaturePolicy::Type::PublickeyCredentialsGetRule, document, LogFeaturePolicyFailure::No)) {
        promise.reject(Exception { NotAllowedError, "The origin of the document is not the same as its ancestors."_s });
        return;
    }

    // Step 5. Skipped since SecurityOrigin doesn't have the concept of "opaque origin".
    // Step 6. The effective domain may be represented in various manners, such as a domain or an ip address.
    // Only the domain format of host is permitted in WebAuthN.
    if (URL::hostIsIPAddress(callerOrigin.domain())) {
        promise.reject(Exception { SecurityError, "The effective domain of the document is not a valid domain."_s });
        return;
    }

    // Step 7.
    if (!options.rpId.isEmpty() && !callerOrigin.isMatchingRegistrableDomainSuffix(options.rpId)) {
        promise.reject(Exception { SecurityError, "The provided RP ID is not a registrable domain suffix of the effective domain of the document."_s });
        return;
    }
    if (options.rpId.isEmpty())
        options.rpId = callerOrigin.domain();

    // Step 8-9.
    // Only FIDO AppID Extension is supported.
    if (options.extensions && !options.extensions->appid.isNull()) {
        // The following implements https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#sctn-appid-extension as of 4 March 2019.
        auto appid = processAppIdExtension(callerOrigin, options.extensions->appid);
        if (!appid) {
            promise.reject(Exception { SecurityError, "The origin of the document is not authorized for the provided App ID."_s });
            return;
        }
        options.extensions->appid = appid;
    }

    // Step 10-12.
    auto clientDataJson = buildClientDataJson(ClientDataType::Get, options.challenge, callerOrigin, scopeAndCrossOriginParent.first);
    auto clientDataJsonHash = buildClientDataJsonHash(clientDataJson);

    // Step 4, 14-19.
    if (!m_client) {
        promise.reject(Exception { UnknownError, "Unknown internal error."_s });
        return;
    }

    if (requestOptions.signal) {
        requestOptions.signal->addAlgorithm([weakThis = WeakPtr { *this }](JSC::JSValue) {
            if (!weakThis)
                return;
            weakThis->m_client->cancel();
        });
    }

    auto callback = [weakThis = WeakPtr { *this }, clientDataJson = WTFMove(clientDataJson), promise = WTFMove(promise), abortSignal = WTFMove(requestOptions.signal)] (AuthenticatorResponseData&& data, AuthenticatorAttachment attachment, ExceptionData&& exception) mutable {
        if (abortSignal && abortSignal->aborted()) {
            promise.reject(Exception { AbortError, "Aborted by AbortSignal."_s });
            return;
        }

        if (auto response = AuthenticatorResponse::tryCreate(WTFMove(data), attachment)) {
            if (weakThis)
                weakThis->resetUserGestureRequirement();
            response->setClientDataJSON(WTFMove(clientDataJson));
            promise.resolve(PublicKeyCredential::create(response.releaseNonNull()).ptr());
            return;
        }
        ASSERT(!exception.message.isNull());
        promise.reject(exception.toException());
    };
    // Async operations are dispatched and handled in the messenger.
    m_client->getAssertion(*frame, callerOrigin, clientDataJsonHash, options, requestOptions.mediation, scopeAndCrossOriginParent, WTFMove(callback));
}

void AuthenticatorCoordinator::isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable(const Document& document, DOMPromiseDeferred<IDLBoolean>&& promise) const
{
    // The following implements https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/#isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable
    // as of 5 December 2017.
    if (!m_client)  {
        promise.reject(Exception { UnknownError, "Unknown internal error."_s });
        return;
    }

    // FIXME(182767): We should consider more on the assessment of the return value. Right now, we return true/false
    // immediately according to platform specific procedures.
    auto completionHandler = [promise = WTFMove(promise)] (bool result) mutable {
        promise.resolve(result);
    };

    // Async operation are dispatched and handled in the messenger.
    m_client->isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable(document.securityOrigin(), WTFMove(completionHandler));
}


void AuthenticatorCoordinator::isConditionalMediationAvailable(const Document& document, DOMPromiseDeferred<IDLBoolean>&& promise) const
{
    if (!m_client)  {
        promise.reject(Exception { UnknownError, "Unknown internal error."_s });
        return;
    }

    auto completionHandler = [promise = WTFMove(promise)] (bool result) mutable {
        promise.resolve(result);
    };
    // Async operations are dispatched and handled in the messenger.
    m_client->isConditionalMediationAvailable(document.securityOrigin(), WTFMove(completionHandler));
}

void AuthenticatorCoordinator::resetUserGestureRequirement()
{
    m_client->resetUserGestureRequirement();
}

} // namespace WebCore

#endif // ENABLE(WEB_AUTHN)