1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317
|
/* wipe
*
* by Berke Durak
*
* Cryptographically-strong (as well as weak) random data generation
*
*/
/* As of version 0.10, different methods for generating
* the required random data can be selected at compile-time.
*
* This improvement was motivated by security and portability
* reasons.
*
* Prior to version 0.10, cryptographically _weak_ random data
* was generated using the following method:
*
* - libc's random () PRNG was seeded with data from /dev/urandom
* (and if not available using getpid () ^ clock () !)
* - since random () returned only 31 bits of data, for speed reasons,
* the low 24 bits were used.
*
* I don't know how much the cryptographical strength of the random
* sequences used to overwrite the magnetic data affect the chances
* of recovery.
*
* Besides this potential problem, there is something much more
* worrying: since wipe is a user-mode program, it uses write ()
* to overwrite the data. However nothing guarantees that the
* same file blocks are used. I guess a normal filesystem would
* not waste its time reallocating file data blocks when overwriting
* the old ones would suffice but I can't guarantee this.
*
* The only way to solve this would be to do block device-level
* wiping, which requires deep knowledge of the file system structure.
* The best solution would be to have file-systems incorporate
* secure wiping options. On Linux, the ext2fs provides a "s"
* file attribute, which makes the file system overwrite the
* file with zeroes when it is unlinked: this could be changed
* to implement a secure erasure mechanism.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include "misc.h"
//#include "rc6.h"
#include "arcfour.h"
#include "md5.h"
#include "random.h"
#ifdef RC6_ENABLED
static struct rc6_KeySchedule rand_rc6;
static u32 rand_rc6_array[2][4];
static int rand_rc6_i;
#endif
u32 (*rand_Get32p) (void);
void (*rand_Fillp) (u8 *b, int n);
static struct arcfour_KeySchedule rand_arcfour;
static u32 rand_extra;
static u32 rand_extra_i;
static void rand_Get128BitsPID (u8 buf[16])
{
MD5_CTX md5;
pid_t p;
time_t t;
char **pt;
debugf ("using poor man's 128 bit random seeder");
MD5Init (&md5);
p = getpid ();
t = time (0);
for (pt = environ; *pt; pt++) MD5Update (&md5, (u8 *) *pt, strlen (*pt));
MD5Update (&md5, (u8 *) &p, sizeof (p));
MD5Update (&md5, (u8 *) &t, sizeof (t));
MD5Final (buf, &md5);
}
static void rand_Get128BitsDevRandom (u8 buf[16])
{
int fd;
debugf ("getting 128 bits from %s", o_devrandom);
fd = open (o_devrandom, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
errorf (ERF_ERN|ERF_EXIT, "could not open \"%s\" for random seeding", o_devrandom);
if (16 != read (fd, buf, 16))
errorf (ERF_ERN|ERF_EXIT, "short read or read error from \"%s\" for random seeding", o_devrandom);
(void) close (fd); /* we got what we wanted, why should we check for errors ? */
}
#define MINIMUM_PIPE_BYTES 128L
static void rand_Get128BitsPipe (u8 buf128[16])
{
FILE *f;
MD5_CTX md5;
u8 buf[1024];
size_t r, totr;
debugf ("getting 128 bits by hashing output of %s", o_randomcmd);
MD5Init (&md5);
f = popen (o_randomcmd, "r");
if (!f) errorf (ERF_ERN|ERF_EXIT, "could not popen () command \"%s\" for random seeding", o_randomcmd);
for (totr = 0; ;) {
r = fread (buf, 1, sizeof (buf), f);
if (r > 0) {
MD5Update (&md5, buf, r);
totr += r;
}
if (r < sizeof(buf)) {
if (!feof (f))
errorf (ERF_ERN|ERF_EXIT, "error reading from pipe \"%s\"", o_randomcmd);
break;
}
}
if (totr < MINIMUM_PIPE_BYTES)
errorf (ERF_EXIT,
"pipe command \"%s\" must output at least %ld bytes (got %ld)",
o_randomcmd,
(long) MINIMUM_PIPE_BYTES,
totr);
if (pclose (f)) errorf (ERF_ERN|ERF_EXIT, "error on pclose ()");
MD5Final (buf128, &md5);
}
#ifdef RC6_ENABLED
inline static u32 rand_Get32_rc6 ()
{
rand_rc6_i ++; if (rand_rc6_i == 4) rand_rc6_i = 0;
if (!rand_rc6_i) {
/* elegant incrementation tip by Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> */
randa_rc6_array[0][0]++ || randa_rc6_array[0][1]++
|| randa_rc6_array[0][2]++ || randa_rc6_array[0][3]++;
rc6_Encrypt (rand_rc6_array[0], rand_rc6_array[1], &rand_rc6);
}
return rand_rc6_array[rand_rc6_i];
}
#endif
static u32 rand_Get32_arcfour ()
{
u32 x;
x = 0;
x |= arcfour_GetByte (&rand_arcfour); x <<= 8;
x |= arcfour_GetByte (&rand_arcfour); x <<= 8;
x |= arcfour_GetByte (&rand_arcfour); x <<= 8;
x |= arcfour_GetByte (&rand_arcfour);
return x;
}
inline static u32 rand_Get32_libc ()
{
u32 r;
#ifdef HAVE_RANDOM
r = random ();
#else
r = rand ();
#endif
if (!rand_extra_i) {
#ifdef HAVE_RANDOM
rand_extra = random () << 1;
#else
rand_extra = rand () << 1;
#endif
rand_extra_i = 31;
} else rand_extra_i --;
r ^= rand_extra & 0x80000000;
rand_extra <<= 1;
return r;
}
#if RC6_ENABLED
static void rand_Fill_rc6 (u8 *b, int n)
{
u32 l;
/* there used to be a stupid bug here, thanks to Michael S.Ree for
* pointing this out.
*/
for (; n >= 4; n -= 4) {
l = rand_Get32_rc6 ();
*((u32 *) b) = l;
b = (char *) (((u32 *) b) + 1);
}
if (n) {
l = rand_Get32_rc6 ();
while (n--) {
*(b++) = l & 0xff; l >>= 8;
}
}
}
#endif
static void rand_Fill_libc (u8 *b, int n)
{
u32 l;
/* there used to be a stupid bug here, thanks to Michael S.Ree for
* pointing this out.
*/
for (; n >= 4; n -= 4) {
l = rand_Get32_libc ();
*((u32 *) b) = l;
b = (u8 *) (((u32 *) b) + 1);
}
if (n) {
l = rand_Get32 ();
while (n--) {
*(b++) = l & 0xff; l >>= 8;
}
}
}
static void rand_Fill_arcfour (u8 *b, int n)
{
arcfour_Fill (&rand_arcfour, b, n);
}
#if 0
u32 rand_Get32 ()
{
return rand_Get32p ();
}
#endif
void rand_Init ()
{
u8 key[16];
switch (o_randseed) {
case RANDS_DEVRANDOM:
debugf ("using random device %s", o_devrandom);
rand_Get128BitsDevRandom (key);
break;
case RANDS_PIPE:
debugf ("using random seed pipe %s", o_devrandom);
rand_Get128BitsPipe (key);
break;
case RANDS_PID:
debugf ("using pid as random seed");
rand_Get128BitsPID (key);
break;
}
switch (o_randalgo) {
case RANDA_LIBC:
debugf ("using libc random generator");
#ifdef HAVE_RANDOM
(void) srandom (key[0] | key[1]<<8 | key[2]<<16 | key[3]<<24);
#else
srand (key[0] | key[1]<<8 | key[2]<<16 | key[3]<<24);
#endif
rand_Get32p = rand_Get32_libc;
rand_Fillp = rand_Fill_libc;
rand_extra = key[4] | key[5]<<8 | key[6]<<16 | key[7]<<24;
rand_extra_i = 32;
break;
#ifdef RC6_ENABLED
case RANDA_RC6:
debugf ("using rc6 random generator");
rc6_SetupKey (key, &rand_rc6);
rand_rc6_array [0] = rand_rc6_array [1] =
rand_rc6_array [2] = rand_rc6_array [3] = 0;
rand_rc6_i = 3;
rand_Get32p = rand_Get32_rc6;
rand_Fillp = rand_Fill_rc6;
break;
#endif
case RANDA_ARCFOUR:
debugf ("using arcfour random generator");
arcfour_SetupKey (key, sizeof (key), &rand_arcfour);
/* "give the crank those extra turns after initialisation"
* suggestion of Jim Gillogly <jim@mentat.com>
*/
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i<RAND_ARCFOUR_EXTRA; i++) arcfour_GetByte (&rand_arcfour);
}
rand_Get32p = rand_Get32_arcfour;
rand_Fillp = rand_Fill_arcfour;
break;
}
}
/* vim:set sw=4:set ts=8: */
|